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EU Parl Watch

Changes between two versions

What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

From · draft committee report· 20 Oct 2025

JURI-PR-776862

on the European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2023 and 2024

To · plenary report· 10 Feb 2026

A-10-2026-0020

on the European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2023 and 2024

AI:What changed, in short

The new version expands recitals on conferral, values, and better lawmaking, and adds paragraphs on national parliaments' subsidiarity checks and AI in lawmaking.1235 It replaces the 'one in, two out' approach with calls for a more ambitious overarching approach, and adds many new paragraphs on competitiveness, SMEs, and simplification.38 It adds paragraphs on implementation dialogues, rule of law, impact assessments, and reporting obligations, and renumbers existing paragraphs.8 The other changes are wording or formal: a phrase shortened and a transition year rephrased.47

6 changes of substance · 0 formal · 2 of wording only

Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem

+63 added · −25 removed · 9 changed paragraphs, packaging included.

Part 1 of 3: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

4 unchanged paragraphs

on the European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2023 and 2024

(2025/2015(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality enshrined therein,

Changed:– having regard to Protocol No 1 to the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the role of national parliaments in the European Union1,

Changed:– having regard to Protocol No 2 to the Treaty on the Functioning of theTEU Europeanand UnionTFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality2,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making3,

Changed:– having regard to the Commission 2023 annual report 2023 of 25 October 2024 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on relations with national parliaments (COM(2024)0493),

Changed:– having regard to the Commission 2024 annual report 2024 of 8 September 2025 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on relations with national parliaments (COM(2025)0473),

– having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law Making covering the years 2017, 2018 and 20194,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2020, 2021 and 20225,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments6,

Changed:– having regard to all the previous Commission communicationscommunication onof the29 needApril for2021 betterentitled regulation‘Better inregulation: orderJoining forces to achievemake better results for the benefit of EUlaws’ citizens,(COM(2021)0219),

Removed:– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe’ (the Draghi report),

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2022 entitled ‘Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws’7,

Removed:– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market’ (the Letta report),

Added:– having regard to the study entitled ‘The “one in, one out” principle’, published by its Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs in October 2023,

Added:– having regard to all previous Commission communications on the need for better regulation in order to achieve better results for the benefit of EU citizens,

Added:– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – a competitiveness strategy for Europe’ (the Draghi report),

Added:– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’ (the Letta report),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0020/2026),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas, in accordance with Article 5 TEU, the limits of EU competences are governed by the principle of conferral; whereas the use of EU competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas, under the principle of conferral, the EU is to act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein; whereas competences not conferred upon the EU in the Treaties remain with the Member States;

Change 2

Removed:B. whereas better law-making is a shared responsibility between the EU institutions and the Member States, requiring a commitment to transparency, proportionality and accountability;

Added:B. whereas EU legislation should be fit for purpose, proportionate, clear and comprehensive in order to effectively benefit citizens and stakeholders; whereas better regulation helps to ensure that EU policies and legislation are geared towards the future, taking account of the faster pace of technological, societal and environmental developments; whereas, therefore, it will be increasingly important to back up regulatory proposals with evidence-based assessments; whereas quality lawmaking should deliver for everyone as a long-term investment in the shared prosperity of our societies and our future;

Added:C. whereas EU lawmaking is driven by the values and requirements of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU; whereas the rule of law ensures that all Union action, including legislative and regulatory processes, is grounded in legality, transparency and effective judicial review;

Added:D. whereas better lawmaking is a common goal for all EU institutions and is a shared responsibility between the EU institutions and the Member States, and should be underpinned by transparency, proportionality, accountability and cooperation between the institutions and the Member States, citizens and stakeholders, while ensuring full respect for all fundamental European values, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights;

Added:E. whereas in her political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 of 18 July 2024, the President-elect stated that ‘future legislation must also be simplified and designed with small businesses in mind and in a spirit of subsidiarity’; whereas she also stated that ‘better lawmaking has to be a joint task – with all institutions involved and all of the legislative process covered’;

Added:F. whereas the Commission has made it clear in its various communications that better lawmaking requires ensuring that EU law and policymaking are based on sound evidence, involves stakeholders, including citizens and businesses, avoids imposing unnecessary burdens and brings tangible and sustainable benefits for EU citizens;

G. whereas national parliaments are the natural guardians of the principle of subsidiarity and play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality through interparliamentary dialogue and the Early Warning System, which allows national parliaments and/or chambers to submit a reasoned opinion if they believe a legislative proposal does not respect the principle of subsidiarity;

Change 3

Removed:D. whereas excessive regulatory burdens hinder the competitiveness, innovation and growth of EU companies, with particularly detrimental effects on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

Added:H. whereas, in accordance with Article 4 TEU, the EU and its Member States are bound by the principle of sincere cooperation, according to which they are to assist each other in carrying out tasks under the Treaties; whereas this includes the task of Member States taking any appropriate measure to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or EU acts;

Removed:E. whereas gold-plating practices undermine not only the uniform application of EU legislation but also citizens’ trust in the EU, and create excessive burdens;

Added:I. whereas the competitiveness, innovation and growth of EU companies should not be unnecessarily hindered by excessive regulatory burdens, which would lead to an outflow of investment and jobs outside the EU, with particularly detrimental effects on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); whereas legal predictability and legal certainty are essential for the single market to function; whereas the single market still faces barriers and fragmentation;

Removed:F. whereas the ‘one in, two out’ principle should not be understood as a numerical target for legislative acts, but rather as a cost-based mechanism aimed at achieving a tangible net reduction in regulatory costs; whereas the focus must remain on the total administrative, compliance and implementation costs imposed on businesses, ensuring that any new obligations are balanced by the double removal or simplification of current rules of equivalent cost;

Added:J. whereas transparent, accurate and uniform application of EU legislation is essential in fostering citizens’ trust in the EU, while avoiding creating unnecessary burdens and additional costs for anyone, including businesses and consumers; whereas under Article 197 TFEU, effective implementation must be regarded as a matter of common interest for the Member States; whereas Member States should avoid adding unnecessary additional administrative or compliance burdens when transposing EU legislation;

Added:K. whereas in 2021, the Commission introduced the ‘one in, one out’ approach with the intention of offsetting new burdens resulting from the Commission’s legislative proposals by removing already existing burdens in the same policy area; whereas this concept is not delivering as a tool for better regulation in its current form, in particular as it does not tackle legislative quality, which cannot be reduced to quantitative targets for the reduction of burdens and costs alone, and does not include the assessment of its possible effects on the current regulatory goals of the EU;

Added:L. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach should not be understood as a numerical target for legislative acts, but rather as a cost-based mechanism aimed at achieving a tangible net reduction in regulatory costs and improvements in the functioning of the EU market and society; whereas the focus must remain on the total administrative, compliance and implementation costs imposed on businesses, ensuring that any new obligations are offset; whereas the current ‘one in, one out’ approach is inadequate in this regard; whereas a more ambitious overarching approach should be established;

Added:M. whereas recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are transforming the manner in which EU law can be assessed and applied, evolving from limited, knowledge-based expert systems towards predictive and generative machine-learning models; whereas such technologies open new possibilities as well as challenges across the legislative cycle – including during pre-enactment analysis, impact forecasting, legislative drafting, public consultation and, in particular, during post-enactment monitoring – thereby offering significant opportunities to improve the timeliness, accuracy and depth of EU lawmaking if handled with due care and with respect for fundamental rights;

Added:N. whereas better lawmaking must aim to serve the EU’s political ambitions, especially its long-term objectives; whereas well carried out ex ante and ex post impact assessments, including in respect of social, economic and environmental impacts, and public consultations are essential tools for well-informed, better, efficient, accountable and transparent lawmaking; whereas the Regulatory Scrutiny Board is responsible for assessing the quality of impact assessments and of fitness checks and major evaluations to support political decision-making;

Subsidiarity and proportionality

Change 4

Changed:1. Recalls that, under the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 5 TEU, the EU has an obligation to legislate only where and to the extent necessary; recalls that the aim of this obligation is to legislate as closely as possible to the citizens of the EU, including both individuals and businesses;EU;

Change 5

Added:2. Recalls that better lawmaking is based on interinstitutional balance among the co-legislators and a shared commitment to sincere and transparent cooperation throughout the entire legislative cycle; notes that this is to be reflected in the setting or reviewing of multiannual priorities, and the yearly joint declaration on annual interinstitutional priorities; recalls that any intention by the Commission to withdraw pending legislative acts as announced in its annual work programmes needs to be duly reasoned and substantiated, allowing for the proper consultation of the EU’s co-legislators;

Added:3. Recalls that recourse to other legal bases than the ordinary legislative procedure is carefully framed in the Treaties; warns against any use of legislative processes specifically provided for emergency situations based on Article 122 TFEU beyond specific situations that necessitate swift reactions to unfolding crises;

Added:4. Recalls that evaluations, impact assessments and stakeholder consultations are key pillars of an efficient, responsible and democratic regulatory process;

5. Notes that in 2023, national parliaments submitted 22 reasoned opinions, a third less than in 2022, in line with the long-term downward trend in the number of reasoned opinions; notes that there was also an increase in the participation of national parliaments in the wider political dialogue with the Commission, representing an increase of over 10 % compared to 2022;

Change 6

Added:6. Notes that national parliaments have submitted only 577 subsidiarity checks and reasoned opinions, 3 803 contributions, three ‘yellow cards’ and no ‘orange cards’ since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009;

7. Notes that, in addition to the subsidiarity control mechanism established by Protocol No 2, the Commission put in place a political dialogue in 2006, through which 402 opinions were submitted in 2023; notes, furthermore, that in those submissions, national parliaments focused on the 2023 Commission work programme;

8. Notes that 2024 marked 15 years since the entry into force and application of the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced higher levels of parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability in the EU, notably through the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Change 7

Changed:5.9. Notes that 2024 was also a transition year between two Commission terms, during which the intensity of national parliamentary scrutiny typically decreases; notes that this was also the case in 2024, during which national parliaments submitted 252 opinions, of which 14 were reasoned opinions; notes that although this is a considerable decrease compared to 2023, it is not unusual for a transition year and was a more modest decrease compared to the previous transition year,year of 2019;

Change 8

Removed:6. Notes that in 2024, the very first action was brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union by a chamber of a national parliament requesting the annulment of a legislative act on the grounds that it exceeded the EU’s competences and breached the principle of subsidiarity; notes, furthermore, that in 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union annulled a provision of a regulation added during the legislative negotiations on the grounds that there was insufficient information to assess and unequivocally establish its proportionality; reaffirms, in the light of the foregoing, that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality remain essential to the EU’s legitimacy and calls for closer cooperation and enhanced structured dialogue with national parliaments;

Added:10. Welcomes the fact that in 2024, the Commission significantly improved the way in which the opinions of national parliaments, as well as its replies to those opinions, are made publicly available, by launching a new online database with a number of filtering possibilities; further welcomes the fact that this improvement also applies to the opinions and replies gathered since 2014;

Removed:Better law-making

Added:11. Calls for earlier, structured and meaningful involvement of national parliaments in the EU policymaking cycle, including during the consultation and agenda-setting phases, and not only once the Commission has adopted a proposal; underlines that granting national parliaments timely access to draft initiatives, background analyses and impact assessment material would enable more effective scrutiny of subsidiarity and proportionality considerations and ensure that national expertise is reflected upstream in the EU legislative process;

Removed:7. Underlines that, despite progress made under the better regulation agenda, EU legislation still generates excessive regulatory burden;

Added:12. Takes note of calls made by several national parliaments for greater involvement in the scrutiny of delegated and implementing acts; stresses the importance of prior scrutiny of such acts by national parliaments in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Removed:8. Considers that in order to achieve the objectives of the better regulation agenda, the quality and use of impact assessments need to be improved; highlights, in particular, the problem that impact assessments only focus on legislative proposals as submitted and are often not properly evaluated after they have been enacted or implemented;

Added:13. Calls for enhanced cooperation with national parliaments through structured digital dialogue platforms to ensure timely information-sharing on new EU initiatives; encourages the consideration of avenues that would enable national parliaments to play a more proactive role in EU policymaking, including through a structured ‘green card’ mechanism allowing collective suggestions for Commission initiatives, operating under reasonable and attainable thresholds; stresses that interparliamentary exchanges should include local and regional representatives to improve the transparency and public ownership of EU lawmaking; notes that empowering parliaments beyond a reactive role would strengthen ownership and the democratic legitimacy of EU action;

Removed:9. Stresses that all major legislative and policy initiatives should be accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis; considers such analyses indispensable for evidence-based policymaking and for maintaining citizens’ and businesses’ trust in EU legislation; is of the opinion that in situations where no impact assessment is drafted, a cost-benefit analysis must be prepared at a later stage and accompany the proposal;