On a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

C.whereas approximately 24 drones were deliberately launched into Poland’s airspace by Russia on 9 and 10 September 2025, while Russia continues to deny any responsibility for the deliberate large-scale incursion;

D.whereas on 19 September, three Russian MIG-31 fighter jets entered and stayed in Estonia’s airspace for a total of 12 minutes, disregarding communication from two Italian pilots in F-35 fighter jets in a deliberate violation of Estonia’s airspace;

E.whereas both Poland and Estonia have invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

F.whereas on 13 September 2025, a Geran-2 drone used by the Russian Federation in attacks against Ukraine entered Romanian airspace, and was intercepted by F-16 aircraft of the Romanian Air Force; whereas the drone flew in Romanian national airspace for approximately 50 minutes before leaving, and whereas the risk of collateral damage prevented it from being shot down; whereas Romania has experienced over 10 drone incursions as well as repeated drone crashes and instances of drone debris landing at its border and in the Danube Delta area between 2023 and 2025;

G.whereas debris from Russian drones has repeatedly entered the territory of Moldova, including the incident in Etulia in February 2024 when fragments of an explosive-laden Shahed drone were discovered; whereas Latvia and Lithuania have also reported multiple incursions and reconnaissance flights, amounting to dozens of incidents since early 2022 and posing serious risks to sovereignty, civilian safety and regional security; whereas Russia bears full responsibility for these actions, which are escalatory, risk miscalculation and endanger lives; whereas several NATO allies have warned they would shoot down Russian jets or drones involved in any further violations of NATO airspace;

H.whereas the Russian Federation deliberately engages in repeated airspace violations and related hostile acts with the aim of testing NATO’s resolve and probing the limits of collective defence, seeking to provoke a reaction by NATO member states; whereas Russia consistently refuses to acknowledge responsibility for such incidents, instead denying all evidence, accusing NATO member states of fabricating reports and disseminating disinformation to discredit the EU and its allies;

I.whereas numerous drones – some already confirmed by the authorities to be used ‘militarily’ – have been spotted over and in close proximity to civilian airports and military bases across NATO member states; whereas these incidents occurred, among other places, in Germany, Norway and Denmark, where such a drone incursion over Copenhagen Airport led to major disruptions in air traffic on 22 September 2025;

J.whereas since 2022, Moscow has shifted to a ‘gig-economy’ model of sabotage in Europe: small, on-demand attacks task-allocated via Telegram and often paid for in cryptocurrency; whereas this model relies on cross-border crypto flows and opaque payment services that exploit regulatory gaps; whereas encrypted platforms such as Telegram enable recruitment and payment routing while facing no oversight;

K.whereas the Russian Federation’s actions form part of a coherent and escalating hybrid-warfare modus operandi directed at NATO, the EU and their member states, encompassing foreign-influence operations targeting elections (including documented interference attempts and disruptive campaigns in Romania and persistent malign influence in Moldova) as well as sustained disinformation, the weaponisation of migration, cyberattacks, and GPS-spoofing and jamming; whereas hybrid actions increasingly take the form of kinetic operations such as arson attacks, maritime sabotage and suspected cuts to undersea communication cables, and acts of sabotage targeting railway infrastructure and disruption of airport operations, as well as other measures designed to degrade democratic resilience and critical infrastructure; whereas these combined activities are intended to probe and test the limits of NATO and national responses, weaken support for Ukraine and create political and social fractures while Moscow disavows responsibility and amplifies denialist narratives; whereas recent high-visibility incidents in the Baltic states, Poland, Denmark, Romania, Moldova and other countries, together with corroborating intelligence assessments, underline the immediacy and severity of the threat, which demands a sharp increase in situational awareness across the EU and NATO and should prompt coordinated efforts to strengthen deterrence and resilience, and to introduce robust countermeasures;

L.whereas on 12 September 2025, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte announced the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s posture along the alliance’s eastern flank; whereas in her State of the Union address, the President of the Commission announced the establishment of a ‘drone wall’;

M.whereas Russian forces continue to carry out systematic drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities in record numbers, targeting civilians in the course of their daily activities, including by striking ambulances and rescue personnel; whereas the use of drones against clearly identifiable civilian targets, the dissemination of footage of these killings and the posting of explicit threats on social media demonstrate a coordinated state policy aimed at terrorising the population and forcing displacement; whereas during recent attacks, Ukrainian government buildings, as well as the EU mission and the Embassy of Poland, were hit, indicating deliberate targeting by the Kremlin;

N.whereas components of Western origin are still being found in Russian missiles and drones, which demonstrates insufficient pressure and inadequate enforcement of sanctions, and requires urgent investigation and prosecution of intermediaries as well as of entities failing to exercise appropriate due diligence and end-user control;

O.whereas apparent neutrality or peace posturing by political actors and movements, whether promoted domestically or imported from abroad, replicates and amplifies Kremlin narratives and thus functionally aids Russian disinformation and foreign-influence operations aimed at confusing voters, polarising societies and undermining free choice at the ballot box; whereas such dynamics have been documented in the neighbourhood (notably in Moldova and in targeted campaigns affecting Romania), and are part of a broader pattern of foreign information manipulation and interference;

1.Condemns in the strongest terms the recent blatant and deliberate violations of Polish and Estonian airspace by the Russian Federation by means of large-scale drone swarms and fighter jet incursions; condemns the Russian Federation for repeatedly breaching the airspace of several other EU Member States and NATO allies including Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Romania; recalls that Russia bears full responsibility for these actions, which are escalatory, risk miscalculation and endanger lives;

2.Strongly condemns the Russian Federation for its ongoing hybrid warfare, which encompasses weaponisation of migration, cyberattacks and misinformation campaigns, sabotage and subversion, as well as a series of aggressive and flagrantly irresponsible actions that threaten the security and territorial integrity of the EU Member States and their neighbours; strongly condemns acts of state-sponsored terrorism, including sabotage, arson and bomb attacks targeting Europe’s military and critical infrastructure, such as airports and railways, plotted assassinations and physical assaults, and even the placement of explosive devices on commercial aircraft, as recently revealed by Lithuanian prosecutors;

3.Recalls that Parliament has recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state that uses means of terrorism;

4.Welcomes the initiative to establish a European ‘drone wall’ as part of a broader defence shield along the EU and NATO’s eastern flank in response to repeated Russian airspace violations; stresses the need for unity, solidarity and rapid implementation in order to strengthen Europe’s security, in particular of those countries most exposed to Russia’s threat; recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of intercepting drones and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) capabilities;

5.Welcomes the ongoing Eastern Sentry operation aimed at shielding and protecting NATO’s eastern flank as well as any other operations and deployments, as concrete means and essential components of strengthening the EU’s collective defence posture along its eastern flank and in the Baltic region;

6.Calls on the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, in close coordination with NATO, to accelerate the development of a concrete and operational plan for the swift deployment of the Eastern Sentry operation, ensuring interoperability with national air-defence systems, adequate financing and robust civilian protection; underlines that time is of the essence in deterring further provocations and safeguarding the sovereignty and security of the Union and its neighbourhood;

7.Underlines the urgent need to accelerate reaction times at both EU and NATO levels in response to repeated Russian provocations, including airspace violations and hybrid operations; stresses the importance of enhanced coordination between Member States, EU institutions and NATO structures, including the possible establishment of a permanent interinstitutional Russia crisis cell, tasked with real-time monitoring, rapid information sharing and swift operational decision-making at the highest institutional level; recalls that delayed reactions not only risk leaving security gaps but also undermine the credibility of the EU and its partners in deterring further Russian aggressive actions;

8.Calls for the EU, in close cooperation with Ukraine, to invest in the deployment of physical barriers and anti-drone nets in order to strengthen the protection of the eastern flank; highlights the importance of the EU’s Black Sea strategy and of the maritime security hub, as well as Romania’s role in hosting it;

9.Recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies against aerial and missile threats, including UAS, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community and household levels, and that these strategies emphasise early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions regarding response behaviour, and protected spaces (sheltering);

10.Encourages Member States to pursue a regulatory environment and procurement processes that coordinate and integrate the existing European ecosystem with strategic partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan where they bring needed critical capabilities and raw materials, emphasising joint development in propulsion, electronic warfare, laser development and mission-critical software;

11.Calls on the European Defence Agency to establish a dedicated, flexible budget for UAS that spans the full capability lifecycle, flexible requirements and appropriations to accelerate acquisition and fielding, while drawing on the operational lessons and battlefield experience gained by Ukraine;

12.Recommends that Member States, particularly frontline states, adopt missile and drone launch detection systems that can transmit information across the EU to serve as a shield for Europe’s multilayered aerial defence capabilities;

13.Calls on the Commission to include specific drone capability goals in the upcoming EU common defence policy, monitored through the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and backed by Permanent Structured Cooperation projects; welcomes the use of the Security Action for Europe instrument and the Defence Equity Facility to scale production, secure supply chains and support the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the unmanned systems sector;

14.Recommends the joint development and procurement of multilayered defence systems and robust domestic preparedness emphasising civil alert systems, protected shelters and public education campaigns;

15.Emphasises the need for stronger civil-military airspace coordination; supports the expansion of joint simulation and interception exercises involving civilian, law enforcement and military organisations to enhance preparedness for multi-domain threats; underlines that such exercises should be conducted on a mandatory annual basis to ensure sustained readiness and interoperability;

16.Underlines that it is unacceptable that, in the fourth year of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Russian missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used in attacks continue to rely heavily on Western-manufactured components; calls for thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea or China must have direct consequences for all other relations with these countries, including trade;

17.Recognises the ongoing role the Drone Coalition plays in the standardisation of UAS, its critical aid to Ukraine and its role in ensuring Member States keep pace with fast-changing requirements on the battlefield; encourages Member States to use this partnership to reduce lengthy procurement, clearance, development and testing requirements to aid the speedy acquisition of UAS and anti-drone systems;

18.Calls for the creation of a joint EU-NATO drone centre of excellence in a frontline state hosting the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battalion, including active testing facilities and an active drone manufacturing hub to streamline joint exercises and interoperability across Member States;

19.Calls for the institutionalisation of Ukraine-NATO-EU knowledge transfer programmes via rotational staff exchanges with personnel from the Ukrainian armed forces and by expanding joint training programmes under the European Defence Agency, focused on real-world drone survivability and innovation lessons;

20.Calls for EU-NATO cooperation in institutionalising the lessons learned from Ukraine’s battlefield experience by integrating the doctrinal and technological innovations into their preparations for modern combat conditions;

21.Calls on the Member States, the Commission and the High Representative, acting in full respect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, to adopt proportionate, transparent and legally robust measures to strengthen democratic resilience and to prevent the establishment of covert foreign influence in Member States;

22.Expresses concern about the alarming increase in Schengen visas being issued to Russian nationals, and the high number of entries recorded in summer 2025; underlines the moral implications of hosting tourists from an aggressor state as well as the related security dimension; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt tougher rules regarding the issuance of tourist visas for Russian citizens and limitations thereon, including introducing a requirement for visa applicants to attach a copy of their military booklets, and to introduce measures restricting the movement of Russian diplomats within the EU;

23.Considers it unacceptable that, despite extensive evidence that Russia conducts state terrorism and systematically uses terrorist means, the EU still does not classify Russia as a high-risk third country for money laundering and terrorist financing, which limits the tools available to counter acts of sabotage sponsored or instigated by the Kremlin; urgently calls on the Commission to initiate the procedure to independently list Russia as a high-risk third country under Regulation (EU) 2016/1675; believes that formally recognising the Russian Federation as a jurisdiction with strategic anti-money laundering and terrorist financing deficiencies would also help to combat sanctions evasion and the circumvention of restrictive measures;

24.Calls for the immediate adoption of a robust 19th sanctions package targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue;

25.Notes reports indicating that Russia has been using Telegram to recruit agents and coordinate sabotage activities within the EU; calls on the relevant authorities, in particular the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications (BIPT), which serves as the regulatory body for Telegram in the EU, to take into account independent data and to classify Telegram as a very large online platform (VLOP), thereby subjecting it to much stricter EU obligations, including enhanced risk-management duties, data-sharing requirements and independent audits;

26.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations.