What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on flagship European defence projects of common interest

(2025/2144(INI))

The European Parliament,

Changed:– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 42(2) and 42(3),42(3) thereof,

Changed:– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 2, 107(3)(b)107(3)(b), 114 and 346,346 thereof,

4 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to Article 2(e) of Protocol No 10 on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) established by Article 42(6) TEU and the joint notification on PESCO signed by ministers of 23 EU Member States on 13 November 2017,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022, in particular paragraph 22 thereof,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

Added:– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

Removed:– having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 March 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’) (COM(2024)0150), in particular Article 15 thereof regarding European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI),

Added:– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund (EDF)1,

Added:– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP Regulation), in particular Chapter IV thereof regarding European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

Added:– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument,

Added:– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

Added:– having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment,

– having regard to the scoping paper of the Commission of 29 September 2025 entitled ‘Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’,

– having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Council of 11 April 2025 entitled ‘Annual progress report on the Implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence’,

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 22 and 23 June 2017, particularly those of paragraph 8 on PESCO, and of 6 March 2025, particularly those of paragraph 3(f),

Added:– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 23 October 2025,

– having regard to the national security strategies of the EU Member States,

Changed:– having regard to special report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors Opinion 02/2024 of 3 October 2024, entitled ‘Opinion 02/20242024 concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP)’, and in particular paragraph 42 thereof,

– having regard to the 2024 annual report by the European Defence Agency (EDA), as well as its report of 14 November 2023 entitled ‘The 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities’, and the 2024 report entitled ‘Coordinated Annual Review on Defence’,

– having regard to the progress report of the PESCO Secretariat of September 2025 on PESCO projects,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

Added:– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and, in particular, Chapter 3 thereof on a single market to play big: scale matters,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, and in particular Chapter 7 thereof,

Removed:– having regard to The Hague Summit Declaration issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in The Hague on 25 June 2025,

Added:– having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 10 January 2023,

Changed:– having regard to the tenth progress reportThe ofHague 10Summit JuneDeclaration 2025issued onby the implementationNATO heads of thestate commonand setgovernment ofparticipating proposalsin endorsedthe bymeeting EUof andthe NATONorth CouncilsAtlantic onCouncil 6in DecemberThe 2016Hague andon 525 DecemberJune 2018,2025,

Added:– having regard to the 10th progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2018,

– having regard to the cooperative equipment programmes managed by the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR),

Changed:– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence2,defence, and in particular its paragraphs 4 and 58,58 thereof,

Changed:– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20243,2024, and in particular its paragraph 46,46 thereof,

Removed:– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0014/2026),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas the challenges posed by the decline in global peace and securitysecurity, the pursuit by Russia of its war of aggression against Ukraine, and the emergence of new and evolving threats to EU security require the EU and its Member States to significantly increase their defence investment in order to develop military and intelligence capabilities that enable them to defend their sovereigntysovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and to bolster deterrence, as well as to act and respond autonomously or in partnership with their allies, particularly within NATO, to immediate and future threats;

Change 2

Removed:B. whereas warfare, historically dominated by conventional weapons, appears to be evolving ‘from steel to web’; whereas it is increasingly incorporating cyber capabilities and networked operations, and warfare strategies are being transformed through new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) and are no longer limited to massed firepower and large-scale confrontations, but moving towards miniaturisation and decentralisation of systems, as evidenced by the use of drone swarms, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields; whereas fighter jets, ships, battle tanks and armoured vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to precision strikes and therefore require greater protection, as they are still essential to military operations;

Added:B. whereas rising attacks on European critical infrastructure, including cyberattacks and sabotage, seriously threaten our daily life and economic activities across the EU, and require a coordinated EU response through large-scale European projects;

Removed:C. whereas in its joint communication of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy’ the Commission highlights that only 18 % of total equipment spending by EU Member States was devoted to EU collaborative defence equipment procurement in 2022, far below the current 35 % collective benchmark set by Member States at the EDA Ministerial Steering Board in 2007; whereas the end users of defence products are primarily the national armed forces of Member States and the latter can therefore only consider increasing their investments in defence industrial projects if these projects concern the development of military capabilities of common interest to their armed forces;

Added:C. whereas warfare, historically dominated by conventional weapons, appears to be evolving ‘from steel to web’; whereas it is increasingly incorporating cyber capabilities and networked operations, and warfare strategies are being transformed through new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) and are no longer limited to massed firepower and large-scale confrontations, but moving towards miniaturisation and decentralisation of systems, as evidenced by the use of drones and drone swarms across all domains, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields; whereas fighter jets, ships, artillery, battle tanks and ground vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to precision strikes and therefore require greater protection, as they are still essential to military and security operations; whereas there remains a need to produce and deploy traditional weapons systems and ammunition on a large scale, when necessary;

Added:D. whereas this new paradigm of conflict means that no region of the EU is exempt from the potential threat of aggression, interference, disinformation, psychological subversion or hybrid attacks; whereas strategic preparation for a prolonged conflict remains crucial to ensuring long-term security and defence resilience;

Added:E. whereas space is becoming an increasingly congested and contested strategic domain, with the growing weaponisation of both ground and space segments; whereas NATO has recognised space as the fifth strategic operational domain, acknowledging the increasing security challenges originating from space and, consequently, the need to make it more secure;

Added:F. whereas in its joint communication of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy’, the Commission highlighted that only 18 % of total equipment spending by EU Member States was devoted to EU collaborative defence equipment procurement in 2022, far below the current 35 % collective benchmark set by Member States at the EDA Ministerial Steering Board in 2007; whereas the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 sets a target of organising at least 40 % of defence procurement as joint procurement by the end of 2027; whereas in order to ramp up European defence industry capacity, on 23 October 2025, the European Council called on the Member States to increasingly gear defence investments towards joint development, production and procurement with the support of the EDA; whereas the coordination of efforts among Member States to ensure efficient allocation of resources, reduce fragmentation and accelerate the development of innovative defence technologies is essential for the establishment of a fully operational market; whereas achieving these objectives requires stronger incentives and a reduction in administrative burdens, while ensuring that cooperation remains market-driven, based on defence capability requirements and the complementary defence planning processes of the EU, its Member States and NATO;

Added:G. whereas ‘European Readiness Flagships’, as presented by the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, are based on a comprehensive approach to defence, encompassing both protection against direct military attacks and preparedness for hybrid threats; whereas they represent an opportunity to foster innovation, interoperability and competitiveness within the EU defence industry, by developing innovative joint industrial partnerships on frontier technologies, substantially strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and making it less dependent on third-country technologies;

Added:H. whereas Member States located on the eastern borders of the EU are the most exposed to serious threats and are essential to the security of the EU as a whole; whereas in its conclusions of 23 October 2025, the European Council noted that the immediate threats on the EU’s eastern flank and the provision of concrete support to Member States need to be addressed as matters of priority; whereas the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 highlights the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch as the initiatives to be launched first; whereas, as proposed, the Eastern Flank Watch is set to reinforce the EU’s eastern borders, by integrating ground, naval and air defence capabilities with effective and state-of-the-art counter-drone systems and technologies that are also instrumental to the European Drone Defence Initiative;

Added:I. whereas the end users of defence products are primarily the national armed forces of Member States and the latter can therefore only consider increasing their investments in defence industrial projects if these projects concern the development of military capabilities of common interest to their armed forces; whereas Article 346 TFEU provides that any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material;

J. whereas the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence sets the objective of developing incentives to stimulate Member States’ collaborative investments in joint projects and the joint procurement of defence capabilities that are developed in a collaborative way within the EU;

Change 3

Changed:E.K. whereas theRegulation proposed(EU) regulation2025/2643 establishing the EDIPEuropean providesDefence forIndustry theProgramme implementation(EDIP) ofprovides Europeanfor Defencethe Projectsimplementation of Common Interest (EDPCI);EDPCIs; whereas EDPCIEDPCIs consist of collaborative industrial projects aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)EDTIB throughout the Union, while contributing to the development of Member States’ military capabilities critical for the security and defence interests of the Union, and includingpromoting thoseopen securingand accessmodular toarchitecture, dual-use innovation, and the cross-border participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps across all operational domains, namely land, maritime, air, space and cyber; whereas the EDIP also includes the Structures for European Armament Programme (SEAPs), a new legal framework that can be used for collaborative armament initiatives under the umbrella of flagship projects;

Change 4

Removed:1. Acknowledges the significant increase in defence expenditure among EU Member States as a clear reflection of their determination to respond to the deteriorating security environment, by enhancing military capabilities, strengthening deterrence, and reinforcing their collective commitment to European and transatlantic defence; acknowledges also that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not merely an increase in national defence spending but a comprehensive shift towards greater coordination, efficiency and integration in the way that Member States develop, resource and implement their defence policies;

Added:L. whereas as emphasised in the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, Ukraine remains Europe’s first line of defence and forms an integral part of Europe’s defence and security architecture; whereas cooperation between the defence industries of the EU and Ukraine, in particular in the context of flagship projects or EDPCIs, is of great importance for their respective markets, competitiveness and innovation potential;

Removed:2. Notes that, despite increased defence efforts, the EU and its Member States continue to face persistent shortfalls in strategic collective capabilities, command and control structures, and sustainable military capacity; underlines that these gaps significantly limit the EU and its Member States’ ability to sustain a prolonged large-scale defence engagement, particularly in the face of acts of hybrid warfare; calls for urgent measures to address these critical capability shortfalls through enhanced cooperation, coordinated planning, and targeted investments to ensure defence readiness;