What changed between the resolution motion joint and the adopted text

Changed:12.15. Expects the white paper on the future of European defence to identify the most pressing threats, structural risks and competitors, and define the extent to which the EU can develop contingency plans to ensure mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and help Europe anticipate, prepare for and deter potential aggressors and defend itself in the short and long term, in order to become a credible power and European pillar within NATO; underlines that the protection of EU land, air and maritime borders contributes to the security of the entire EU, in particular the EU’s eastern border, and thus stresses that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the East;

Changed:13.16. Calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats;threats including energy weaponisation, infrastructure sabotage and the instrumentalisation of migration; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

Added:20. Emphasises the importance of ensuring a geographically balanced distribution of defence financing in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

Added:22. Calls for urgent financial support to ensure the timely supply of defence products through joint procurement, industrial coordination, stockpiling, access to finance for manufacturers and the expansion and modernisation of production capacities;

Changed:20.25. Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and non-EU states facilitating the circumvention of sanctions, providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; urges the Member States to pay special attention to the Russian shadow fleet and the security and environmental risks this poses;

Added:28. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should draw on lessons learnt from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drone and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

Added:29. Stresses that preparedness for hybrid and grey zone attacks must become part of the EU’s strategic culture, with permanent exercises, joint threat assessments and pre-planned, coordinated responses among Member States, particularly in regions bordering hostile powers;

Added:40. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and work constructively to find a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

Changed:46.54. Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and new market entrants through simplified access to funding; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production; suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the line of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; calls for a more geographically balanced development of the EDTIB, ensuring that critical capabilities, such as ammunition production, air defence systems and drone technologies, are also developed in frontline states, which have a direct understanding of operational needs;

Changed:50.58. Welcomes the proposal for European Defence Projects of Common Interest on the development of common capabilities that go beyond the financial means of a single Member State; believes that these projects should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin the major common priorities of several Member States and in fields such as external border protection and defence, in particular in the land domain, as well as strategic enablers, particularly in space and European air defence, to act on the whole spectrum of threats, military mobility, in particular strategic and tactical air transport, deep strikes, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, in order to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that pragmatism must prevail due to the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focusfocus, where possible, on rapidly available and proven European technologies that gradually reduce our dependencies and improve our security; highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by incorporating companies throughout the Union and to boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers and champions; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair return, our defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence;

Changed:53.61. Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened; calls for the Commission and the Member States to be jointly tasked with the mapping and monitoring of the EDTIB, with the aims of protecting its strengths, reducing its vulnerabilities, avoiding crises and providing it with an effective and efficient industrial policy;

Changed:61. Strongly69. believesConsiders that European preference shouldmust be the cornerstoneguiding ofprinciple alland long-term ambition of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European expertise, in order to strengthen European defencedevelop capabilitiesand onprotect aEuropean long-termtechnological basisexcellence; andstresses, ashowever, EUthat taxpayersuch moneypreference must create addednot valuebe onpursued EUat territory;the underlinesexpense thatof the European preferencedefence principlereadiness mustof bethe reflectedUnion, ingiven EUthe defenceextent regulationsof ininternational clearsupply and unambiguous eligibility criteria bothvalue forchains entitiesin andthe fordefence products;sector;

Changed:69.77. Strongly supports the idea that EU Member States must increase their defence and security financing to new levels; notes that some Member States have already increased their defence spending to 5 % of GDP and insists that the current security environment and the multiple, complex and evolving security threats require Member States to increase their defence spending to at least 3 % of GDP;

Added:85. Underlines the need to enhance our partnerships with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for a broad EU-UK security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

Added:86. Calls for enhanced cooperation with Western Balkan countries in the area of defence industries; emphasises that Western Balkan countries have significant expertise in defence industries and that the EU should consider procuring military equipment from Western Balkan countries; emphasises that this approach would help make Western Balkan countries stronger allies of the EU;

Added:87. Believes that every effort must be made to maintain and, if possible, foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sector, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop greater sovereignty;

Changed:19.24. Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.250,25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the EU Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets to serve as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase our support for Ukraine’s military needs;

Changed:63.71. Urges the Member States to stop invoking Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive (2009/81/EC), thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to review the DirectivesDirective on the transfer of defence-related products and the Directive on defence procurement as well as the inter-community transfer directive (2009/43/EC) with a view to strengthening the common market for defence and introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like the one we are currently facing;

Changed:39.47. Considers that the CSDP must strongly participate in the fight against hybrid warfare against partner countries, particularly candidate countries; is deeply worried by the sharp increase in hybrid attacks, including sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation and election interference, with the objective of weakening the EU and its candidate countries; calls on the EU Member States to consider appropriate deterrence and countermeasures, including through the use of Article 42(7) TEU; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to pool resources and expertise in the field of cybersecurity; strongly advocates the development of a unified European approach to cyber forces; further insists on the swift creation of joint European cyber capabilities; recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyberthreatscyber threats in real time;