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Changes between two versions

What changed between the resolution motion joint and the adopted text

From · resolution motion joint· 24 Apr 2024

RC-9-2024-0262

on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

To · adopted text· 25 Apr 2024

TA-9-2024-0380

New allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

Changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations and punctuation-only edits are left out; they are under “Every difference”.

The changes · 4

Change 1

Added:D. whereas there are also ‘Russlandversteher’ (Russia understanding) politicians within mainstream political parties; whereas several public figures from EU Member States, including former heads of government and cabinet members, most notably Gerhard Schröder, have held well-paid positions in Kremlin-controlled energy companies; whereas, even after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, some of these people decided not to step down and continued to receive the Kremlin’s blood money, with the silent complicity of their political parties; whereas they continue to use their pro-Russian influence in both their domestic and the European political scenes;

Change 2

Changed:F.G. whereas on 27 March 2024, after having uncovered a pro-Russian network attempting to conduct influence operations with implications for Czechia and the EU, via the Prague-based ‘Voice of Europe’ news site, the Czech foreign ministry announced that it had sanctioned Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, for running a Russian influence operation from Czech territory using this news site, along with a middleman called Artem Marchevskyi, for his activities conducted with the aim of undermining European support for Ukraine and influencing the 2024 European Parliament elections by portraying the EU as a belligerent entity, and describing Ukraine as an irremediably corrupt country; whereas shortly after this revelation, the website was taken offline by the authorities but was back online on 11 April,April 2024, operating from a website hosted by a cloud services and website service provider based in Kazakhstan;

Change 3

Changed:6. Is extremely worried by recent reports, dated 17 April,April 2024, of two alleged Russian spies with dual German-Russian nationality who were arrested in Bavaria after being accused of scouting targets for potential attacks and sabotage operations, including the targeting of military facilities; reiterates its high concern about the extent of Russian espionage activities in Germany and other countries, such as Poland where similar activities were discovered in March 2023, and reiterates its strong call for a decisive response to the threat posed by Russian agents operating in Germany and beyond;

Change 4

Removed:7. Is equally concerned by the arrest on 22 April of three Germans detained on suspicion of working with the Chinese Ministry of State Security to hand over technology that could be used for military purposes; reiterates its previous calls on Member States to more effectively combat all elements of spying in the EU, which must also include better protection of critical infrastructure as well as a frank and clear confrontation of the originating states of espionage; underlines that these espionage revelations are likely to be just the tip of the iceberg and are a serious threat to our security and democracy;

Added:7. Strongly condemns the Russian practice of instrumentalising illegal immigrants by pushing them into EU territory to destabilise neighbouring Member States, in particular Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland;

Added:8. Is equally concerned by the arrest on 22 April 2024 of three Germans detained on suspicion of working with the Chinese Ministry of State Security to hand over technology that could be used for military purposes; reiterates its previous calls on Member States to more effectively combat all elements of spying in the EU, which must also include better protection of critical infrastructure as well as a frank and clear confrontation of the originating states of espionage; underlines that these espionage revelations are likely to be just the tip of the iceberg and are a serious threat to our security and democracy;