What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint

Removed:B90263/2024

Added:European Parliament resolution on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

Removed:European Parliament resolution on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the Union

(2024/2696(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Removed:– having regard to its decision of 13 September 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 8 February 2024 entitled ‘Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union’,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

Changed:– having regard to its previous resolutions on EU-Russia relations, in particular its resolution of 1023 OctoberNovember 20192022 on foreign electoralrecognising interferencethe andRussian disinformationFederation inas nationala andstate Europeansponsor democraticof processes,terrorism,

Changed:– having regard to its previous resolutionsthe onEuropean EU-RussiaExternal relations,Action inService particular(EEAS) thatreport of 823 FebruaryJanuary 2024 onentitled Russiagate:‘2nd allegationsEEAS ofReport Russianon interferenceForeign inInformation theManipulation democraticand processesInterference ofThreats the– EuropeanA Union,Framework for Networked Defence’,

Changed:– having regard to itsthe resolutionCommission communication of 2312 NovemberDecember 20222023 on recognisingDefence theof RussianDemocracy Federation(COM(2023)0630), asand athe stateproposals sponsorfor the Defence of terrorism,Democracy package therein,

Added:– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 April 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine,

Removed:– having regard to the European External Action Service report of 23 January 2024 entitled ‘2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats – A Framework for Networked Defence’,

Removed:– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630),

Removed:– having regard to the Commission proposal of 12 December 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023)0637),

Removed:– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

Removed:– having regard to the legal principle of the presumption of innocence,

– having regard to its Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament,

Change 1

Removed:– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body,

Added:– having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed:– having regard to Rule132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

Added:A. whereas increasing attempts by state and non-state actors from third countries to directly or indirectly interfere with democratic decision-making and electoral processes in the Union and its Member States are being reported; whereas there is clear evidence of such attempts by Russia to interfere in electoral processes and policymaking worldwide and especially against the EU and its Member States, through a wide array of different hybrid warfare methods, embedded within a broader strategy to undermine the proper functioning of European democratic processes and legislative procedures; whereas these methods include but are not limited to cyberattacks, including on the European Parliament, elite capture of European decision-makers, election meddling, as well as by funding movements and lobbies;

Removed:A. whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and as reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and embedded in international human rights treaties, and whereas those values, which are common to the Member States, constitute the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the Union;

Added:B. whereas new studies and reports shows that, in recent months, well-known disinformation networks have scaled up operations aimed at disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives on social media, especially on platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok; whereas there is proof that Russian influence networks have used AI and bots in social media and relied on the large-scale publishing of political advertisements purchased through fake accounts; whereas traditional media outlets have also been used to push their interests in the political agenda; whereas this hybrid war was the precursor for and continues to support Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas this foreign interference constitutes a form of external pressure that can effectively undermine the exercise of EU and Member States’ sovereignty;

Removed:B. whereas foreign interference aimed at undermining the proper functioning of European democratic processes, including interference through provision of undue financial support to elected politicians and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), large- scale information manipulation operations and political disinformation campaigns, as well as the sabotaging of election infrastructure with the aim of altering the outcome of elections, constitute serious threats to the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, TEU; whereas reports abound of increasing attempts by state and non-state actors from third countries, and in particular from Russia, to interfere, directly or indirectly, with democratic decision-making and electoral processes in the Union and its Member States; whereas those foreign interferences constitute forms of external pressure that can effectively undermine the exercise of EU and Member States’ sovereignty;

Added:C. whereas Russia has systematically maintained contacts with far-right and far-left parties, and other personalities and movements to gain support from institutional actors within the Union in order to legitimise its illegal and criminal actions; whereas analysis of voting patterns and speeches in the European Parliament has shown these parties to have been the most sympathetic to Russia, including calls as extreme as those made in public in January 2024 by Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Miroslav Radačovský – who was also paid by Russian sources to observe the parliamentary elections in Russia in 2021 – for the destruction of Europe; whereas the Hungarian Fidesz party has been spreading pro-Kremlin messages and propaganda;

Removed:C. whereas investigations ongoing in several Member States increasingly point to the existence the existence of links between the Kremlin and MEPs from far-right political parties; whereas politicians from far-right parties, including Alternative für Deutschland (AfD),Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (National Rally), Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance), Matteo Salvini’s Lega (League) and the Spanish party VOX have allegedly promoted pro-Russian propaganda via the Voice of Europe media organisation;

Added:D. whereas under President Putin, Russia has identified democracy, human rights and the European way of life as a threat to its dictatorial government and hence for years has been pursuing a strategy of systematically trying to weaken and ultimately destroy democracies both in the EU and in candidate countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, the Western Balkans and other neighbouring countries such as Armenia;

Removed:D. whereas analysis of voting patterns in the European Parliament has shown that MEPs from the far right and far left of the political spectrum were the most sympathetic to Russia;

Added:E. whereas according to media reports confirmed by Polish, Czech and Belgian security services, as well as by the Prime Ministers of Belgium and Czechia, certain MEPs and candidates in the upcoming European elections have received payment from the Russian Government or its proxies to spread propaganda and disinformation and to influence the elections to the European Parliament in various European countries;

Removed:E. whereas Voice of Europe, an online media outlet directly funded by third-country nationals with strong Kremlin ties, provided European politicians and MEPs from the extreme right with a platform to promote Russian propaganda aimed at spreading anti-EU disinformation and at undermining EU support for Ukraine; whereas far-right politicians suspected of links with Russia used Voice of Europe to portray the EU as a belligerent entity and to describe Ukraine as an irremediably corrupt country; whereas those politicians tend to normalise manifestations of hatred and intolerance based on race, national origin or sexual orientation and to project a vision of Russia as the authentic keeper of traditional family values; whereas the public discourse of those politicians is leading to dangerous divisions in society as a whole and is a threat to democracy;

Added:F. whereas on 27 March 2024, after having uncovered a pro-Russian network attempting to conduct influence operations with implications for Czechia and the EU, via the Prague-based ‘Voice of Europe’ news site, the Czech foreign ministry announced that it had sanctioned Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, for running a Russian influence operation from Czech territory using this news site, along with a middleman called Artem Marchevskyi, for his activities conducted with the aim of undermining European support for Ukraine and influencing the 2024 European Parliament elections by portraying the EU as a belligerent entity, and describing Ukraine as an irremediably corrupt country; whereas shortly after this revelation, the website was taken offline by the authorities but was back online on 11 April, operating from a website hosted by a cloud services and website service provider based in Kazakhstan;

Removed:F. whereas intelligence agencies and prosecuting authorities in several Member States allege that Voice of Europe was used by the Kremlin as a vehicle to pay thousands of euro, in cash or cryptocurrencies, to far-right politicians running in the upcoming European elections; whereas, following the publication of these allegations, Voice of Europe ceased to operate from the territory of the Union; whereas Voice of Europe has resumed its operations from a website hosted by a cloud and website service provider based in Kazakhstan; whereas Belgium’s federal prosecutor opened an investigation into the pro-Russian propaganda network that is accused of paying MEPs to promote the Kremlin’s agenda and to undermine EU support for Ukraine;

Added:G. whereas on 28 March 2024, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo stated, during a debate in the Belgian Parliament, that based on investigations conducted by Belgian intelligence services in collaboration with their Czech counterparts, it was evident that Russia had approached European parliamentarians and paid some of them to promote Russian propaganda; whereas, on 12 April 2024, Prime Minister De Croo further announced the opening of criminal prosecution and requested an urgent meeting of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and called for the broadening of the mandate for the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office;

Removed:G. whereas Russian funding of political activities and politicians within the EU continues to be revealed; whereas there are ongoing investigations by US law enforcement authorities into the acceptance by the AfD’s lead candidate for the upcoming European elections, Maximilian Krah, of payments made by Oleg Voloshyn, a pro-Russian activist who is on the US sanctions list; whereas the Kremlin has, in the past, sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe and, among other things, enabled the party of Marine Le Pen to receive a loan of EUR 9.4 million from a Russian bank in 2013; whereas since then, Le Pen and her party members have expressed a pro-Kremlin stance on multiple occasions;

Added:H. whereas on 28 March 2024, Poland’s Internal Security Agency announced that it had conducted searches as part of a collaborative investigation with other European security services into alleged Russian espionage linked to ‘Voice of Europe’, recovering large sums of cash and leading to charges against a Polish citizen suspected of Russian espionage; whereas according to the Internal Security Agency, this individual is believed to have been embedded within Polish and EU parliamentary circles, carrying out tasks commissioned and financed by counterparts from Russian intelligence;

Removed:H. whereas a recent study by the Commission found that, in the first year of Russia’s war against Ukraine, online platforms ‘enabled the Kremlin to run a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting the European Union and its allies, reaching an aggregate audience of at least 165 million and generating at least 16 billion views’; whereas Russian funding of political activities and politicians within the EU also contributes to an increase in the reach of online pro-Kremlin propaganda, disseminated in particular via AfD accounts, contributing to a disproportionately negative impact on civic discourse online;

Added:I. whereas on 29 March 2024, Austrian authorities arrested a former Austrian intelligence officer on multiple charges, including allegedly providing mobile phone data of former high-ranking Austrian officials to Russian intelligence, involvement in planning a burglary at a prominent journalist’s apartment, and drafting ‘suggestions for improvement’ following a Russian-ordered killing in Germany; whereas the arrested former Austrian intelligence officer was in close contact with far-right politicians from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in the country’s parliament and government;

Removed:I. whereas receipt of foreign funding in breach of existing provisions on the transparency of political financing and campaign financing constitutes a major corruptive factor that undermines the integrity of the electoral process; whereas funding received in breach of the rules applicable to political financing reduces public trust in the legitimacy of the democratic processes in the Member States and at the Union level; whereas the integrity of the EU institutions, and their resilience in the face of foreign interference that affects democratic decision-making and electoral processes, are paramount to the correct functioning of European democracy; whereas the capacity of the Union and the Member States to prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of illicit political financing constitutes a crucial benchmark for the rule of law;

Added:J. whereas on 16 April 2024 media reports circulated that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had questioned German MEP Maximilian Krah, the lead candidate of Alternative for Germany (AfD) for the European elections and member of Parliament’s Committee on International Trade and Subcommittee on Security and Defence, last December in New York over suspicions that he was receiving money from Kremlin agents; whereas, on 23 April 2024, press reports indicated that an assistant to MEP Maximilian Krah had been arrested on suspicions of spying for China, showing a pattern of cooperation with malign foreign actors seeking to undermine European democratic values and processes;

Removed:J. whereas, in a leaked classified addendum to Russia’s official ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ from April 2023, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls for an ‘offensive information campaign’ and other measures spanning ‘the military-political, economic and trade and informational psychological spheres’ against a ‘coalition of unfriendly countries’, noting that ‘it is important to create a mechanism for finding the vulnerable points of their external and internal policies with the aim of developing practical steps to weaken Russia’s opponents’ and that the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine will ‘to a great degree determine the outlines of the future world order’;

Added:K. whereas on 18 April 2024, the German authorities arrested two suspected saboteurs in the German state of Bavaria who were allegedly spying on military installations for possible bomb or arson attacks on behalf of a Russian intelligence service, allegedly to sabotage German support for Ukraine in the war against Russia; whereas the arrests indicate that Russia’s secret services are evidently entering new dimensions, which include attacks on military facilities, in addition to disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

Removed:K. whereas on numerous occasions, MEPs from the predominantly far-right spectrum have knowingly served Russia’s interests by participating in fake election observation missions to Russian-occupied territories and other regions; whereas high-ranking pro-Russian politicians often travel secretly to Russia and its proxies, as was the case with Petr Bystron, AfD member of the German Bundestag, when he covertly travelled to Belarus while covering up his trip with sham meetings in Vilnius;

Added:L. whereas a Czech media outlet claims that the Czech secret services have audio recordings confirming the payment of money of Russian origin to Petr Bystron, a candidate for the European elections, member of the German Bundestag and foreign policy officer for AfD; whereas according to German newspaper Der Spiegel, the money was handed over either in cash at covert meetings in Prague or via cryptocurrency; whereas reputable German media outlets have also recently revealed that an employee of an AfD member in the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB); whereas, according to media reports, the same person had been checked twice by German authorities when entering Germany from Russia and was carrying cash sums of EUR 9 000;

Removed:L. whereas Russia is known to extensively deploy a wide array of hybrid warfare tactics as part of a larger strategy to undermine the proper functioning of European democratic processes; whereas a wealth of evidence shows that Russian malign interference tactics rely on a myriad of tools, including coordinated political disinformation campaigns on social media, cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructures related but not limited to elections, as well as direct and indirect financial support of political actors and elite capture; whereas the use of foreign interference and information manipulation as a means to divide democratic societies was the precursor of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and has increased since then;

Added:M. whereas, on 12 February 2024, VIGINUM, the French Government agency responsible for identifying foreign digital interference, published a report detailing a vast Russian disinformation campaign dubbed ‘Portal Kombat’, consisting of 193 websites tasked with disseminating pro-Russian narratives among Russian-speaking and European populations across Europe and the United States; whereas, in late 2023, the French authorities indicated that the Stars of David found painted in several locations in Paris were part of a destabilisation operation tied to a pro-Russian businessman from Moldova;

Removed:M. whereas new research shows that, in recent months, well-known disinformation networks have scaled up operations aimed at disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives on social media, especially on platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and Tiktok; whereas these networks of Russian influence rely on the publishing, on a wide scale, of political advertisements purchased through fake accounts; whereas the objective of these foreign disinformation campaigns is to influence the outcome of the upcoming European elections by spreading Eurosceptic messages and promoting pro-Russian candidates; whereas, under EU law, very large online platforms and very large search engines must mitigate risks arising from any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes and on public security; whereas targeted political advertising on online platforms based on special categories of personal data, such as political views, is prohibited;

Added:N. whereas, according to media analyses, since August 2023, 16 far-right MEPs from Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Slovakia, Estonia, Spain, Croatia, Denmark and Belgium participated in debates and interviews organised by ‘Voice of Europe’; whereas the vast majority of these politicians tend to normalise manifestations of hatred and intolerance based on race, national origin or sexual orientation and to project a vision of Russia as the authentic keeper of traditional family values; whereas the public discourse of those politicians is leading to dangerous divisions in society as a whole, and is a threat to democracy;

Removed:N. whereas the EU still lacks legally binding rules on transparency for the providers of interest representation services, including those that are directly or indirectly funded by third countries with the malign aim of influencing policies, decision-making and electoral activities in the Union; whereas enhancing harmonised transparency standards for all interest representatives within the Union is crucial to effectively prevent malicious interference throughout the Union, whether external or internal; whereas the regulation of interest representation services at the Union level must be accompanied by adequate safeguards against potential risks deriving from the disproportionate administrative burdens that may be imposed, in particular, on civil society actors and non-governmental organisations with no financial links to third countries involved in malign interference activities;

Added:O. whereas investigative journalists exposed a classified addendum to Russia’s official ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, in which the Russian Foreign Ministry calls for an ‘offensive information campaign’ and other measures spanning ‘the military-political, economic and trade and informational psychological spheres’ against a ‘coalition of unfriendly countries’ led by the United States, noting that ‘it is important to create a mechanism for finding the vulnerable points of their external and internal policies with the aim of developing practical steps to weaken Russia’s opponents’ and that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will ‘to a great degree determine the outlines of the future world order’;

Removed:O. whereas Parliament’s Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation, exposed in detail the Russian-led efforts and operations to infiltrate, influence and interfere with European democracies and the EU institutions, and called for a new, permanent sanctions regime to be established, targeting perpetrators engaging in malign foreign manipulation and interference of information;

Added:P. whereas a recent study by the Commission found that, in the first year of Russia’s war against Ukraine, online platforms ‘enabled the Kremlin to run a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting the European Union and its allies, reaching an aggregate audience of at least 165 million and generating at least 16 billion views’; whereas Russian funding of political activities and politicians within the European Union also contributes to an increase in the reach of pro-Kremlin propaganda, contributing to a disproportionately negative impact on civic discourse online;

Removed:P. whereas official investigations revealed the existence of numerous Russian spies working in sensitive institutions located in the EU, including NATO headquarters and the German Foreign Intelligence Service; whereas it is believed that the infiltration of the EU and its Member States by Russian spies is very prevalent, especially in Member States with pro-Kremlin sentiments, such as Hungary and Slovakia;

Added:Q. whereas through its cultivation of contacts and relationships, Russia aims to build political and economic influence to destabilise democracy in the European Union; whereas press reports have highlighted contacts between some secessionists in Catalonia, going so far as to the holding of a meeting between the former Russian diplomat Nikolai Sadovnikov and the then-separatist leader and former President of Catalonia, now sitting MEP Carles Puigdemont, in Barcelona, on the eve of Catalonia’s illegal referendum in October 2017; whereas some MEPs and members of national and regional parliaments have consistently voiced sentiments that can be considered pro-Russian, for example by attributing the start of the conflict to Ukraine, participating as unofficial election observers in Crimea, and expressing a wish for its defeat in the war, downplaying the possibility of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, opposing further weapon shipments to Ukraine, and advocating for territorial concessions from the government in Kyiv; whereas in March, a delegation of AfD members of the Bavarian regional parliament was invited to observe the so-called presidential elections in Russia and subsequently assessed the elections as open, democratic and free in public statements;

Removed:Q. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the establishment of a genuine ethics body, composed of independent ethics experts, and entrusted with the authority to investigate alleged breaches of ethics rules on its own initiative and to deal with individual cases if a participating institution or any of its members request it; whereas Parliament also demanded that the ethics body be trusted with the power to issue recommendations for sanctions, and the ability to receive and assess declarations;

Added:R. whereas the Kremlin has sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe, including by providing the party of Marine Le Pen with a loan of EUR 9.4 million in 2013; whereas since then, Le Pen and her party members have further bolstered their pro-Kremlin stance by attending political events in Russia, including their participation in sham election observation missions during regional or national elections;

Removed:R. whereas, in the wake of the Qatargate and Moroccogate allegations, Parliament reviewed its Code of Conduct with a view to strengthening procedures for dealing with breaches of transparency rules, improving sanctions mechanisms and reforming the relevant advisory committee; whereas the reviewed Code of Conduct establishes that any elected MEP found to be in breach of transparency rules can be given a penalty by the President of the European Parliament;