What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Removed:1. Reiterates that an independent judiciary is the backbone of the rule of law, as it is a precondition for an effective remedy when rights and freedoms are withheld or violated; underlines that an independent and effective judiciary is vital for the implementation of EU law, given that the Commission relies on the national judicial authorities to enforce EU law; expresses its concern that this ‘presumption of compliance’ becomes the ‘pretence of compliance’ when the Commission ignores national judicial authorities’ shortcomings; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may be robust on paper, in some cases they are not immune to state capture, political interference or nepotism; is aware of the fact that this is difficult to detect by simply assessing the formal structures; therefore urges the Commission to conduct a more qualitative analysis, including contextual elements;

Added:B. whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe clearly expressed a desire for the EU to systematically uphold the rule of law across all Member States, to protect citizens’ fundamental rights and to retain the EU’s credibility when promoting its values within the EU and abroad;

Removed:2. Notes that the Commission finds wide disparities between EU Member States in terms of judicial independence and safeguards; notes that the report mentions a number of positive initiatives and ongoing developments concerning the Councils of the Judiciary, notably in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Hungary; highlights, however, that an independent assessment shows that of the four ‘super milestones’ related to the independence of the judiciary in Hungary only one can be considered fully implemented; notes that the Commission finds that concerns on the Councils for the Judiciary still have to be addressed in Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Spain and Cyprus; notes with concern that disciplinary proceedings may be used as a means to curtail judicial independence, as is the case in Poland and Bulgaria; notes that the Commission has, finally, referred Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for violations of EU law by its Constitutional Tribunal;

Added:C. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or in particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union;

Removed:3. Notes that the Commission finds that whereas certain Member States, including Finland, Austria, Slovenia, Cyprus, Sweden and Hungary, have taken or announced initiatives to improve judicial appointment processes and high courts’ functioning, challenges persist in appointing high-level judges in Malta, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ireland; highlights that serious concerns persist in Poland regarding previously appointed Supreme Court judges, including its First President, and regarding the continuous non-implementation of a CJEU preliminary ruling on a judicial appointment to the Chamber of Extraordinary Control; notes that the Commission finds that in Slovakia the crime of abuse of law introduced for judges as regards their judicial decisions continues to raise concerns, as it has a negative psychological impact on judges and is burdensome for the investigatory authorities;

Added:D. whereas it is necessary to strengthen and streamline existing mechanisms and to develop a single comprehensive EU mechanism to protect democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights effectively and to ensure that the values laid down in Article 2 TEU are upheld throughout the Union and promoted among candidate countries, so as to prevent Member States from developing domestic law that runs counter to the protection of Article 2 TEU;

Added:E. whereas Parliament has at various moments addressed the rule of law situations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia in its resolutions; whereas the Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG) of Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs has also monitored certain issues in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, France, Greece, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain;

Added:F. whereas the Commission has suggested setting up an interinstitutional ‘contact group’ on the rule of law; whereas Parliament has taken up this suggestion and proposed to the Commission and the Council to create an ‘interinstitutional pilot project on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights’; whereas the Council Presidency has responded by stating that it might consider this after its evaluation of its rule of law dialogue and the Commission reiterated its openness to discussing an informal rule of law contact group;

Added:G. whereas some Member State governments have unfortunately not made themselves available for an exchange of views in the DRFMG and have not answered its written questions or met with its members during missions in the Member States; whereas other Member States, however, have made themselves available for DRFMG sessions, questions and missions, as part of their joint responsibility for safeguarding EU values;

Added:Justice and prosecutorial systems

Added:1. Reiterates that an independent judiciary is the backbone of the rule of law, as it is a precondition for an effective remedy when laws, rights, freedoms and democratic principles are withheld or violated; underlines that an independent and effective judiciary is not only vital in maintaining the rule of law and democracy in the Member States and the Union, but it is also key in implementing EU law, given that the Commission relies on the national judicial authorities to enforce EU law; expresses the importance of mutual trust, while also underlining that the Commission cannot ignore the shortcomings of national judicial authorities in some Member States or assume that they are all able to provide effective judicial remedies; notes, with concern, that while some judicial systems may look robust and satisfactory on paper, in some cases they are not immune to state capture, political interference or nepotism; is aware of the fact that this is difficult to detect by simply assessing the formal structures; urges the Commission, therefore, to conduct a more qualitative analysis, including contextual elements, particularly about long-term implementation;

Added:2. Notes that the Commission finds wide disparities between EU Member States in terms of judicial independence and safeguards; notes that the report mentions a number of positive initiatives and ongoing developments concerning the Councils for the Judiciary, notably in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Hungary; notes that the Commission finds that concerns on the Councils for the Judiciary still have to be addressed in Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Spain and Cyprus; notes, with concern, that disciplinary proceedings may be used as a means of curtailing judicial independence, as is the case in Poland and Bulgaria; notes that the Commission has finally referred Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for violations of EU law by its Constitutional Tribunal;

Added:3. Notes that the Commission finds that whereas certain Member States, including Finland, Austria, Slovenia, Cyprus, Sweden and Hungary, have taken or announced initiatives to improve judicial appointment processes and the functioning of high courts, challenges persist in appointing high-level judges in Malta, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia and Ireland; highlights that the Commission finds that serious concerns persist in Poland regarding previously appointed Supreme Court judges, including its First President, and regarding the continuous non-implementation of a CJEU preliminary ruling on a judicial appointment to the Chamber of Extraordinary Control; notes that the Commission finds that in Slovakia the crime of abuse of law introduced for judges as regards their judicial decisions continues to raise concerns, as it has a negative psychological impact on judges and is burdensome for the investigatory authorities; highlights that serious concerns persist in Hungary regarding judicial independence, in contravention of the Commission’s super milestones, including the persistence of obstacles to preliminary references, problems with the allocation of cases in Kúria and the deficient system of nomination of the President of the Kúria;

Added:4. Underlines that the judiciary should be allocated sufficient means to be truly accessible and able to provide an effective remedy to citizens; notes that the Commission finds that increased resources for the judiciary and other measures taken by Malta, Cyprus and Greece have not yet resulted in a reduction as regards the length of proceedings, with backlogs of cases remaining a serious challenge; whereas in Croatia, Italy and Portugal some steps in the right direction have been taken, but the effectiveness of the reforms remains to be seen; notes that the Commission has called on Germany to ensure adequate resources for the justice system, including on the level of remuneration for judges, taking into account European standards on resources and remuneration for the justice system; calls on Germany to continue implementing the ‘Pact for the Rule of Law’ and to provide sufficient resources for the justice system by increasing the number of judges to strengthen the federal justice system; recognises that the Commission finds that some progress can be seen in the implementation of the recommendation made in the 2022 rule of law report on the efficiency of the justice system, including in Malta and Spain;

Added:5. Welcomes the funding through the justice programme to support judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters and to contribute to the further development of European justice;

Added:6. Believes that for citizens to have effective access to justice, the Member States should do more to provide free of charge or affordable legal aid, in particular for those unable to afford such aid themselves, and should further facilitate access to a lawyer; notes that the Commission finds that efforts are being made to address concerns related to access to justice and legal aid in Spain, France, Finland, Bulgaria, Malta and Lithuania, and that concerns persist in Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg and Hungary; notes also that the Commission finds that steps towards ensuring the right of access to a lawyer are ongoing in several Member States including Spain, France, Finland, Bulgaria and Malta, and that in other Member States, such as Lithuania, Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg and Hungary, improvements are still pending; calls, in this context, on the Commission to include in the next rule of law report an assessment of the application of the EU acquis on legal aid in civil and criminal matters, such as Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, as CJEU case-law reveals that questions still remain about its interpretation;

Added:7. Underlines the important role of the Councils for the Judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU;

Added:8. Points out that the prosecution service is a key element for the capacity of the judiciary to fight crime and corruption; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and accountability of the prosecution service; stresses the need for safeguards to be put in place to help preserve the autonomy and accountability of the prosecution service, including ensuring that it is free from undue political pressure, especially from the government;

Added:9. Calls on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges, following the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations and taking into account such codes being applicable at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the CJEU, to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency in conflicts of interest and in gifts received by the judiciary, to address the issue of revolving doors and to require justices to explain their recusal decisions publicly;

Added:10. Expresses concern over the substantial personnel changes and the announced significant structural and organisational changes in the Slovak police and other independent democratic institutions, including among investigators working on serious crimes and cases of high-level corruption in Slovakia’s National Criminal Agency (NAKA), raising doubts as to the motivations behind such changes; expresses deep concern over the Slovak Government’s unjustified accelerated legislative process, particularly regarding the proposed amendments to the criminal code and the dissolution of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which threaten the integrity of judicial processes, undermine the EU’s fight against fraud and endanger the protection of European financial interests and nature in Slovakia; calls on the Slovak Government to reconsider these amendments in the light of their potential consequences for the rule of law and the Union’s financial interests as well as the EU anti-corruption framework; recalls that any criminal reform must contain sufficient and adequate safeguards to ensure the continuation and effectiveness of new and ongoing criminal cases, especially in relation to high-level corruption, and to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of the prosecution in line with the Commission recommendations in subsequent rule of law reports; expresses concern that the assignment of the cases of the Special Prosecutor will lead to considerable delays and some cases may collapse in view of the statute of limitations;

Added:11. Notes the actions of the Spanish Government linked to it being sworn into office recently, including the future adoption of an amnesty law; acknowledges the questions, opinions and concerns expressed by various stakeholders in reaction to these developments, including by associations of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, academics, civil society and the general public; notes that the Commission has also written to the Spanish Government to request explanations; underlines that this merits an independent assessment; calls on the Spanish Government, in this regard, to provide full transparency to the European institutions about this amnesty law and notes that the Spanish Senate has asked for an opinion of the Venice Commission regarding its constitutionality and compliance with European rules and standards; regrets also the long-standing blocking situation of the Council for the Judiciary, on which the Commission has made specific recommendations to the Spanish authorities in its rule of law report;

Corruption

Change 2

Changed:4.12. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to the rule of law and severely undermines trust in democracy and equality before the law; calls on the Member States and the Commission to doincrease muchtheir moreefforts to eradicate corruption;

Change 3

Removed:5. Regrets that, despite all Member States having anti-corruption strategies in place, perceptions of corruption vary greatly across the EU, with Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands ranking among the least corrupt, while the perceived levels of corruption in Bulgaria, Malta, Hungary, Greece and Slovenia are worrying; notes as well with concern that the Commission finds that some Member States, such as Bulgaria, Malta, Hungary, Greece and Slovenia, have yet to establish a solid track record in the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption cases that lead to final convictions that have a deterrent effect;

Added:13. Underlines that the 2022 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with a large proportion of Europeans believing that corruption is widespread in their country (68 %) and that the level of corruption has increased (41 %); appreciates that all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place, which are regularly evaluated and reviewed; recalls that not only a sound legal framework, but also effective implementation are needed to eradicate corrupt practices and that the prevention of such practices also requires transparent and accountable governance and integrity frameworks;

Removed:6. Underlines that Member State government and EU officials should set an example by refraining from any corrupt practices and that there should be no government or political interference in corruption investigations; points out that EU officials as well may be involved in corruption, as demonstrated by ‘Qatargate’, therefore reiterates its demand for the annual report to also cover the EU institutions;

Added:14. Regrets the fact that, despite all Member States having anti-corruption strategies in place, perceptions of corruption vary greatly across the EU, with Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands ranking among the least corrupt, while the perceived levels of corruption in Bulgaria, Malta, Hungary, Greece and Slovenia are worrying29; notes, also with concern, that the Commission finds that some Member States, such as Bulgaria, Malta, Hungary, Greece and Slovenia, have yet to establish a solid track record in the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption cases that lead to final convictions that have a deterrent effect; notes that GRECO recently published a report on Cyprus, highlighting the lack of actual effectiveness of the anti-corruption legislation and pointing out specific risks within law enforcement;

Removed:7. Condemns the fact that Malta continues to operate its Citizenship by Investment (CBI) scheme, which is a major risk for corruption and other crimes, especially in light of the steps taken by several other Member States to ensure that investor citizenship schemes are abolished; reaffirms its position that the Commission should use its prerogative to propose legislation and initiate an EU legislative ban on all CBI Schemes in the EU;

Added:15. Underlines that Member State government and EU officials, politicians, elected representatives and leaders should set an example by refraining from any corrupt practices and that there should be no government or political interference in corruption investigations; calls on the DFRMG to follow up on Parliament resolutions on the rule of law to help combat impunity for corruption; points out that EU officials, politicians, elected representatives and leaders may also be involved in corruption, as demonstrated by Qatargate; reiterates, therefore, its demand for the annual report to also cover the EU institutions; reiterates its call on the Commission to finalise negotiations on the EU’s full membership of GRECO as soon as possible;

Removed:8. Considers that membership of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) should be a precondition for receiving EU funds; reiterates its call for an expansion of the mandate of EPPO;

Added:16. Stresses that citizens and businesses should feel safe to report cases of corruption, in particular through whistleblowing; notes that the Commission finds that there are still major obstacles to whistleblowing across the EU, although some Member States, such as Slovakia, Cyprus, Denmark and Malta, have taken steps to try and improve this situation; calls on the Slovak Government to respect the binding principles of the EU Whistleblower Directive and to reconsider the proposed changes in the protection of whistleblowers in Slovakia; expresses particular concern about whistleblowers being retroactively stripped of their protection, resulting in a lack of legal certainty; notes that the whistleblower office has flagged the issues to the Commission;

Removed:9. Notes that corruption may involve national authorities, including judicial and police authorities, who are the very authorities who are supposed to be combating it; considers that EU bodies, such as Europol, could play an important role in investigating corruption and securing evidence, but that the requirement for national approval of Europol involvement is an obstacle; calls for the reinforcement of the Europol mandate to enable it to investigate corruption cases of the kind described above;

Added:17. Condemns the fact that Malta continues to operate its citizenship by investment (CBI) scheme, which brings a major risk of corruption and other crimes, especially in the light of the steps taken by several other Member States to ensure that investor citizenship schemes are abolished; notes the pending action brought before the CJEU by the Commission against Malta for its CBI scheme and reaffirms its position that the Commission should use its prerogative to propose legislation and initiate an EU legislative ban on all CBI schemes in the EU;

Added:18. Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union, and encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in subsequent reports; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO; considers that membership of the EPPO should be a precondition for receiving EU funds; reiterates its call for an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO;

Added:19. Finds that European bodies, such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) should improve their cooperation to prevent corruption both in the EU Member States and in the European institutions; calls also, in this context, for the creation of an effective EU ethics body;

Added:20. Notes that corruption may involve national authorities, including judicial and police authorities – the very authorities that are supposed to be combating it; remains concerned, in this regard, that slow and limited progress has been made in eliminating the culture of impunity at the highest level in Malta, as identified by the independent public inquiry into the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia; considers that EU bodies, such as Europol, play an important role in investigating corruption and gathering evidence, but that the requirement for national approval of Europol involvement is an obstacle; calls for the reinforcement of the Europol mandate to enable it to investigate corruption cases of the kind described above; stresses the importance of oversight of Europol being guaranteed at EU level, of EU independent accountability mechanisms, bodies and agencies being strengthened and of democratic scrutiny of Europol’s activities being improved, including by the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group, including a systematic evaluation of all the activities of the agency and compliance with its mandate, as well as the duty to follow up on recommendations issued by Parliament to the agency;

Added:21. Welcomes the Commission’s anti-corruption proposals, which respond to Parliament’s calls to step up the fight against corruption; notes that the Commission intends to mainstream the prevention of corruption in the development of EU policies and programmes and to actively support Member States’ efforts to implement sound anti-corruption policies and legislation; welcomes the willingness to address the cross-border dimension of corruption by criminalising corruption offences and harmonising penalties across the EU;

Added:22. Stresses that corruption and money laundering are intrinsically linked and that money laundering is one of the most important enablers of the illegal activities of organised crime and thus an attack on the rule of law through which criminals transfer the proceeds of crime into the legal economy; is aware that fraud against the EU budget can also be a precursor to money laundering; reaffirms its firm belief that only by strengthening the EU’s anti-fraud architecture and increasing transparency in the European institutions can the protection of the EU’s financial interests be effectively and efficiently pursued and strengthened, overcoming the inherent limitations of national systems which are not sufficient to counter increasingly transnational attacks on the Union’s financial interests;

Independent authorities

Change 4

Changed:10.23. Highlights that checks and balances can only function when constitutional courts, ombudspersons, national human rights institutions, audit offices,firms, equality bodies and all other independent authorities are able to function and have sufficiently broad mandates, independence, integrity and adequate funding;

Change 5

Changed:11.24. Notes that the Commission finds that the situation concerning ombudspersons, national human rights institutions, equality bodies and other independent authorities varies greatly among the Member States, with some developments in the right direction in Cyprus, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Poland, with challenges remaining in Lithuania, Hungary and Croatia, with still no national human rights institution established atin allline with the UN Paris Principles in Italy, Czechia, Malta and Romania, with delays in appointments in various independent authorities in Bulgaria, Spain and Austria, and with Poland putting the effective functioning of the Supreme Audit Office at risk; notesnotes, with great concernconcern, the recent developments in Greece, where independent authorities such as the Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE) and the Greek Data Protection Authority have been under increasing pressure due to their work concerning the illegitimate use of spyware, with the ADAE’s Boardboard Membersmembers having been replaced hurriedly replaced recently by the Greek Parliament, apparently becauseas a result of the ADAE’s imminent decision to impose a fine on the Greek intelligence agency;

Media pluralism and media freedom

25. Highlights that without media pluralism and media freedom, democratic life and the rule of law cannot survive;

Change 6

Changed:13.26. UnderlinesConsiders that the importancetransparency of transparencymedia ofownership is the basic minimum to preserve media ownership;pluralism; notes that the Commission finds thatthat, since the 2022 Rulerule of Lawlaw reportreport, new legislation increasing the transparency of media ownership or improving public availability of media ownership information has been adopted in Greece, Luxembourg,Luxembourg and Sweden and that such legislation has been strengthened in Cyprus, while in Bulgaria, CzechiaCyprus; andnotes Francethat change remains pending;pending notesin asBulgaria, wellCzechia thatand France; encourages the CommissionEuropean findsinstitutions thatto mediafinally regulatorsadopt areand protectedimplement bya insufficientrobust safeguardsand againstambitious undueMedia politicalFreedom influenceAct andto thatensure the authorities lackharmonisation resources,of particularlytransparency inof Hungary,media Slovenia,ownership Poland,legislation Greeceat andEU Romania;level;

Change 7

Removed:14. Stresses the importance of the editorial independence of public service media and the duty of all Member States to respect this;

Added:27. Notes that the Commission finds that media regulators are insufficiently protected by safeguards against undue political influence, such as in Hungary, Slovenia and Poland, and that the authorities lack resources, particularly in Greece and Romania; calls on the Commission to take all the necessary measures to ensure the effective implementation of Article 30 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, stipulating the requirement of safeguards for the independence of national regulatory authorities;

Added:28. Stresses the importance of the editorial independence of public service media and the duty of all Member States to respect this; stresses the need to establish safeguards against internal and external interferences; considers that public service media should be shielded against political pressures, including undue dismissals, and that safeguards should be put in place to guarantee that editorial decisions can be taken freely; notes that the Commission finds that Luxembourg, Slovenia, Germany, Estonia, Slovakia and Czechia have taken initiatives to strengthen the legal safeguards or budgetary means to improve the independence of national public service broadcasters, with Cyprus, Ireland and Sweden also discussing reforms, and an absence of measures to that effect in Romania, Malta, Poland and Hungary; notes that the most recent Media Pluralism Monitor rated the risk to editorial autonomy and political independence in Malta as ‘high’, and re-evaluated the overall risk to media pluralism in Malta, changing it from ‘medium’ to ‘high’;

Added:29. Notes, with concern, the planned restructuring of the Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS), the country’s main public broadcaster; underscores the importance of maintaining free, independent media as a cornerstone of a democratic society; regrets the decision of the Slovak Prime Minister and several government officials to halt communication with key media outlets, recognising this as a significant impediment to the public’s right to receive relevant governmental information; emphasises that such actions curtail media freedom and transparency and contribute to the spread of manipulative disinformation in public spaces;

30. Calls on the Council and the Commission to provide adequate funding for independent and European-wide quality journalism at national, regional and local levels;

Protection of journalists

Change 8

Changed:16.31. Recalls that independent journalism is a vital element of the democratic rule of law as part of the essential checks and balances and an element of public scrutiny; expresses its concerns at the deliberate attempts of several governments and economic powers to silence journalists who are exposing wrongdoing; stresses that unwarranted interference and pressure, fear and self-censorship have a chilling effect on the exercise of journalistic freedom of expression;

Change 9

Changed:17.32. Regrets the worrying trends in the safety of journalists in several Member States; notes that the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists has registered more than 1 600 threat alerts since 2015; regrets the intimidation of journalistjournalists during election campaigns, such as recently happened in the election in Slovakia; regrets Malta’s failure to improve the working conditions of journalists since the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, including the failure to effectively implement all the recommendations of the public inquiry report of 29 July 2021; calls on Slovak government officials to refrain from verbal attacks on individuals; underscores the duty of public and government officials to serve all citizens, especially in a country with a history of hate crime and the murder of a journalist;

Change 10

Removed:18. Regrets that despite concerns raised by various international organisations, Malta’s proposed anti-SLAPP provisions are not sufficient to protect the work of journalists; calls on the Greek government to address the serious challenges identified by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), an alliance that tracks, monitors and reacts to violations of press and media freedom, in particular related to arbitrary surveillance, impunity or crimes against journalists, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), media independence and pluralism; notes with great concern the recent detention of a reporter by the French authorities, apparently for the purpose of uncovering her sources, as well as the illegal wiretapping of a Dutch journalist working for ‘De Correspondent’;

Added:33. Is alarmed by the persistence of SLAPPs across the European Union; calls on the Member States to implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 and adopt domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings; remarks that this can be done by removing prison sentences for defamation cases, decriminalising defamation and favouring civil or administrative procedures instead; welcomes the political agreement between the EU co-legislators on the anti-SLAPP directive; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of proposing further legislation to cover all SLAPP cases, including domestic cases; regrets that despite concerns raised by various international organisations, Malta’s proposed anti-SLAPP provisions are deemed not sufficient to protect the work of journalists ; reiterates its call on some Maltese politicians, including the former Maltese prime minister, to withdraw the libel cases inherited by Daphne Caruana Galizia’s heirs that are still ongoing several years after her assassination;

Removed:19. Calls for the EU institutions to reach a swift agreement on an ambitious anti-SLAPP directive; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of further legislation to cover all SLAPP cases;

Added:34. Calls on the Greek Government to address the serious challenges identified by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), an alliance that tracks, monitors and reacts to violations of press and media freedom, in particular related to arbitrary surveillance, impunity or crimes against journalists, SLAPPs, media independence and pluralism; notes with great concern the recent detention of a reporter by the French authorities, apparently for the purpose of uncovering her sources, as well as the illegal wiretapping of a Dutch journalist working for ‘De Correspondent’;

Change 11

Changed:20.35. Strongly condemns the lack of seriousa decisive breakthrough in the investigation into the murder of Giorgos Karaivaz; notes that the two alleged killers were arrested more than two years after the murder on the basis of evidence that appears to have been available to the police the entire time; considers that the mastermind behind the murder has still not been identified; notes that Karaivaz – like Daphne Caruana Galizia and Ján Kuciak – was investigating corruption and crime, and may have made enemies in high places, including in political circles; points out that the suspected mastermind of the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia has still not been tried,convicted, nor have all the cases of corruption and crime she was investigating been adequately addressed by the authorities;

Change 12

Changed:21.36. Condemns the illegal surveillance of journalists, in particular by means of spyware; is dismayed at the Commission'sCommission’s refusal to implement all the recommendations of the Pegasus Special Inquiry Committee and considers it a failure to act; reiterates its call on the Commission to assess the fulfilment of the specific conditions for Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Spain set out in the Recommendation, the deadline for which was 30 November 2023; points out that in none of the many hundreds of cases of abuse of spyware against journalists, activists, politicians, lawyers and other political targets, has justice been served; concludes therefore that, contrary to the Commission'sCommission’s assumption, many national authorities are neither willing nor able to address the matter, leaving the victims without effective remedy and democracy unprotected; is deeply concerned at the chilling effect of the impunity of spyware abuse on journalists and their sources; underlines that the illegitimate use of spyware by national governments directly and indirectly affects the integrity of decision-making, thereby undermining European Union democracy and highlighting the urgency for the greater transparency and legal accountability of the surveillance industry;

Change 13

Added:37. Recalls that the trade in and use of spyware need to be regulated strictly, that the use of spyware by Member States must be proportionate and must not be arbitrary, and that surveillance must only be authorised in narrowly, pre-determined circumstances; considers that effective ex ante mechanisms to ensure judicial oversight are critical to protecting individual freedoms; reaffirms that individual rights cannot be put at risk by permitting unfettered access to surveillance; underlines that the ability of the judiciary to perform meaningful and effective ex post oversight in the area of requests for surveillance for national security is also important in order to ensure that the disproportionate use of spyware by governments can be challenged;

38. Stresses that the impact of the illegitimate use of spyware is much more pronounced in Member States where the authorities that would usually be tasked with investigating, providing redress to persons targeted and ensuring accountability, are captured by the state and where a rule of law crisis exists and the independence of the judiciary is endangered, such that the national authorities cannot be relied upon; calls therefore on the Commission to put in place dedicated country-specific monitoring and recommendations related to Member States’ unlawful use of spyware in the rule of law report, assessing the responsiveness of state institutions to provide redress to targeted persons;