What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

Changed:Roleon the role of trade in strengthening the EU’s economic security

8 unchanged paragraphs

(2025/2113(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (FDI Screening Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries,

Changed:– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020,2019/1020 (Critical Raw Materials Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2024 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the resilience of the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act),

Changed:– having regard to the Commission recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (COM(2023)6689),(C(2023)6689),

7 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/63 of 15 January 2025 on reviewing outbound investments in technology areas critical for the economic security of the Union,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/683 of 8 April 2025 on coordination of national control lists,

– having regard to the Council recommendation of 23 May 2024 on enhancing research security,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 January 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2024)0023),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 11 March 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying a framework for strengthening the availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as the availability of, and accessibility of, medicinal products of common interest, and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/795 (COM(2025)0102),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 20 January 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (The Cybersecurity Act 2) (COM(2026)0011),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 21 January 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act) (COM(2026)0016),

Changed:– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN (2023)0020),(JOIN(2023)0020),

7 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 December 2025 entitled ‘Strengthening EU economic security’ (JOIN(2025)0977),

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 of 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the Mission Letter of 17 September 2024 from the President of the Commission to the Commissioner-designate for Trade and Economic Security and for Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency,

– having regard to the Union list of critical medicines established and maintained by the European Medicines Agency to address vulnerabilities and shortages in the supply of essential medicinal products,

Changed:– having regard to the Commission Whitewhite Paperpaper of 24 January 2024 on export controls (COM(2024)0025),

Changed:– having regard to the Commission Whitewhite Paperpaper of 24 January 2024 on outbound investments (COM(2024)0024),

Changed:– having regard to the Commission Whitewhite Paperpaper of 24 January 2024 on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential (COM(2024)0027),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A100000/2026),(A10-0148/2026),

A. whereas the EU’s openness to trade and investment remains a cornerstone of its prosperity, competitiveness and global influence;

Change 1

Changed:B. whereas the international economic environment has undergone a structural shift characterised by rising geopolitical rivalry, systemic competitioncompetition, structural overcapacity and the increasing use of economic instruments for strategic purposes;purposes, such as the weaponisation of trade and economic dependencies and economic coercion;

Change 2

Removed:C. whereas a credible economic security strategy must preserve the integrity of the internal market, legal certainty for economic operators and the EU’s commitment to a rules-based international order;

Added:C. whereas the increasing use of export controls or export restrictions, state aid policies that distort fair competition, trade weaponisation and economic coercion require the EU to urgently develop an effective economic security strategy that comprehensively addresses its economic vulnerabilities;

Added:D. whereas a credible economic security strategy must be guided by the objective of strengthening the EU’s economic, digital and financial autonomy while preserving the integrity of the internal market, quantifying overdependencies in the relevant sectors, ensuring legal certainty for economic operators and upholding the EU’s commitment to fair and sustainable trade and a rules-based international order; whereas this also requires the reduction of strategic technological dependencies, including in digital infrastructure, semiconductors, cloud services and cybersecurity systems, as these are integral components of economic security;

Added:E. whereas the joint communication of 3 December 2025 marks a conceptual shift in the EU’s approach to economic security, reflecting the recognition that trade and economic openness cannot be regarded solely as positive-sum in nature, and that third countries may leverage economic interdependency for strategic or coercive purposes; whereas, as a consequence, the EU and its Member States must be prepared to accept economic costs, where necessary, to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance overall security; whereas economic security considerations must therefore be integrated into the EU’s trade and economic policy as a structural dimension, rather than being treated as an exceptional departure from it;

Added:F. whereas the concept of economic security has not been defined in EU law or in any official EU documentation, notwithstanding the comprehensive frameworks set out in the joint communications of 20 June 2023 and 3 December 2025; whereas a broad consensus has nonetheless emerged around the understanding that economic security for the EU consists in its capacity to anticipate, deter and respond to threats to its economy, its citizens and its strategic interests – including risks to supply chain resilience, to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure, to technology security, including through technology leakage, and to economic openness where dependencies are weaponised or coercion exercised – and that addressing it requires the EU to, on the one hand, tackle strategic dependencies through domestic production or diversification and, on the other hand, mitigate structural vulnerabilities through the preservation of EU control over critical assets, including through the screening of foreign investments;

Added:G. whereas recent analysis reveals production cost differentials of 30 % to 40 % between European and Chinese producers, affecting close to two thirds of European manufacturing added value; whereas these differentials are structural and self-reinforcing, driven by a coherent system of state support, factor cost advantages and regulatory asymmetry that productivity gains alone cannot offset; whereas the EU is experiencing an unprecedented trade imbalance with China, with the deficit reaching EUR 400 billion despite the EU maintaining an overall surplus with the rest of the world; whereas this imbalance has been driven by massively subsidised manufacturing overcapacity in China, which has led to deindustrialisation in the EU; whereas the expected exchange rate adjustment has not materialised, further widening competitiveness gaps and contributing to losses of market share for European manufactures; whereas existing EU trade defence instruments are largely product-specific and their implementation, as it currently stands, is insufficient to address systemic, economy-wide distortions of this magnitude;

Added:H. whereas the EU allocates significantly fewer administrative resources to trade defence enforcement than comparable jurisdictions, thereby raising practical barriers to the opening and handling of cases at a time when European industries face mounting trade pressure; whereas, relative to total import volumes and values, the EU already makes substantially less frequent use of trade defence instruments than the United States, Canada and Australia; whereas EU anti-dumping duties are often markedly lower than those imposed by other major economies despite comparable findings of dumping and injury; whereas the EU is required to apply an injury margin if it is less than the dumping margin; whereas the EU has been reluctant to act on the basis of a threat of injury alone; whereas this combination of lower enforcement intensity, procedural constraints and comparatively modest duty levels contributes to trade diversion and to the perception of the EU as a softer enforcement environment or ‘dumping ground’, thereby increasing pressure on the EU’s industrial base;

Added:I. whereas climate change and environmental degradation constitute a growing and systemic risk to the EU’s long-term economic security, disrupting supply chains, threatening agricultural production and driving competition for resources; whereas the weaponisation of fossil fuel deliveries by Russia, after it began its war of aggression against Ukraine, demonstrated with particular clarity that dependency on imported energy from unreliable third countries constitutes a direct and acute threat to the EU’s economic security, and that accelerating and de-risking the transition to renewable energy sources is therefore not only an environmental imperative but a strategic one; whereas, however, the green transition itself has rapidly generated new and significant dependencies, notably with regard to critical raw materials and clean technologies, such as solar panels, photovoltaic inverters, electric vehicles and grid batteries, the supply of which is concentrated in China; whereas the EU must take care not to substitute one strategic dependency for another, and must therefore pursue genuine autonomy in the inputs required for the ecological transition as a core component of its economic security strategy;

Added:J. whereas supply chain monitoring can help to identify, prevent and mitigate economic security risks;

Added:K. whereas economic security must ultimately serve the EU’s citizens; whereas the ability to withstand and manage external economic shocks is a prerequisite for the preservation of living standards, the continuity of public services and the maintenance of social cohesion; whereas economic security policy must therefore be assessed not only in terms of macroeconomic aggregates or strategic interests, but also with reference to its concrete impact on the well-being of citizens;

I. The evolving economic security risk landscape

Change 3

Changed:1. Welcomes the joint communication of 3 December 2025 as a necessary step to strengthen the EU’s common approach to economic security; notes that further steps are necessary to operationalise the EU’s economic security objectives, including an action plan, a roadmap and concrete targets on de-risking supply chains in strategic sectors;

Change 4

Removed:2. Acknowledges that the EU’s high degree of integration into global markets has increased its exposure to disruptions, coercive practices and strategic leverage by third countries, exercised through supply chains, access to critical inputs and dependence on key physical and digital infrastructure;

Added:2. Considers that the joint communication rightly emphasises the need for a change of culture, moving from a reactive to a more proactive approach to economic security; underlines that this requires a paradigm shift towards a whole-of-system approach, in which the Commission, Parliament, the Member States, the private sector and other public and private stakeholders work together to contribute to the objective of strengthening the EU’s economic security; underlines that a genuine European economic security strategy must be based on a strategic orientation, integrating and strategically aligning policies in the fields of climate and energy, trade and competition, digital market regulation, industrial policy, research and innovation, foreign investment and the role of the euro;

Removed:3. Underlines that recent crises – including the COVID-19 pandemic, disruptions to energy supplies following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, recurring tensions affecting global transport and logistics routes and coercive restrictions on access to critical materials – have shown how economic dependencies can rapidly translate into shortages, inflation, production stoppages and concrete constraints on Europe’s economic activity and the EU’s ability to respond effectively to external shocks; emphasises that these vulnerabilities are structural rather than temporary, as they result from concentrations and monopolies that have developed over time;

Added:3. Shares the Commission’s assessment that economic security measures can carry a certain cost both for companies and public institutions in the short term, but underlines that the costs resulting from dependencies and exposure to economic coercion are much higher; calls for such measures to be adequately supported through the next multiannual financial framework’s Horizon Europe and Competitiveness Fund; encourages the Commission to ensure sufficient support for the industries and workers most affected by supply chain disruptions or other forms of economic pressure or economic coercion;

Removed:4. Concludes that reinforcing the EU’s economic security is key to safeguarding the resilience of supply chains and protecting Europe’s strategic autonomy;

Added:4. Recalls that the EU is one of the largest global trading powers, deriving more than 20 % of its GDP from external trade; stresses that trade and international investment are of fundamental importance to the EU’s economy; underlines that the EU’s high degree of integration into global markets has increased its exposure to disruptions, coercive practices and strategic leverage by third countries, exercised through chokepoints in supply chains, monopolistic positions in critical inputs, dependency on high-risk suppliers of critical technologies and vulnerabilities in key physical and digital infrastructure and in terms of energy imports from third countries; stresses that this substantial and structural dependency on external actors for strategic goods, services and infrastructure creates dangerous vulnerabilities that need to be addressed urgently;

Removed:II. Prevention through diversification and competitiveness

Added:5. Underlines that recent crises – including the COVID-19 pandemic, disruptions to energy supplies resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the proliferation of illegal tariffs, trade restrictions and other protectionist measures, recurring tensions affecting global transport and logistics routes, coercive restrictions on access to critical materials, the escalating economic impact of climate change, including as a result of extreme weather events that disrupt production and logistics, state aid policies, and third countries’ dumping of subsidised overcapacity in key sectors of European markets – have shown how import dependencies can rapidly translate into shortages, inflation, harm to local production capacities and production stoppages; underlines that export dependencies also have proven to be a substantial risk to EU exporters; stresses that both import and export dependencies amount to concrete constraints on Europe’s economic activity and the EU’s ability to respond effectively to external shocks; emphasises that these vulnerabilities are structural rather than temporary, as they result from concentrations and monopolies that have developed over time;

Removed:5. Reaffirms that openness to trade and investment, combined with the diversification of partners, suppliers and transport routes, must remain the EU’s primary means of reducing structural vulnerability to external shocks, disruptions and coercive practices;

Added:6. Expresses deep concern regarding China’s systemic market distortions that fuel overcapacity, including extensive state-directed support mechanisms, strategic ‘Buy China’ procurement, preferential treatment of domestic firms and a lack of reciprocity; reiterates that trade cannot be fair in a system where one country dominates and floods the global market;

Removed:6. Calls on the Commission to actively pursue a new wave of ambitious trade agreements and sectorial partnerships with reliable partners as a central element of its diversification strategy; stresses that economic security cannot be achieved through autarky or protectionism, and that multiple, diversified interdependencies with reliable partners constitute the most robust and sustainable basis for resilience;

Added:7. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to create a comprehensive, systematic, regularly updated assessment of the EU’s most critical dependencies along value chains, and calls for these assessments to include an analysis of vulnerabilities that could potentially result in EU chokepoints, including quantified data on import concentrations and global market shares by country and sector;