Changes between two versions
What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report
From · draft committee report· 8 Sept 2025
on the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2024
To · plenary report· 17 Feb 2026
on the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2024
AI:What changed, in short
The report adds new recitals on the Ombudsman's election and mandate, and on AI and disinformation.12 It replaces recitals on inquiry statistics with citations of Treaty and Charter articles, and adds details on citizens helped.3 The report significantly changes operational paragraphs, softening language on chemicals and pesticides, and adding new topics like Frontex and AI.78911 It also updates paragraphs on transparency, disability rights, and cooperation with ombudsmen, adding new calls for action.101213 The other changes are formal or wording: recitals rephrased and reordered.456
11 changes of substance · 0 formal · 2 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
Changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations and punctuation-only edits are left out; they are under “Every difference”.
Changes of substance · 11
Change 1 Substance
AI summary:Adds a recital noting that Teresa Anjinho was elected as the new Ombudsman on 17 December 2024.
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Changed:A. whereas the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2024 was formally submitted to the President of Parliament on 13 May 2025 and the Ombudsman, Ms Teresa Anjinho, presented the report to the Committee on Petitions in Brussels on 24 June 2025; whereas Ms Teresa Anjinho was elected as the new Ombudsman on 17 December 2024;
Change 2 Substance
AI summary:Adds recitals on the mandate of Emily O'Reilly and on the Ombudsman's role in addressing disinformation and malicious activities from third countries.
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Added:B. whereas the activities covered by the 2024 annual report were carried out under the mandate of Ms Emily O’Reilly, who served as European Ombudsman from 2013 until the end of her term in early 2025;
Added:C. whereas the work of the Ombudsman contributes to helping EU institutions become more efficient, effective, citizen-friendly and accountable, thereby increasing citizens’ trust in the European project; whereas, in the exercise of her mandate, the Ombudsman may have to address new phenomena that have significantly increased in recent times, such as disinformation and malicious activities from third countries, aimed at undermining citizens’ trust in the EU;
Change 3 Substance
AI summary:Replaces recitals on inquiry statistics with new recitals citing Treaty and Charter articles, and adds recitals on citizens helped and inquiry distribution.
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Removed:C. whereas in 2024, the Ombudsman opened 415 inquiries, of which 411 were complaint-based and 4 own-initiative, while closing 427 inquiries (421 complaint-based and 6 own-initiative);
Added:E. whereas Article 15 TFEU states that ‘in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible’ and that ‘any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’;
Removed:D. whereas in 2024, the majority of the inquiries concerned the Commission (270 inquiries, or 65.0 %), followed by EPSO (27 inquiries, or 6.5 %), the EEAS (16 inquiries or 3.9 %) and Frontex (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %); whereas the remaining inquiries were distributed as follows: OLAF (11 inquiries, or 2.6 %), Parliament (9 inquiries, or 2.2 %), Europol (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the EIB (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the European Union Agency for Asylum (5 inquiries, or 1.2 %), other EU Agencies (33 inquiries, or 8.0 %) and other EU institutions or bodies (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %);
Added:F. whereas Article 41 of the Charter states that ‘every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’;
Added:G. whereas Article 43 of the Charter states that ‘any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role’;
Added:H. whereas Article 298(1) TFEU states that ‘in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration’;
Added:I. whereas the EU is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD), a binding international human rights instrument to ‘promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity’; whereas compliance with the UN CRPD in the EU is monitored by the EU Framework for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was chaired by the European Disability Forum in 2024; whereas the Ombudsman, as a member of this framework, pays close attention to the EU administration’s implementation of the UN CRPD; whereas the framework prepared an updated contribution, which included input from the Ombudsman, for the UN CRPD Committee to help ensure that the Committee can complete in 2025 its periodic review of the EU’s implementation of the Convention, while respecting the fact that the EU is a regional organisation whose competences are based in the Treaties;
Added:J. whereas 17 770 citizens were helped by the Ombudsman in 2024; whereas the Ombudsman opened 415 inquiries, of which 411 were complaint-based and 4 own-initiative, while closing 427 inquiries (421 complaint-based and 6 own-initiative);
Added:K. whereas in 2024, the majority of the inquiries concerned the Commission (270 inquiries, or 65.0 %), followed by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) (27 inquiries, or 6.5 %), the European External Action Service (16 inquiries or 3.9 %) and Frontex (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %); whereas the remaining inquiries were distributed as follows: the European Anti-Fraud Office (11 inquiries, or 2.6 %), Parliament (9 inquiries, or 2.2 %), Europol (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the European Investment Bank (8 inquiries, or 1.9 %), the European Union Agency for Asylum (5 inquiries, or 1.2 %), other EU Agencies (33 inquiries, or 8.0 %) and other EU institutions or bodies (14 inquiries, or 3.4 %);
Change 4 Substance
AI summary:Adds recitals on AI recommendations and on the Ombudsman's role, replacing a previous recital on the same role.
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Removed:H. whereas the Ombudsman’s role is instrumental in guaranteeing the protection of citizens’ rights arising from the EU Treaties, in ensuring the full transparency, democratic accountability and integrity of the EU decision-making processes, and in improving ethical standards within the EU administration; whereas the Ombudsman is a redress mechanism for citizens encountering problems in gaining access to documents held by the EU institutions;
Added:O. whereas in 2024, the Ombudsman made a series of recommendations to help the Commission ensure that the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in its decision-making remains accountable; whereas the Ombudsman also underlined the importance of transparency when it comes to maintaining public trust that the EU administration will use AI responsibly; whereas the Ombudsman encouraged the Commission to reflect on what information it should make publicly available around future AI projects and to consider carrying out public consultations on the possible adoption or development of powerful new AI tools;
Added:P. whereas the Ombudsman’s role is instrumental in guaranteeing the protection of citizens’ rights arising from the EU Treaties and the Charter, in ensuring the full transparency, democratic accountability and integrity of the EU decision-making processes, and in improving ethical standards within the EU administration; whereas the Ombudsman is a redress mechanism for citizens encountering problems in gaining access to documents held by the EU institutions;
7 more changes of substance
Change 6 Substance
AI summary:Replaces multiple recitals on various inquiries with new recitals on different inquiries, including changes to the Energy Platform, RSB, pesticides, and others.
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Removed:K. whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry on the basis of a complaint by non-governmental organisations that denounced the fact that the all-corporate membership of the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group, set up by the Commission, was at odds with the Commission’s rules on balanced representation; whereas the Ombudsman found the explanations provided by the Commission with regard to the complete exclusion of civil society representatives, even with observer status, from this group unconvincing; whereas the Ombudsman’s inspections revealed that the group discussed and promoted further structural fossil fuel energy supply, with social, environmental, economic and geopolitical implications for the EU;
Added:S. whereas the Ombudsman acknowledged the Commission’s efforts to shorten delays in processing complaints related to alleged breaches of EU law, to enhance communication with individual complainants, and to improve the dissemination of relevant public information through its dedicated infringements website; whereas the Ombudsman called on the Commission to pursue further improvements in this regard;
Removed:L. whereas the Ombudsman conducted a complaint-based inquiry into the composition of the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), the outcome of which confirmed the absence of the necessary social and environmental expertise, in breach of the provisions of the Commission’s communication on the RSB; whereas the Ombudsman also examined how the RSB interacts with interest representatives and determined that if outreach activities of RSB members give rise to doubts as regards the RSB’s independence and impartiality, RSB members should refrain from carrying out such activities;
Added:T. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission decided on the composition of the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group; whereas the Ombudsman found the Commission’s explanations for excluding civil society representatives, even with observer status, from this Group unconvincing;
Removed:M. whereas the Ombudsman opened a complaint-based inquiry into how the Commission works on ‘urgent’ legislative proposals, such as the recent amendment to the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP), and into how the Commission assesses whether its proposals are consistent with the climate-neutrality goals of the European Climate Law;
Added:U. whereas the Ombudsman conducted a complaint-based inquiry into the composition of the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), the outcome of which confirmed that the current composition does not sufficiently ensure the social and environmental expertise required under the Commission’s communication on the RSB; whereas the Ombudsman also examined how the RSB interacts with interest representatives and determined that if outreach activities of RSB members give rise to doubts as regards the RSB’s independence and impartiality, RSB members should refrain from carrying out such activities;
Removed:N. whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry into the Commission’s decision to invite only industry representatives to a workshop on pesticides, a working area that has a direct impact on health and the environment, and concluded that the Commission could have ensured greater transparency; whereas the Ombudsman considered public concern surrounding the organisation of industry-only workshops legitimate, as they are perceived as an occasion for industry to unduly influence the Commission’s work; whereas when inquiring into the rules relating to the substitution of hazardous substances in pesticides, including a guidance document on comparative assessment, the Ombudsman expressed particular concern about the Commission’s failure to act in improving the rules on pesticide substitution, despite having been aware since 2020 that they were ineffective;
Added:V. whereas the Ombudsman opened a complaint-based inquiry into how the Commission works on ‘urgent’ legislative proposals, such as the recent amendment to the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP);
Removed:O. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission dealt with the allegations of a conflict of interest involving one of its Commissioners in the context of its handling of an infringement complaint; whereas the Ombudsman confirmed that the Commission decided to assign the infringement complaint to the Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), despite being alerted to the fact that the brother of the Commissioner for Agriculture was among the members of the Polish Parliament who had proposed the legislation at issue; whereas the Ombudsman found that the manner in which the Commission had assessed the conflict of interest was flawed and perceived as negatively affecting its independence;
Added:W. whereas the Ombudsman launched an inquiry into the Commission’s decision to invite only industry representatives to a workshop on pesticides, and concluded that greater transparency could have been ensured, suggesting that the Commission develop a dedicated webpage, publish information and documents about upcoming pesticide events as soon as they become available and ensure that all relevant stakeholders have the opportunity to express their views; whereas the Ombudsman considered public concern surrounding the organisation of industry-only workshops legitimate, as they are perceived as an occasion for industry to disproportionately influence the Commission’s work;
Removed:P. whereas Parliament approved with near unanimity the Ombudsman’s Special Report on the time the Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents and asked the Commission to correct the systemic delays in its handling of access requests, as they are in breach of the democratic principles set out in the EU Treaties; whereas the Ombudsman found that the Commission missed the legal deadlines for reviewing initial access decisions in 85 % of cases and that delays typically occurred in relation to access requests concerning areas of significant public importance; whereas such delays have particularly serious consequences in the case of legislative documents, as they undermine citizens’ ability to scrutinise EU decisions and policies in a timely manner, hampering their meaningful participation in the democratic life of the EU;
Added:X. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission dealt with the allegations of a conflict of interest involving one of its Commissioners in the context of its handling of an infringement complaint;
Removed:Q. whereas the Ombudsman launched a number of inquiries into the lack of public access to legislative documents, criticising the Commission’s refusal to grant access to stakeholder and Member State input on the EU Nature Restoration Law and to documents on the revision of EU rules on food information to consumers; whereas the Ombudsman examined, from a more systemic viewpoint, the EU institutions’ compliance with the principle of legislative transparency, as laid down in the EU Treaties, and concluded that both the Council and the Commission were failing to give full effect to this principle;
Added:Y. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into how the Commission handled concerns regarding guidelines developed by a European Reference Network for rare diseases by facilitating discussions between healthcare providers across Europe; whereas the Ombudsman welcomed the Commission’s establishment of a complaint mechanism to allow people to raise issues about the activities and functioning of such networks, which facilitate collaboration among healthcare providers across Europe; whereas this mechanism was created in response to the Ombudsman’s inquiry;
Removed:R. whereas the Ombudsman inquired into deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and revealed the existence of serious shortcomings in Frontex’s role in search and rescue operations, including the failure to ensure that Frontex’s fundamental rights monitors are sufficiently involved in decision-making on maritime emergencies, as well as the absence of internal Frontex guidelines on issuing emergency signals; whereas the Ombudsman underscored that there is no single accountability mechanism at EU level that could independently investigate the role of the national authorities, the role of Frontex, and the role of the Commission, which is responsible for ensuring compliance with fundamental rights provisions under the EU treaties;
Added:Z. whereas Parliament approved with near unanimity the Ombudsman’s Special Report on the time the Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents and invited the Commission to address the delays in access requests; whereas the Ombudsman found that the Commission missed the legal deadlines for reviewing initial access decisions in 85 % of cases; whereas delays can be more problematic in the case of legislative documents;
Removed:S. whereas according to the Ombudsman the Commission’s refusal to disclose documents relating to stakeholder input on its legislative proposal for combating child sexual abuse amounted to maladministration, as it hindered the public from scrutinising the impact and influence of such private stakeholders;
Added:AA. whereas the Ombudsman launched a number of inquiries into the lack of public access to legislative documents, criticising the Commission’s refusal to grant access to stakeholder and Member State input on the EU Nature Restoration Law and to documents on the revision of EU rules on food information to consumers; whereas the Ombudsman examined, from a more systemic viewpoint, the EU institutions’ compliance with the principle of legislative transparency, as laid down in the EU Treaties, and concluded that both the Council and the Commission were not fully adhering to this principle;
Added:AB. whereas the Ombudsman carried out several complaint-based inquiries related to the use of remote testing by EPSO; whereas in six inquiries, the Ombudsman found maladministration: in particular, the Ombudsman noted that EPSO had failed to properly address the complainants’ arguments, had demonstrated a lack of flexibility in doing so or had taken unreasonable decisions; whereas the Ombudsman also criticised EPSO for often providing complainants with contradictory information on how to prove they had faced problems and for rejecting complaints even when candidates had followed the instructions for reporting technical issues;
Added:AC. whereas the Ombudsman conducted an inquiry following deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and suggested the establishment of an EU accountability mechanism that could independently investigate the respective roles of national authorities, Frontex and the Commission;
Added:AD. whereas, according to the Ombudsman, the Commission could have provided greater access to documents relating to stakeholder input on its legislative proposal for combating child sexual abuse, as limited access hindered the public’s ability to scrutinise the impact and influence of such private stakeholders;
Change 7 Substance
AI summary:Replaces paragraph 4 on chemical authorisation deadlines with a new version that adds PFAS and stresses coordination with member states and civil society.
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Changed:4. Is extremely concernedworried about the Commission’s breach of the legally binding deadlines for preparing authorisation decisions concerning dangerous chemical substances;substances, stressesincluding thatper- theand Commission’spolyfluoroalkyl significantsubstances delays(PFAS); constituteunderlines athat majorrespecting threatthese deadlines is essential to ensure the protection of human health and the environment, asand companieslegal arecertainty ableand topredictability continuein usingthe suchEU’s chemicaldecision-making substances,process; includingstresses per-that, in order to address the health and polyfluoroalkylenvironmental substancesrisks (PFAS),posed whichby arePFAS, associatedthe Commission should not only coordinate with increasedMember risksStates, oftheir cancernational and geneticlocal damage,authorities, andbut also with impairedrelevant reproductivecivil health;society organisations, academic and scientific institutions, which play an essential role in this field;
Change 8 Substance
AI summary:Replaces paragraph 5 on risk management for substances of very high concern, softening language on rejecting applications and adding references to REACH.
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Changed:5. Believes that the Commission must address, as a matter of priority, all of the severe shortcomings surrounding its management of risk in relation to substances of very high concern, andincluding rejectby anyrevising requestsits forinternal authorisationprocedures ofto suchensure substancesthat andit bancan theirtake useswifter wheredecisions thereon isthese persistentapplications, uncertaintyin line with regardthe togoals of the protectionRegulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH), to protect human health and the environment; is firmly convinced that the Commission should fully implement all of the recommendations resulting from the Ombudsman’s inquiry, including athe recommendationone thatconcerning applications for authorisation of a substance of very high concern that lack all of the necessary information be rejected to ensure that companies are not allowed to continue using these dangerous substances;information;
Change 9 Substance
AI summary:Replaces paragraph 6 on pesticides, removing calls for an immediate end to authorisation and a 2035 ban, and instead stresses improving substitution rules.
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Changed:6. Strongly believes that the continued authorisation of hazardous pesticides must end immediately; stressesStresses that the Commission must significantlyshould improve the rules on the substitution of hazardous substances in pesticides in order to favour safe nonchemical alternatives and swiftly move towards a sustainable food system and a toxin-free environment; urges the Commission to refrain from approving ‘active substances’ usedbetter intake pesticidesinto whereaccount noeffective, safe use has been identified or where additional data confirming their safety is needed, given the already very harmful consequences that the use of pesticides has had for human health and the environment, in full application of the precautionarynon-chemical principle;alternatives; calls on the Commission to ensure that the approval process is fully transparent and freefollows fromstrict safeguards against conflicts of interest, and to commit to puttingduly antaking endinto toaccount the use of all synthetic pesticides by 2035Ombudsman’s atsuggestions thefor latest;improvement;
Change 11 Substance
AI summary:Replaces paragraphs 8 to 22 with new paragraphs on various topics, including expert groups, RSB, CAP, conflicts of interest, access to documents, Frontex, and AI.
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Removed:8. Criticises the lack of transparency surrounding the identity and nature of, and the benefits gained by, private companies in return for sponsoring informal meetings of Ministers, as well as cultural and social events, organised by the Council of the EU, and regrets that such sponsors are even authorised to use the logo of the Presidency of the Council for commercial purposes; believes that this practice must be stopped immediately, in compliance, inter alia, with Parliament’s specific request to the Council in this regard, namely to refrain from obtaining any corporate sponsorship and to adopt the most stringent rules to prevent conflicts of interest, so as to safeguard the reputation and integrity of both the Council and the Union as a whole;
Added:8. Highlights the importance of the Ombudsman’s activities in increasing transparency and helping to improve the balanced composition of the Commission’s expert groups, in particular the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group, given the high economic, social and environmental stakes involved with regard to energy policies; notes that the Commission decided not to include civil society representatives in this Group; is of the opinion that EU citizens should be informed of the profiles of all members of the expert groups;
Removed:9. Highlights the paramount importance of the Ombudsman’s activities in helping to improve the balanced composition of the Commission’s expert groups, in particular the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group, given the high social and environmental stakes involved with regard to energy policies; strongly regrets that the Commission decided to completely exclude civil society representatives from this Group, giving fossil fuel industries privileged and unmonitored access to EU policymakers and increasing their influence on EU decision-making, thereby undermining citizens’ trust, public scrutiny and transparency;
Added:9. Notes the Ombudsman’s suggestions for improving the RSB; calls on the Commission to ensure that the composition of the RSB fully reflects the diversity of expertise set out in its related communication;
Removed:10. Emphasises that, in a new report of May 2025 to the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change called for a total ban on fossil fuel industry lobbying, advertising and sponsorship, and for the public to be adequately informed about the fossil fuel industry’s deliberate contributions to the planetary crises and about the human rights impacts of their actions over decades;
Added:10. Notes the Ombudsman’s ongoing inquiry into how the Commission prepared a proposal to amend legislation related to the common agricultural policy without conducting an impact assessment and with limited consultation of stakeholders, in particular farmers; emphasises the need to uphold the principles of evidence-based decision-making, as enshrined in the Commission’s better regulation guidelines and toolbox, as well as in case-law;
Removed:11. Supports the Ombudsman’s suggestions for improving the RSB; considers it essential for RSB members to assess both the actual risk of undue influence and the public perception of their independence when choosing their outreach activities, and to avoid holding meetings with individual interest representatives; calls on the Commission to ensure that the composition of the RSB fully reflects the diversity of expertise specified in its related communication, i.e. the three pillars of sustainable development, namely macro- and microeconomics, social policy and environment policy, and to clearly describe the criteria it applies in selecting RSB members, given the key role played by the RSB and the significant influence of its opinions on Commission decision-making in the area of EU lawmaking;
Added:11. Expresses its appreciation for the Ombudsman’s work in urging the Commission to guarantee the participation of all economic, social and environmental stakeholders in its decision-making process, and in helping to ensure the integrity of that process;
Removed:12. Commends the Ombudsman’s investigations into how the Commission prepared a proposal to amend legislation related to the common agricultural policy; deplores the fact that the Commission, in preparing the proposal concerned, did not carry out an impact assessment, chose not to consult environmental organisations and failed to appropriately consult the general public; strongly regrets the Commission’s decision to weaken the CAP’s environmental requirements without comprehensively examining the available evidence to ensure that the new rules did not undermine the EU’s environmental and climate goals and the sustainability of EU agriculture in the long run, thus violating the principle of evidence-based decision-making, as laid down in its Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox, as well as in case-law;
Added:12. Calls on the Ombudsman to examine the Commission’s practice of financing environmental non-governmental organisations that subsequently lobby Parliament and the Commission to further green policies; stresses that such practices risk creating conflicts of interest, distort the democratic process and undermine the legitimacy of EU decision-making;
Removed:13. Expresses its appreciation for the Ombudsman’s outstanding work in urging the Commission to guarantee the full and meaningful inclusion of all social and environmental stakeholders in its decision-making process, and in helping to prevent the decision-making process from being unduly influenced by industry;
Added:13. Considers it essential that the Commission takes into consideration the Ombudsman’s suggestions for improving its handling of conflicts of interest involving its Commissioners, with a view to safeguarding the integrity of the decision-making process; highlights, in this context, the Ombudsman’s contribution towards enhancing the ethics and transparency of EU institutions in relation to revolving doors policy, cooling-off periods and potential conflicts of interest in cases where former Commissioners and former senior staff of EU institutions or agencies take up new jobs in the private sector;
Removed:14. Considers it essential that the Commission fully and consistently implement the Ombudsman’s suggestions for improving its handling of potential conflicts of interest involving its Commissioners, namely to ensure that any decision-making process supervised directly or indirectly by the Commissioner(s) concerned is suspended until a final decision is taken on the existence of a conflict of interest, and to inform the relevant departments of the allegation in a timely manner so that they can start reviewing or suspend any relevant ongoing decision-making process at the earliest possible opportunity;
Added:14. Underlines the fact that public access to the documents held by EU institutions is a fundamental right set out in the EU Treaties, and plays a crucial role in ensuring that the EU institutions operate in a transparent manner, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of, and public trust in, the EU, including through the timely implementation of all of the Ombudsman’s recommendations, thus demonstrating in practice that transparency is a governing rule and a fundamental priority; calls on the Commission to improve the way it handles such requests and to address systemic delays, including through the use of digital tools and simplified procedures; underlines that citizens’ right of public access to information applies to written, physical and electronic documents, and to audio and audiovisual recordings related to the policies, activities and decisions of the EU institutions, and recalls that work-related text messages and instant messages are considered ‘documents’ under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001;
Removed:15. Underlines the fact that public access to the documents held by EU institutions is a fundamental right set out in the EU Treaties, and plays a crucial role in ensuring that the EU institutions operate in a transparent manner, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of, and public trust in, the EU; expects the Commission to significantly improve its handling of requests for public access to documents, including through the timely implementation of all of the Ombudsman’s recommendations, thus demonstrating in practice that transparency is the governing rule and a fundamental priority; considers that if the Commission’s significant delays in processing requests for public access to documents persist, it will be necessary to bring an action against it before the CJEU on the grounds of infringement of the Treaties, including Article 15(3) TFEU on the right of EU citizens and residents to access documents;
Added:15. Notes that the Council and the Commission have refused to disclose legislative documents, relying on reasoning already dismissed by the CJEU; appreciates the Ombudsman’s key work in this area to ensure that the EU institutions concerned promptly disclose legislative documents, and stresses that a refusal to grant public access to documents can only occur in truly exceptional circumstances;
Removed:16. Regrets that, in many instances, the Council and the Commission have refused to disclose legislative documents, using vague, abstract, and unsubstantiated arguments or relying on reasoning already dismissed by the CJEU; appreciates the Ombudsman’s key work in this area to ensure that the EU institutions concerned promptly disclose legislative documents, and stresses that a refusal to grant public access to documents can only occur in truly exceptional circumstances;
Added:16. Stresses that Frontex must operate within the provisions enshrined in its regulation, including the obligations related to fundamental rights and compliance with relevant international law; takes note of the reform of the Frontex mandate announced by the President of the Commission for 2026; expects that reinforcing the mandate, resources and budget of Frontex will ensure that the agency can perform its work under the best possible conditions in order to better support the Member States, including in search and rescue operations;
Removed:17. Underlines that Frontex must fully comply with fundamental rights in all of its activities, including in its direct or indirect engagement in search and rescue operations, and fully and consistently comply with relevant international human rights law; stresses that under the applicable EU and international legal framework Member States are obliged to render assistance to any vessel or person in distress at sea, regardless of the nationality or status of the person or the circumstances in which that person is found;
Added:17. Stresses that Frontex’s primary mission must be the protection of the EU’s external borders, the control of human traffickers and coyotes, and the fight against illegal immigration; underlines that a lack of border control is what leads to more deaths at sea;
Removed:18. Supports the Ombudsman’s suggestions for addressing all of the shortcomings identified in her inquiry into deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, including her call for the Council of the EU, the Commission and Parliament to establish an independent commission of inquiry to assess the reasons for the large numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, with a view to, inter alia, implementing the changes needed to prevent a recurrence of any tragic loss of life;
Added:18. Notes the Ombudsman’s commitment to fundamental rights; notes that the Ombudsman asked for greater transparency with regard to the human rights information considered before signing the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU);
Removed:19. Stresses that the Ombudsman criticised the Commission for its lack of transparency with regard to the human rights information that it relied on before signing the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and expressed concerns about the absence of a prior human rights impact assessment, in particular in relation to the ‘Migration and mobility’ pillar of the MoU; expects the Commission to implement all of the Ombudsman’s suggestions for improvement in a timely manner, applying the most effective measures and upholding the highest standards of human rights protection in all migration-related issues;
Added:19. Regrets the Commission’s refusal to follow the Ombudsman’s recommendation to grant greater public access to documents related to the drafting of proposed legislation to combat child sexual abuse; recalls that citizens should be able to scrutinise the Commission’s work on legislative proposals; underlines that transparency is of particular importance in this context, as the proposal directly touches on the protection of children, citizens’ fundamental rights and private life;
Removed:20. Criticises the Commission’s refusal to follow the Ombudsman’s recommendation to give greater public access to documents related to the drawing up of proposed legislation to combat child sexual abuse, thus failing to ensure that citizens can verify that it acted independently, and exclusively in the public interest;
Added:20. Takes note of the Ombudsman’s decision to open an inquiry into the Commission’s data collection on the impact of the wolf population in the EU; notes, however, that in accordance with the Ombudsman’s statute, the inquiry had to be closed due to a pending case before the CJEU (T-634/24), where the same issues are raised; underlines the importance of basing any decision regarding the legal protection status of wolves on scientific evidence and the protection of rural communities;
Removed:21. Appreciates the Ombudsman’s decision to open an inquiry into how the Commission carried out targeted data collection on the impact of the wolf population in the EU; deplores the fact that the Commission cited a Large Carnivore Initiative for Europe Specialist Group report to justify downgrading the wolf’s legal protection status in the EU, although it had previously used the same report as the basis for opposing a proposal of the same nature, and despite the fact that no significant changes in wolf populations were recorded; is deeply concerned that the decision to downgrade the protected status of wolves lacks any sound scientific basis, a situation exacerbated by the fact that there was no public access to the relevant documents and insufficient efforts were made to implement adequate preventive measures, which is at odds with the provisions of the Bern Convention; fears that this decision has created a worrying precedent endangering the overall approach to conservation goals and the management of wildlife and natural habitats;
Added:21. Welcomes the Ombudsman’s series of proposals to the Commission on improving transparency in the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, which serves as a forum to coordinate approaches and deepen trade, economic and technology relations; believes that the Ombudsman’s recommendations must be swiftly implemented to uphold the highest transparency and accountability standards;
Removed:22. Welcomes the Ombudsman’s series of proposals to the Commission on improving transparency in the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, which serves as a forum to coordinate approaches and deepen trade, economic and technology relations; believes that the Ombudsman’s recommendations must be swiftly implemented and be coupled with additional legally-binding requirements to uphold the highest transparency and accountability standards, especially in light of the Commission’s recent seriously damaging political agreement to further increase the EU’s dependence on the United States in various critical sectors, including defence, AI and fossil fuels, combined with commitments to weaken EU energy regulations, which is detrimental to the EU Green Deal and creates disadvantageous imbalances for the food and agricultural sectors in the EU;
Added:22. Appreciates the Ombudsman’s series of suggestions to help the Commission ensure that its use of AI in decision-making remains accountable; stresses that EU institutions must maintain effective human oversight over AI systems and ensure that their use complies with the principles of transparency and accountability and with fundamental rights; believes that decision-making should not be delegated to these systems; stresses the importance of providing adequate training to public officials responsible for overseeing AI to properly assess risks and verify AI-generated results; encourages the Commission to increase transparency by clearly communicating information on future AI projects and conducting public consultations on the development of new AI tools; calls on the Ombudsman to continue monitoring developments in this field;
Change 12 Substance
AI summary:Replaces paragraph 23 on disability rights, adding a call for the Ombudsman to examine accessibility and representation of persons with disabilities.
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Changed:23. Commends the Ombudsman’s overall activities to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, with a particular focus on the EU administration’s implementation of the UN CRPD,CRPD; asupports bindingthe internationalOmbudsman’s humanview rightsthat, instrumentas aimeda atparty promotingto andthe ensuringUN CRPD, the fullEU andshould equallead enjoymentby ofexample allin humancomplying rightswith andUN fundamentalCRPD freedomsstandards; bystresses, allhowever, personsthat withalthough disabilities;progress supportshas been made within the Ombudsman’sEU viewinstitutions that,in asimplementing athe partyprovisions toof the UN CRPD, the achievement of many accessibility targets is still delayed and insufficiently effective; recommends that the Ombudsman intervene to examine and accelerate measures on accessibility and reasonable accommodations within the EU shouldinstitutions leadand byto exampleexamine inwhether complyingpeople with UNdisabilities CRPDare standards;proportionally represented in the institutions;
Change 13 Substance
AI summary:Replaces paragraph 24 on cooperation with the Ombudsman with new paragraphs on cooperation with national ombudsmen and EPSO deficiencies.
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Removed:24. Notes that the acceptance rate for the Ombudsman’s proposals by the EU institutions stood at 82 % in 2024, which is a slight improvement on previous years; firmly believes that the Union’s institutions, agencies, offices and bodies must cooperate satisfactorily with the Ombudsman in all instances, fully and consistently complying with all of the Ombudsman’s recommendations;
Added:24. Stresses the importance of close cooperation between the Ombudsman, the national and regional ombudsmen gathered in the European Network of Ombudsmen, and the administrations of Member States, with a view to promoting good administration, transparency and the protection of citizens’ rights across the EU; encourages further exchanges of best practices and joint initiatives to strengthen citizens’ trust in both EU and national institutions; encourages the Ombudsman to also strengthen cooperation with the ombudsman institutions of EU candidate countries;
Added:25. Notes with concern the deficiencies identified by the Ombudsman in the functioning of EPSO; is alarmed by the Ombudsman’s conclusions of multiple cases of maladministration due to EPSO’s mishandling of candidate complaints, in particular concerning remote testing procedures and platform deficiencies, often providing complainants with contradictory information, demonstrating a lack of flexibility, and taking unreasonable decisions; calls on EPSO to take all necessary measures to urgently remedy all its shortcomings in order to restore the integrity, transparency and accountability of its recruitment procedures;
Added:26. Appreciates that, following the Ombudsman’s decisions, EPSO decided to give four complainants the opportunity to retake their tests; notes that, in addition to the cases that were closed with a finding of maladministration, EPSO also settled two other cases during the Ombudsman’s inquiry by deciding to invite the complainants to retake their tests; recalls that, in response to a suggestion and remarks by the Ombudsman, EPSO stated that it will ensure that the functionality of tools used by candidates during tests can be reviewed retroactively and that, in the future, candidates automatically receive a copy of their answers along with the correct answers after testing;
Added:27. Notes that the acceptance rate for the Ombudsman’s proposals by the EU institutions stood at 82 % in 2024, which is a slight improvement on previous years; firmly believes that the Union’s institutions, agencies, offices and bodies must cooperate satisfactorily with the Ombudsman;
2 changes of wording only
Change 5 Wording
AI summary:Rephrases a recital on corporate sponsorships of the Council's rotating Presidency, simplifying the description of public disquiet.
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Changed:J.R. whereas the Ombudsman inquired intoexamined the Councilcontinued use of thecorporate EU’ssponsorships continuedby usethe rotating Presidency of corporatethe sponsorships,Council, as this practice has given rise to persistent and considerable public disquiet regarding the potential influence that sponsors might exertbe exerting on the EU decision-making process, particularly on deliberations concerning EU policy and legislation affecting such sponsors’ private interests, entailing serious reputational risks for both the Council and the Union as a whole;sponsors;
Change 10 Wording
AI summary:Rephrases paragraph 7 on transparency and citizen participation, adding a reference to political negotiations and adjusting wording.
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Changed:7. Stresses that the EU institutions must guarantee the full transparency of, and the highest adequate levels of citizen participation in, the EU’s decision-making process; considers it to be of the utmost importance to ensure that citizens can hold decision-makers to account, fully exercise their democratic rights and have access to all relevant information and documents, particularly those of a legislative nature, including while the legislative process is ongoing, as also stipulated in CJEU case law;case-law; emphasises that the EU institutions, agencies, bodies and offices must ensure full transparency of political negotiations, while taking into account the need for their efficient conduct and adhereadherence to the highest ethical standards in their interactions with private stakeholders;