What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing market data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of a consolidated tape, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payments for forwarding client orders

Changed:(COM(2021)727(COM(2021)0727 – C90440/2021 – 2021/0385(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

Changed:– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)727),(COM(2021)0727),

Changed:– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9 0440/2021),(C9-0440/2021),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Added:– having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 1 June 2022,

Added:– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 March 2022,

– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A90000/2022),(A9-0040/2023),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Change 1

Removed:Title 1: amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing market data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of a consolidated tape, optimising the trading obligations and regulating the forwarding and execution of client orders

Added:AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT*

Removed:Recital 6: (6) Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 allows competent authorities to waive the pre-trade transparency requirements for market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue who determine their prices by reference to the midpoint price of the primary market or the most relevant market in terms of liquidity. In order to increase pre-trade transparency and thereby reinforce the price formation process, that waiver should only be applicable to orders with a size greater than or equal to a size to be determined by ESMA, which should not exceed twice the standard market size. When defining the possible threshold, ESMA should take into account the impact of that measure on i) market quality, ii)overall liquidity on Union trading venues, iii) end investors’ outcomes and iv) the domestic and international attractiveness and competitiveness of Union capital markets and firms. Where the consolidated tape for shares and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) will provide bid and offer prices from which a midpoint can be derived, the reference price waiver should also be available for systems deriving the midpoint price from the consolidated tape.

Added:to the Commission proposal

Removed:Recital 7: (7) Dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency, using the reference price waiver laid down in Article 4(1), point (a) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in Article 4(a) point (a), point (i) of that Regulation. The use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘DVC’). The DVC is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. The amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the Union. When this threshold is breached, dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. Secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the Union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the Union. When this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. The venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended, until the Union wide threshold is breached. This causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. In order to reduce complexity and align the Union with international practices, the cap mechanism should be suspended for at least five years. ESMA, which would be empowered to monitor market conditions and, in particular, the price formation process and the liquidity availabl…

Added:---------------------------------------------------------

Removed:Recital 8: (8) Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 contains requirements for trading venues to publish information related to transactions in non-equity instruments, including the price and the volume. Article 11 of that Regulation contains the grounds for national competent authorities to allow for delayed publication of those details. Deferred publication of those details is allowed where a transaction is above the large in scale (‘LIS’) size threshold and is in an instrument for which there is no liquid market, or where that transaction is above the size specific to the instrument threshold in case the transaction involves liquidity providers. National competent authorities have discretion in the duration of the deferred period and in the details of the transactions that may be deferred. That discretion has led to differing practices among the member states and to ineffective post-trade transparency publications. To ensure transparency towards all types of investors, it is necessary to harmonise the deferral regime at the level of the European Union, remove discretion at national level and facilitate market data consolidation. It is therefore appropriate to reinforce post-trade transparency requirements by removing the discretion for national competent authorities and setting out the categories of transactions for which deferral is allowed, taking into account the size of the transactions and the liquidity of the financial instruments concerned.

Added:REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

Removed:Recital 9: (9) To ensure an adequate level of transparency, the price and the volume of a non-equity transaction should be published as close to real time as possible and the price should only be delayed until maximally the end of the trading day. However, in order not to expose liquidity providers in non-equity instruments to undue risk, it should be possible to mask the price and volume of very large transactions for a longer period of time, which should not exceed four weeks. The exact calibration of the various buckets corresponding to different time deferrals should be left to ESMA due to the technical expertise required to specify the calibration as well as due to the need to allow for the flexibility to amend the calibration. Those deferrals should be based on the liquidity of the non-equity instrument (using the issuance size as a proxy), the size of the transaction (trade size) and should no longer include the size specific to the instrument concerned nor the large in scale size. In order to simplify the pre-trade transparency regime for bonds and derivatives, the size specific to the instrument should be removed, and the large in scale size should be lowered so that only one threshold remains at an adequate level.

Added:amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing market data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of a consolidated tape, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payments for forwarding client orders

Removed:Recital 11: (11) In order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. Systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote, as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. That possibility, however, has led to very low levels of pre-trade transparency provided by systematic internalisers in equity instruments, and has hampered the achievement of a level playing field. It is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum size to be determined by ESMA. The minimum size should not exceed twice the standard market size, and should be determined by considering the following objectives: i) increasing pre-trade transparency of equity instruments for the benefit of end-investors; ii) maintaining a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers; iii) providing end investors with an adequate choice of trading options; and iv) ensuring that the trading landscape in the Union remains attractive and competitive both domestically and internationally.

Added:(Text with EEA relevance)

Removed:Recital 12: (12) In order to create a level playing field, in addition to the obligation to publish firm quotes, systematic internalisers should also not be allowed to match at midpoint below a size to be determined by ESMA and aligned with the size below which systematic internalisers’ pre-trade transparency requirements apply. It should furthermore be clarified that systematic internalisers should be allowed to match at midpoint above this size without complying with the tick size regime. That would bring the Union in line with the prevalent international market practices.

Added:THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Removed:Recital 15: (15) Due to the disparate quality of market data, it is difficult for market participants to compare those data, which devoids data consolidation of much added-value. It is of the utmost importance for the proper functioning of the transparency regime set out in Title II and III of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and for the consolidation of data by consolidated tape providers that market data are of high quality. It is therefore appropriate to require that those market data comply with high quality standards in terms of both substance and format. It should be possible to change the substance and the format of the data within a short time to allow for changing market practices and insights. Therefore the requirements for the quality of data should be specified by ESMA in draft regulatory technical standards and should take into account prevailing industry standards and practices, international developments and standards agreed at the Union or international level, as well as the advice of a dedicated consultative group established by the Commission, composed of experts from the industry and from public authorities tasked with providing indications limited to the output of the consolidated tape. ESMA will be closely involved in the work of that consultative group.

Added:Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

Removed:Recital 17: (17) Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 requires that the majority of trading in shares takes place on trading venues or systematic internalisers (‘share trading obligation’). This requirement does not apply to trades in shares which are non-systematic, ad hoc or irregular and infrequent. It is not clear when this exemption applies. ESMA therefore clarified this by making a distinction between shares on the basis of their International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). Pursuant to that distinction, only shares with an EEA ISIN are subject to the share trading obligation. That approach provides clarity to market participants trading in shares. It is therefore appropriate to incorporate ESMA’s current practice in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, while simultaneously removing the exemption for trades in shares which are non-systematic, ad-hoc or irregular and infrequent.

Added:Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Removed:Recital 19: (19) Reporting in financial markets – in particular transaction reporting – is already highly automated and data is more standardised. Some inconsistencies between frameworks have already been resolved in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) Refit and Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (SFTR). The empowerments for ESMA should be aligned to adopt technical standards and ensure greater consistency in transaction reporting between the EMIR, SFTR and MiFIR frameworks. This will improve transaction data quality and avoid unnecessary additional costs for the industry. In addition, the transaction reporting should allow for a broad exchange of transaction data between national competent authorities to adequately reflect the latter’s evolving supervisory needs to monitor the most recent market developments and potential related risks. This should address, for instance, the need for any national competent authority to obtain a comprehensive overview of the investment made by clients residing, domiciled or established in its jurisdiction, including where such investments are made through investment firms authorised in another Member State or financial instruments for which it is not the competent authority of the most relevant market in terms of liquidity.

Added:After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Removed:Recital 19 a (new): (19a) Market participants and ESMA have shown that the existing reporting regime can create uncertainty about who should report transactions and can lead to double reporting. The problem is particularly acute when investment firms trading with each other do not know whether their counterparty is a systematic internaliser for the traded financial instrument, and as such should report transactions to the approved publication arrangement. In addition, the link between the reporting obligation and the status of systematic internaliser has led to an inflated number of systematic internalisers in the Union, distorting the picture of market participants. The link between the systematic internaliser status and the post-trade transparency and reporting requirements should be removed, introducing instead the possibility for market participants to register as a designated reporting entity. In addition, ESMA should establish a register of all designated reporting entities, specifying their identity as well as the instruments or classes of instruments for which they are designated reporting entities. That would eliminate uncertainty about who should report a transaction and reduce the regulatory burden on investment firms, particularly smaller ones. Such an approach would also have the advantage that only those firms that qualify or have opted in as SIs will act as liquidity providers, providing further clarity to the overall structure of the equity market.

Added:Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,

Removed:Recital 20: (20) Competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. However, no entity has, up until now, applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. It is therefore considered appropriate to empower ESMA to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. ESMA should prioritise the selection and authorisation of a consolidated tape provider for bonds, followed by shares and ETFs and finally by derivatives. The selection processes for each CTP should be staggered at regular intervals, with each selection process starting no later than six months after the initiation of the preceding one. Given the similarities between shares and ETFs, ESMA should conduct a parallel process for those two financial instruments, accepting proposals for either a single consolidated tape comprising both shares and ETFs, or two separate tapes. For shares only, the CTP should comprise pre-trade data related to the best bid and offer. ESMA should also require the CTP for shares to be capable or at least to have the technical capabilities to consolidate and display pre-trade data related to the first five layers of order books.

Added:Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

Removed:Recital 21: (21) According to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this Regulation, the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. The expected revenue of the CTP should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the CTP and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. This principle should not prevent CTPs from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model and from using the core market data to offer further analytics or other services aimed to increase the revenue pool. The market data contributor should only receive a remuneration based on the costs it has incurred in generating the data and providing it to the CTP. Retail investors should have access to the consolidated tape, either free of charge or for a nominal annual fee, and the tape provider should ensure that the information provided to retail investors is easily accessible and displayed in a user-friendly and understandable format.

Added:Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Removed:Recital 22: (22) There is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. A venue of primary admission admits companies to the public markets, playing a crucial role in the life of a share and for the share’s liquidity. This is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission. In smaller regulated markets the level of concentration of trading in shares, for which they are also the venue of primary admission, means that their relative contribution to the fragmentation of trading in the Union is less significant compared to that of larger regulated markets. The average daily trading volume of shares in the smaller regulated markets is relatively low, often accounting for less than 1 % of the average daily trading volume of the Union as a whole. Finally, smaller regulated markets are, on average, less diversified and more dependent on data revenues, and the mandatory contribution to the consolidated tape for shares could deprive them of their most important source of income. Therefore, given the lower levels of fragmentation of smaller markets, their relative share of the overall trading landscape and legitimate concerns about the viability of their business, an exclusion from the mandatory contributions to the consolidated tape should be considered appropriate to allow them to maintain their local admissions and saf…

Added:Whereas:

Removed:Recital 23: (23) The desired outcome would be to provide end investors with a truly consolidated overview of the trading opportunities available in the Union and to increase the overall domestic and international attractiveness of the Union capital markets, in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union, and to include small regulated markets in the picture created by the consolidated tape. Regardless of the exemption granted to smaller regulated markets under this Regulation from the mandatory contribution of market data to the consolidated tape, a dedicated revenue participation scheme for the consolidated tape for equities should be established, in order to incentivise their opt-in to the mandatory contribution scheme, which should remain nonetheless entirely voluntary. In particular, data from trades in the less liquid shares traded in smaller regulated markets should attract a higher remuneration than their notional trading value would indicate. Whether a share is less liquid should be determined on the basis of the proportion of pre-trade transparent liquidity displayed by the regulated market that admits the less liquid share, relative to the average daily trading turnover in that share.

Added:(1) In its 2020 CMU Action Plan, the Commission announced its intention to table a legislative proposal to create a centralised data base which was meant to provide a comprehensive view on prices and volume of equity and equity-like financial instruments traded throughout the Union across a multitude of trading venues (‘consolidated tape’). On 2 December 2020, in its conclusion on the Commission’s CMU Action Plan, the Council encouraged the Commission to stimulate more investment activity inside the Union by enhancing data availability and transparency by further assessing how to tackle the obstacles to establishing a consolidated tape in the Union.

Removed:Recital 24: (24) Given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the EU financial markets, ESMA should be entrusted with providing the European Commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed to incentivise smaller regulated markets to opt in to the mandatory contribution of market data in the context of the consolidated tape for equities. This report should be prepared on the basis of at least 18 months of operation of the CTP and subsequently at the request of the Commission, where deemed necessary or appropriate. The assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets in the revenue of the CTP is fair and effective in inducing those markets to contributing to the consolidated tape and in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. The assessment should also establish whether the inclusion of those smaller regulated markets in the consolidated tape resulted in i) an increase in the trading volumes of shares in those regulated markets, ii) a positive effect on professional and retail investors participation in the market, and iii) an improvement of the trading conditions for end-investors. The Commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act, where necessary or appropriate.

Added:(2) In its roadmap on ‘The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience’ of 19 January 2021, the Commission confirmed its intention to improve, simplify and further harmonise capital markets’ transparency, as part of the review of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 the European Parliament and of the Council. As part of efforts to strengthen the international role of the Euro, the Commission also announced that such reform would include the design and implementation of a consolidated tape, in particular for corporate bond issuances to increase the liquidity of secondary trading in euro-denominated debt instruments.

Removed:nOr. en

Added:(3) Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council provides for a legislative framework for ‘consolidated tape providers’ or ‘CTPs’, both for equity and non-equity. Those CTPs are currently responsible for collecting from trading venues and approved publication arrangements (‘APAs’) market data about financial instruments and consolidating those data into a continuous electronic live data stream, which provides market data per financial instrument. The idea behind the introduction of a CTP was that market data from trading venues and APAs would be made available to the public in a consolidated manner, including all of the Union’s trading markets, using identical data tags, formats and user interfaces.

Removed:Recital 32: (32) Financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible price and the highest possible likelihood of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. To that end, financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients. It should be incompatible with that principle of best execution that a financial intermediary receives a payment from a trading counterpart in exchange for ensuring the execution of client trades. Investment firms should be therefore be prohibited from receiving such payment. That prohibition should apply to instruments traded on venues, specifically to shares, ETFs and derivatives, and should concern any type of intermediary, whether it is a trading venue, a systematic internaliser or an OTC firm.

Added:(4) To date, however, no supervised entity has applied for authorisation to act as a CTP. ESMA has identified three main obstacles that have prevented supervised entities to apply for registration as a CTP. First, a lack of clarity as to how the CTP is to procure market data from the various execution venues or from the data reporting service providers concerned. Second, insufficient quality in terms of harmonisation of the data reported by those execution venues to allow for a cost-efficient consolidation. Third, a lack of commercial incentives to apply for authorisation as a CTP. It is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles. Such removal requires, first, that all trading venues and systematic internalisers (‘SIs’) provide CTPs with market data (provision rule). It secondly requires an improvement of the data quality by harmonising the data reports that trading venues and SIs should submit to the CTP. It thirdly requires that market data contributors transmit to the CTP as close to real time as it is technically possible pre- and post-trade information for shares and ETFs and as close to real time as it is technically possible post-trade information for bonds and derivatives.

Removed:Recital 34: (34) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to facilitate the emerging of a consolidated tape provider cross markets for each asset classes and to amend certain aspects of the existing legislation in order to improve transparency on markets in financial instruments but also to further enhance the level playing field between regulated markets and systematic internalisers, as well as enhance the international competitiveness of the Union’s capital markets, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at the Union level, measure should be adopted at Union level, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. This Regulation furthermore respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter, in particular the freedom to conduct a business and the right to consumer protection,

Added:(5) Article 1(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council requires operators of systems in which multiple third-party buying and selling trading interests in financial instruments are able to interact (‘multilateral systems’) to operate in accordance with the requirements concerning regulated markets (‘RMs’), multilateral trading facilities (‘MTFs’), or organised trading facilities (‘OTFs’). The placement of that requirement in Directive 2014/65/EU has left room for varying interpretations of that requirement, which has led to an uneven playing field between multilateral systems that are licensed as an RM, MTF or OTF, and multilateral systems that are not licensed as such. In order to ensure a uniform application of that requirement, it should be introduced in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014.

Removed:Regulation (EU) No 600/2014

Added:(6) Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 allows competent authorities to waive the pre-trade transparency requirements for market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue who determine their prices by reference to the midpoint price of the primary market or the most relevant market in terms of liquidity. ▌In order to increase pre-trade transparency and thereby reinforce the price formation process, that waiver should only be applicable to orders with a size greater than or equal to a size to be determined by ESMA. When defining the threshold, it is appropriate for ESMA to take into account the impact of that measure on market quality, on the overall liquidity on Union trading venues, on end-investors’ outcomes, and on the domestic and international attractiveness and competitiveness of Union capital markets and firms. Where the consolidated tape for shares and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) will provide bid and offer prices from which a midpoint can be derived, the reference price waiver should also be available for systems deriving the midpoint price from the consolidated tape.

Removed:Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new), Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 16 a (new): (aa) the following point is inserted: / ‘(16a) ‘designated reporting entity’ means an investment firm responsible for making transactions public through an APA in accordance with Articles 20(1) and 21(1);’;

Added:(7) Dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency, using the reference price waiver laid down in Article 4(1), point (a) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in Article 4(a) point (a), point (i) of that Regulation. The use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘DVC’). The DVC is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. The amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the Union. When this threshold is breached, dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. Secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the Union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the Union. When this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. The venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended, until the Union wide threshold is breached. This causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. To simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness, this Regulation introduces a new single volume cap relying solely on the EU-wide threshold. That threshold should be lowered to 7 % to compensate for a potential increase of trading under those waivers as a consequence of abolishing the venue specific threshold. Utilising all the available and relevant market data, ESMA should regularly assess the calibration of the threshold of the single volume cap, its scope, its effects on the competitiveness of Union firms and the significance of the market impact and the efficiency of the price formation process in the Union. ESMA could also consider ways to thoroughly improve the limitations that are currently in place to limit dark trading, including further intervention on any trading system, as opposed to only a subset thereof, to ensure that these are effective in their aim to safeguard the price formation process without unduly affecting the global competitiveness of Union firms and the attractiveness of the Union’s markets. Taking into account financial stability considerations, international best practices and developments, ESMA should formulate its suggestions in a report to the Commission by ... [three years after the entry into force of this amending Regulation], and every two years thereafter.

Removed:Inclusion of new ‘designated reporting entities’ (DREs) status in definitions of MiFIR. Feedback from market participants and ESMA showed that the existing SIs reporting regime creates uncertainty, leads to duplicative reporting, and leads to higher costs, particularly for smaller investment firms. The changes to SI regime (including the introduction of a register of DREs by ESMA) seek to decouple SIs regime and reporting obligations, providing clarity, more flexibility, and leading to a clearer, more reliable picture of market participants.

Added:(8) Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 contains requirements for trading venues to publish information related to transactions in non-equity instruments, including the price and the volume. Article 11 of that Regulation contains the grounds for national competent authorities to allow for delayed publication of those details. Deferred publication of those details is allowed where a transaction is above the large in scale (‘LIS’) size threshold and is in an instrument for which there is no liquid market, or where that transaction is above the size specific to the instrument threshold in case the transaction involves liquidity providers. National competent authorities have discretion in the duration of the deferred period and in the details of the transactions that may be deferred. That discretion has led to differing practices among the member states and to ineffective post-trade transparency publications. To ensure transparency towards all types of investors, it is necessary to harmonise the deferral regime at the level of the European Union, remove discretion at national level and facilitate market data consolidation. It is therefore appropriate to reinforce post-trade transparency requirements by removing the discretion for national competent authorities and setting out the categories of transactions for which deferral is allowed, taking into account the size of the transactions and the liquidity of the financial instruments concerned.

Removed:Regulation (EU) No 600/2014