What changed between the resolution motion joint and the adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy,

– having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

– having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

– having regard to the EU-China summit of 7 December 2023,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions on China of 30 June 2023,

– having regard to the visits of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 25 to 27 July 2023 and of the Committee on International Trade of 19 to 21 December 2022 to Taiwan,

– having regard to the statement of 1 September 2024 by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the latest dangerous actions in the South China Sea,

– having regard to the statements by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on China’s military drills around Taiwan, including the most recent statement of 14 October 2024,

– having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statements of 18 April 2023 and of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

– having regard to the statement by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of 23 September 2024,

– having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

– having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

– having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

– having regard to the press statement by the US Department of State of 13 October 2024,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to Article 7 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), concluded on 9 May 1992,

– having regard to Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),

– having regard to Article 4 of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),

– having regard to Article 8 and Article 18(h) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO),

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted the official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC); whereas today Taiwan, while not being a member of the United Nations, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states, as well as with the Holy See;

B. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its access to participation in multilateral forums, such as the WHO;

D. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC in 1949;

E. whereas UN Resolution 2758 addresses the status of the PRC, but does not determine that the PRC enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it make any judgement on the future inclusion of Taiwan in the UN or any other international organisation; whereas, however, the PRC continues to misinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations and unilaterally change the status quo; whereas these actions highlight the PRC’s ambition to alter the existing multilateral international order and undermine international law, and can be seen as an expression of systemic rivalry;

F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

G. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024 the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

H. whereas supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organisations does not undermine the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy, which remains the political foundation of EU-China relations;

I. whereas over the past decade the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

J. whereas the statutes of most international organisations tasked to address global issues, including the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, provide opportunities for entities such as Taiwan to participate without infringing on the rights of member states;

K. whereas Taiwan has consistently demonstrated a peaceful and cooperative attitude globally, has significantly enhanced global developments and thus could contribute greatly to the work of various international organisations;

L. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party;

M. whereas in a speech on Taiwan’s national day of 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

N. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

O. whereas during the exercises four formations of the PRC coastguard patrolled the island and briefly entered its restricted waters; whereas the very frequent deployment of the coastguard by the PRC in the Strait in what the PRC considers ‘law enforcement’ missions is putting constant pressure on the Taiwanese authorities and causing a dangerous increase in the risk of collisions, in what is one of the most concrete indications of the PRC’s intention to erode the status quo; whereas the exercises launched on 14 October 2024 were the fourth round of large-scale war games by the PRC in just over two years;

P. whereas these activities were condemned by Taiwan as an ‘unreasonable provocation’ and are the latest in a series of war games conducted by the PRC against Taiwan; whereas these military drills came days after Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s new president, gave a speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of challenges from the PRC;

Q. whereas the median line, which was set up in a decades-old tacit agreement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, was designed to reduce the risk of conflict by keeping the military aircraft from both sides of the Strait at a safe distance and thus prevent fatal miscalculations; whereas the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army violated the median line only four times between 1954 and 2020, but now routine incursions reflect Beijing’s intent to irreversibly reset long-standing benchmarks;

R. whereas the press statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the US Department of State reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity; whereas the High Representative’s statement recalls the need to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion and calls on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions;

S. whereas on 23 May 2024 the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

T. whereas over the past few years the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022 the PRC also fired missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone;

U. whereas on top of military pressure the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

V. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

W. whereas the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law includes the use of non-peaceful means, triggered by ambiguous thresholds, to achieve what the PRC calls ‘unification’ with Taiwan; whereas such military action is a grave threat to the security and stability of the entire region, with potentially dire global consequences; whereas EU and US deterrence is of strategic importance to dissuade the PRC from undertaking any unilateral action against Taiwan;

X. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

Y. whereas the EU has condemned the dangerous actions conducted by Chinese coastguard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 31 August 2024; whereas this incident is the latest in a series of actions endangering the safety of life at sea and violating the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with international law; whereas maritime security and freedom of navigation must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, UNCLOS;

Z. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the export of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;