What changed between the resolution motion joint and the adopted text

13. Welcomes the call for an urgent meeting of Eurojust requested by Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo; welcomes further the request to examine, and when necessary broaden, the mandate for the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to be able to prosecute such cases; welcomes also the agreement announced by the Belgian Presidency to launch a temporary crisis task force to counter Russia’s attempts to interfere in the forthcoming European elections and stresses that in the context of the upcoming European elections, all national and EU authorities must intensify their efforts to combat foreign interference to ensure the full integrity of these important elections; stresses, in this regard, that freedom of speech, freedom of the media, and compliance with the law are equally important in all democratic processes and cannot be unduly restricted;

14. Reiterates its previous condemnation of past cases of political partnerships between far-right parties in Europe and the Russian leadership, such as the bank loan for Le Pen’s party in France, the partnership agreement between Austria’s FPÖ party and Putin’s United Russia party, as well as numerous meetings and exchanges between various elected MEPs, including the leadership of Germany’s AfD party;

15. Expresses its concern about the Austrian espionage case, in which a former Austrian intelligence officer, Egisto Ott, who is said to be closely tied to FPÖ politician Hans-Jörg Jenewein, is accused of spying for Russia and illegally retrieving personal data from police databases, including handing over mobile phone data of former high-ranking Austrian officials to Russian intelligence;

16. Expresses its concern about credible reports of increased Russian attempts to interfere in the upcoming elections for the Bulgarian national parliament on 9 June 2024; raises strong concerns about the existence and Russian control of a network of disinformation agents active on social media platforms, in traditional media, academia, non-governmental organisations and political parties; is extremely concerned about the numerous properties currently owned by Russian authorities in the territory of Bulgaria, some of them of strategic importance, and which serve as centres of Russian influence and leverage over the democratic processes in the country;

17. Expresses its serious concern about a number of policies and positions of the Hungarian Government, which under the leadership of Prime Minister Orban has on numerous critical occasions assumed a pro-Russian, as well as pro-Chinese, stance;

18. Condemns Russia’s participation in disinformation campaigns, as well as the alleged intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with a Catalan secessionist group; suggests that the European Centre of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats in Helsinki carry out a study; calls on the competent judicial authorities to effectively investigate the connections of the MEPs allegedly associated with the Kremlin and Russia’s attempts at destabilisation and interference in the EU and its Member States; deplores all attacks on judges investigating any interference activities;

19. Believes that the recent allegations might constitute sanctionable behaviour under its Code of Conduct and if confirmed must be met with the firmest response; underlines the importance of immediately conducting a thorough internal investigation in order to assess all possible cases of foreign interference from Russia and other countries in the European Parliament; highlights that these revelations are part of a larger pattern of Russian interference, as highlighted in the final reports of INGE and ING2;

20. Considers that the allegations regarding the MEPs concerned underline the need for an enhanced security culture in the European Parliament; reiterates, therefore, its call for the full implementation of the recommendations contained in its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption, including mandatory security training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers, in particular those attending in camera meetings; underlines that many national parliaments and international organisations have legitimate and well-functioning systems in this domain and calls for best practices to be assessed;

21. Calls for Parliament to introduce mandatory, effective and regular training on security, interference, ethical standards, compliance and integrity for all MEPs and their offices and for all Parliament staff, raising awareness that they are potential targets of foreign state and non-state actors; calls for Parliament’s services to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems to detect foreign interference while respecting MEPs’ freedom of mandate;

22. Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; recalls further that, while Russia remains the main origin of foreign interference and disinformation in the European Union, other countries have also conducted such campaigns; underlines that the EU’s response to these threats can only be effective if it is based on a transversal, holistic and long-term policy approach jointly carried out by both the EU and its Member States; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things, through a dedicated parliamentary body; stresses that vigilance and protection against foreign interference are particularly necessary in the run-up to the European elections this year;

23. Highlights the key legislation on media freedom and digital rights adopted by the European Union in recent years, such as the European Media Freedom Act, the Artificial Intelligence Act or the Digital Services Act; highlights, nevertheless, that further action is needed to stop the spread of malign disinformation online and to protect the right of European citizens to reliable news;

24. Welcomes the adoption of the legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which includes new EU-level rules aimed at addressing money laundering risks related to politically exposed persons;

25. Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to include in the forthcoming 14th sanction package new Kremlin-backed media outlets and other broadcasting and media organisations and individuals responsible for propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the EU;

26. Underlines the key role of investigative journalism in revealing the attempts at foreign interference and covert activities; reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for investigative journalism; strongly condemns the large-scale disinformation campaign exposed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January, purportedly orchestrated by Russia on X (formerly Twitter), with the intention of manipulating public opinion;

27. Strongly condemns ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, such as the terror of the Nazi regime, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy, as well as its attempts to systematically spread false historical narratives;

28. Insists on the need to do more to protect the European information environment and EU citizens’ right to access reliable information; recalls the need to establish, as stated in Parliament’s previous reports, ‘mirror clauses’ whereby the openness of the European information space to third countries would be proportionate to the access European media outlets have in these countries; underlines that the media outlets working for hostile and authoritarian regimes should not have access to European Parliament premises; insists that labelling on platforms should go beyond identifying deep fakes to also establish positive labelling using tools created by the media sector, such as the Journalism Trust Initiative; expresses, in this context, its general support for the New Deal for the Right to Information proposed by Reporters Without Borders;

29. Believes that more efforts are needed to properly protect European democracy and strongly calls upon national authorities to fully inform citizens of the Member States concerned in the ‘Voice of Europe’ case;

30. Notes that the ultimate goal of Russian interference is to undermine, divide and weaken the EU and to erode support for Ukraine; Stresses that the Russian Federation’s hybrid tactics do not advance Russia’s political agenda within the EU in the least, but, on the contrary, generate further momentum for the EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine in its defence against the illegal occupier;

31. Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has exposed the massive extent of foreign manipulation of information in the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, namely the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; calls for the EU and its neighbouring countries to increase their cooperation in the fight against disinformation, hybrid threats and cyber security;

32. Calls for the European Union to be vigilant with regard to attempts by any third country, including Russia, to unduly influence its democratic processes; warns the Russian Federation that hybrid disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and influence operations already constitute serious attacks on European democracy and any physical action on European soil would constitute a dramatic escalation; calls on the Member States to expose and investigate Russian attempts to sabotage critical infrastructure; stresses the need to strengthen safeguards to protect election infrastructure, which is particularly vulnerable to physical attacks and cyberattacks before and during elections;

33. Recalls that even in the case where the law limits the sources of political funding, Russian actors have found ways to circumvent them and offered support to their allies; recalls in particular the evidence of loans from foreign banks (such as in the case of the National Front party in France in 2016), purchase and commercial agreements (such as in the allegations reported by Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung on 17 May 2019 about the FPÖ party and by Buzzfeed and L’Espresso on 10 July 2019 about Lega per Salvini Premier in Italy), and facilitation of financial activities (as reported by the British press in relation to the Leave.eu campaign);

34. Condemns the fact that foreign interference campaigns are often directed against specific minorities and vulnerable groups and notes that the targeting of those minorities serves the larger purpose of undermining the appeal of democratic and equal societies;

35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.