What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Changed:on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amendingamending Regulations (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2017/1131 as regards measures to mitigate excessive exposures to third-country central counterparties and improve the efficiency of Union clearing markets

7 unchanged paragraphs

(COM(2022)0697 – C90412/2022 – 2022/0403(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0697),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C90412/2022),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A90000/2023),(A9-0398/2023),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Change 1

Removed:Recital 2: (2) Post-trade infrastructures are a fundamental aspect of the Capital Markets Union and are responsible for a range of post-trade processes, including clearing. An efficient and competitive clearing system in the Union is essential for the functioning of Union capital markets and is a cornerstone of the Union’s financial stability. It is therefore necessary to lay down further rules to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of clearing services in the Union in general, and of central counterparties (CCPs) in particular, by streamlining procedures, especially for the provision of additional services or activities and for changing CCPs’ risk models, by increasing liquidity, by encouraging clearing at Union CCPs, by modernising the framework under which CCPs operate, and by providing the necessary flexibility to CCPs and other financial actors to compete within the single market.

Added:AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT*

Removed:Recital 4: (4) Central clearing is a global business and Union market participants are active internationally. However, since the Commission adopted the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs in 201727 , concerns have been expressed repeatedly, including by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)28 , about the ongoing risks to the Union financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, in particular due to the potential risks that can arise in a stress scenario. In the short-term, to mitigate the risk of cliff edge effects related to the withdrawal of the UK from the Union due to an abrupt disruption of Union market participants’ access to UK CCPs, the Commission adopted a series of equivalence decisions to maintain access to UK CCPs. However, the Commission called on Union market participants to reduce their excessive exposures to systemic CCPs outside the Union in the medium term. The Commission reiterated that call in its communication “The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience”29 in January 2021. The risks and effects of excessive exposure…

Added:to the Commission proposal

Removed:Recital 9 a (new): (9a) Post-trade risk reduction services (PTRR services) generate non price-forming transactions to reduce risk in derivatives portfolios without changing the market risk. PTRR services include portfolio compression, portfolio optimisation or rebalancing services. PTRR services reduce systemic risk and operational risk, and are therefore a valuable tool to improve the resilience of the derivative market. As explained by ESMA in its Report to the European Commission on post trade risk reduction services with regards to the clearing obligation (EMIR Article 85(3a))1a, submitted in November 2020, as well as in its letter to the Commission of 1 April 20221b, the application of the clearing obligation to transactions resulting from PTRR services limits the use of these services to uncleared portfolios, and can lead to an increase in the use of complex products that are not subject to the clearing obligation. To facilitate the use of PTRR services, a targeted and conditional exemption to the clearing obligation for transactions resulting from PTRR services should be introduced. Such exemption should regard only the risk neutral transactions resulting from the PTRR exercise, while it would leave the original trades, on which the risk reduction exercises is performed, subject to the clearing obligation when applicable. In this way, the recommended exemption would remove barriers to the use of the PTRR services in portfolios to be cleared, enable a broader range of counterparties to ha…

Added:---------------------------------------------------------

Removed:Recital 10: (10) It is necessary to address the financial stability risks associated with excessive exposures of Union clearing members and clients to systemically important third-country CCPs (Tier 2 CCPs) that provide clearing services that have been identified by ESMA as clearing services of substantial systemic importance pursuant to Article 25(2c) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. In December 2021, ESMA concluded that the provision of certain clearing services provided by two Tier 2 CCPs, namely for interest rate derivatives denominated in euro and Polish zloty, Credit Default Swaps (CDS) denominated in euro and Short-Term Interest Rate Derivatives (STIR) denominated in euro, are of substantial systemic importance for the Union or one or more of its Member States. As noted by ESMA in its December 2021 assessment report, were those Tier 2 CCPs to face financial distress, changes to those CCPs’ eligible collateral, margins or haircuts may negatively impact the sovereign bond markets of one or more Member States, and more broadly the Union financial stability. Furthermore, disruptions in markets relevant for monetary policy implementation may hamper the transmission mechanism critical to central banks of issue. Measures requiring financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties that are subject to the clearing obligation to hold, directly or indirectly, and regularly clear through accounts at CCPs established in the Union seem therefore appropriate in order to gradually reduce t…

Added:2022/0403 (COD)

Removed:Recital 10 a (new): (10a) It is appropriate, given the novelty of the requirement and its potential impact on the competitiveness of EU clearing members and clients, that the obligation requiring financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties that are subject to the clearing obligation to hold, directly or indirectly, accounts at CCPs established in the Union and regularly clear through those accounts products of substantial systemic importance is phased-in gradually. Initially, financial and non-financial counterparties should be required to exchange intial and variation margins in an account at a CCP established in the Union, and to regularly enter into new positions on that same account. Given the diversity of market participants in the Union, and their different levels of clearing activity, the frequency with which they are required to enter into new positions should be established by ESMA, and should be calibrated in such a way as not to significantly alter the normal conduct of business of those counterparties. It is also appropriate that the requirement only applies to such derivative contracts that are entered into after the entry into force of this Regulation, as to not compromise the existing positions of the counterparties subject to the requirement.

Added:Proposal for a

Removed:Recital 11: (11) It is necessary to ensure that the calibration of the level of the clearing activity to be maintained in accounts at Union CCPs can be adapted to changing circumstances, and can be adjusted in light of the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the introduction of the requirement. ESMA and the Joint Monitoring Mechanism introduced in this Regulation have an important role in the assessment of the substantial systemic importance of third-country CCPs and their clearing services and of the broader functioning of the Union's clearing ecosystem. Following the introduction of the requirement to clear a proportion of derivative contracts at acive accounts, ESMA, in cooperation with the Joint Monitoring Mechanism, should assess whether that requirement is sufficient to achieve its alleged objectives, namely to mitigate, or be, in the absence of further measures, likely to mitigate, the financial stability risks associated with excessive exposures of Union clearing members and clients to systemically important third-country CCPs (Tier 2 CCPs) that provide clearing services of substantial systemic importance. As a secondary objective, that assessment should also consider whether the competitiveness of Union clearing members and clients has not been negatively impacted by the introduction of that requirement. Where that assessment leads to the conclusion that further measures are necessary, ESMA, in cooperation with EBA, EIOPA and the ESRB and after consulting the ESCB, should develop…

Added:REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

Removed:Recital 12: (12) To ensure that clients are aware of their options and can take an informed decision as where to clear their derivative contracts, clearing members and clients that provide clearing services in both Union and recognised third-country CCPs should inform their clients about the option to clear a derivative contract in a Union CCP, and should clearly disclose the costs associated with clearing services in the different CCPs where it is possible to clear those contracts. Such obligation to inform should be distinct from the active account requirement.

Added:amending Regulations (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2017/1131 as regards measures to mitigate excessive exposures to third-country central counterparties and improve the efficiency of Union clearing markets

Removed:The scope of the Art 7b(1) is broader than the scope of the active account requirement, as it requires relevant clearing members and clients to systematically propose Union clearing alternatives even for services that are not determined as being of substantial systemic importance by ESMA. The purpose of the proposed Article 7b(1) of EMIR is to provide incentives to end clients, subject or not to the active account requirement, to clear at EU central counterparties (CCPs).

Added:(Text with EEA relevance)

Removed:Recital 13: (13) To ensure that ESMA has the necessary information on the clearing activities undertaken by clearing members or clients in recognised CCPs, a reporting obligation should be introduced for such clearing members or clients. The information to be reported should distinguish between securities transactions, derivative transactions traded on a regulated market and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions. ESMA should, in close cooperation with the ESCB, specify the content and the format of the exact information to be reported, and in doing so should ensure that the obligation does not create additional reporting requirements unless necessary, so that the administrative burden for clearing members or clients is minimised.

Added:THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Removed:Recital 13 a (new): (13a) Under the current framework, ESMA receives transaction data under EMIR and SFTR, which provides an EU-wide view on markets, but not on CCPs' risk management. This lack of data creates substantial issues for ESMA, which requires timely and reliable information on CCPs activities and practices to fulfill its financial stability mandate. It seems therefore necessary that a formal reporting requirement regarding CCP risk management data by EU CCPs to ESMA is introduced. This would help further strengthen the standardisation and comparability across data, and ensure it is delivered on time, while covering similar data as the reports prepared by EU CCPs and shared with the college on a monthly basis, and therefore not be additional burden for CCPs. In addition to the possibility for ESMA to request data directly from CCPs, clearing members and clients in market turmoil, the data received in the monthly (voluntary) data reports via the college should be formalised to ensure higher standardisation, comparability and timely delivery.

Added:Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

Removed:Recital 14: (14) Regulation (EU) 2019/834 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 amended Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to introduce, inter alia, an exemption from reporting requirements for OTC derivative transactions between counterparties within a group, where at least one of the counterparties is a non-financial counterparty. That exemption has been introduced because intragroup transactions involving non-financial counterparties represent a relatively small fraction of all OTC derivative transactions and are used primarily for internal hedging within groups. As such, those transactions do not significantly contribute to systemic risk and interconnectedness with the rest of the financial system. The exemption for those transactions from reporting requirements has, however, limited the ability of ESMA, the ESRB and other authorities to clearly identify and assess the risks taken by non-financial counterparties. Considering their potential interconnectedness with the rest of the financial system and taking into account recent market developments, in particular strains on energy markets as a result of Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine, more visibility on intragroup transactions might be warranted. However, the impact of the reintroduction of the clearing obligation on commercial activities of non-financial counterparties is unclear. It is also unclear whether direct reporting from non-financial counterparties would significantly improve the effectivene…

Added:Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Removed:Recital 18 a (new): (18a) In order to avoid market fragmentation and ensure a level playing field, acknowledging the fact that in some jurisdictions the exchange of variation and initial margin for single-stock options and equity index options is not subject to equivalent margin requirements, the treatment of those products should be phased-in. This phase-in period would provide time for ESMA to monitor regulatory developments in other jurisdictions and for the Commission to ensure that appropriate requirements are in place in the Union to mitigate counterparty credit risk in respect of such contracts whilst avoiding scope for regulatory arbitrage.

Added:After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Removed:Recital 19: (19) To ensure a consistent and convergent approach amongst competent authorities throughout the Union, authorised CCPs or legal persons that wish to be authorised under Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to provide clearing services and activities in financial instruments should also be able to be authorised to provide clearing services and other activities in relation to non-financial instruments. Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 applies to CCPs as entities, and not to specific services, as set out in Article 1(2) of that Regulation. When a CCP clears non-financial instruments, in addition to financial instruments, ESMA should be able to ensure that the CCP complies with all requirements of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 for all services it offers.

Added:Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,

Removed:Recital 20: (20) Union CCPs face challenges in expanding their product offer and experience difficulties in bringing new products to the market. Those challenges and difficulties can be explained by certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 that render some authorisation procedures too long, complex and uncertain in their outcome. The process of authorising Union CCPs or extending their authorisation should therefore be simplified, while ensuring the appropriate involvement of ESMA and the college referred to in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. First, to avoid significant, and potentially indefinite, delays when ESMA assesses the completeness of an application for an authorisation, ESMA should swiftly acknowledge receipt of that application and quickly verify whether the CCP has provided the documents required for the assessment. To ensure that Union CCPs submit all required documents with their applications, ESMA should develop draft regulatory and implementing technical standards specifying which documents should be provided, what information those documents should contain and in which format they should be submitted. Second, to ensure an efficient and concurrent assessment of applications, CCPs should be able to submit all documents via a central database where they should be shared instantaneously with the CCP’s competent authority, ESMA and the college. Third, a CCP’s competent authority, ESMA and the college should, during the assessment period, engage and ask the…

Added:Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

Removed:Recital 21: (21) There is currently uncertainty as to when an additional service or activity is covered by a CCP’s existing authorisation. It is necessary to address that uncertainty and to ensure proportionality when the proposed additional service or activity does not increase the risks for the CCP. It is therefore necessary to lay down that applications in those cases should not undergo the full assessment procedure. For that reason, it should be specified which additional clearing services and activities are non-material, and thus do not increase the risks for a Union CCP, and should be approved through a non-objection procedure by ESMA. That non-objection procedure should be applied where the CCP intends to clear a new currency in a class of financial instruments already covered by the CCP’s authorisation for which the CCP does not have in place the relevant payment facility, intends to offer a new settlement or delivery mechanism or service which involves establishing links with a different securities settlement system, central securities depository (CSD) or payment system or intends to offer contracts that cannot be liquidated in the same manner or together with contracts already cleared by the CCP. In addition, a CCP should also be able to ask its competent authority for the non-objection procedure to apply where that CCP considers that the proposed additional service or activity would not increase its risks, in particular where the new clearing service or activity is similar to …

Added:Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Removed:Recital 22: (22) To foster a cooperative supervision of CCPs on an ongoing basis, the college should issue an opinion where ESMA considers withdrawing a CCP’s authorisation and when a competent authority conducts the annual review and evaluation of that CCP.

Added:Whereas:

Removed:Recital 24: (24) The clearing landscape in the Union has undergone major changes since 2019, when amending regulations to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 were adopted, and a more coordinated and integrated approach to the supervision of EU CCPs appears necessary, especially as more systemic activity is expected to shift towards the Union due to the requirement to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for services of substantial systemic importance. ESMA should therefore be the direct supervisor of EU CCPs, and enhanced cooperation and integration between all relevant authorities is necessary to ensure that risks concentrated in EU CCPs are adequately monitored and managed, in order to minimise systemic risk and spill-over effects across Member States. Empowering ESMA with a direct supervisory role vis-a-vis EU CCPs requires adapting the existing supervisory framework under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 , providing ESMA with decision-making powers over EU CCPs, but also by clarifying how these new powers would interact with the supervisory role of the national competent authorities. Under a new and more integrated approach, relevant supervisory decisions should be drafted and adopted by ESMA, having taken into account the opinion of the college. The competent authority of the CCP may be requested by ESMA to assist with drafting decisions, the verification of activities of the CCP, and the day-to-day assessments. ESMA should be empowered to delegate specific supervisor…

Added:(1) Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council contributes to the reduction of systemic risk by increasing the transparency of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and by reducing the counterparty credit and operational risks associated with OTC derivatives.

Change 2

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Change 3

Removed:Recital 26: (26) ESMA should have the means to identify potential risks to the Union’s financial stability. ESMA should therefore, in cooperation with the ESRB, EBA, EIOPA, and the ECB in the framework of the tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the single supervisory mechanism conferred upon it in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201336 , identify the interconnections and interdependencies between different CCPs and legal persons, including, as far as possible, shared clearing members, clients and indirect clients, shared material service providers, shared material liquidity providers, cross-collateral arrangements, cross-default provisions and cross-CCP netting, cross-guarantee agreements and risks transfers and back-to-back trading arrangements.

Added:(3) It is essential for the clearing system to benefit from more clearing options and alternatives in order to ensure that banks and the real economy have continuous access to safe and efficient clearing solutions. The Union needs to make a significant contribution by developing and offering safe, efficient and innovative clearing infrastructures. The evolution of clearing markets brings with it new product offerings, risk profiles and approaches to risk management. That requires supervisory and regulatory approaches to be adapted and regulators and the industry to work closely together. To attract business, CCPs must be safe and resilient. Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 lays down measures to increase the transparency of derivatives markets and mitigate risks through clearing and the exchange of margin. In that respect, CCPs play an important role in mitigating financial risks. Rules should therefore be laid down to further enhance the stability of Union CCPs, notably by amending certain aspects of the regulatory framework. In addition, and in recognition of Union CCPs’ role in preserving the Union’s financial stability, it is necessary to strengthen further their supervision, with particular attention to their role within the broader financial system and the fact they provide services across borders.

Removed:As the ESRB is responsible for macroprudential issues, ESMA should seek the ESRB advice when assessing potential risks to the EU financial stability. Also, the addition of 'as far as possible' is to reflect the fact that there are no direct contractual links between CCPs and indirect clients.

Added:(4) Central clearing is a global business and Union market participants are active internationally. However, since the Commission adopted the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs in 2017, concerns have been expressed repeatedly, including by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), about the ongoing risks to the Union financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, in particular due to the potential risks that can arise in a stress scenario. In the short-term, to mitigate the risk of cliff edge effects related to the withdrawal of the UK from the Union due to an abrupt disruption of Union market participants’ access to UK CCPs, the Commission adopted a series of equivalence decisions to maintain access to UK CCPs. However, the Commission called on Union market participants to reduce their excessive exposures to systemic CCPs outside the Union in the medium term. The Commission reiterated that call in its communication “The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience” in January 2021. The risks and effects of excessive exposures to systemic CCPs outside the Union were considered in the report published by ESMA in December 2021 following an assessment conducted in accordance with Article 25(2c) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. That report concluded that some services provided by those systemically important UK CCPs were of such substantial systemic importance that the current arrangements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 were insufficient to manage the risks to the Union financial stability. To mitigate the potential financial stability risks to the Union due to the continued excessive reliance on systemic third-country CCPs, but also to enhance the proportionality of measures for those third-country CCPs that present less risks for the financial stability of the Union, it is necessary to further tailor the framework introduced by Regulation (EU) 2019/2099 to the risks presented by different third-country CCPs. At the same time, it is necessary that the changes be well calibrated, in light of the potential impact of regulatory measures on the competitiveness of the Union's market participants.

Removed:Recital 28: (28) It is necessary to ensure a prompt exchange of information, knowledge sharing and effective cooperation between the authorities involved in the supervision of authorised CCPs and in the monitoring of risks to the financial stability of the Union, and in particular where a swift decision by ESMA is required. It is therefore appropriate to create a framework for joint supervisory activities for each Union CCP to assist those supervisory authorities, including by providing input to ESMA within the context of the non-objection procedure for extending a CCP’s existing authorisation, assisting in establishing the frequency and depth of a CCP’s review and evaluation, and participating in on-site inspections.

Added:(5) Article 4(2) and Article 11(5) to (10) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 exempt intragroup transactions from the clearing obligation and the margin requirements. To provide more legal certainty and predictability concerning the framework for intragroup transactions, the equivalence decisions in Article 13 of that Regulation should be replaced by a simpler framework. Article 3 of that Regulation should therefore be amended to replace the need for an equivalence decision with a list of third countries for which an exemption should not be granted. Consequently, Article 13 of that Regulation should be deleted. Since Article 382 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council refers to intragroup transactions as provided for in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, that Article 382 should also be amended accordingly.

Removed:Recital 31: (31) The 2020 market turmoil as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2022 high prices on energy wholesale markets following Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified aggression against Ukraine showed that, while it is essential for competent authorities to cooperate and exchange information to address ensuing risks when events with cross-border impacts emerge, ESMA still lacks the necessary tools to ensure such coordination and a convergent approach at Union level. ESMA should therefore be able to convene meetings of the CCP Supervisory Committee, either on its own initiative or upon request, potentially with an enlarged composition, to coordinate effectively competent authorities’ responses in emergency situations. ESMA should also be able to ask, by simple request, information from market participants which is necessary for ESMA to perform its coordination function in those situations and to be able to issue recommendations to the competent authority. Finally, given that developments in financial markets could have direct implications for the banking system or for monetary policy decisions, representatives of relevant central banks of issue should always be invited to participate in the coordination meetings of the CCP Supervisory Committee in response to such emergencies.

Added:(6) Given the fact that entities that are established in countries that are listed as high-risk third countries that have strategic deficiencies in their regime on anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing, as referred to in Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council, or in third countries that are listed in Annexes I and II to the Council conclusions on the revised EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes are subject to a less stringent regulatory environment, their operations may increase the risk, including due to increased counterparty credit risk and legal risk, for the Union financial stability. Consequently, such entities should not be eligible to be considered in the framework of intragroup transactions.

Removed:Recital 38: (38) To mitigate potential risks for the financial stability of the Union, or of one or more of its Member States, CCPs and clearing houses should not be allowed to be clearing members of other CCPs nor should CCPs be able to accept to have other CCPs as clearing members or indirect clearing members. This exclusion should not affect interoperability arrangements, or other arrangements such as cross-margining and sponsored-memberships or sponsored access, between CCPs.

Added:(7) Strategic deficiencies in the regime on anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing, or lack of cooperation for tax purposes are not necessarily the only factors that can influence risk, including counterparty credit risk and legal risk, associated with derivative contracts. Other factors, such as the supervisory framework, also play a role. The Commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to identify the third countries whose entities may not benefit from those exemptions despite not being identified in those lists. Considering that intragroup transactions benefit from reduced regulatory requirements, regulators and supervisors should carefully monitor and assess the risks associated with transactions involving entities from third countries.

Removed:Recital 40: (40) To ensure clients and indirect clients have better visibility and predictability of margin calls, and thus further develop their liquidity management strategies, clearing members and clients providing clearing services should ensure transparency towards their clients. Due to their closer relationship with CCPs and their professional experience with central clearing and liquidity management, clearing members are best placed to communicate in a clear and transparent manner to clients how CCP models work, including in stress events, and the implications such events can have on the margins clients are requested to post, including any additional margin clearing members themselves may ask. A better understanding of CCP margin models can improve clients’ ability to reasonably predict margin calls and prepare themselves for collateral requests, particularly in stress events. In order to ensure that clearing members are able to effectively provide the required levels of transparency on margin calls and CCP margin models to their clients, CCPs should also provide them with any information they require. ESMA, in consultation with EBA and the ESCB, should better specify the scope and the format of the exchange of information between CCPs and clearing members and between clearing members and their clients.

Added:(8) To ensure a level playing field between Union and third-country credit institutions offering clearing services to pension scheme arrangements, an exemption from the clearing obligation under Article 4, point (iv), of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should be introduced where a Union financial counterparty or a non-financial counterparty that is subject to the clearing obligation enters into a transaction with a pension scheme arrangement established in a third country which is exempted from the clearing obligation under that third country’s national law.