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Changes between two versions

What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint

From · resolution motion· 12 Jun 2026

B-10-2026-0289

on the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

To · resolution motion joint· 16 Jun 2026

RC-10-2026-0285

on the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

These two texts have too little in common to compare paragraph by paragraph: they are different documents rather than versions of one (for example one group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted).

+38 added · −60 removed · 2 changed paragraphs, packaging included.

Part 1 of 2: Paragraphs 1–60

Removed:B100289/2026

European Parliament resolution on the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

(2026/2735(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Removed:– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

Added:– having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Cuba, in particular those of 19 September 2024 on the case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba, of 29 February 2024 on the critical situation in Cuba, and of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island,

Removed:– having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, in particular Article 1 thereof,

Added:– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part, signed in December 2016, and which has provisionally applied since 1 November 2017, and in particular to the essential elements clause under Article 1(5) thereof and to the suspension clause under Article 85(3)(b) thereof,

Removed:– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,

Added:– having regard to the consent given by Parliament to the PDCA on 5 July 2017, premised on a tangible improvement in human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba,

Changed:– having regard to the UN GuidingEU PrinciplesGlobal onHuman BusinessRights andSanctions HumanRegime Rights(EU ofMagnitsky 2011,Act),

Removed:– having regard to the principles laid down in the UN Charter,

Added:– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to all of which Cuba is a party,

Removed:– having regard to the successive UN General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the United States’ embargo against Cuba, adopted for the 33rd consecutive year in 2025,

Added:– having regard to the reports of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Prisoners Defenders, in particular the May 2026 edition of its monthly report, published on 11 June 2026, covering torture, the structural violation of due process, ‘pre-criminal social dangerousness’, digital surveillance and forced malnutrition in Cuban prisons,

Removed:– having regard to the United States’ so-called Monroe Doctrine, which remains the heart of US diplomacy on the American continent and justifies its expansionism and interference,

Added:– having regard to the joint hearing of its Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights on the situation in Cuba, held on 5 May 2026, and to the testimonies presented by the rapporteur for Cuba of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Stuardo Ralón Orellana, and by Cuban opposition leader and former political prisoner José Daniel Ferrer,

Removed:– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part (the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement),

Added:– having regard to the speeches by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas at Parliament’s plenary, in particular those of 6 May 2025 and 19 May 2026, and to the EU-Cuba Human Rights Dialogues,

Changed:– having regard to Rulethe 136(2)IACHR ofstatements itson RulesCuba of Procedure,25 March 2026,

Change 1

Removed:A. whereas the United States’ embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, has now lasted more than 64 years and represents one of the longest and most comprehensive unilateral sanctions regimes in modern history, inflicting cumulative economic damage estimated by the Cuban authorities at over USD 1.5 trillion;

Added:– having regard to the Freedom Accord (Liberation Agreement) signed in Miami on 2 March 2026 by the Cuban opposition coalitions Pasos de Cambio and the Asamblea de la Resistencia Cubana (ARC),

Removed:B. whereas the US economic, trade and financial blockade on Cuba constitutes a violation of the human rights of the Cuban people that qualifies as an act of economic warfare hindering the development of the Cuban people and the full achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals;

Added:– having regard to the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 12 June 2023 on the case of rights defenders Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero in Cuba,

Removed:C. whereas the UN General Assembly voted in 2025, for the 33rd consecutive year, in favour of a resolution calling for an end to the US embargo against Cuba, reflecting the near-universal consensus of the international community that the embargo is illegal and contrary to the principles of the UN Charter; whereas the EU and the vast majority of its Member States have consistently supported such resolutions;

Added:– having regard to the indictment unsealed on 20 May 2026 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, charging Raúl Castro and five other officials in connection with the shooting-down of two civilian aircraft belonging to the Brothers to the Rescue organisation in 1996,

Removed:D. whereas on 29 January 2026, President Donald Trump issued new executive measures further tightening restrictions on Cuba’s access to fuel and financial transactions; whereas on 1 May 2026, the US administration announced secondary sanctions targeting non-US companies, including European entities, that trade or invest in Cuba, in direct violation of international law and sovereign European economic interests;

Added:– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed:E. whereas Executive Order 14404, signed by President Trump, has triggered a wave of forced withdrawals of European and other foreign companies from Cuba’s tourism sector, including the Spanish chains Meliá and Iberostar and the Canadian chain Blue Diamond; whereas these sanctions, explicitly extraterritorial in nature, are designed to eliminate foreign competition from Cuba’s strategic economic sectors; whereas simultaneously, the Canadian mining company Sherritt International, present in Cuba for 32 years, was forced to suspend operations at the Moa nickel and cobalt mine and entered into a preliminary agreement to sell a 55 % majority stake to Gillon Capital LLC, the family office of Ray Washburne, a major Trump fundraiser and former Trump-appointed head of the US development finance agency, with the explicit non-objection of the US State and Treasury Departments;

Added:A. whereas more than five decades of political and economic choices by the Cuban communist regime have driven the country into a profound crisis, marked by blackouts of up to 22 hours a day, acute shortages of food, water, fuel and medicine and widespread poverty, under a constitutionally entrenched one-party regime that has lasted for more than 67 years, and in which it is the only permitted political force; whereas this collapse of a political and economic model built on immobility, repression and resistance to change, compounded by the absence of free, fair and competitive elections and the prohibition of political pluralism, brings Cuba increasingly close to the characteristics of a failed state and constitutes an anti-democratic anomaly in its region;

Removed:F. whereas the re-inclusion of Cuba on the United States’ list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is a politically motivated designation lacking credible justification, with severe extraterritorial consequences, including restrictions on access to the international banking system, obstacles to humanitarian and medical purchases and a further deterioration of living conditions for the Cuban population;

Added:B. whereas, according to the NGO Prisoners Defenders, Cuba held a record 1 281 political prisoners at the end of May 2026, including minors – some held in maximum-security prisons alongside adults – with many detainees in serious ill health, among them athletes, artists, independent journalists and peaceful activists; whereas the organisation documents systematic torture, sexual violence and death threats against detainees, and found, in a statistically representative study, that every political prisoner examined, including minors, had suffered torture and been denied medical care, amid recurrent patterns of arbitrary and incommunicado detention, enforced temporary disappearance and harassment of families; whereas the case of José Daniel Ferrer, founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba and a prisoner of conscience whose release Parliament has repeatedly demanded, is emblematic of the regime’s methods and resulted in his forced exile in October 2025;

Removed:G. whereas the EU has adopted specific instruments to counter the extraterritorial application of unilateral sanctions imposed by third countries, including in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and whereas the EU must ensure that European operators are not forced to interrupt lawful trade and investment with Cuba as a result of such unlawful extraterritorial measures;

Added:C. whereas, in their daily lives, ordinary Cubans face hospitals that are unable to function normally and without basic medicines and where patients must bring their own supplies, alongside chronic shortages of food and water and essential goods, sold only in foreign-currency stores beyond the reach of ordinary state wages; whereas, according to the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights, 89 % of families live in extreme poverty and 7 in 10 Cubans must skip meals, while the UN reports a backlog of over 96 000 pending surgeries, including 11 000 for children, and around 1 million people are dependent on water trucking that is constrained by diesel shortages;

Removed:H. whereas Cuba, despite enduring more than six decades of comprehensive economic blockade, has achieved remarkable results in human and social development, including near-universal literacy, one of the highest doctor-to-patient ratios in the world, a public health system capable of developing its own vaccines, significant advances in biotechnology and medical research, and a life expectancy comparable to that of far wealthier nations;

Added:D. whereas, in April 2026, the EU released an additional EUR 2 million in humanitarian aid, in addition to the EUR 4 million already allocated this year for the Caribbean region, to support humanitarian partners delivering urgent relief to the most vulnerable; whereas the updated UN plan of action for Cuba, seeking to assist around two million people, remains severely underfunded, the UN having mobilised USD 26.2 million with a USD 68 million shortfall remaining;

Removed:I. whereas the comprehensive blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba bears the hallmarks of a medieval siege: a deliberate, systematic strategy of collective starvation and deprivation designed to break the will of an entire population through suffering; whereas the blocking of fuel, medicines, food, financial transactions and access to international trade, tightened relentlessly over six decades and escalated further in 2026, constitutes a form of organised cruelty directed not against a government but against millions of ordinary civilians, including children, elderly people and people with health problems; whereas such a strategy is not only illegal under international law but also morally indefensible and unworthy of any state that claims to uphold the values of democracy and human dignity, as well as those of a civilised society;

Added:E. whereas cumulative inflation in Cuba over the past four years exceeds 500 %, while state salaries are worth between USD 15 and 25 a month at the black-market rate – the only realistic rate on the island; whereas the regime has made the country dependent on imported fuel, and as its traditional suppliers Russia and Venezuela have curtailed deliveries the energy emergency has deepened, culminating in the complete collapse of the national electricity system for several days in October 2024, leaving 11 million people without power;

Removed:J. whereas these measures have produced a total humanitarian blockade, causing acute fuel shortages, prolonged nationwide blackouts, with some areas reporting daily power cuts of up to 20 hours, disruptions to the water supply, transportation and food distribution, and serious impairment of hospital services across the island;

Added:F. whereas Cuba today imports more than 70 % of the food it consumes – in a fertile tropical country that was once one of the world’s largest sugar producers – a collapse that is the direct result of decades of collectivised, state-controlled and militarised agriculture and of an unproductive economic model;

Removed:K. whereas nearly 96 000 patients are reportedly awaiting surgery due to reduced hospital capacity caused by fuel shortages; whereas power cuts disrupt hospital services, the refrigeration of medicines and vaccines, and the functioning of essential medical equipment; whereas approximately 170 containers of essential humanitarian relief goods, worth an estimated USD 6.3 million, have remained undistributed as a direct consequence of fuel shortages;

Added:G. whereas the humanitarian emergency is not the product of any external embargo but the direct consequence of the regime’s own model and failures – the militarisation and state monopolisation of the economy, the suppression of private enterprise and the diversion of resources to the security apparatus rather than to the food, medicine and electricity its people need; whereas this model is embodied in the corrupt military conglomerate GAESA, which controls close to half of the island’s economy, is accountable to no one and captures the regime’s hard-currency earnings – including from the medical missions that the UN has likened to forced labour – even as hospitals are left without basic supplies; whereas this crisis cannot be separated from decades of state repression, and further instability risks graver humanitarian, migratory and security consequences;

Removed:L. whereas a 2025 study published in The Lancet Global Health estimates that unilateral coercive measures are associated with around 564 000 deaths annually worldwide, with children under five representing 51 % of these deaths; whereas these findings confirm the deadly humanitarian impact of the sanctions regime against Cuba;

Added:H. whereas EU–Cuba relations are governed by the PDCA, whose stated objective was that the regime would progressively open up and improve the situation of its citizens; whereas, almost nine years after Parliament gave its consent to the PDCA, the regime has made no significant opening whatsoever but has instead intensified repression, persecuted dissent and increased the number of political prisoners, while the economic situation has deteriorated to unacceptable levels; whereas the agreement has failed in its core purpose and the VP/HR has acknowledged that the agreement has not met its objectives and is now under review;

Removed:M. whereas the Pan American Health Organization has warned of a heightened risk of resurgence of mosquito-borne diseases such as dengue, chikungunya and oropouche across the Caribbean region, a risk directly exacerbated by weakened public health infrastructure resulting from the blockade;

Added:I. whereas rejection of the regime is widespread both on and off the island – evidenced by recurrent demonstrations and ‘pot-banging’ (cacerolazo) protests and by the largest exodus in Cuba’s history, with hundreds of thousands leaving in search of a better future – while many who fled or were forced out are not allowed to return and remain in exile; whereas the regime’s only response to demands for change is to entrench itself and intensify repression;

Removed:N. whereas electricity shortages and transport cuts resulting from the US embargo are disrupting education across Cuba, including by causing temporary school and university closures, with serious consequences for young people’s access to learning;

Added:J. whereas brutal and relentless repression is the only mechanism keeping the regime alive; whereas, in July 2021, thousands took to the streets in more than fifty localities chanting ‘Freedom!’ – the largest wave of protests since 1994 – only to be crushed by plain-clothes police, paramilitary groups and the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution; whereas hundreds were arbitrarily detained and more than 700 people were tried in summary proceedings that Parliament condemned as a ‘judicial farce’ and given sentences of up to 25 years for protesting peacefully, which may amount to crimes against humanity; whereas the message was deliberately exemplary: whoever protests risks their job, their freedom, their family or their life;

Removed:O. whereas Cuba is not, and cannot be considered, a threat to the national security of the United States, as falsely claimed in the executive orders; whereas any threat or use of force against Cuba would constitute a serious violation of the UN Charter and the principle of sovereignty; whereas the growing militaristic rhetoric emanating from Washington, including discussions in US policy circles about the possibility of military escalation and regime change, raises serious and legitimate concerns;

Added:K. whereas the regime persistently refuses entry to delegations of the European Parliament, to UN special rapporteurs and to independent monitors, and insists on excluding the democratic opposition and independent civil society from any political dialogue;

Removed:P. whereas US pressure, threats of sanctions and economic coercion against sovereign governments in Latin America, including Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, aimed at restricting fuel shipments, trade and economic cooperation with Cuba, constitute violations of the sovereignty of these countries and of their right to freely conduct trade and regional cooperation;

Added:L. whereas talks have taken place in recent months between the regime and the United States administration, the content of which remains undisclosed, and the regime has acknowledged negotiations with Washington; whereas the United States has adopted targeted sanctions against senior figures of the regime and the institutions of its security and military apparatus, citing the regime’s repression at home and hostile activities abroad; whereas any process of normalisation must not come at the expense of human rights or relieve the regime of accountability;

Removed:Q. whereas the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, provisionally applied since 2017, constitutes the cornerstone of the EU’s constructive engagement policy and the appropriate framework for dialogue, cooperation and mutual respect; whereas attempts to undermine this agreement through external pressure, unilateral sanctions or policies of isolation must be firmly rejected;

Added:M. whereas the regime maintains close military cooperation with the Russian Federation, including the reported recruitment of thousands of Cuban nationals – to fight in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which is incompatible with the spirit of the PDCA and contrary to the security interests of the EU; whereas, at the end of March 2026, a Russian-owned tanker carrying an estimated 730 000 barrels of crude oil was allowed to dock on Cuba’s northern coast;

Removed:R. whereas US political pressure and visa restrictions aimed at undermining Cuban medical cooperation missions threaten a vital contribution to public health systems across Latin America and the Caribbean and many other countries, including in the EU;

Added:N. whereas, on 2 March 2026, more than 50 Cuban opposition and civil-society organisations, on the island and in exile, presented a roadmap to democratic transition – known as the Liberation Agreement, or Freedom Accord – setting out three phases of liberation, stabilisation and reconstruction, and democratisation, culminating in free, fair, multiparty elections supervised by the international community; whereas any transition must be Cuban-led and inclusive of all Cubans, on the island and in the diaspora;

Removed:S. whereas the presence of the Cuban medical brigade in Calabria, which has provided essential health services in peripheral, rural and underserved areas of southern Italy, has been widely recognised as a positive example of international medical cooperation and has generated a deep sense of gratitude among European citizens towards Cuba for its contribution to the protection of the right to health;

Added:1. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic repression carried out by the Cuban regime – in particular the torture, sexual violence, death threats, forced malnutrition, mass surveillance, forced labour and judicial persecution inflicted on political prisoners, protesters, dissidents, students, religious leaders and human-rights defenders – and the imprisonment of children; expresses its full solidarity with the Cuban people and with all those persecuted for defending their fundamental rights, including the leaders of the historical and emerging democratic opposition, and independent civic movements;

Removed:T. whereas Caribbean and overseas territory solidarity initiatives aimed at breaking the humanitarian isolation imposed by the US blockade deserve recognition and support; whereas the Nuestra America Convoy, an international civil society campaign uniting over 140 solidarity associations and delegations from more than 38 countries, reflects the broad international rejection of the blockade;

Added:2. Demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and of all persons arbitrarily detained for exercising their fundamental rights, including minors, an end to torture and ill-treatment, immediate access to free and fair trials, and to medical care for those in serious ill health, and full reparation for the victims of torture; demands that the regime grant unimpeded access to the International Committee of the Red Cross, UN special rapporteurs and procedures, a European Parliament delegation and independent observers to all places of detention, and deplores its repeated refusal to do so;