What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

4 unchanged paragraphs

on the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2024

(2025/2138(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2024,

Changed:– having regard to Article 10(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),Union,

8 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to Articles 15, 24(3), 228 and 298(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Articles 11, 41, 42 and 43 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD),

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/1163 of the European Parliament of 24 June 2021 laying down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties (Statute of the European Ombudsman) and repealing Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom,

– having regard to the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, as adopted by Parliament on 6 September 2001,

– having regard to the Framework Agreement on Cooperation concluded between Parliament and the European Ombudsman on 15 March 2006, which entered into force on 1 April 2006,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the European Ombudsman’s activities,

– having regard to Rules 55 and 148(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Petitions (A100000/2025),(A10-0015/2026),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2024 was formally submitted to the President of Parliament on 13 May 2025 and the Ombudsman, Ms Teresa Anjinho, presented the report to the Committee on Petitions in Brussels on 24 June 2025; whereas Ms Teresa Anjinho was elected as the new Ombudsman on 17 December 2024;

Change 2

Added:B. whereas the activities covered by the 2024 annual report were carried out under the mandate of Ms Emily O’Reilly, who served as European Ombudsman from 2013 until the end of her term in early 2025;

Added:C. whereas the work of the Ombudsman contributes to helping EU institutions become more efficient, effective, citizen-friendly and accountable, thereby increasing citizens’ trust in the European project; whereas, in the exercise of her mandate, the Ombudsman may have to address new phenomena that have significantly increased in recent times, such as disinformation and malicious activities from third countries, aimed at undermining citizens’ trust in the EU;

D. whereas Articles 20, 24 and 228 TFEU empower the European Ombudsman to receive complaints concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acting in its judicial role;

Change 3

Removed:C. whereas in 2024, the Ombudsman opened 415 inquiries, of which 411 were complaint-based and 4 own-initiative, while closing 427 inquiries (421 complaint-based and 6 own-initiative);

Added:E. whereas Article 15 TFEU states that ‘in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible’ and that ‘any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’;

Removed:D. whereas in 2024, the majority of the inquiries concerned the Commission (270 inquiries, or 65.0 %), followed by EPSO (27 inquiries, or 6.5 %), the EEAS (16 inquiries or 3.9 %) and Frontex (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %); whereas the remaining inquiries were distributed as follows: OLAF (11 inquiries, or 2.6 %), Parliament (9 inquiries, or 2.2 %), Europol (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the EIB (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the European Union Agency for Asylum (5 inquiries, or 1.2 %), other EU Agencies (33 inquiries, or 8.0 %) and other EU institutions or bodies (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %);

Added:F. whereas Article 41 of the Charter states that ‘every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’;

Added:G. whereas Article 43 of the Charter states that ‘any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role’;

Added:H. whereas Article 298(1) TFEU states that ‘in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration’;

Added:I. whereas the EU is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD), a binding international human rights instrument to ‘promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity’; whereas compliance with the UN CRPD in the EU is monitored by the EU Framework for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was chaired by the European Disability Forum in 2024; whereas the Ombudsman, as a member of this framework, pays close attention to the EU administration’s implementation of the UN CRPD; whereas the framework prepared an updated contribution, which included input from the Ombudsman, for the UN CRPD Committee to help ensure that the Committee can complete in 2025 its periodic review of the EU’s implementation of the Convention, while respecting the fact that the EU is a regional organisation whose competences are based in the Treaties;

Added:J. whereas 17 770 citizens were helped by the Ombudsman in 2024; whereas the Ombudsman opened 415 inquiries, of which 411 were complaint-based and 4 own-initiative, while closing 427 inquiries (421 complaint-based and 6 own-initiative);

Added:K. whereas in 2024, the majority of the inquiries concerned the Commission (270 inquiries, or 65.0 %), followed by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) (27 inquiries, or 6.5 %), the European External Action Service (16 inquiries or 3.9 %) and Frontex (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %); whereas the remaining inquiries were distributed as follows: the European Anti-Fraud Office (11 inquiries, or 2.6 %), Parliament (9 inquiries, or 2.2 %), Europol (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the European Investment Bank (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the European Union Agency for Asylum (5 inquiries, or 1.2 %), other EU Agencies (33 inquiries, or 8.0 %) and other EU institutions or bodies (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %);

L. whereas in the inquiries closed by the Ombudsman in 2024, no maladministration was found in 15.5 % of cases, the matter was settled by the institution in 61.1 % of cases, no further inquiries were justified in 15.7 % of cases, and maladministration was found in 8.0 % of cases;

M. whereas the top three concerns in the inquiries closed by the Ombudsman in 2024 were transparency and accountability (42.2 %), culture of service (17.3 %) and recruitment (14.1 %); whereas other concerns include respect for fundamental rights, public participation in EU decision-making, ethics, proper management of infringement procedures, whistleblowing and sound financial management;

N. whereas in 2024, the Ombudsman also conducted wider strategic inquiries and initiatives in relation to systemic issues in the EU institutions, covering public access to documents, fundamental rights, ethical issues, accountability in decision-making and recruitment of EU civil servants;

Change 4

Removed:H. whereas the Ombudsman’s role is instrumental in guaranteeing the protection of citizens’ rights arising from the EU Treaties, in ensuring the full transparency, democratic accountability and integrity of the EU decision-making processes, and in improving ethical standards within the EU administration; whereas the Ombudsman is a redress mechanism for citizens encountering problems in gaining access to documents held by the EU institutions;

Added:O. whereas in 2024, the Ombudsman made a series of recommendations to help the Commission ensure that the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in its decision-making remains accountable; whereas the Ombudsman also underlined the importance of transparency when it comes to maintaining public trust that the EU administration will use AI responsibly; whereas the Ombudsman encouraged the Commission to reflect on what information it should make publicly available around future AI projects and to consider carrying out public consultations on the possible adoption or development of powerful new AI tools;

Added:P. whereas the Ombudsman’s role is instrumental in guaranteeing the protection of citizens’ rights arising from the EU Treaties and the Charter, in ensuring the full transparency, democratic accountability and integrity of the EU decision-making processes, and in improving ethical standards within the EU administration; whereas the Ombudsman is a redress mechanism for citizens encountering problems in gaining access to documents held by the EU institutions;

Q. whereas the Ombudsman launched an own-initiative inquiry, following a public consultation on transparency and accountability in EU environmental decision-making; whereas the Ombudsman concluded that the average time of 14.5 months and, in some cases, several years, taken by the Commission to prepare draft decisions for granting or refusing authorisation for dangerous chemicals, despite the statutory deadline of three months, amounted to maladministration; whereas the Ombudsman also found that the Commission’s failure to ensure sufficient transparency of the related overall decision-making process constituted maladministration, as it prevented the public from understanding the status of the individual files and the reasons for delays;

Change 5

Changed:J.R. whereas the Ombudsman inquired intoexamined the Councilcontinued use of thecorporate EU’ssponsorships continuedby usethe rotating Presidency of corporatethe sponsorships,Council, as this practice has given rise to persistent and considerable public disquiet regarding the potential influence that sponsors might exertbe exerting on the EU decision-making process, particularly on deliberations concerning EU policy and legislation affecting such sponsors’ private interests, entailing serious reputational risks for both the Council and the Union as a whole;sponsors;

Change 6

Removed:K. whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry on the basis of a complaint by non-governmental organisations that denounced the fact that the all-corporate membership of the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group, set up by the Commission, was at odds with the Commission’s rules on balanced representation; whereas the Ombudsman found the explanations provided by the Commission with regard to the complete exclusion of civil society representatives, even with observer status, from this group unconvincing; whereas the Ombudsman’s inspections revealed that the group discussed and promoted further structural fossil fuel energy supply, with social, environmental, economic and geopolitical implications for the EU;

Added:S. whereas the Ombudsman acknowledged the Commission’s efforts to shorten delays in processing complaints related to alleged breaches of EU law, to enhance communication with individual complainants, and to improve the dissemination of relevant public information through its dedicated infringements website; whereas the Ombudsman called on the Commission to pursue further improvements in this regard;

Removed:L. whereas the Ombudsman conducted a complaint-based inquiry into the composition of the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), the outcome of which confirmed the absence of the necessary social and environmental expertise, in breach of the provisions of the Commission’s communication on the RSB; whereas the Ombudsman also examined how the RSB interacts with interest representatives and determined that if outreach activities of RSB members give rise to doubts as regards the RSB’s independence and impartiality, RSB members should refrain from carrying out such activities;

Added:T. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission decided on the composition of the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group; whereas the Ombudsman found the Commission’s explanations for excluding civil society representatives, even with observer status, from this Group unconvincing;

Removed:M. whereas the Ombudsman opened a complaint-based inquiry into how the Commission works on ‘urgent’ legislative proposals, such as the recent amendment to the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP), and into how the Commission assesses whether its proposals are consistent with the climate-neutrality goals of the European Climate Law;

Added:U. whereas the Ombudsman conducted a complaint-based inquiry into the composition of the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), the outcome of which confirmed that the current composition does not sufficiently ensure the social and environmental expertise required under the Commission’s communication on the RSB; whereas the Ombudsman also examined how the RSB interacts with interest representatives and determined that if outreach activities of RSB members give rise to doubts as regards the RSB’s independence and impartiality, RSB members should refrain from carrying out such activities;

Removed:N. whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry into the Commission’s decision to invite only industry representatives to a workshop on pesticides, a working area that has a direct impact on health and the environment, and concluded that the Commission could have ensured greater transparency; whereas the Ombudsman considered public concern surrounding the organisation of industry-only workshops legitimate, as they are perceived as an occasion for industry to unduly influence the Commission’s work; whereas when inquiring into the rules relating to the substitution of hazardous substances in pesticides, including a guidance document on comparative assessment, the Ombudsman expressed particular concern about the Commission’s failure to act in improving the rules on pesticide substitution, despite having been aware since 2020 that they were ineffective;

Added:V. whereas the Ombudsman opened a complaint-based inquiry into how the Commission works on ‘urgent’ legislative proposals, such as the recent amendment to the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP);

Removed:O. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission dealt with the allegations of a conflict of interest involving one of its Commissioners in the context of its handling of an infringement complaint; whereas the Ombudsman confirmed that the Commission decided to assign the infringement complaint to the Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), despite being alerted to the fact that the brother of the Commissioner for Agriculture was among the members of the Polish Parliament who had proposed the legislation at issue; whereas the Ombudsman found that the manner in which the Commission had assessed the conflict of interest was flawed and perceived as negatively affecting its independence;

Added:W. whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry into the Commission’s decision to invite only industry representatives to a workshop on pesticides, and concluded that greater transparency could have been ensured, suggesting that the Commission develop a dedicated webpage, publish information and documents about upcoming pesticide events as soon as they become available and ensure that all relevant stakeholders have the opportunity to express their views; whereas the Ombudsman considered public concern surrounding the organisation of industry-only workshops legitimate, as they are perceived as an occasion for industry to disproportionately influence the Commission’s work;

Removed:P. whereas Parliament approved with near unanimity the Ombudsman’s Special Report on the time the Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents and asked the Commission to correct the systemic delays in its handling of access requests, as they are in breach of the democratic principles set out in the EU Treaties; whereas the Ombudsman found that the Commission missed the legal deadlines for reviewing initial access decisions in 85 % of cases and that delays typically occurred in relation to access requests concerning areas of significant public importance; whereas such delays have particularly serious consequences in the case of legislative documents, as they undermine citizens’ ability to scrutinise EU decisions and policies in a timely manner, hampering their meaningful participation in the democratic life of the EU;

Added:X. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission dealt with the allegations of a conflict of interest involving one of its Commissioners in the context of its handling of an infringement complaint;

Removed:Q. whereas the Ombudsman launched a number of inquiries into the lack of public access to legislative documents, criticising the Commission’s refusal to grant access to stakeholder and Member State input on the EU Nature Restoration Law and to documents on the revision of EU rules on food information to consumers; whereas the Ombudsman examined, from a more systemic viewpoint, the EU institutions’ compliance with the principle of legislative transparency, as laid down in the EU Treaties, and concluded that both the Council and the Commission were failing to give full effect to this principle;

Added:Y. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission handled concerns regarding guidelines developed by a European Reference Network for rare diseases by facilitating discussions between healthcare providers across Europe; whereas the Ombudsman welcomed the Commission’s establishment of a complaint mechanism to allow people to raise issues about the activities and functioning of such networks, which facilitate collaboration among healthcare providers across Europe; whereas this mechanism was created in response to the Ombudsman’s inquiry;

Removed:R. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and revealed the existence of serious shortcomings in Frontex’s role in search and rescue operations, including the failure to ensure that Frontex’s fundamental rights monitors are sufficiently involved in decision-making on maritime emergencies, as well as the absence of internal Frontex guidelines on issuing emergency signals; whereas the Ombudsman underscored that there is no single accountability mechanism at EU level that could independently investigate the role of the national authorities, the role of Frontex, and the role of the Commission, which is responsible for ensuring compliance with fundamental rights provisions under the EU treaties;

Added:Z. whereas Parliament approved with near unanimity the Ombudsman’s Special Report on the time the Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents and invited the Commission to address the delays in access requests; whereas the Ombudsman found that the Commission missed the legal deadlines for reviewing initial access decisions in 85 % of cases; whereas delays can be more problematic in the case of legislative documents;

Removed:S. whereas according to the Ombudsman the Commission’s refusal to disclose documents relating to stakeholder input on its legislative proposal for combating child sexual abuse amounted to maladministration, as it hindered the public from scrutinising the impact and influence of such private stakeholders;

Added:AA. whereas the Ombudsman launched a number of inquiries into the lack of public access to legislative documents, criticising the Commission’s refusal to grant access to stakeholder and Member State input on the EU Nature Restoration Law and to documents on the revision of EU rules on food information to consumers; whereas the Ombudsman examined, from a more systemic viewpoint, the EU institutions’ compliance with the principle of legislative transparency, as laid down in the EU Treaties, and concluded that both the Council and the Commission were not fully adhering to this principle;

Added:AB. whereas the Ombudsman carried out several complaint-based inquiries related to the use of remote testing by EPSO; whereas in six inquiries, the Ombudsman found maladministration: in particular, the Ombudsman noted that EPSO had failed to properly address the complainants’ arguments, had demonstrated a lack of flexibility in doing so or had taken unreasonable decisions; whereas the Ombudsman also criticised EPSO for often providing complainants with contradictory information on how to prove they had faced problems and for rejecting complaints even when candidates had followed the instructions for reporting technical issues;

Added:AC. whereas the Ombudsman conducted an inquiry following deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and suggested the establishment of an EU accountability mechanism that could independently investigate the respective roles of national authorities, Frontex and the Commission;

Added:AD. whereas, according to the Ombudsman, the Commission could have provided greater access to documents relating to stakeholder input on its legislative proposal for combating child sexual abuse, as limited access hindered the public’s ability to scrutinise the impact and influence of such private stakeholders;

1. Approves the annual report for 2024 presented by the Ombudsman and commends her excellent presentation of the Ombudsman’s key activities in 2024;

2. Congratulates the new Ombudsman on her appointment and praises her commitment to ensuring that the EU administration upholds a citizen-oriented approach;

3. Expresses its appreciation for the constructive cooperation between the Ombudsman and Parliament, in particular its Committee on Petitions, as well as the other EU institutions;