What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Changed:1. Grants the Director of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union discharge in respect of the implementation of the Centre’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting theActing Director of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union discharge in respect of the implementation of the Centre’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training discharge in respect of the implementation of the Centre’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training discharge in respect of the implementation of the Centre’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Banking Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Banking Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Banking Authority for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Banking Authority for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Director of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control discharge in respect of the implementation of the Centre’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control discharge in respect of the implementation of the Centre’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Chemicals Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Chemicals Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Environment Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Environment Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Environment Agency for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Environment Agency for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Fisheries Control Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Fisheries Control Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Fisheries Control Agency for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Fisheries Control Agency for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Food Safety Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Food Safety Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Food Safety Authority for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Food Safety Authority for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Director of the European Institute for Gender Equality discharge in respect of the implementation of the Institute’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Institute for Gender Equality discharge in respect of the implementation of the Institute’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Institute for Gender Equality for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Institute for Gender Equality for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Director of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology discharge in respect of the implementation of the Institute’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology discharge in respect of the implementation of the Institute’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Labour Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Labour Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Medicines Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Medicines Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Director of the European Union Drugs Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting theExecutive Director of the European Union Drugs Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Maritime Safety Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Maritime Safety Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Maritime Safety Agency for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Maritime Safety Agency for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Railways discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Railways discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Railways for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Railways for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Director General of the Euratom Supply Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director General of the Euratom Supply Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Securities and Markets Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Securities and Markets Authority discharge in respect of the implementation of the Authority’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Securities and Markets Authority for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Securities and Markets Authority for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Director of the European Training Foundation discharge in respect of the implementation of the Foundation’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Training Foundation discharge in respect of the implementation of the Foundation’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Training Foundation for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Training Foundation for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Asylum discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Asylum discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Asylum for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Asylum for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Interim Executive Director of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Interim Executive Director of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions discharge in respect of the implementation of the Foundation’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions discharge in respect of the implementation of the Foundation’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Administrative Director of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Administrative Director of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Director of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Grants the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

Changed:1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2024;

Added:H. whereas, for the financial year 2024, the Court of Auditors issued unqualified opinions for almost all agencies; whereas maintaining high standards of sound financial management, effective internal control systems and budgetary discipline remains essential to ensure the proper and transparent use of Union funds and to strengthen citizens’ trust in the Union’s institutions;

Added:I. whereas Union agencies have seen an increasing scope of responsibilities in recent years; whereas adequate and predictable resources, combined with robust governance structures and clear accountability mechanisms, are necessary to enable them to fulfil their mandates effectively and to safeguard the Union’s credibility;

Added:J. whereas the cybersecurity incident affecting one of the agencies in 2024 demonstrates the vulnerability of Union bodies handling sensitive data; whereas strengthening cybersecurity, business continuity planning and internal control systems should be treated as a horizontal priority across all agencies;

Removed:3. Recalls that point 60 of the Common Approach states that every agency should be evaluated every five years; urges the Commission to explore further synergies and consolidation in the activities, and possible merging of agencies with complementary activities, such as the agencies in the field of education and training, in order to ensure cost-effectiveness and streamline agency functions, including potential mandate reviews where inefficiencies or redundancies exist; encourages, where necessary, the application of the sunset/review clause to maintain efficiency and ensure the optimal use of resources; believes that budgetary efficiency is key to the functioning of the agencies; recalls in this regard the recommendation of the Court in the Special Report 22/2020 which advises the Commission to increase the use of cross-cutting evaluations of agencies in the context of the Commission’s fitness checks of the different policy areas;

Added:3. Expresses concern regarding the Union's growing debt burden; notes that, according to the Annual Report of the European Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), outstanding loans borrowed by the Union could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027, which is almost ten times the level of debt from 2020; warns that rising borrowing costs pose a risk to future budgets and reduce the fiscal space for new priorities;

Removed:4. Highlights the importance of the discharge procedure, which is not only a treaty-based obligation but also promotes transparency, accountability, and open dialogue on the Union’s finances; considers that the practice of granting discharge only by internal authority, applied by agencies such as the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), and the Single Resolution Board (SRB), raises potential conflicts of interest or insufficient evaluation and scrutiny, whereas Parliament-granted discharge enhances transparency and public accountability; believes this higher standard should apply uniformly to all Union-related bodies, regardless of their financing model, and recalls the Common Approach on fully self-financed agencies (point 58), which calls for exploring democratic accountability mechanisms which include annual reporting to Parliament, Council, and Commission, as well as consideration of their recommendations, to ensure public scrutiny over agencies implementing EU policies without traditional discharge procedures;

Added:4. Stresses that transparency is not only a compliance obligation but a precondition for public trust in agencies exercising significant regulatory or operational powers; calls on agencies to proactively publish key documents of non-confidential content in a timely and user-friendly manner, while following the principle of proportionality, complying with data protection laws, taking into account security, legal, strategic and other relevant concerns and abiding by the regulation and mandate of the respective agency;

Removed:5. Notes with concern that over the years, Union decentralised agencies have been entrusted with an expanding number of tasks through revised regulations, new legislation or service-level and delegation agreements with the Commission often without corresponding structural resources or permanent posts; highlights that this recurrent pattern, creates operational pressure which in turn might contribute to budgetary management weaknesses and a growing structural dependence on external contractors, particularly in the area of information and communication technologies (ICT), cybersecurity and other operational-enabling functions; warns that such long-term dependence may undermine institutional capacity, continuity, and knowledge retention, and may create risks of structural dependence on external providers and reduced operational autonomy;

Added:5. Recalls that point 60 of the Common Approach states that every agency should be evaluated every five years; urges the Commission to explore further synergies and consolidation in activities, and possible merging of agencies with complementary activities, in order to ensure cost-effectiveness and streamline agency functions, including potential mandate reviews where inefficiencies or redundancies exist; insists that, in accordance with the principles of proportionality, efficiency and fiscal responsibility, all EU agencies shall be subject to periodic performance reviews; encourages, where necessary, the application of the sunset/review clause to maintain efficiency and ensure the optimal use of resources; believes that budgetary efficiency is key to the functioning of the agencies; recalls in this regard the recommendation of the Court in the Special Report 22/20202 which advises the Commission to increase the use of cross-cutting evaluations of agencies in the context of the Commission’s fitness checks of the different policy areas; notes that the Court Special Report 22/2020 found that agencies’ measurable contribution to Union policy objectives is not always clearly demonstrated; underlines that the 33 decentralised agencies manage over EUR 4,1 billion and that, beyond compliance checks, Parliament could further consider how to assess their impact; encourages reporting on a limited set of outcome and impact indicators and calls on the EU Agencies Network, in cooperation with the Court, to explore and, where appropriate, develop a common performance framework for submission to the discharge authority;

Removed:6. Stresses that transparency, robust conflict-of-interest (COI) controls and clear rules governing interactions with stakeholders are essential safeguards for the independence, credibility and accountability of Union decentralised agencies; underlines that many agencies operate in sectors where close cooperation with industry, consultancies, technical experts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or external partners is necessary, but where the risks of undue influence, unbalanced consultations or opacity remain; highlights that transparent procedures, public disclosure of meetings, balanced and transparent expert selection, and continuous COI screening are indispensable to ensure that agency decisions are based solely on objective evidence and the Union’s general interest; urges all agencies to put in place and enforce such measures;

Added:6. Stresses that respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law constitutes a prerequisite for good performance and sound financial management; considers that only agencies ensuring full compliance with fundamental rights obligations can be regarded as performing satisfactorily, irrespective of budget execution rates;

Removed:7. Acknowledges that decentralised agencies vary in their exposure to lobbying risks depending on their mandate and operational context; highlights that current practices for ensuring transparency also differ; notes that for example, euLISA maintains a dedicated transparency register on its webpage covering all meetings of its senior management with economic operators, Frontex provides on its website a register with information on meetings linked specifically to procurement-related matters, ECHA publishes information on the meetings held by senior managers with external stakeholder organisations; is of the opinion that, while a one-size-fits-all model would be neither proportionate nor operationally meaningful, establishing common minimum standards would enhance coherence; notes the replies provided by agencies in the previous discharge cycle, including their varying use of the Transparency Register and the fact that several agencies have already introduced internal transparency registers or conflict-of-interest systems tailored to their mandates; calls on the agencies to adopt minimum standards such as the implementation of the 4-eye-principle, clear code of conduct strategy including clear rules to avoid a conflict of interest and the implementation of specific internal transparency registers with clear standards reflecting the mandate of the agency and the relevant data protection rules; highlights that transparency registers should be accessible to auditors on a case by case basis; considers that implementation should be progressive taking into account new digital possibilities in order to avoid creating additional administrative burden for agencies;

Added:7. Calls on all agencies to continue to ensure compliance with fundamental rights and data protection in their respective operations;

Removed:8. Notes that, in 2024, the 33 decentralised agencies reported that they employ a total of 11 491 members of staff (compared to 10 580 in 2023), comprising officials, temporary agents, contract agents and seconded national experts (SNEs), representing an increase of 8,61 % compared to 2023; notes that while gender balance in the Union decentralised agencies is improving, significant disparities remain; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA, ERA, euLISA and Europol, have a higher percentage of male staff, while agencies like CdT, EFSA, EMA, ETF, and Eurojust have more female staff; notes that the percentage is often sector-specific, with men dominating IT-related and law enforcement roles, and women more prevalent in education/training and healthcare sectors; recalls that the Union’s commitment to promoting gender equality in management positions is still not fully realised; emphasises that the efforts of Commission in this regard should be improved; recalls that Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (Staff regulations) states that recruitment should also be based on the broadest geographical balance selected from EU Member States; notes that there is a natural tendency for higher percentage of staff stemming from the Member State in which the Agency is located; recalls that the agencies located in countries with relatively low correction coefficient are facing continuous challenges in attracting skilled and geographically diverse staff;

Added:8. Highlights the importance of the discharge procedure, which is not only a treaty-based obligation but also promotes transparency, accountability, and open dialogue on the Union’s finances; considers that the practice of granting discharge through governance arrangements established in the founding acts of agencies such as the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), and the Single Resolution Board (SRB), reflects their specific legal and financial frameworks and ensures appropriate evaluation and scrutiny, while supporting transparency and public accountability; recalls the Common Approach on fully self-financed agencies (point 58), which calls for exploring democratic accountability mechanisms, including annual reporting to Parliament, Council, and Commission, as well as consideration of their recommendations, in order to ensure public scrutiny over agencies implementing Union policies without recourse to the general Union budget; considers, nevertheless, that it would be desirable for fully self-financed agencies to become part of the discharge procedure for agencies under the responsibility of the Committee on Budgetary Control, or at least to be subject to enhanced reporting obligations before the Committee on Budgetary Control;

Removed:9. Notes that, in 2024, the staff turnover rate was more than 5% in 16 out of 33 agencies (namely BEREC Office, CdT, Cedefop, CEPOL, ECDC, EEA, ELA, euLISA, EUOSHA, Eurofound, Eurojust, Europol, FRA) and that two of them exceeded the 10% rate (namely EIT, ETF); commends the agencies that have taken targeted measures to prevent high staff turnover rates; calls on the Commission and the Member States to allow to higher contract agents for longer periods or allow a higher number of temporary agents to guarantee a better continuity and knowledge preservation;

Added:9. Notes with concern that over the years, Union decentralised agencies have been entrusted with an expanding number of tasks through revised regulations, new legislation or service-level and delegation agreements with the Commission often without corresponding structural resources or permanent posts; highlights that this recurrent pattern, creates operational pressure which in turn might contribute to budgetary management weaknesses and a growing structural dependence on external contractors, particularly in the area of information and communication technologies (ICT), cybersecurity and other operational-enabling functions; warns that such long-term dependence may undermine institutional capacity, continuity, and knowledge retention, while also weakening the Union’s digital sovereignty and the personal integrity of citizens; calls therefore on such long term dependence to be regularly assessed and to reduce structural dependency on external consultants, in particular for core functions; stresses that excessive outsourcing undermines institutional memory, accountability and value for money; calls on the Commission to ensure agencies are adequately staffed to perform their mandates in-house where possible;

Removed:10. Welcomes the fact that in 2024 most agencies adopted and implemented the Charter on Diversity and Inclusion, which promotes equal treatment, diversity and inclusion in the workplace and in social life;

Added:10. Notes that rule of law deficiencies in certain Member States, including weakened judicial independence and prosecution capacity, can undermine agencies’ cooperation frameworks, data reliability and operational integrity; calls on the Commission to assess and address these risks;

Removed:11. Highlights that establishing an effective complaint mechanism for staff in Union decentralised agencies requires combining strong confidentiality guarantees, including anonymous reporting channels, with clear, harmonised procedures aligned with the Staff Regulations and communicated through regular staff training; considers that agencies should appoint independent, professionally trained ethics or complaints officers, or utilise shared inter-agency structures for smaller agencies, to ensure impartial handling of Article 90 of the Staff Regulations requests, harassment reports, conflicts of interest, and whistleblowing disclosures; calls on the agencies to ensure that staff have access to an external escalation channel and robust protection against retaliation through systematic follow-up checks, while transparency should be enhanced through anonymised annual reporting on complaints and outcomes, and impartiality improved through the use of inter-agency investigation panels for sensitive cases; calls on the implementation of protection mechanisms against false accusation and denunciation;

Added:11. Stresses that transparency, robust conflict-of-interest controls and clear rules governing interactions with stakeholders are essential safeguards for the independence, institutional credibility, and accountability of Union decentralised agencies as well as the public's trust in their strong and robust functioning; underlines that many agencies operate in sectors where close cooperation with industry, consultancies, technical experts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or external partners is necessary, but where the risks of undue influence, unbalanced consultations or opacity remain; highlights that transparent procedures, public disclosure of meetings, balanced and transparent expert selection, and continuous conflict-of-interest screening are indispensable to ensure that agency decisions are based solely on objective evidence and the Union’s general interest; urges all agencies to put in place and enforce such measures, calls for transparent safeguards, including clear and adequate cooling-off periods, proactive monitoring and transparency of stakeholder interactions; recommends regular independent reviews of conflict-of-interest frameworks, respecting the principle of proportionality, and invites the Commission and the EU Agencies Network to promote peer learning to enhance governance and transparency standards;

Removed:12. Notes the important role of the EU Agencies Network (EUAN) and in particular its ICT Advisory Committee (ICTAC) in supporting agencies’ preparedness for the implementation of the Cybersecurity Regulation through enhanced coordination, knowledge sharing and cooperation with DG DIGIT, CERT-EU and the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation; calls on EUAN and ICTAC to provide comprehensive and regular information on the state of implementation across all decentralised agencies, including common challenges, identified risks, resource needs, and planned mitigation measures, in order to enable effective oversight;

Added:12. Acknowledges that decentralised agencies vary in their exposure to lobbying risks depending on their mandate and operational context; notes that transparency practices vary across Agencies; notes that for example, eu-LISA maintains a dedicated transparency register on its webpage covering all meetings of its senior management with economic operators, European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) provides on its website a register with information on meetings linked specifically to procurement-related matters, ECHA publishes information on the meetings held by senior managers with external stakeholder organisations; is of the opinion that, while a one-size-fits-all model would be neither proportionate nor operationally meaningful, establishing common minimum standards would enhance coherence and accountability; notes the replies provided by agencies in the previous discharge cycle, including their varying use of the Transparency Register and the fact that several agencies have already introduced internal transparency registers or conflict-of-interest systems tailored to their mandates; calls on the agencies to adopt minimum standards such as the implementation of the 4-eye-principle, clear code of conduct strategy including clear rules to avoid a conflict of interest and the implementation of specific internal transparency registers with clear standards reflecting their respective mandate and applicable data protection rules; highlights that such transparency registers should be accessible to auditors on a case by case basis; considers that their implementation should be progressive and make use of new digital possibilities in order to avoid creating unnecessary and/or additional administrative burden for agencies;

Removed:13. Stresses the importance of developing clear, robust and meaningful key performance indicators (KPIs) in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) of EU agencies, as these reports constitute a primary source of information for external users; notes that some KPI systems frequently lack continuity, standardisation, operational depth, documented methodology for selecting, updating, and retiring KPIs, transparency, comparability and multi-annual tracking, thereby reducing comparability and the capacity of external users to assess performance objectively; underlines that KPIs should be streamlined and well-designed, built on SMART principles and applied consistently across reporting cycles, which are essential for evaluating efficiency, effectiveness and progress toward strategic objectives;

Added:13. Notes that, in 2024, the 33 decentralised agencies reported that they employ a total of 11 491 members of staff (compared to 10 580 in 2023), comprising officials, temporary agents, contract agents and seconded national experts (SNEs), representing an increase of 8,61 % compared to 2023; notes that while gender balance in the Union decentralised agencies is improving, significant disparities remain; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA, EIGE, ERA, euLISA and Europol, have a higher percentage of male members staff, while agencies like CdT, EFSA, EMA, ETF, and Eurojust have more female members of staff; notes that the percentage is often sector-specific; calls on the agencies to adopt corrective strategies, including transparent promotion procedures and targeted leadership development; recalls that the Union’s commitment to promoting gender equality in management positions is still not fully realised; emphasises that the efforts of the Commission in this regard should be improved; recalls that Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (Staff regulations3) states that recruitment should be on the basis of objective, transparent and merit-based criteria and also be based on the broadest geographical balance selected from Member States; notes that there is a natural tendency for to employ a higher percentage of staff stemming from the Member State in which the Agency is located; recalls that the agencies located in countries with relatively low correction coefficient are facing continuous challenges in attracting skilled and geographically diverse staff; encourages agencies to promote gender balance in HR strategies and management selection panels; invites the Commission and EU Agencies Network to provide best practices and benchmarking tools to support gender-balanced leadership;

Removed:14. Acknowledges the cooperation with external partners such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Strategic Planning Network on modernising KPI methodologies; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA and ECDC, have developed more robust and operationally relevant indicators; calls on agencies with inefficient, non-quantifiable and non-measurable KPI systems to draw on these stronger models and to systematically share best practices through EUAN, in order to improve comparability, enhance the usefulness of AARs for external users, and strengthen overall performance assessment across the agencies;

Added:14. Notes that, in 2024, the staff turnover rate was more than 5 % in 16 out of 33 agencies (namely the BEREC Office, CdT, Cedefop, CEPOL, ECDC, EEA, ELA, eu-LISA, EUOSHA, Eurofound, Eurojust, Europol, FRA) and that two of them exceeded the 10 % rate (namely EIT, ETF); commends the agencies that have taken targeted measures to prevent high staff turnover rates; calls on the Commission and the Member States to allow them to hire contract agents for longer periods or allow a higher number of temporary agents to guarantee a better continuity and knowledge preservation; considers that burnout, turnover and precarious employment pose risks to institutional integrity, internal controls and sound financial management; emphasises that Management Boards are responsible for agencies’ integrity and accountability, regrets insufficient action on serious findings, and calls for enhanced transparency vis-à-vis the discharge authority;

Removed:15. Draws attention to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigations affecting several agencies: ENISA (two 2024 cases, one ongoing, one dismissed, and a 2025 recruitment case), eu-LISA (conflict of interest and procurement probes), EIT (three KIC-related cases concluded with EUR 1520 million recoveries), Frontex (eight concluded cases in 20232024), and ongoing investigations at ACER and EEA; urges all agencies to ensure full cooperation with OLAF, to strengthen internal controls, recruitment and procurement safeguards, and to provide further information to the discharge authority as soon as confidentiality restrictions are lifted;

Added:15. Welcomes the fact that in 2024 most agencies adopted and implemented the Charter on Diversity and Inclusion, which promotes equal treatment, diversity and inclusion in the workplace and in social life; strongly encourages those Agencies who have not joined yet to consider proceeding with the adoption and implementation without delay;

Removed:16. Notes that the absence of opt-out (break-out) clauses that allow the early termination of lease contracts continues to pose a financial risk to EU agencies; recalls that the importance of including such clauses in rental agreements was highlighted by the difficult situation faced by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) following Brexit, which was unable to terminate its long-term lease in London and had to pay rent in both London and Amsterdam as a result; acknowledges that since 2019 several agencies have introduced break-out clauses, but notes that not all agencies have done so, including cases where new or renewed leases were signed without such provisions; urges agencies and the Commission to systematically assess the need for break-out clauses when negotiating or renewing lease contracts, taking into account the lessons learned from past experience, in order to limit financial exposure and ensure greater budgetary flexibility;

Added:16. Highlights that establishing an effective complaint mechanism for staff in Union decentralised agencies requires combining strong confidentiality guarantees, including anonymous reporting channels, with clear, harmonised procedures aligned with the Staff Regulations and communicated through regular staff training; considers that agencies should appoint independent, professionally trained ethics or complaints officers, or utilise shared inter-agency structures for smaller agencies, to ensure impartial handling of Article 90 of the Staff Regulations requests, harassment reports, conflicts of interest, and whistleblowing disclosures; calls on the agencies to ensure that staff have access to an external escalation channel as well as strong, independent and effective protection against any retaliation through systematic follow-up checks, while transparency should be enhanced through anonymised annual reporting on complaints and outcomes, and impartiality improved through the use of inter-agency investigation panels for sensitive cases; calls on the implementation of protection mechanisms against false accusation and denunciation;

Added:17. Notes the important role of the EU Agencies Network (EUAN) and in particular its ICT Advisory Committee (ICTAC) in supporting agencies’ preparedness for the implementation of the Cybersecurity Regulation through enhanced coordination, knowledge sharing and cooperation with DG DIGIT, CERT-EU and the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation; calls on EUAN and ICTAC to provide comprehensive and regular information on the state of implementation across all decentralised agencies, including common challenges, identified risks, resource needs, and planned mitigation measures, in order to enable effective oversight; stresses the need for robust cybersecurity and careful AI use, noting opportunities but also financial and operational risks; calls on agencies to assess AI-supported processes in financial, procurement, or decision-making functions, and to ensure transparency, documentation, auditability, and full compliance with Union data protection and cybersecurity rules;

Added:18. Stresses the importance of developing clear, robust and meaningful key performance indicators (KPIs) in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) of EU agencies, as these reports constitute a primary source of information for external users; notes that some KPI systems frequently lack continuity, standardisation, operational depth, documented methodology for selecting, updating, and retiring KPIs, transparency, comparability and multi-annual tracking, thereby reducing comparability and the capacity of external users to assess performance objectively; underlines that KPIs should be streamlined and well-designed, built on specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) principles and applied consistently across reporting cycles, which are essential for evaluating efficiency, effectiveness and progress toward strategic objectives; stresses the need to enhance the use of results- and impact-oriented reporting by focusing on materiality and proportionality, to reduce administrative burden; underlines that performance indicators must be explicitly derived from the objectives of each agency's founding mandate and capture outputs, outcomes and, above all, impacts; calls on agencies to include cost-benefit analysis and transparent budgeting in their performance frameworks;

Added:19. Acknowledges the cooperation with external partners such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Strategic Planning Network on modernising KPI methodologies; highlights that some agencies, such as ACER, EASA and ECDC, have developed more robust and operationally relevant indicators; calls on agencies with inadequate or immeasurable KPI systems to draw on these stronger models and to systematically share best practices through EUAN, in order to improve comparability, enhance the usefulness of AARs for external users, and strengthen overall performance assessment across the agencies; calls on the Commission to require that all agency evaluations under point 60 of the Common Approach systematically assess the impact of each agency on its policy area, and that programmes or activities that have not demonstrated effectiveness within a reasonable timeframe be terminated, with funds reallocated to more effective measures;

Added:20. Draws attention to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigations affecting several agencies: ENISA (two 2024 cases, one ongoing, one dismissed, and a 2025 recruitment case), eu-LISA (conflict of interest and procurement probes), EIT (three KIC-related cases concluded with EUR 15-20 million recoveries), Frontex (two ongoing and eight concluded cases in 2023-2024), and ongoing investigations at ACER and EEA; urges all EU agencies to ensure full cooperation with OLAF, to strengthen internal controls, recruitment and procurement safeguards, and to provide further information to the discharge authority as soon as confidentiality restrictions are lifted;

Added:21. Recalls that Frontex’s mandate was significantly expanded in 2019, when a revised regulation expanded its tasks and authorised a standing corps of 10 000 border guards with a corresponding increase in the budget; underlines that budget increases, irrespective of the Agency concerned, must always be matched by adequate accountability and transparency provisions;

Added:22. Notes that the absence of opt-out (break-out) clauses that allow the early termination of lease contracts continues to pose a financial risk to EU agencies; recalls that the importance of including such clauses in rental agreements was highlighted by the difficult situation faced by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) following Brexit, which was unable to terminate its long-term lease in London and had to pay rent in both London and Amsterdam as a result; acknowledges that since 2019 several agencies have introduced break-out clauses, but regrets that not all agencies have done so, including cases where new or renewed leases were signed; urges agencies and the Commission to systematically introduce break-out clauses when negotiating or renewing lease contracts, taking into account the lessons learned from past experience, in order to limit financial exposure and ensure greater budgetary flexibility;

Added:24. Notes that the budget of 33 EU agencies rose from EUR 3,6 billion in 2023 to 4,1 billion in 2024; calls on the Commission to analyse five-year cumulative costs, distinguishing mandate-driven growth from administrative expansion, and to justify further increases with demonstrable added value; emphasises that budget growth must be matched by stronger governance, internal controls, staffing and absorption planning to avoid irregularities, carryovers, and ineffective spending;

Added:25. Notes that the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and other EU agencies are assisting in supporting Union institutions in the area of fundamental rights-related implementation of Union law; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authority to provide all EU agencies with adequate and predictable resources;

Changed:23. Is of31. theExpresses opinionconcern that ENISA is in a critical position due to the growing complexity of Union cybersecurity needsneeds, the continuous escalation of cyber threats and the lack of proportional funding and adequate staffing; echoes the Council’s conclusions on ENISA of December 2024 which highlight ENISA’s central role in the Union’s cybersecurity ecosystem and the need to align funding and resources with its expanded mandate; stresses, that additional resources must be accompanied by measurable performance targets and regular reporting on the concrete outcomes achieved;

Changed:25.33. Notes the progressive expansion of Europol’s mandate, including recently adopted and proposed measures conferring enhanced capacities to combat serious and organised crime, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking inof human beings, cybercrime and terrorism; recalls that these developments encompass, inter alia, strengthened cooperation with private actors through direct data exchanges, reinforced large-scale data analysis capabilities, and upgraded operational assistance to Member States via specialised support teams; emphasises that the effective implementation of those additional tasks requires a corresponding increase in Europol’s human resources;resources, observes,but however,also robust internal safeguards, sufficient compliance capacity and strengthened supervisory mechanisms; observes, that Europol’s budget increased by only 5,78 % in 2024 compared to 2023; therefore urges that Europol’s budget be further reinforced in order to address persistent staffing shortages and to ensure that its financial resources are commensurate with its expanding responsibilities; stresses Europol’s key role in combating migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, cross-border crime and terrorism; underlines that Frontex should focus on core operations; and welcomes Frontex’s ongoing efforts to strengthen its Fundamental Rights Officer;

Changed:26.34. NotesCalls thefor needan toincrease expandin Eurojust’s personnelstaffing levels in light of its foreseen enhanced mandate to include third states,countries , particularly following the 2022 invasionRussian war of aggression against Ukraine, which enables it to gather, store, and analyse evidence of core international crimes (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity), share such evidence with national authorities and international bodies including the International Criminal Court, and create a dedicated Core International Crimes Evidence Database for this purpose, thereby moving beyond merely supporting investigations to actively safeguarding essential evidence for future investigation, while noting that the 2024 budget only reflected a modest percentage increase compared to the 2023 budget, and urges that personnel funding be raised accordingly along with the overall budget in view of the expected future mandate;

Changed:30.38. Recalls that the 2023 discharge resolutionsresolution already noted the importance of strengthening the European supervisory authorities’ (EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA) capacity to identify and separately account for the costs of activities financed by different revenue streams;ESMA); is aware that their founding regulations do not mandate a separation between activities funded by Union contributions and national contributions and giventhat the lackoverall ofcost-sharing clearmechanism delineationdoes innot therequire regulationsdifferentiation betweenat the twolevel fundingof sources,individual activities, resulting in these authorities do not differentiatedifferentiating between costs covered by the Union budget and those funded by Member States as highlighted by the Court in its Annual report in 2023;

Changed:31.39. Considers that introducingenhancing separatetransparency costin accountingbudgeting forand ESAactivity-based activitiesreporting would enhancecontribute transparency,to accountabilityimproved oversight and decisionaccountability, making,in particular for agencies financed by multiple revenue streams allowing stakeholders, including Member States, financial institutions and taxpayers to better assess efficiency and fairness; stresses that theclarity currentregarding lackthe oflink differentiationbetween limitsrevenue oversightsources and insistsactivities thatstrengthens costsconfidence andin revenuesthe ofsound ESA’suse activitiesof shouldUnion befunds, clearlywhile identified,respecting accountedthe forlegal separatelyframework andset disclosedout in annual accountsthe andagencies’ programmingfounding documents;regulations;

Changed:35.43. Notes that in 2024, 11 agencies (ACER, ECDC, EEA, EFCA, EIGE, ELA, EMA, ENISA, ESA, eu-LISA, EU-OSHA,EUOSHA, Eurofound, EUSPA, FRA and Frontex) had carry-over levels exceeding 15 % across combined budget titles, with recurring patterns; notes that in the case of Frontex and ESA, carry-overs reached more than 40 % and 30 % respectively; calls on the agencies to improve multi-annual planning, procurement scheduling and commitment forecasting to support better implementation of appropriations within the financial year for which they are authorised; calls on the Commission to require agencies with recurrent carry-overs to submit corrective action plans; recalls that the Court, in its annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2024, emphasised that recurrent high rates of carry-overs undermine the budgetary principle of annuality;

Changed:36.44. Is of the opinion that carry-overs could, in some cases, be justified by the multiannual nature of operations or caused by factors beyond the control of the agencies concerned; notes the Court’s statement during the hearing held on 1 December 2025 that, under its new audit approach, it will endeavour to provide a clearer overall overview of the nature of carry-overs in future reports, while acknowledging the Court’s clarification that an agency-by-agency differentiated breakdown of the causes of carry-overs is not feasible due to methodological and resource constraints; welcomes the Court’s readiness to highlight recurring patterns and systemic factors contributing to excessive carry-overscarry-overs; stresses nevertheless that persistently high and recurrent levels of carry-overs may point to underlying structural challenges in planning, implementation or resource allocation; calls on the agencies to improve its budgetary forecasting and project scheduling to minimise unplanned carry-overs and ensure that appropriations are used efficiently within the financial year;

Changed:38.46. Insists on the need to ensure adherence to legal time limits for payments and notes that a high frequency of delayed payments may negatively impact the agencies’ reputations; calls on the agencies concerned to take measures to avoid future payment delays and interest on late payments and ensure a timely settlement of obligations; recalls that compliance with payment deadlines under the Financial Regulation constitutes a legal obligation and a core element of the financial management; calls on the agencies to implement corrective measures where late payments persist over several years ensuring systematic respect of statutory deadlines;

Changed:39.47. UrgesCalls on the European supervisory authorities’ (EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA) to improve their capacity to identify and separately account forstrengthen thetransparency costsin oftheir activities financed by different revenue streams in order to improve accounting oversight and transparency as recommended by ECA as not being able to account for thesethe posesECA ain riskrelation to the transparency ofrevenue usemanagement ofand Unionfinancing funds;structures;

Changed:40.48. Notes the conclusion of the European Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) in its annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2024 (the ‘Court’s report’), found that the Court’s audit had similar results as in previous years, with weaknesses in public procurement procedures noted as the main source of irregular payments; calls on the agencies concerned to reinforce their ex ante controls, improve the documentation of award criteria and ensure strict justification for negotiated procedures without publication; calls on the Commission to provide targeted guidance and training to agencies with recurring procurement deficiencies; further calls on the agencies to ensure full traceability, competitive procedures, and proper record-keeping in all procurement operations and invites the internal audit services of the agencies to prioritise procurement reviews;

Changed:44.52. Notes that the Court considers the risk to budget management to be low, with the Court’s audit reporting weaknesses relating mainly to automatic carry-overs of non-differentiated appropriations and late payments; highlights that weaknesses in management and control systems concern issues such as the absence of adequate ex-post/ex-ante checks, operational procurements launched without proper financing decisions, expenditure implemented without the proper delegation of power by an authorising officer, weaknesses in the management of grants and delays in an agency’s evaluation by the Commission; stresses that these weaknesses listed by the Court, undermine sound financial management and expose agencies to financial and reputational risks; calls on the agencies concerned to ensure full compliance with the Financial Regulation and to take the necessary corrective measures, and invites the Commission to closely monitor their implementation;

Changed:48.56. Notes that, concerning the ELA, the qualification relates to payments amounting to EUR 2,6 million in 2024, representing 5,7 % of the total payment appropriations available; notes that this amount includes EUR 2,2 million related to a contract deemed irregular in the 2022 audit report due to the awarded value exceeding the established maximum contract limit contravening point 12.3(a) of Annex I to the Financial Regulation and EUR 0,4 million associated with deficiencies in ex ante checks on contract implementation; takes note of the ELA reply’s during the hearing held on 1 December 2025 that, notwithstanding the irregular award, actual payments made under the contract remained within the EUR 6 million ceiling established in the tender specifications, and that the contract was essential to ensuring the Authority’s continuity of operations during its initial establishment phase; further notes that the irregular contract ended in February 2024 and was not renewed; welcomes the Authority’s assurances that corrective measures have been implemented, including revised tender documentation, strengthened procurement procedures and updated internal checklists to prevent similar irregularities; urges the ELA to strengthen planning and prioritisation mechanisms to ensure efficient use of appropriations and timely implementation of operational activities in the future;

Changed:50.58. Notes that “observations” in the agencies’ specific annual reports are in fact “not timed recommendations” by the Court; notes that the Court annually follows-up on those observations by assessing their status as “open” or “closed”; considers, however, that long-standing open observations should call for timely and concrete corrective measures, accompanied by reinforced oversight by the respective management boards in order to prevent recurrent weaknesses;

Changed:57.65. Notes that in June 2024, CEPOL experienced a significant cyber-attack that impacted all business areas, leading to the cancellation of 10 onsite training activities and the suspension of all online training for the remainder of the year; notes furthermore that the event not only disrupted CEPOL’s operational activities but it also resulted in additional unplanned expenditures related to incident response, system recovery, and enhanced cybersecurity measures; isnotes awarethat the security breach was the direct result of a sophisticated cyberattack that targeted CEPOL’s digital infrastructure, and that unauthorised actors gained access to a substantial volume of personal data, compromising its confidentiality, integrity, and availability; emphasises that due to the attack,cyber incident, approximately 99 000 individuals had to be notified directly about the breach of their personal data and that the attack prompted a criminal investigation supported by CERT-EU and Europol; is concerned that despite some circumstantial evidence the threat actor has not been conclusively identified; draws attention to CERT-EU’s advice to rebuild the infrastructure, leading to the implementation of a zero-trustzero-trust, approachfull-cloud infrastructureIT environment with new equipment by DG DIGIT within three weeks; notes that CEPOL is currently implementing 42 cybersecurity tasks and projects as part of its Cybersecurity Plan; highlights that ICT security awareness and training sessions have been rolled out to all staff, complemented by regular intranet notifications and updates, as part of standard practice; stresses that cybersecurity failures pose not only operational but also reputational, financial and legal risks for agencies; calls for binding minimum cybersecurity standards and adequate, stable funding to ensure their effective implementation;

Removed:58. Recalls that Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/284 establishes a binding and ambitious cybersecurity framework for all decentralised agencies, including the adoption of a comprehensive cybersecurity risk-management system, the implementation of robust technical and organisational measures across all ICT environments, the progressive transition towards zero-trust architecture, strengthened cooperation with CERT-EU, and strict incident-reporting obligations; notes that several of these core requirements remain challenging given the current uneven levels of preparedness across agencies; stresses that all agencies must treat CEPOL’s cyber-attack as a clear lesson learnt and accelerate implementation of the Regulation’s cybersecurity provisions;

Added:66. Stresses that when agencies operate outside the territory of the Union or cooperate with third-country authorities, they remain fully bound by Union law; calls on the Commission to ensure that cooperation agreements, operational arrangements and data-sharing frameworks include enforceable safeguards, monitoring mechanisms and clear reporting obligations to the discharge authority;

Added:67. Recalls that Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/284 establishes a binding and ambitious cybersecurity framework for all decentralised agencies covering financial mechanisms, operational platforms and sensitive data, as well as the implementation of robust technical and organisational measures across all ICT environments, the progressive transition towards zero-trust architecture, strengthened cooperation with CERT-EU, DG DIGIT and other relevant inter-institutional bodies as well as strict incident-reporting obligations; notes that several of these core requirements remain challenging given the current uneven levels of preparedness across agencies; stresses that the cybersecurity incident affecting CEPOL demonstrates the daily cyber threats to which the agencies are exposed and their vulnerability when handling sensitive data; calls for accelerated implementation in all agencies of Cyber security provisions of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/284, and regular stress-testing of agencies’ IT; urges agencies to enhance real-time threat monitoring, response capabilities, and staff cybersecurity training;

Added:68. Notes the underrepresentation of men in the staff of EIGE at just 29 % and 21 % (8 men) in the management board, encourages EIGE to achieve a more balanced gender representation in the future hiring of staff;

Changed:71.81. TakesNotes notethat in May 2025 the discharge of the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) status reportwas ofpostponed 31due Octoberto 2025findings onby the implementation of corrective actions, as agreed between theOLAF Executiveregarding Directorgovernance and the Managementstability; Board,notes asthat a follow-upconfidential toinvestigation Parliament’sby resolution;OLAF notesfound that thesenior Managementmanagement Boardat isthe addressingEUAA Parliament’sagency observationsbypassed instaff lineregulations withand itsthat proceduresOLAF andinvestigators willhave reviewnoted progressthat onsuch outstandinghiring measurespractices atare itsin meetingbreach inof Novemberthe 2025;Union's Staff Regulations;

Removed:72. Notes that while improvements were made in 2024 to strengthen the Agency’s ethical framework, staff awareness, and internal conflict-of-interest procedures, the structural conflict of interest identified by OLAF regarding complaints against the Executive Director has not yet been addressed, as the Legal Unit responsible for preparing such cases continues to operate under the direct supervision of the Executive Director, undermining the independence of the complaints process; notes that most corrective actions are scheduled for 2025 and 2026, including organisational changes, an optimisation programme, training for staff and managers, improvements to governance documents, enhanced transparency in reporting irregularities, a review of internal guidance on requests and complaints under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations, strengthened cooperation with DG HR for handling complaints and a review of procedures for requests for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations;

Added:82. Takes note of the EUAA status report of 31 October 2025 on the implementation of corrective actions, as agreed between the Executive Director and the Management Board, as a follow-up to Parliament’s resolution; notes that the Management Board is addressing Parliament’s observations in line with its procedures and will review progress on outstanding measures at its meeting in November 2025; urges the Agency to fully clarify all open issues, to implement OLAF recommendations in a credible and transparent manner, and to establish robust internal control, ethical oversight and accountability mechanisms; calls on the Agency to inform the discharge authority of any remedial steps taken without undue delay; stresses that the conclusion of OLAF investigations does not in itself constitute closure of governance failures; reiterates that the discharge authority retains full oversight rights until structural weaknesses in management, transparency and conflict-of-interest handling are fully remedied and verified;

Added:83. Notes that while improvements were made in 2024 to strengthen the Agency’s ethical framework, staff awareness, and internal conflict-of-interest procedures, the structural conflict of interest identified by OLAF regarding complaints against the Executive Director had not yet been addressed, as the Legal Unit responsible for preparing such cases continued to operate under the direct supervision of the Executive Director, undermining the independence of the complaints process; notes that most corrective actions are scheduled for 2025 and 2026, including organisational changes, an optimisation programme, training for staff and managers, improvements to governance documents, enhanced transparency in reporting irregularities, a review of internal guidance on requests and complaints under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations, strengthened cooperation with DG HR for handling complaints and a review of procedures for requests for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations;

Added:85. Reserves the right to condition or postpone future discharge decisions where agencies fail to deliver full and verifiable structural reforms following serious findings;

Added:(vi) Frontex to strengthen the budget planning and execution to ensure compliance with the principle of annuality; stresses that the scale and complexity of the agency's mandate require robust internal mechanisms and invites the agency to reinforce oversight of procurement and contract management procedures; encourages Frontex to strengthen follow-up procedures on audit findings and to report measurable progress to the discharge authority;

Added:(vii) Eurojust to share future budgeting needs with the Commission regarding the future expansion of the mandate and urges adequate funding and staffing be provided to address this expansion of the mandate;

Changed:79.91. Takes note of the explanation provided during the hearing held on 1 December 2025 by the Executive Director of the ELA regarding the structurally high share of temporary workers, in particular SNEs, who currently account for around 425042-50 % of the ELA’s operational staff and are legally prevented from performing core functions such as representing the Authority, or managing financial and procurement files,functions, thereby creating concentration of responsibilities and a higher risk of errors; supports the Executive Director’s request for an adjustment of the establishment plan to allow a shift fromreplace SNE-based resourcing towardswith additional Temporary Agent posts which should be filled through open and competitive procedures within the existing budgetary ceiling; is of the opinion that the Labour Authority should be a role-model in labour standards and seek to offer longer contracts which would be in the interests of staff, the continuity of business, and knowledge retentionretention; andcalls on the avoidanceAuthority bottle-necks;to further enhance cooperation with national labour authorities in order to avoid duplication and to improve information exchange;

Changed:81.93. Observes that monitoring systems in all agencies, including SMART objectives and KPIs should be strengthened to improve performance assessment and stakeholder engagement; highlights that data gaps (particularly in the ETF), missing performance targets, and the absence of national-level indicators undermine effectiveness; observes that these challenges require improved data completeness, clearerlegally clear target-setting, and enhanced monitoring frameworks to ensure comprehensive performance assessments and alignment with stakeholder needs; stresses the importance of transparent governance structures and conflict-of-interest safeguards to support stakeholder confidence in their work;

Changed:82.94. Takes note that the four agencies (Cedefop, EUOSHA, Eurofound, and the ETF) have the potential to reduce the administrative burden and improve efficiency through shared services;services20; highlights that the agencies should reduce administrative burdens on staff to maintain sustainable workloads by sharing common services for HR, legal, IT, and technical functions; points out that this would enable agencies to decrease staff engaged in administrative activities and increase focus on core operations; calls on these agencies, in close coordination with the Court, to develop a structured shared-services implementation plan with concrete milestones, to facilitate mutual exchange of best practices and recommendations among the agencies concerned as well as across the broader EUAN, drawing on the Court's audit findings and cross-cutting evaluations; calls on the Commission to report annually to the discharge authority on the progress achieved under this plan;

Changed:83.95. Notes that Cedefop has been involved in a legal dispute with a former staff member whose contract was not renewed in 2017; recalls that, in 2020, the General Court annulled Cedefop’s decision and ordered the payment of financial compensation, which was implemented by Cedefop; notes that a subsequent action brought by the former staff member concerning the implementation of that judgment was dismissed by the General Court in February 2024; observes that the former staff member has appealed that judgment to the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-209/24 P) and that the final judgment is still pending; recalls that the General Court found breaches of fundamental procedural guarantees, including the right to be heard, the rights of the defence, the duty of care and the principle of good administration; notesunderlines that following the non-compliance of the director with concernthe thatcode noof disciplinaryconduct procedureand appearswith the administrative and procedural provisions the management board refused to haverenew beenthe initiatedcontract followingwith thosethe findings:director; criticises the excessive length of the decision-making processprocess, the excessive costs of the legal procedure and the legal advisors and the fact that the case remains pending; urges that thestaff-related staffdecisions memberbe taken in questiona receivestransparent compensationand fortraceable manner; calls on the lostCommission income;and urgesthe thatagencies to establish mechanisms granting agencies greater flexibility to address and resolve staff-related decisionsdisputes beat takenan early stage, including through amicable settlements where appropriate, in order to avoid lengthy and costly litigation; further calls on the Commission and the EU Agencies Network to create a transparentshared legal service for agencies dedicated to handling the agencies’ legal affairs and traceableproviding manner;timely legal guidance;

Added:97. Observes that 75 % of work-related cancers are linked to asbestos exposure, acknowledges EU-OSHA’s contribution in 2024 to the Commission’s new guidelines on asbestos and encourages EU-OSHA to continue to allocate staffing and budget resources towards contributing to asbestos awareness and methods to address the widespread asbestos issue across Europe;

Added:108. Lauds the work of the EMA in addressing the medication shortage of amoxicillin antibiotics in Europe and working together with national medicines agency to address the shortage with the result that Amoxicillin was removed from the shortages list in 2024; encourages the EMA to continue to apply staffing and budget resources for similar goals;

Added:109. Notes that the ECA recommended in its Special Report 12/2024 that the EMA continues to work on making their communications readily accessible to the public, so the public has a better insight into the use of Union funds by this agency;

Added:110. Notes that the ECA, in its December 2024 Special Report, recommended that the EMA coordinate with the ECDC and HERA to improve pandemic preparedness through clearer roles, more efficient use of Union funds, and review of the tools, procedures, and guidance developed during the pandemic to determine which should be retained or adapted in line with scientific and technological progress, and encourages adequate resources to support this effort;

Added:111. Highlights that the EMA has flagged, inter alia, ongoing shortages of critical medicines in members states of the European Union and the EEA, including key cancer drugs (Fludarabine, Vindesine, Fluorouracil, Cisplatin, Topotecan, Methotrexate) for leukaemia, lymphoma, ovarian, and small-cell lung cancer, as well as essential diabetes treatments (various insulins, liraglutide, dulaglutide) needed for type 1 and type 2 diabetes management;

Added:116. Highlights that the ECA recommends the work of the ECDC with Member States to strengthen a harmonised Union-wide infectious disease surveillance system, improve internal processes to provide timelier and more practical guidance, and communicate more clearly with the public using plain language, to better reflect the use of Union funds, as noted by the ECA in its Special Report 12/2024;

Added:(iii) the ECDC and the EMA to apply some of their budget towards implementing the recommendations outlined by the Court in Special Report 12/2024 and listed above;

Added:(iv) the EMA, the Commission and Member States to take immediate action to address ongoing shortages of critical medications listed above, and in this regard urges the EMA to collaborate closely with national authorities and the Commission to: i) allocate enough resources to address the problem ii) analyse and propose ways to address the causes of these shortages, including manufacturing, supply chain, distribution challenges, and internal market obstacles or national protectionism, including the necessity of production of European medicines iii) develop contingency plans to ensure uninterrupted patient access, including prioritisation of high-need cases; highlights that immediate and coordinated action is vital to prevent delays in treatment, avoid deterioration of patient outcomes, and protect public trust in European healthcare system; encourages the EMA to apply additional internal resources from their budget towards this goal;

Changed:105.123. Notes the Court’s observation that ECHA signed a specific IT infrastructure contract valued at EUR 8,1 million, exceeding by EUR 1,3 million the authorising officer’s delegated limit;limit by EUR 1,3 million; takes note of the Agency’s explanation that the contract was based on non-binding service volume estimates within the limits of annual appropriations and that actual budgetary commitments did not exceed delegated authority; encourages ECHA to ensure clear alignment between financial delegations and contractual commitments; calls on the Agency to introduce enhanced forward-looking screening mechanisms for external contractors involved in work related to the Agency's regulatory decision-making;

Changed:106.124. Draws attention to the concerns raised by several civil-society organisations regarding a potential professional conflict of interest in the case of Ramboll Germany GmbH, a consultancy that previously carried out technical studies for ECHA while also providing services to industry stakeholders seeking to influence upcoming PFAS restrictions; stresses that expert advisory structures should reflect balanced representation of scientific, industrial and civil-society expertise in order to strengthen legitimacy and evidence-based decision making; acknowledges the organisations’ claim that Ramboll’s parallel activities could have compromised the impartiality required under Articles 2(56) and 143(d) of the Financial Regulation; stresses that the principle of sound financial management requires the Agency to ensure that procurement and contract execution are conducted in a manner preserving institutional impartiality and public confidence; notes that unidentified conflicts of interest may affect the credibility of Union-funded activities even in the absence of procedural irregularity; calls for adequate safeguards addressing both actual and apparent risks;

Changed:107.125. Takes note, however, of ECHA’s clarification that the work carried out by Ramboll Deutschland for the Agency on PFAS was performed between 2020 and 2021, prior to the consultancy’s 2022 engagement with industry, and that conflict-of-interest assessments were performed in accordance with ECHA’s procedures at the time the contract was awarded; notes furthermore that under the current 2024 framework contract Ramboll has not submitted tenders for specific contracts; welcomes ECHA’s statement that it conducted a detailed internal review in response to access-to-documents requests and found no unmanaged conflict of interest; stresses nonetheless the importance of ensuring robust, proactive and forward-looking conflict-of-interest checks for all external contractors, particularly those involved in technical work feeding into sensitive regulatory decisions, voicesdecisions; concernemphasises that someexpert contractsgroups betweenshould NGOscontain anda thebalance Commissionof containedmembers workfrom programvarious pointssectors withincluding the goal ofprivate underminingsector, thescience worksectors ofand ECHAcivil andsociety theto decision-makingrepresent processdifferent ofcompetencies relevantand committeesviewpoints; ininvites the EuropeanAgency Parliament,to emphasisesintegrate thatcontractor expertindependence groupschecks shouldinto containits abroader balanceinternal ofcontrol membersand fromrisk variousmanagement sectorsframework; includingstresses the privateneed sector,to scienceensure sectorsrobust and civilproactive societyprocedures to representprevent differentany competenciesrisk andof viewpoints;conflict of interest or undue influence;

Changed:111.129. Recalls that the Court’s observation concerning ACER’s structural reliance on interim workers has remained open since 2019, with interim staff continuing to perform long-term tasks that should normally fall to directly employed staff; notes that, although the number of interim workers decreased from 18 in 2023 to 16 in 2024, the situation persisted and ACER intends to subcontract part of these activities; takes note of the Agency’s replies to the questionnaire, according to which extensive outsourcing is necessary due to insufficient in-house resources and specialised expertise; observes that ACER outsources a wide range of functions, including highly specialised consultancies and studies in energy regulation, legal services, event organisation, and various general services, but that the most significant dependency concerns the IT domain, where the design, development, implementation, support, maintenance and security of its systems are carried out largely by external service providers; highlights in this regard that more than 100 external IT experts (not necessarily full-time) are engaged in delivering IT services to ACER, compared with only 17 internal IT staff, creating a substantial structural imbalance; notes furthermore that ACER states that this outsourcing model was explicitly recommended by the Commission in view of the Agency’s limited establishment plan and resource constraints; underlines, however, that such persistent dependence on external providers for core IT capabilities, combined with the continued use of interim workers for permanent tasks, raises concerns regarding knowledge retention, operational continuity and long-term institutional capacity; stresses that the heavy IT dependency must be urgently addressed to safeguard knowledge retention and operational continuity; requests that the Commission and ACER report to the discharge authority on the corrective measures adopted;

Changed:120.138. Notes that, in 2023, the EIT transitioned its grant agreements from an annual to a multi-annual structure; draws attention to the fact that this change impacts the Court’s assessment of legality and regularity, which can only be performed during interim and final payments; notes that in 2024, the EIT paid EUR 412 million in pre-financing for multi-annual agreements, comprising 92,9 % of total payments for the year; takes note that these payments' legality and regularity will be assessed in future years; stresses that such a high share of pre-financing payments requires strengthened monitoring and control mechanisms in order to mitigate the risk of future financial corrections or recoveries;

Added:146. Notes the strategic role of EUSPA as a key pillar of the EU Space Programme in reinforcing the Union’s industrial base, competitiveness and innovation; invites the Commission, when preparing the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), to ensure that EUSPA is adequately empowered and resourced to strengthen its performance and delivery capacity in support of the Union’s strategic autonomy and sovereignty, including through the implementation of new tasks under the EU Space Act; underlines the importance of prioritising European procurement in areas critical to the Union’s resilience, security and technological independence;

Changed:A. whereas Union decentralised agencies, executive agencies and other bodies are distinct legal entities set up to carry out specific technical, scientific or managerial tasks that help Union institutions to design and implement policies; whereas they are located in different memberMember statesStates and have significant influence in areas of vital importance to Union citizens’ daily lives, such as health, safety, security, freedom and justice; recalls that the discharge procedure is not merely a technical accounting exercise, but a core instrument of democratic accountability through which Parliament assesses whether Union bodies act in line with the principles of sound financial management;

Changed:2. Points out that while the establishment or expansion of EU agencies is intended to enhance the Union's capabilities, it is criticalimportant to ensure that this process is guided by thorough evaluations,evaluations and rigorous analyses, impact assessments and a clear demonstration of added value; so that lessons can be learned and consideration can be given to terminating their mandate if necessary; highlights that this approach would not only ensure better regulation but also enhance the effectiveness, accountability, transparency and coherence of the Union’s institutional landscape; underlines that any consideration of mergers, consolidation or termination of agency mandates must be based on a comprehensive assessment, thus complementing budgetary or efficiency considerations;

Changed:19.27. Takes note that the EEA’s 2024 budget increase reflects newthe expansion of its legislative mandates and ongoing operational needs,responsibilities, stemming from the implementation of the policies of the European Green Deal, such as the Nature Restoration Regulation (adopted late in 2024), a recast of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer (E-PRTR) Regulation, the EU Carbon Removals and Carbon Management Farming Certification (CRCF), and an initiative for expanded monitoring of emissions from heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) were supported by recruitment of staff; notes furthermore that the agency also implemented tasks under the revised Land-use, land-useLand-use changeChange and forestryForestry Regulation (2023); is also aware that New Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with DG MARE, DG SANTE, and DG RTD expanded the Agency’s role in ocean/water restoration, health threats, and environmental data integration, strengtheningproviding Uniondata climate,and biodiversity,analysis andto policyinform support;Union environmental policy;