What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint

Removed:B90124/2024

Added:Motion for a European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Removed:European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

(2024/2548(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Removed:– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,

Removed:– having regard to its previous resolutions on foreign interference and corruption,

Removed:– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

Removed:– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

Removed:– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption,

– having regard to its decision of 13 September 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability,

Change 1

Removed:– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption,

Removed:– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

Removed:A. whereas reports by independent media outlets on 29 January 2024 presented concrete evidence asserting that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the Fifth Service of the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (FSB) from at least 2004 to 2017; whereas the case has been referred to the European Parliament’s Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members for investigation; whereas the Latvian security services have also announced their own investigation;

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

Removed:B. whereas the Russian Federation is known to use an array of different methods of interference, as part of a larger strategy to harm, confuse, frighten, weaken and divide the EU’s Member States and to attack their democratic functioning, as well as that of the EU institutions; whereas subverting support for Ukraine within the EU has become another explicit goal of the Russian Federation’s interference in EU countries’ democratic spaces;

Added:– having regard to its previous resolutions on EU-Russia relations, in particular that of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

Removed:C. whereas journalists and experts have continued to reveal Russia’s funding of political activities and connections to politicians in the EU before and after 24 February 2022, which puts at risk the integrity of the democratic functioning of the EU Member States and institutions and necessitates a thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable;

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe,

Removed:D. whereas there is concrete evidence that the EU’s polity, media and electoral processes are being targeted and interfered with through disinformation campaigns, corruption schemes and other tactics aimed at undermining democratic ideals and fundamental rights; whereas the 2024 European elections are likely to be a special target for disinformation campaigns at local, regional and EU level;

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness,

Removed:E. whereas foreign interference, information manipulation and disinformation gravely undermine and threaten the fundamental freedoms of expression and information, as laid down in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas they also undermine democratic processes in the EU and its Member States, including the holding of free and fair elections;

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine,

Removed:F. whereas the European Parliament’s response to foreign interference has become more vigilant, first with the Special Committee for foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU and later following the 2022 Qatargate and Moroccogate scandals; whereas Parliament’s Rules of Procedure were amended on 13 September 2023 to strengthen integrity, independence and accountability in Parliament; whereas, however, more robust measures have yet to be taken to ensure effective protection against undue external influence;

Added:– having regard to the European External Action Service report of 23 January 2024 entitled ‘2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats – A Framework for Networked Defence’,

Removed:1. Condemns all attempted Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union; insists that the Russian authorities and any individual or entity acting on its behalf must end these practices; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to take appropriate measures against Russian individuals and should the allegations of interference be confirmed in order to safeguard the security of our Union and its democratic processes;

Added:– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630),

Removed:2. Expresses deep concern over reports that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the FSB’s Fifth Service while also serving as a Member of the European Parliament; stresses that it is imperative that the European Parliament, as well as the Latvian authorities, investigate this matter thoroughly in order to determine, without delay, the appropriate sanctions and criminal proceedings;

Added:– having regard to the Commission proposal of 12 December 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023)0637),

Removed:3. Stresses that an FSB informant having access to benefits and information as a Member of the European Parliament would be a severe threat to our Union’s security and democracy; calls for an immediate investigation into these matters, including any other potential cases of Russian or other foreign interference or other kinds of malicious interference in the work of the European Parliament;

Added:– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

Removed:4. Remains steadfast in its support for efforts to improve and enforce the rules that protect the integrity of this institution as a pillar of European democracy;

Added:– having regard to the legal principle of the presumption of innocence,

Removed:5. Reiterates its concerns about Russia’s significant funding of and close connections with political parties and politicians in a number of countries throughout Europe, as it attempts to further interfere and gain leverage in domestic- and EU-level processes;

Added:– having regard to its Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament,

Removed:6. Expresses particular concern about recent reports that the Russian authorities are providing specific narratives to far-right political parties and actors in different EU countries, most notably in Germany and France, aimed at subverting public support for Ukraine, following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022;

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body,

Removed:7. Stresses that, in this year of major elections, including the European Parliament elections in June, more effective responses are needed at both national and European level to fight Russian and other foreign interference in electoral processes, be it in the form of cyberattacks, the use of bots on social media, widespread disinformation or the use of agents of influence; calls for the Member States and the European institutions to implement resilience strategies for the elections;

Added:– having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed:8. Underlines the need to strengthen permanent monitoring efforts and enhance their implementation well ahead of elections, referendums and other important political processes across Europe;

Added:A. whereas foreign interference, information manipulation and disinformation constitute a serious violation of the universal values and principles on which the Union is founded, such as human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law; whereas trust in Parliament’s integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy;

Removed:9. Urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities; calls for the Commission to improve the quality of the Defence of Democracy package, specifically the proposal of 12 December 2023 for a directive establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, to effectively address internal threats of undue influence and to move away from a singular and ineffective focus on actors receiving foreign funding;

Added:B. whereas there is evidence of Russian interference and manipulation in many democracies, as well as of its practical support for extremist forces and radical-minded entities to promote the destabilisation of the Union;

Removed:10. Stresses that, beyond the EU’s own democratic spaces, there is an urgent need for it and its Member States to provide enhanced support to Eastern Partnership and candidate countries, as well as to partner countries in the Global South, in particular through cooperation on building state and societal resilience to disinformation and Russian covert influence and state propaganda, in order to counter any strategic weakening or fragmentation of their societies and institutions;

Added:C. whereas Parliament’s Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation, exposed in detail the Russian-led efforts and operations to infiltrate, influence and interfere with European democracies and the EU institutions; whereas the European Parliament’s response to foreign interference has become more vigilant; whereas, however, more robust measures have yet to be taken and internal reforms must be adopted to ensure effective protection against undue external influence;

Removed:11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the parliaments of the Member States and the Russian authorities.

Added:D. whereas Russia is using a wide array of hybrid warfare tactics to achieve its goals, as part of a larger strategy to undermine the proper functioning of European democratic processes; whereas the use of foreign interference and information manipulation, as a means to divide democratic societies, was the precursor of Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and has increased since then; whereas Russia’s spread of disinformation through both traditional media outlets and social media platforms, elite capture, its hacking of election candidates and cyberattacks have risen to an unprecedented level;

Added:E. whereas the systematic falsification of history has been part of Russia’s information warfare for decades;

Added:F. whereas the Kremlin has been operating an extensive network of agents of influence across the EU, who have affected electoral processes and policies on key strategic issues such as energy infrastructure; whereas these agents of influence actively target all areas of public life, particularly culture, historical remembrance, the media and religious communities, as well as politicians and their families; whereas dozens of investigations have proven links between prominent active or retired European political and public actors and the Kremlin;

Added:G. whereas funding from outside the EU of political activities and politicians within the European Union before and after 24 February 2022, in particular from Russia, continues to be revealed; whereas this funding poses a risk for the integrity of democratic processes in the EU Member States and requires thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable; whereas the Kremlin has sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe and, among other things, allowed the party of Marine Le Pen to receive a loan of EUR 9.4 million from a Russian bank in 2013; whereas since then, Le Pen and her party members have on multiple occasions expressed a pro-Kremlin stance;

Added:H. whereas Russia has established contacts with parties, personalities and movements in order to rely on actors within the Union’s institutions in order to legitimise Russian positions, support independence movements and proxy governments and to press for the easing of sanctions and mitigate the consequences of international isolation; whereas MEPs from certain political groups, as well as some non-attached MEPs, have been spreading blatant pro-Kremlin propaganda in Parliament;

Added:I. whereas reports by independent media outlets on 29 January 2024 presented concrete evidence asserting that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the Fifth Service of the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (FSB) from at least 2004 to 2017;

Added:J. whereas her actions were described as including political advocacy on behalf of the Russian Federation, through the organisation of events, as well as the provision of information on the inner workings of Parliament; whereas the investigative report suggests that the MEP concerned requested payment at least once from her counterparts to cover the costs of services rendered;

Added:K. whereas these allegations rely, among other things, on what are described as leaked email conversations between the MEP concerned and two case-handlers at the FSB’s Fifth Service, dating from 3 October 2005 and onwards;

Added:L. whereas the MEP concerned has been well known for her pro-Russia stance and consistent spread of anti-Latvian and anti-EU narratives throughout her time as an MEP, including her opposition to the existence of Latvia as a sovereign country and her refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas the MEP is further known to engage in highly problematic political conduct, among other things, through her participation in a referendum observation visit in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2014, a visit to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in 2016 and her participation in pro-Kremlin propaganda TV shows in Moscow; whereas the MEP deliberately gave the impression that these trips were made on behalf of the European Parliament or the EU; whereas the MEP concerned organised and promoted events in the European Parliament with pro-Kremlin representatives from the Donetska and Luhanska regions before their illegal annexation; whereas her activities were allegedly often sponsored by Kremlin-funded front groups, such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation; whereas the MEP concerned, along with other MEPs, organised public events and travelled to Lithuania to demonstrate in support of Algirdas Paleckis, a Lithuanian citizen and former diplomat and politician who was convicted of espionage for Russia;

Added:M. whereas newspaper reports have for a long time highlighted contacts and close personal relationships between secessionists in Catalonia, including authorities of the government of the autonomous community of Catalonia, and the Kremlin; whereas through its cultivation of contacts and relationships, Russia aims to build political and economic influence to destabilise democracy in the European Union; whereas Court of Instruction Number 1 in Barcelona, which is in charge of the investigation into the Voloh case, which links, among others, the former President of Catalonia and his entourage with Russia, recently extended the investigation for six months;

Added:N. whereas the MEP concerned was excluded from her political group and now sits as a non-affiliated member; whereas the Member concerned gathered support from some other MEPs whose public positions on international issues are similar to hers;

Added:O. whereas in the wake of the revelations, the President of the European Parliament immediately announced the launch of an internal investigation, including a referral to the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members; whereas the investigation is currently ongoing; whereas the possible penalties under the Rules of Procedure include forfeiture of the entitlement to the daily subsistence allowance, temporary suspension from participation in all or some of the activities of Parliament and limitations on the right to access confidential or classified information; whereas the Latvian security service announced it will investigate the allegations;