What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Changed:11.24. Notes that the Commission finds that the situation concerning ombudspersons, national human rights institutions, equality bodies and other independent authorities varies greatly among the Member States, with some developments in the right direction in Cyprus, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Poland, with challenges remaining in Lithuania, Hungary and Croatia, with still no national human rights institution established atin allline with the UN Paris Principles in Italy, Czechia, Malta and Romania, with delays in appointments in various independent authorities in Bulgaria, Spain and Austria, and with Poland putting the effective functioning of the Supreme Audit Office at risk; notesnotes, with great concernconcern, the recent developments in Greece, where independent authorities such as the Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE) and the Greek Data Protection Authority have been under increasing pressure due to their work concerning the illegitimate use of spyware, with the ADAE’s Boardboard Membersmembers having been replaced hurriedly replaced recently by the Greek Parliament, apparently becauseas a result of the ADAE’s imminent decision to impose a fine on the Greek intelligence agency;

Changed:13.26. UnderlinesConsiders that the importancetransparency of transparencymedia ofownership is the basic minimum to preserve media ownership;pluralism; notes that the Commission finds thatthat, since the 2022 Rulerule of Lawlaw reportreport, new legislation increasing the transparency of media ownership or improving public availability of media ownership information has been adopted in Greece, Luxembourg,Luxembourg and Sweden and that such legislation has been strengthened in Cyprus, while in Bulgaria, CzechiaCyprus; andnotes Francethat change remains pending;pending notesin asBulgaria, wellCzechia thatand France; encourages the CommissionEuropean findsinstitutions thatto mediafinally regulatorsadopt areand protectedimplement bya insufficientrobust safeguardsand againstambitious undueMedia politicalFreedom influenceAct andto thatensure the authorities lackharmonisation resources,of particularlytransparency inof Hungary,media Slovenia,ownership Poland,legislation Greeceat andEU Romania;level;

Removed:14. Stresses the importance of the editorial independence of public service media and the duty of all Member States to respect this;

Added:27. Notes that the Commission finds that media regulators are insufficiently protected by safeguards against undue political influence, such as in Hungary, Slovenia and Poland, and that the authorities lack resources, particularly in Greece and Romania; calls on the Commission to take all the necessary measures to ensure the effective implementation of Article 30 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, stipulating the requirement of safeguards for the independence of national regulatory authorities;

Added:28. Stresses the importance of the editorial independence of public service media and the duty of all Member States to respect this; stresses the need to establish safeguards against internal and external interferences; considers that public service media should be shielded against political pressures, including undue dismissals, and that safeguards should be put in place to guarantee that editorial decisions can be taken freely; notes that the Commission finds that Luxembourg, Slovenia, Germany, Estonia, Slovakia and Czechia have taken initiatives to strengthen the legal safeguards or budgetary means to improve the independence of national public service broadcasters, with Cyprus, Ireland and Sweden also discussing reforms, and an absence of measures to that effect in Romania, Malta, Poland and Hungary; notes that the most recent Media Pluralism Monitor rated the risk to editorial autonomy and political independence in Malta as ‘high’, and re-evaluated the overall risk to media pluralism in Malta, changing it from ‘medium’ to ‘high’;

Added:29. Notes, with concern, the planned restructuring of the Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS), the country’s main public broadcaster; underscores the importance of maintaining free, independent media as a cornerstone of a democratic society; regrets the decision of the Slovak Prime Minister and several government officials to halt communication with key media outlets, recognising this as a significant impediment to the public’s right to receive relevant governmental information; emphasises that such actions curtail media freedom and transparency and contribute to the spread of manipulative disinformation in public spaces;

Changed:16.31. Recalls that independent journalism is a vital element of the democratic rule of law as part of the essential checks and balances and an element of public scrutiny; expresses its concerns at the deliberate attempts of several governments and economic powers to silence journalists who are exposing wrongdoing; stresses that unwarranted interference and pressure, fear and self-censorship have a chilling effect on the exercise of journalistic freedom of expression;

Changed:17.32. Regrets the worrying trends in the safety of journalists in several Member States; notes that the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists has registered more than 1 600 threat alerts since 2015; regrets the intimidation of journalistjournalists during election campaigns, such as recently happened in the election in Slovakia; regrets Malta’s failure to improve the working conditions of journalists since the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, including the failure to effectively implement all the recommendations of the public inquiry report of 29 July 2021; calls on Slovak government officials to refrain from verbal attacks on individuals; underscores the duty of public and government officials to serve all citizens, especially in a country with a history of hate crime and the murder of a journalist;

Removed:18. Regrets that despite concerns raised by various international organisations, Malta’s proposed anti-SLAPP provisions are not sufficient to protect the work of journalists; calls on the Greek government to address the serious challenges identified by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), an alliance that tracks, monitors and reacts to violations of press and media freedom, in particular related to arbitrary surveillance, impunity or crimes against journalists, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), media independence and pluralism; notes with great concern the recent detention of a reporter by the French authorities, apparently for the purpose of uncovering her sources, as well as the illegal wiretapping of a Dutch journalist working for ‘De Correspondent’;

Added:33. Is alarmed by the persistence of SLAPPs across the European Union; calls on the Member States to implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 and adopt domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings; remarks that this can be done by removing prison sentences for defamation cases, decriminalising defamation and favouring civil or administrative procedures instead; welcomes the political agreement between the EU co-legislators on the anti-SLAPP directive; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of proposing further legislation to cover all SLAPP cases, including domestic cases; regrets that despite concerns raised by various international organisations, Malta’s proposed anti-SLAPP provisions are deemed not sufficient to protect the work of journalists ; reiterates its call on some Maltese politicians, including the former Maltese prime minister, to withdraw the libel cases inherited by Daphne Caruana Galizia’s heirs that are still ongoing several years after her assassination;

Removed:19. Calls for the EU institutions to reach a swift agreement on an ambitious anti-SLAPP directive; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of further legislation to cover all SLAPP cases;

Added:34. Calls on the Greek Government to address the serious challenges identified by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), an alliance that tracks, monitors and reacts to violations of press and media freedom, in particular related to arbitrary surveillance, impunity or crimes against journalists, SLAPPs, media independence and pluralism; notes with great concern the recent detention of a reporter by the French authorities, apparently for the purpose of uncovering her sources, as well as the illegal wiretapping of a Dutch journalist working for ‘De Correspondent’;

Changed:20.35. Strongly condemns the lack of seriousa decisive breakthrough in the investigation into the murder of Giorgos Karaivaz; notes that the two alleged killers were arrested more than two years after the murder on the basis of evidence that appears to have been available to the police the entire time; considers that the mastermind behind the murder has still not been identified; notes that Karaivaz – like Daphne Caruana Galizia and Ján Kuciak – was investigating corruption and crime, and may have made enemies in high places, including in political circles; points out that the suspected mastermind of the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia has still not been tried,convicted, nor have all the cases of corruption and crime she was investigating been adequately addressed by the authorities;

Changed:21.36. Condemns the illegal surveillance of journalists, in particular by means of spyware; is dismayed at the Commission'sCommission’s refusal to implement all the recommendations of the Pegasus Special Inquiry Committee and considers it a failure to act; reiterates its call on the Commission to assess the fulfilment of the specific conditions for Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Spain set out in the Recommendation, the deadline for which was 30 November 2023; points out that in none of the many hundreds of cases of abuse of spyware against journalists, activists, politicians, lawyers and other political targets, has justice been served; concludes therefore that, contrary to the Commission'sCommission’s assumption, many national authorities are neither willing nor able to address the matter, leaving the victims without effective remedy and democracy unprotected; is deeply concerned at the chilling effect of the impunity of spyware abuse on journalists and their sources; underlines that the illegitimate use of spyware by national governments directly and indirectly affects the integrity of decision-making, thereby undermining European Union democracy and highlighting the urgency for the greater transparency and legal accountability of the surveillance industry;

Added:37. Recalls that the trade in and use of spyware need to be regulated strictly, that the use of spyware by Member States must be proportionate and must not be arbitrary, and that surveillance must only be authorised in narrowly, pre-determined circumstances; considers that effective ex ante mechanisms to ensure judicial oversight are critical to protecting individual freedoms; reaffirms that individual rights cannot be put at risk by permitting unfettered access to surveillance; underlines that the ability of the judiciary to perform meaningful and effective ex post oversight in the area of requests for surveillance for national security is also important in order to ensure that the disproportionate use of spyware by governments can be challenged;

Changed:23.39. Regrets the continuous difficulties that many citizens, journalists and parliamentarians in many Member States face in obtaining information and access to documents; underlines thatthat, too oftenoften, public authorities are deliberately frustratingfrustrate access to information and documents, such as by disproportionately delaying decisions or giving only artificial access by only making information only partially available; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have taken initiatives to better regulate access to information, such as in Czechia, Lithuania and Slovakia, and certain others are working towards improvements in this area, such as Germany, Spain, Croatia, Luxembourg and Hungary; notes, however, that some Member States still do not fully address concerns, such as Malta, Austria and Finland; reiterates its call on the Maltese Government to withdraw its appeals against a series of freedom of information requests filed by The Shift News;

Added:40. Calls on the EU institutions to show exemplary behaviour when it comes to access to information and documents; notes in this regard the recent European Ombudsman’s Special Report concerning the time the European Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents, following her strategic inquiry into this matter in which she found maladministration because the Commission showed systemic and significant delays in dealing with confirmatory applications; calls on the Commission to address this recurrent problem once and for all;

Added:41. Encourages the Member States to regulate lobbying, such as by introducing national mandatory transparency registers for all politicians, members and officials of governments, authorities and agencies; encourages politicians, government officials and officials of authorities and agencies to make public a list of all their meetings;

Added:Economic dimension of the rule of law

Added:42. Calls for the strengthening of the principle of the rule of law in the internal market; underlines that reliable and stable rule-of-law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and therefore for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the European Union; regrets Member States’ measures in this area that violate Union law, such as certain protectionist measures;

Changed:24.47. Acknowledges the crucial role civil society and a healthy civic space play in upholding and protecting the rule of law, and reiterates its call for a separate chapter to be dedicated to the condition of civil society in Member States; notes that the Commission finds that Malta, Ireland, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Germany have announced or initiated efforts to improve the framework for civil society, and finds that civil society faces particular challenges in Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy and France, and continued authoritarian and serious systemic restrictions in Hungary and Poland; calls on all Member States to accept civil society organisations (CSOs) as important stakeholders in democratic life and to create an enabling environment for civil society;

Changed:25.48. Calls on the Commission to further invest, through dedicated funding, in building capacity for CSOs to monitor and report on the rule of law situation in the Member States, such as through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme, and to ensure adequate protection to CSOs engaging in this process; is concerned that the biased distribution of funding in certain countries impacts CSOs working on promoting the rights of vulnerable groups or working, more generally, for causes that governments do not support; encourages a thorough assessment of these issues in all countries covered by the report and stresses the need for country recommendations to address these issues; urges the Commission to consider direct management of EU funds, in order to ensure that eligible beneficiaries, such as CSOs, businesses and local authorities, receive the EU funding intended for them;

Removed:The protection of minorities

Added:49. Welcomes the Commission proposal for a Directive on European cross-border associations (COM(2023)0516) and commits to prioritising its adoption; urges the Commission, further, to establish a strategy providing for minimum standards for the protection of CSOs in all Member States in order to promote a regulatory and political environment free from threats and attacks, and to provide them with sustainable and non-discriminatory access to resources while supporting and encouraging their engagement in civil dialogue and participation in policy-making;

Added:50. Is deeply concerned about plans announced by the Slovak Government to adopt legislation that would undermine the civic space, including by restricting the work of NGOs and stigmatising organisations in receipt of foreign funding;

Added:51. Deplores the fact that the situation of human rights defenders in the EU has continued to increasingly deteriorate in recent years; urges the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that human rights defenders are able to work free from hindrance and insecurity;

Removed:27. Calls on the EU Member States to make the protection of LGBTIQ+ rights a real and cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to use all means available to ensure that LGBTIQ rights are respected throughout the EU, including the use of infringement procedures against Member States; calls on Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion’s 12 recommendations to combat hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people as well as the recommendations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance; notes the recent Romanian draft law, aiming to comply with the CJEU’s 2018 Coman ruling, as well as the criticism that the draft law implements that ruling only very narrowly and that it does not guarantee equal rights for same-sex couples;

Added:59. Stresses the necessity to fight against all types of discrimination, hate speech and crimes specifically targeting minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities; calls on the Commission to include a specific new pillar on this in the next report, mapping all forms of xenophobia, racism, antisemitism, islamophobia, anti-gypsyism, LGBTIQ-phobia, hate speech and discrimination across all Member States;

Added:60. Is alarmed by the recent surge in antisemitism, including acts of violence, intimidation and symbols of hate displayed in public spaces;

Added:61. Is also alarmed by the level of islamophobia in the EU, including smear campaigns and disinformation;

Removed:29. Calls on the Commission to include a specific new pillar on the protection of minorities in the next report, mapping all forms of xenophobia, racism, antisemitism, islamophobia, anti-gypsyism, and LGBTIQ-phobia across all Member States;

Added:68. Stresses that gender-based violence, both online and offline, is a particularly serious crime and a widespread violation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Union which needs to be addressed with greater efficiency and determination on a common basis; stresses that gender-based violence is the result of societal and systemic structural gender inequalities that have a cross-border dimension; points, in particular, to the growing anti-gender, anti-LGBTIQ+ and anti-feminist movements, which are well-organised and have a cross-border nature; considers, in addition, that the cross-border dimension of gender-based cyber violence and the great individual, economic and societal impact of gender-based violence across all Member States reaffirm the need to combat gender-based violence in its multiple dimensions on a common Union basis;

Removed:30. Expresses its disappointment at the Commission’s slowness to address non-compliance with fundamental rights laws and case law by Member States; rejects the Commission’s interpretation that the refusal of national authorities to comply with Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings in fundamental rights cases are to be considered ‘individual cases’ and not to be addressed by infringement procedures; urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of EU human rights law, and not to rely on ‘private enforcement’;

Added:69. Stresses that the failure to combat violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence on a common basis also results from the lack of minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions; notes that this includes a common definition of gender-based violence, minimum rules concerning key issues of prevention, underreporting, victim protection, support and reparation, and the prosecution of perpetrators; underlines that the approaches and levels of commitment of Member States to prevent and combat gender-based violence vary significantly and that, therefore, a common-basis approach would also contribute to law enforcement in cross-border operations;

Changed:32.75. Notes that the proper enforcement of all EU law is the very precondition for a union based on the rule of law; condemns the sometimes open and unashamed non-compliance of several Member States with EU law in various fields, such as the right to effective judicial protection, anti-corruption laws, asylum, the implementation of sanctions, and human rights law; underlines that this risks making the EU a lawlessan zone,area where some Member States feel more equal than others and citizens’ EU rights and freedoms are not evenly protected;

Changed:34.77. Strongly regrets the fact that the Commission is not taking stronger action to enforce EU law; calls therefore on the Commission to step up the number of new infringement procedures and to push forward existing infringement procedures with more audacity and urgency; calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU; calls on the Commission not to use ‘dialogue’ with Member States or the ‘pilot’ procedure as an open-ended means to avoid launching actual infringement procedures; calls on the Commission to revise its policypolicy, –outlined whichin hasits no2022 basiscommunication inon theenforcing TreatiesEU –law, not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ cases,redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also as most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues;

Changed:35.78. Notes the persistent problem of the incomplete implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)ECtHR judgments, noting the recent decisions of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers[1];Ministers; welcomes the inclusion of the systemic indicators on the implementation of ECtHR leading judgments in the rule of law report since its 2022 edition; calls on the Commission, however, to set up a scoreboard dedicated to monitoring the implementation of each and every CJEU and ECHRECtHR judgment relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to fully integrate it into the annual rule of law report; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments without delay, and calls on the Commission to assess the consequences for the compliance with EU law and to take infringement action where needed;

Changed:The ruleRule of lawLaw report as a tool

Changed:36. Recognises79. thatWelcomes the rule of law report has becomeas a benchmarkcrucial forcornerstone of the EU institutions’rule workof onlaw toolbox and commends the Commission for delivering a diligently researched and well-written report; recalls that the annual rule of law issuesreport was introduced in response to a Parliament resolution adopted on the EUbasis andof ina specificlegislative Memberown-initiative States;report in 2016;

Changed:37.80. AcknowledgesRecognises that the Commission's rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inceptiona inbenchmark 2020;for regrets,the however,EU thatinstitutions’ thework 2023on editionrule of thelaw reportissues wasin notthe significantlyEU expandedand byin addingspecific aMember comprehensiveStates; newacknowledges pillar;the reiteratesCommission’s itscontinuous positioncommitment thatthroughout the reportyears shouldto coverenhancing the full scoperelevance of the values ofreport, Articlesuch 2as TEU,by asits theseinclusion cannotof becountry-specific seenrecommendations in isolation;the callsprevious onedition theand Commissionan toassessment expandof thetheir scopefulfilment ofin the report nextcurrent year;report;

Removed:38. Is concerned that the Commission, in its effort to be factual and even-handed, sometimes ends up being too diplomatic and imprecise when identifying rule of law problems in Member States; regrets that the use of euphemistic language and the artificially equal number of conclusions and recommendations per Member State conceals the very real differences between Member States; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of the recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; notes the sometimes stark differences between the summaries of country chapters and the in-depth content of the chapters themselves, suggesting an editorial intervention;

Added:81. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from the 2016 Parliament resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; calls on the Commission to take steps to address this; regrets, in particular, that the 2023 edition of the report was not significantly expanded by adding a comprehensive new pillar; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s 2016 Rule of Law Checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year;

Removed:39. Reaffirms that many of these challenges could be overcome by involving an independent panel of experts in the drafting of the report, as they would be less bound by diplomatic considerations; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on this point and to explore all possibilities to involve independent experts in subsequent editions of the rule of law report;

Added:82. Is concerned that the Commission, in its effort to be factual and even-handed, sometimes ends up being too diplomatic and imprecise when identifying rule of law problems in Member States; regrets that the use of euphemistic language and the artificial equal number of conclusions and recommendations per Member State conceals the very real differences between Member States; reiterates the recommendation to differentiate between systemic and individual breaches, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law; calls on the Commission to make clear that when the Article 2 TEU values are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of the recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; reiterates the need to set out a timeline, targets and concrete actions for the implementation of the recommendations and to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance; notes the sometimes stark differences between the summaries of country chapters and the in-depth content of the chapters themselves, suggesting an editorial intervention;

Changed:41.90. Takes note of the Council’s ongoing evaluation of its rule of law dialogue and the Council’s stated position that it will consider further possible interinstitutional cooperation in that context; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive, by inviting other institutions and stakeholders to its sessions, in particular Council of Europe bodies such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner, as well as representatives of the European Parliament;

Changed:42.91. Regrets that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected Parliament'sParliament’s offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law;law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement;

Added:93. Asks its Bureau, in the light of the reluctance of the Commission and the Council, to organise a public procurement procedure in order to create a temporary panel of independent experts under the auspices of Parliament, in line with the commitment undertaken in its previous resolutions, in order to advise Parliament on compliance with the values under Article 2 TEU in various Member States and to show by example how such a panel could work in practice;

Changed:45.95. Calls on the Commission to include, strictly monitor and safeguard the DRF conditions in all budgetary instruments and processes; callsreaffirms onits serious concerns about the Commission indecision thisconsidering regardthat notthe tohorizontal unblockenabling anycondition cohesionof fundsthe forCharter Hungaryhad unlessbeen allfulfilled in relation to judicial independence, thus enabling conditionsthe haveHungarian beenauthorities fullyto metsubmit andreimbursement claims of up to EUR 10.2 billion, even though even following the judiciaryrecent inreforms, thatHungary Memberdoes Statenot canmeet bethe consideredstandard fullyof independentjudicial onindependence paperset andout in practice;the Charter; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation further and without delay where needed, and not to lift the measures adopted in the case of Hungary until all the preconditions and milestones have been effectively fulfilled; calls on the Commission to rigorously verify that the rule of law related milestones in the various Member State recovery and resilience plans are fulfilled as a condition for disbursing funding when Member States make payment requests; calls on the Commission to assign the primary responsibility for the application of these conditions to the Commissioners responsible for the rule of law;

Changed:46.96. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the CouncilCouncil, the governments of the Member States and the Commission.

Added:The founding values of our Union - democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights - cannot be taken for granted. They form the very pre-condition for our freedom, safety and prosperity. That is why they merit our defence every day.

Added:We see that these values are under increasing pressure in our Union. In some Member States, citizens can no longer count on an independent judiciary, free and fair elections, and the protection of their rights. Other Member States’ governments are on a similar path, slowly but steadily eroding institutional checks and balances. Independent journalists and minorities are always the first to suffer.

Added:Action needs to start from an independent and comprehensive monitoring of the situation. Following the Parliament’s 2016 proposal for the “Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Pact”, the Commission launched its first annual Rule of Law report in 2020. The Parliament welcomes this monitoring work of the Commission. It however also finds that the Commission is not painting a full and candid picture of the situation. Independent NGOs, academics, watchdogs and journalists often find the situation on the ground to diverge substantially from the Commission’s overly diplomatic language.

Added:This report of the European Parliament aims to cover a wide range of concerns, without shying away from mentioning specific situations and Member States. That is awkward sometimes, but it must be done if we are to tackle the problems head-on. It is also necessary if we are to have a meaningful dialogue with the other EU institutions and with Member States’ governments and parliaments. We can learn from each other. The EU is fortunately still a place where so many citizens and authorities care for democracy, the Rule of Law and fundamental rights. We need to have an open conversation and get out of our institutional trenches.