What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

Changed:on the European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

The European Parliament,

Changed:– having regard to the ECB’sEuropean Central Bank’s (ECB) feedback of 28 April 2025 on the input provided by Parliament as part of its resolution on the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report,

8 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB, in particular Articles 2, 15 and 21 thereof,

– having regard to Articles 119, 123(1), 125, 127(1) and (2), 130, 282(2) and 284(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Articles 3 and 13 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to the monetary dialogues with the President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde, of 20 March 2025, 23 June 2025, and 6 October 2025,

– having regard to the ECB’s 2025 monetary policy strategy assessment,

– having regard to the ECB’s 2025 report on the international role of the euro,

– having regard to the ECB’s climate and nature plan 2024-2025,

– having regard to Eurostat’s inflation estimate of 20 August 2025 and Eurostat’s flash estimates of 1 October 2025,

Added:– having regard to the EGOV briefing of October 2025 entitled ‘Turning point or continuity? The ECB’s 2025 strategy review’ published by its Directorate-General for Economy, Transformation and Industry1,

Added:– having regard to the EGOV analysis of June 2025 entitled ‘The silent hand of central banking: collateral framework’ published by its Directorate-General for Economy, Transformation and Industry2,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0002/2026),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas, according to Eurostat, EU annual inflation stood at 2.42.5 % in August 2025 and euro area inflation at 2.22.1 % in SeptemberOctober 2025, as measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP);prices;

Change 2

Removed:B. whereas the ECB’s inflation target has shifted over time from a reference value of ‘below 2%’ to an objective of ‘below, but close to 2%’, to a symmetric target of ‘around 2%’;

Added:B. whereas, according to the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey of October 2025, median expectations for inflation are still above 2 %;

Removed:C. whereas the marginal lending facility and deposit facility rate have formed a tight corridor around the interest rate on the main refinancing operations;

Added:C. whereas the ECB’s inflation target has shifted over time from a reference value of ‘below 2 %’ to an objective of ‘below, but close to 2 %’, to a symmetric target of ‘2 %’ over the medium term;

Removed:D. whereas the ECB’s boundaries in purchasing government debt have been widening steadily, from the Securities Market Programme (SMP) to Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) and the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI)1;

Added:D. whereas the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility rate have formed a tight corridor around the interest rate on the main refinancing operations;

Removed:E. whereas reinvestments under the asset purchase programme (APP) were discontinued as of July 2023, and in the case of the PEPP as of December 2024;

Added:E. whereas the ECB’s boundaries in purchasing government debt have been widening steadily, from the Securities Market Programme to Outright Monetary Transactions, as well as the Public Sector Purchase Programme, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) and the Transmission Protection Instrument3;

Added:F. whereas reinvestments under the asset purchase programme (APP) were discontinued as of July 2023, and in the case of the PEPP as of December 2024, thus setting a path for a reduction of the ECB’s balance sheet size;

Added:G. whereas deflation can be a benign consequence of technological progress;

H. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB prohibit the direct monetary financing of governments;

Governance

Change 3

Changed:1. Recalls that Article 127 TFEU states that ‘the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119.’;119’;

2. Underlines that the statutory independence of the ECB, as laid down in the Treaties, is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability;

Change 4

Changed:3. Highlights that the ECB is accountable to Parliament; stresses that the ECB must take decisions to fulfil its mandate without political interference; notes that central banks should be independent but not isolated;

Change 5

Removed:4. Notes the importance of transparency for accountability; invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments;

Added:4. Notes the importance of transparency for accountability and that strong institutional design and accountability mechanisms are necessary; welcomes in this regard the arrangements in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Parliament and the ECB on structuring the practices for interaction in the area of central banking;

Removed:5. Emphasises that political independence requires that the ECB refrain from taking political actions;

Added:5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments;

Added:6. Welcomes the independence of the ECB as enshrined in Article 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical;

Monetary policy

Change 6

Changed:6.7. Highlights the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability, which is aone preconditionof the necessary conditions for growthgrowth, competitiveness and economic stability;stability in the Union;

Change 7

Changed:7.8. Expresses concern at the high levels of inflation in recent years;the notesyears thatfollowing the ECBCOVID-19 reactedpandemic, tooinstigated slowlyby supply shocks; notes that a timely return to theprice surgestability in inflation;this period would have been warranted through ECB decisions; invites the ECB to thoroughly assess the causes of these high levels of inflation;inflation in its annual report, along with a set of policy recommendations to draw the right conclusions from any future inflationary crises;

Change 8

Removed:8. Acknowledges the continued risk of a resurgence in inflation; underlines the importance of not easing monetary policy too rapidly;

Added:9. Welcomes the decline in inflation from the rates of 2022-2023 as well as the recent inflation stabilisation; notes that the ECB has cut the deposit rate by 200 basis points between June 2024 and June 2025; acknowledges the continued risk of a resurgence in inflation; underlines that further steps towards easing monetary policy should be prudent, data-driven and guided by price stability;

Change 9

Changed:9.10. Emphasises in particular the potentially distortive impact of geopolitical uncertaintyuncertainty, energy security risks and trade disruptions on price developments;

Change 10

Removed:10. Notes that a symmetric target of around 2 % is adduced as a reason to encourage inflation in times of near-zero inflation;

Added:11. Invites the ECB to assess the appropriateness of its symmetric target, also taking qualitative factors into account; notes the 2025 monetary policy strategy assessment and encourages the ECB to periodically conduct such assessments;

Removed:11. Invites the ECB to revise its symmetric target in favour of a more qualitative framework for protecting price stability, where price stability is defined as that state in which expected changes in the general price level do not effectively alter business or household decisions;

Added:12. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional monetary policy tools that have side effects; notes in particular that asset purchase programmes can distort price signals; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; supports the ECB in further diminishing its direct role in purchasing securities; encourages the ECB to gradually phase out its government bond purchasing programmes; regrets the impact of the fiscal position on the ECB’s fulfilment of its primary mandate;

Removed:12. Indicates that price stability, as mentioned in the mandate, could be interpreted as stability of the price level as opposed to the current interpretation of inflation stability;

Added:13. Regrets that the ECB’s short-term lending schemes have largely displaced the private interbank funding market since the financial crisis of 2008; calls on the ECB to avoid paying banks deposit rates that are above market rates, as this runs counter to the principle of an open market economy with free competition, and to remove any obstacle hindering the recovery of short-term unsecured interbank markets;

Removed:13. Notes that deflation can be the benign consequence of technological progress; recognises the ECB’s role in avoiding protracted periods of deflation due to deficient developments in the money supply;

Added:14. Emphasises the importance of ensuring high standards on quality requirements for collateral in lending arrangements with the ECB; recognises that collateral standards can be used as a tool for monetary policy transmission;

Removed:14. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional policies applicable only during crisis periods; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; supports the ECB in further diminishing its direct role in purchasing securities;

Added:15. Supports the ECB in its efforts to include owner-occupied housing in its monitoring of price indices for reasons of both representativeness and comparability across countries in the euro area, contingent on a harmonised and methodologically robust approach;

Removed:15. Regrets that the ECB’s short-term lending schemes have largely displaced the private interbank funding market; calls on the ECB to avoid paying banks deposit rates that are above market rates, as this runs counter to the principle of an open market with free competition;

Added:Secondary objective: supporting the general economic policies in the Union

Removed:16. Emphasises the importance of ensuring high standards on quality requirements for collateral in lending arrangements with the ECB;

Added:16. Notes that the ECB, pursuant to Article 127(1) TFEU, must support the general economic policies of the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU, as long as its commitment to price stability remains unaffected;

Removed:17. Supports the ECB in its efforts to include owner-occupied housing in its monitoring of price indices for reasons of both representativeness and comparability across countries in the euro area;

Removed:Secondary objectives