What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Titles VI and XVI thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Title V thereof,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014,

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 6 March 2025, 21 and 22 March 2024, 14 and 15 December 2023, 29 and 30 June 2023, 15 December 2022 and 30 and 31 May 2022,

– having regard to the conclusions of the Council, particularly those of 6 December 2024, 18 November 2024, 13 June 2024, 27 May 2024, 24 October 2023, 24 January 2022 and 22 January 2018,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2017 entitled ‘Improving Military Mobility in the European Union’ (JOIN(2017)0041),

– having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1328 of 10 August 2021 specifying the infrastructure requirements applicable to certain categories of dual‐use infrastructure actions pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council,

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 September 2021 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility from October 2020 to September 2021 (JOIN(2021)0026),

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 November 2023 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023 (JOIN(2023)0037),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 May 2025 on The European Union’ s strategic approach to the Black Sea region (JOIN(2025)0135),

– having regard to the Commission support study on the climate adaptation and cross-border investment needs to realise the TEN-T network, published in 2024,

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 March 2025 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 (JOIN(2025)0011),

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the revised Annex II to the Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the Union as adopted by the Council on 18 March 2025 (ST 6728/25 ADD1),

– having regard to the annual reports from 2022, 2023 and 2024 of the European Defence Agency, as well as its reports on military mobility from March 2018 and 26 January 2024,

– having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 04/2025 of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the statement on military mobility issued by the transport ministers of Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia on 27 May 2025,

– having regard to the tenth progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2018,

– having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communique issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, and the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission as well as the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 December 2018 and 6 December 2016, respectively,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE)through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 1 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review (COM(2025)0123),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025, for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on building a comprehensive European port strategy,

– having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on the impact of the Russian illegal war of aggression against Ukraine on the EU transport and tourism sectors,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations,

– having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A10-0242/2025),

A. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has drawn renewed attention to military mobility, highlighting the urgent need to facilitate the rapid cross-border movement of troops, equipment and assets throughout the EU in order to strengthen deterrence and defence;

B. whereas instabilities and changing geopolitical crises in different regions of the world require the EU and its Member States, in coordination with NATO, to be ready to respond to potential acts of aggression or different types of crises along all their external borders;

C. whereas Member States that share external borders with Russia or Belarus, as well as those bordering Ukraine, and experiencing Russia’s incursions into their airspace, are under a direct security threat, especially as Western security services warn that Russia could attack the EU in the short term;

D. whereas military mobility is an essential enabler for common European security and defence and was identified as a critical enabler in the 2023 EU capability development priorities (CDP);

E. whereas the resilience, deterrence and speed of military movements in Europe have now become an essential condition for the credibility of European defence; whereas military mobility in the EU significantly strengthens the security and resilience of the 27 Member States, including against increasing acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure and the rise of hybrid threats, provided that it is fully enabled to deliver its potential;

F. whereas significant efforts are needed to improve regional transport links and enhance the pan-European network, connecting EU countries from Finland and the Baltic States in the north to the Iberian Peninsula in the south; whereas the development of coherent military mobility infrastructure in the four EU priority military mobility corridors would be essential for deploying and supplying troops and military equipment at short notice and on a large scale by rail, road, waterways, sea and air, when and where needed, while ensuring its dual-use functionality to keep essential civil supply chains functioning;

G. whereas military mobility is a priority for EU-NATO cooperation and must enable, by an aligned approach, the movement of allied forces both in times of peace, crisis or war; whereas enhancing interoperability within the EU, with NATO and with partners such as Ukraine, is vital for collective defence; whereas, in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the EU-NATO partnership, strong leadership and coordinated governance are necessary to transform technical cooperation into a shared strategic vision, thereby strengthening mobility as a tool for cohesion and collective security;

H. whereas Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) plays a key role in enhancing and aligning the EU’s defence capabilities, reducing dependencies regarding strategic enablers such as military mobility;

I. whereas the EU is working to promote connectivity with regional partners and candidate countries;

J. whereas the EU’s defence industrial base suffers vulnerabilities, including an over-reliance on non-EU imports, fragmented production and supply, under-investment and limited production capacity; whereas the European economic security strategy emphasises the importance of reducing strategic dependencies and protecting critical technologies and assets to safeguard EU sovereignty and competitiveness;

K. whereas the European Council conclusions of 6 March 2025 underlined that the Union must ‘become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously with immediate and future challenges and threats’, thus reaffirming the need to reduce external dependencies and consolidate the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB);

L. whereas the SAFE initiative, adopted by the Council on 27 May 2025, provides for up to EUR 150 billion in support of joint procurement, industrial ramp-up and defence-related production within the EU, thereby creating a strategic opportunity to bring the European preference principle into operation and to ensure that EU funds strengthen European industry rather than reinforce external dependencies;

M. whereas the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the EU Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) can play an important role in supporting the development of innovative technologies and capabilities relevant to military mobility; stresses that synergies between EDIP, EDIRPA, the Connecting Europe Facility, and other EU funding instruments should be fully exploited in order to strengthen the resilience of transport infrastructure and enhance the EU’s overall capacity for swift and secure military movement;

N. whereas robust investment screening contributes to the EU’s economic security, protects critical infrastructure and technologies from hostile acquisitions, and complements industrial policies aimed at fostering European autonomy and technological leadership; whereas the revision of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union is a key instrument for safeguarding the EU’s security, public order and strategic interests;

O. whereas Parliament adopted its position on the proposed regulation, emphasising that all Member States should be required to maintain a screening mechanism for foreign investments on grounds of security or public order, and that stronger harmonisation is required across national systems to address strategic dependencies and emerging technological and infrastructure vulnerabilities;

P. whereas despite significant progress in recent years to enhance military mobility through the implementation of the actions set out in the Action plan on military mobility 2.0, considerable regulatory, administrative, and financial barriers, as well as bottlenecks and infrastructure obstacles remain;