On a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

–having regard to the speech by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski delivered at the UN Security Council emergency session on 22 September 2025,

–having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 22 September 2025 on the violation of Estonian airspace, delivered at the UN Security Council emergency session,

–having regard to the statement by the North Atlantic Council of 23 September 2025 on recent airspace violations by Russia,

–having regard to the statement by Commissioner Andrius Kubilius of 26 September 2025 following the high-level videoconference on eastern flank defence cooperation,

–having regard to the remarks by Council President António Costa on 1 October 2025 at the press conference following the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,

–having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.whereas intrusions into NATO’s and the EU’s airspace, blamed on Russia, have been occurring since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and have recently reached an unprecedented scale, raising questions about whether Russia is attempting to test NATO’s resolve or divert its attention and resources from the war in Ukraine;

B.whereas recent specific incidents include a large-scale violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones on 10 September 2025, when approximately 20 Russian drones flew deep over the countryside before being shot down by NATO jets or crashing, marking the first direct military engagement between NATO and Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion;

C.whereas on 19 September 2025, three armed Russian MiG-31 aircraft violated Estonian airspace for 12 minutes, and Russian fighter planes violated the security zone over a Polish drilling platform in the Baltic Sea;

D.whereas Romania and Latvia also reported that Russian drones had violated their airspace in September 2025, and Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Lithuania, France, Germany and Belgium experienced coordinated drone incursions over or near civilian and military airports or military facilities, causing temporary airport closures;

E.whereas the recent series of drone incursions across the Baltic Sea region demonstrate a significant hybrid threat to the safe and effective implementation of the Single European Sky initiative;

F.whereas it is suspected that the drones are being launched from vessels, including those belonging to the Russian shadow fleet operating in the Baltic Sea to circumvent sanctions;

G.whereas European leaders have cast these incidents as deliberate provocation orchestrated by Russia, viewing them as part of a pattern of reckless and irresponsible behaviour by the Russian authorities;

H.whereas NATO allies, including Poland and Estonia, invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty following these incursions; whereas EU Member States discussed these incursions during meetings of their permanent representatives;

I.whereas NATO launched the Eastern Sentry military activity to bolster its air defence posture along the entire eastern flank following the Polish incident, and Finland, Sweden and Denmark participated in the Protective Fence 25 exercise to strengthen defence capability and readiness from dispersed formations;

J.whereas the security of Ukraine is interlinked with European, transatlantic and global security, and Russia aims to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from supporting Ukraine towards defending its own territory;

K.whereas some NATO countries, including Poland, have warned they are ready to shoot down Russian aircraft entering their territory, while NATO emphasises that decisions on whether to engage intruding aircraft are based on available intelligence regarding the threat posed, including intent and armament;

L.whereas the United States’ stance on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is unpredictable, making the EU and its Member States Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and necessitating a stronger, unified European response to defend EU citizens, regional stability and international peace; whereas EU-US cooperation in the area of security and defence remains crucial and should be strengthened; whereas effective deterrence of Russian aggression necessitates robust security guarantees, coordinated collaboratively by the EU and the United States;

M.whereas air defence systems to provide protection against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are based on kinetic action or electronic countermeasures, in particular jammers, to interrupt drone control and/or cause the aircraft to land;

N.whereas for the protection of the informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 October 2025 in Copenhagen, the Danish authorities prohibited all civilian drone flights in Danish airspace from 29 September to 3 October; whereas several Member States supported Denmark in providing these security measures for the meeting;

O.whereas the statement by Council President António Costa on 1 October 2025 following the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government clearly indicates a willingness to improve interoperability of capabilities as well as strong commitment to the flagship Eastern Flank Watch, including through the capability coalitions coordinated by the respective leading countries, and the EU ‘drone wall’ initiative;

P.whereas the recent airspace incursions demand a bold response and a comprehensive approach in the upcoming defence readiness roadmap 2030;

Q.whereas the process of building fully fledged multilayered airspace defence should have started after the illegal annexation of Crimea; whereas decisions, financing, procurement and acquisition, and operability take time;

R.whereas it would be crucial for Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia to have fully fledged EU UAV capability along NATO’s eastern flank and the Black Sea region; whereas such capability would require significant European defence-related investment under the current and the next multiannual financial frameworks (MFF);

S.whereas there is an urgent need for measures to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to enhance the EU’s defence industrial production capacity, strengthen the competitiveness of the European defence industry and secure the supply of defence products;

T.whereas continued effort and investment are needed to support technological innovation and research in defence to support the EDTIB and European strategic autonomy;

1.Strongly condemns Russia’s reckless and escalatory actions of violating the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, as well as the deliberate drone incursions aimed at critical infrastructure in Denmark, Sweden and Norway; is convinced that every Member State has the right to shoot down Russian aircraft as a proportionate and legitimate response to incursions into its airspace;

2.Considers that the deliberate disruption, by Russian foreign agents, of the EU’s air traffic, critical services and infrastructure, and of the functioning of the political institutions of the EU and the Member States using UAVs constitutes a serious violation of applicable international norms and poses a serious threat to EU citizens and to peace and security in Europe;

3.Welcomes the decisive response by NATO forces, including the interception and escorting of Russian fighter jets out of Estonian airspace, and the shooting down of Russian drones over Poland; fully supports NATO’s efforts to reinforce its capabilities and strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, including through the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry;

4.Calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; calls on the Council, along with its American partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, and to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU;

5.Calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an ‘escalation ladder’ of EU responses to hybrid warfare waged by Russia or any other non-EU country against the Union in terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains; points out that frameworks of this kind will provide options for EU retaliatory measures matching the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU;

6.Stresses that a range of hybrid activities which Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of armed attack; underscores, therefore, the need to apply the available legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia’s hostile activities, which violate EU Member States’ territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population;

7.Condemns Russia for jamming and spoofing GPS signals in the Baltic Sea region and other areas, which poses serious safety risks for civilian aviation and undermines navigational reliability; recalls that the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization demanded that Russia fulfil its international obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation and ensure that the disturbances cease immediately; calls on the Council and the Commission to take appropriate measures to exert sufficient pressure on Russia to stop these malign activities and to take the steps needed to restore the stability of navigation systems throughout the EU;

8.Calls for revision of the EU’s capability planning process; is convinced that the headline goal process should cover not only crisis management but also collective defence, including the full capability spectrum under the national and international capability objectives; considers that the EU should consider capability apportioning requirements for its Member States, reflecting NATO’s model; believes that such a process could be carried forward within the framework of a European defence semester;

9.Believes that the recent incursion into the EU’s airspace is a catalyst for rapid and thorough advances in domains such as intelligence sharing, common logistics and the harmonisation of security and defence procurement; calls for advances towards a European command-and-control structure that not only manages crises in line with the common security and defence policy (CSDP), but also serves as the equivalent of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); notes that, to avoid duplication, such a structure should complement SHAPE and would provide proper resources to the EU Military Staff (EUMS);

10.Stresses the need to set up joint command-and-control centres for any future UAV or counter-UAV initiative; underlines the need to train operators and staff as well as conduct drills; underlines the need to fully integrate any UAV capability into the conventional air defence forces;

11.Highlights the need to support the Member States along NATO’s eastern flank and the Black Sea region in developing capabilities for intelligence gathering and the detection and tracking of threats originating beyond the EU’s external borders, such as hybrid operations, attacks on critical infrastructure, instrumentalised migration or drone incursions, with a view to boosting the EU’s situational awareness and capability to effectively anticipate threats; points out that such capabilities should include drone surveillance systems and other technologies allowing for aerial surveillance in EU border regions;

12.Calls on the Member States and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to urgently consolidate the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project entitled Integrated Multi-Layer Air and Missile Defence System (IMLAMD), especially against the threat posed by low-cost UAVs; insists that European investment in long-range precision weapons systems and enhanced air defence is crucial to ensure deterrence and reduce the risk of Russia exploiting vulnerabilities; calls on the Commission to address this domain in the upcoming defence readiness roadmap 2030;

13.Calls on the Commission to work closely with the European Investment Bank Group and the EDA on ensuring a comprehensive approach combining capability development and funding; calls on the Member States to significantly increase the staff and budget of the EDA to facilitate adequate and timely capability development and joint procurement; notes that the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence as well as the 14 capability development priorities and the eight strategic enablers and force multipliers in the EU capability development plan are stepping stones to defence readiness;

14.Welcomes the EU drone wall initiative as announced by Commission President von der Leyen, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas; invites the Commission to present a detailed implementation plan; welcomes also the Eastern Flank Watch initiative announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her State of the Union address on 10 September 2025; calls on the Commission to update Parliament on this initiative as soon as possible;

15.Urges the Commission to present a comprehensive plan on how to support European UAV and drone wall capabilities through EU (co-)funded actions; calls on the Commission to present a coherent plan at the European Council meeting on 23-24 October 2025;

16.Calls on the Commission to swiftly process any requests from Member States regarding voluntary adaptation of their national recovery and resilience plans to meet the funding requirements of UAV capability development;

17.Stresses the need for enhanced maritime surveillance and coordinated legal measures to address the use of commercial vessels as platforms for hybrid attacks such as drone attacks against critical infrastructure; believes that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-UAV strategies;

18.Calls on the Commission to fully engage with the representatives of UAV manufacturers in the Member States, including with manufacturers of dual-use UAVs and satellites;

19.Calls for the supply of raw materials to be strengthened and diversified further, in view of the expansion of UAV manufacturing, and highlights, in this context, the importance of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, which serves as a starting point for comprehensive, cohesive and strategic action; stresses the strategic importance of the EU’s partnerships with Ukraine, Canada and Latin America;

20.Underlines that UAV technological evolution requires flexibility and rapid upgrades, which need to be facilitated by future EU initiatives; notes that the EU is likely to favour sophisticated, expensive and cutting-edge solutions that often come with major delays; calls for continuous investment in defence innovation and technology to support the EDTIB and close the investment and research gaps that exist in defence technology; highlights the strategic importance of defence-related production and the need to ensure that production output can be rapidly scaled up in times of crisis;

21.Notes that UAV capabilities require significant acceleration of military mobility capabilities as well as fast cross-border movement of equipment and personnel, particularly focusing on border checks, customs procedures and clearance processes; notes, in this regard, the need for a military Schengen area;

22.Underlines the need for targets for both UAV and counter-UAV development, to ensure comprehensive UAV capabilities; calls on the Commission to propose further and far-reaching exemptions from EU environmental legislation for UAV manufacturing facilities;

23.Calls on the Member States and the Commission to fully engage in amending relevant EU and national regulatory frameworks to facilitate future UAV and counter-UAV capabilities, especially in view of the engagement of armed forces;

24.Stresses that increased EDF funding rates should apply to projects relating to those capabilities, as is already the case for PESCO projects; underlines that the EU needs to develop, in full alignment with NATO requirements and plans, a set of coherent full spectrum air and missile defence capabilities, ranging from countering small UAVs to defeating hypersonic threats;

25.Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure swift implementation of the European internal security strategy (ProtectEU) and the preparedness strategy to ensure comprehensive readiness and protection against threats posed by Russia’s breaches of European airspace and other threats; stresses the need for sufficient EU funding in this respect under the current and next MFFs;

26.Calls on the Commission and the Member States to jointly develop secure, reliable and resilient systems of communication and information sharing to be used by law enforcement, security agencies and civilian institutions for matters of security, in particular in times of crises;

27.Calls on the Member States to activate Article 42(7) TEU where such gross aggressive actions amount to an armed attack or contribute to preparing an imminent attack; calls for military support for the Member States concerned to be funded from the European Peace Facility; is convinced that any Member State that opposes recourse to the European Peace Facility in such cases contravenes its duty of loyalty and solidarity under Article 24(3) TEU and its obligation of mutual aid and assistance enshrined in Article 42(7) TEU; considers, therefore, that an opposing vote may not be considered in the Council; recalls that constructive abstention should be possible for those Member States whose constitutional prerogatives require it;

28.Calls for the capacity of Frontex to be boosted, in the light of the continuous pressure exerted by Russia and Belarus on the EU’s external borders through instrumentalised migration, in order to provide swift and flexible support to Member States by addressing any technological and operational gaps when they arise, whether in the air, on land or in water;

29.Welcomes the announcement by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Ukraine will begin foreign production and exporting of proprietary defence technologies to preferred European and NATO partners; calls for the EU and its Member States to make use of this offer and learn from Ukraine’s UAV ecosystem; calls for the EDIP legislation to be finalised swiftly and for it to be used, alongside the SAFE instrument, to commit financial resources to learning and mutual support in UAV warfare;

30.Notes that adequate UAV and counter-UAV capabilities must involve a multilevel partnership between the EU and Ukraine; recognises the potential contribution of Ukraine’s military and industrial know-how accumulated during Russia’s invasion;

31.Calls on the Commission, together with the EDA, to coordinate the purchase of defence UAV licenses from Ukraine, to enable willing Member States to produce the UAVs; calls on those Member States, in the light of the rapid innovative cycles in drone development, to ensure that the drones they produce are constantly supplied to Ukraine as soon as updated versions are available;

32.Reiterates that the recent aggressive actions by Russia must not, and will not, deter the EU and its Member States from their enduring commitment to supporting Ukraine in the exercise of its inherent right to self-defence; emphasises that assisting Ukraine in strengthening its air defence capabilities is crucial, as engagement in Ukrainian skies reduces the risk of drones reaching EU territory;

33.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO and the President and Parliament of Ukraine.