What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on competition policy – annual report 2024

(2024/2079(INI))

The European Parliament,

Changed:– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,

Changed:– having regard to the publication of 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice:choice – political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029’,2024–2029’,

Changed:– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

Changed:– having regard to the report of 18 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

Changed:– having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special ReportReport21/2024 21/2024of 23 October 2024 entitled ‘State aid in times of crisis – Swift reaction but shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring and inconsistencies in the framework to support the EU’s industrial policy objectives’,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation),

Removed:– having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 22 September 2022 in Case C‑611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), of 10 September in Case C‑465/20 P (European Commission v Ireland and Apple Sales International) and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission),

Added:– having regard to Article 11 TFEU, which mandates the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development,

Removed:– having regard to the Commission’s report of 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

Added:– having regard to Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030, which provides that environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, should be phased out without delay,

Removed:– having regard to the report entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’ published by the European Securities and Markets Authority,

Added:– having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 September 2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission, of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑465/20 P, European Commission v Ireland and Others, and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission),

Added:– having regard to the Commission’s report of June 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

Added:– having regard to the study entitled ‘The role of commodity traders in shaping agricultural markets’, published by its Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in November 2024,

Added:– having regard to the report of 20 December 2023 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0000/2024),(A10-0071/2025),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas athe current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contextcontexts, requiresmarked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness;competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;

Change 2

Changed:B. whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy;economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;

Change 3

Added:C. whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;

Added:D. whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;

Added:E. whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;

General considerations

Change 4

Removed:1. Considers that EU competition shields against concentrations and accumulations of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in protecting consumers;

Added:1. Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;

Change 5

Changed:2. Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of thesustainability, environmentenergy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal;Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;

Change 6

Removed:3. Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common social and environmental standards;

Added:3. Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;

A competitive Union

Change 7

Changed:4. Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes Mariothe Draghi’sDraghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and Enricothe Letta’sLetta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovationinnovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;

Change 8

Changed:5. Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost European competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and cautionspoints againstto allowingthe marketneed integrationfor througheffective mergers;merger control procedures;

Change 9

Removed:6. Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law;

Added:6. Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;

Removed:7. Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; notes the divergent fiscal capacities of Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects; calls on the Commission and Member States not to engage in a subsidy competition; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further fragmentation; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

Added:7. Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;

Removed:8. Takes note of Mario Draghi’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public investment in this context; considers the introduction of a permanent EU investment capacity to be vital;

Added:8. Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

Added:9. Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;

Added:10. Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;

Added:11. Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;

Enforcement priorities

Change 10

Removed:9. Welcomes Mario Draghi’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers;

Added:12. Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;

Removed:10. Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses; maintains that prioritising exploitative abuses of consumers could help to directly address price hikes caused by profit-driven inflation or greedflation; regrets that exploitative cases have seldom been pursued by the Commission and asks for the relevant guidelines to be updated with due regard to consumer vulnerability;

Added:13. Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;

Removed:11. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies;

Added:14. Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;

Removed:12. Welcomes the priority given to housing by the new Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls for an SGEI revision that expands the exemption for affordable housing to middle-income households; calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest;

Added:15. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

Added:16. Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;

Added:17. Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;

Added:18. Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;

Merger and antitrust

Change 11

Changed:13.19. Notes with concern the GeneralCourt Court’sof Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation leavesdoes not provide the Commission ill-equippedwith tosufficient addresstools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the singleinternal market warrantsjustifies the additioninclusion of aan singleinternal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act;Act encourages(DMA); calls on the Commission to promptrequire Member States that have or can claim the relevant jurisdictioncompetence to reviewexamine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;

Change 12

Removed:14. Welcomes Mario Draghi’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as climate protection, sustainability and the impact on workers, to be taken into account when examining the impact of a concentration on the internal market;

Added:20. Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0.7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;