Changes between two versions
What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint
From · resolution motion· 15 Oct 2025
on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections
To · resolution motion joint· 17 Oct 2025
on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections
These two texts have too little in common to compare paragraph by paragraph: they are different documents rather than versions of one (for example one group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted).
+60 added · −50 removed · 5 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 1 of 2: Paragraphs 1–60
Removed:B100455/2025
European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections
(2025/2900(RSP))
The European Parliament,
Changed:– having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, in particular those adopted since the fraudulent presidential elections of 2020,
Added:– having regard to the joint statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for Enlargement of 9 August 2025 on the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus,
Added:– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 17 September 2025 on the joint strategic military exercise ZAPAD-2025,
Added:– having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 February 2024 on parliamentary and local elections and of 1 August 2024 on the release of a number of political prisoners, and the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 8 August 2023 on the third anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections,
Added:– having regard to the Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020 and 19 February 2024 and to the European Council conclusions on Belarus of 22 October 2021,
– having regard to the Letter of Intent on Cooperation between the European Parliament and the Belarusian Democratic Forces, signed on 3 May 2024,
Changed:– having regard to the Luxembourg Solutions on addressing the specific challenges faced by hundreds of thousands of Belarusians in exile, adopted on 6-76 and 7 June 2024 under the auspices of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE),Europe,
Change 1
Removed:– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights instruments to which Belarus is a party,
Added:– having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur of 22 April 2025 on human rights developments in Belarus between 1 April 2024 and 31 March 2025, and to the report of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 25 March 2024 on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,
Removed:– having regard to the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime,
Added:– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and other international human rights instruments to which Belarus is a party,
Removed:– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
Added:– having regard to the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 24 June 2025 entitled ‘Legal and human rights issues in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine’, which holds Aliaksandr Lukashenka responsible for the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus,
Removed:A. whereas the sham presidential elections held in Belarus on 9 August 2020, used by Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the de facto ruler of Belarus since 1994, to prolong his authoritarian grip on the nation, were neither free nor fair, and were defined by massive fraud and the systematic denial of democratic standards; whereas the results of these fraudulent elections triggered a nationwide popular uprising for freedom and democracy, the largest anti-regime protests in the country’s history, which were brutally suppressed by the regime;
Added:– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
Removed:B. whereas Belarus remains engulfed in a harsh climate of political repression and human rights violations under the rule of Lukashenka, who, since gaining power in 1994, has suppressed the opposition and transformed Belarus into an authoritarian state; whereas this authoritarian grip has tightened since the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections, and the regime has continued to systematically crush every form of democratic life, silence dissent and cement its totalitarian control over society; whereas since the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections, the regime has intensified its campaign of arrests and repression; whereas the Lukashenka regime launched a systematic, brutal crackdown on people protesting against the results of the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections, resulting in at least 13 500 arrests in the six days following the announcement of the election results;
Added:A. whereas more than five years after the fraudulent presidential elections of 9 August 2020 and the ensuing brutal crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy protests, the human rights situation in Belarus remains critical; whereas the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has, with Russian support, conducted a relentless campaign of repression against peaceful protesters, democratic leaders, lawyers, journalists, athletes, artists, trade unions, religious leaders, civil society actors and others;
Change 2
Changed:C.B. whereas Lukashenka,the throughmass hismobilisation deliberateof policyBelarusian ofcitizens repressionin and2020 violence,represented isan responsibleunprecedented fordemand thefor deathdemocracy, ofjustice numerousand peacefulhuman protestersrights and politicalwas prisonersmet aswith asystemic resulthuman ofrights brutalviolations, useincluding ofmass force,arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and theat denialleast ofa basicdozen medicalconfirmed caredeaths inof detention;peaceful protesters; whereas the victims include Vitold Ashurak, Alena Amelina, Raman Bandarenka, Valery Bohdan, Hanna Kandratsenka, Tamara Karavai, Vadzim Khrasko, Mikalai Klimovich, Aliaksandr Kulinich, Ihar Lednik, Uladzimir Krysionak, Mikita Kryucou, Andrei Padniabenny, Artsyom Parukau, Ales Pushkin, Dzmitry Sarokin, Siarhei Shchatsinka, Dzmitry Shlethauer, Valiantsin Shtermer, Dzmitry Stakhouski, Kanstantsin Shyshmakou, Aliaksandr Taraikouski and Aliaksandr Vikhor, whose deaths exemplify the regime’s contempt for human life and fundamental rights;
Change 3
Removed:D. whereas the European Union remains steadfast in its commitment to the common goal of restoring democracy in Belarus through free and fair elections, and to strengthening Belarus’s sovereignty and independence as fundamental guarantees of its democratic future;
Added:C. whereas none of Belarus’s past six presidential elections were free or fair, including the sham elections of 26 January 2025, which were conducted amid arrests and repression; whereas the Lukashenka regime maintains an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, suppressing political dissent, muzzling freedom of expression and preventing peaceful assembly; whereas the sham elections were not observed by any official missions from any democratic countries, and the European Parliament and like-minded partners did not recognise them;
Removed:E. whereas at least 8 519 people have faced criminal prosecution on political grounds since 2020, and more than 100 000 cases of repression have been recorded, demonstrating the enormous scale of the Lukashenka regime’s repression and anti-democratic practices;
Added:D. whereas the 31-year authoritarian regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has been characterised by the systematic repression of political opponents and dissent, including the enforced disappearance of Lukashenka’s critics; whereas Lukashenka remains in power largely through the loyalty of the establishment and the security forces, and with significant political, economic, propaganda and security support from the Russian Federation;
Removed:F. whereas the subsequent 2024 parliamentary and local elections, and the 2025 presidential elections, exemplified the regime’s disregard for democratic norms, with all candidates pre-approved by the authorities, opposition parties eliminated and voters denied any real choice; whereas the Lukashenka regime has fostered an atmosphere of fear and intimidation aimed at suppressing political dissent, muzzling freedom of expression and preventing peaceful assembly;
Added:E. whereas, according to the Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, over 8 900 individuals have faced politically motivated charges since 2020, with over 1 200 political prisoners still detained, many of whom are being held in poor conditions that put their lives at risk; whereas 96 cases of political repression were recorded in September 2025 alone, with 77 individuals being recognised as political prisoners that month;
Removed:G. whereas over 1 100 individuals in Belarus remain detained for political reasons and are frequently subjected to torture and ill treatment, including prolonged isolation and denial of medical care; whereas reports indicate that new political prisoners are being arrested while negotiations concerning the release of others are taking place, amounting to the deliberate use of people as political hostages; whereas the so-called ‘release of political prisoners’ often entails their forced expulsion from Belarus without identity documents, personal belongings or legal protection; whereas Mikalai Statkevich, a prominent opposition leader, refused on 11 September 2025 to leave Belarus as part of a forced transfer of political prisoners to Lithuania, after which he disappeared and the regime has refused to disclose any information about his fate;
Added:F. whereas several political prisoners have died in custody or soon after being released as a result of the inhumane conditions they endured in prison; whereas international organisations, including the OHCHR, have documented systematic human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detentions, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, enforced disappearances, forced labour, denial of medical care, restricted access to visits by lawyers and family members, solitary confinement, persecution on political or national grounds, deportation, and suppression of fundamental freedoms; whereas the penitentiary system functions as a network of slave-labour camps, with prisoners, including political detainees, being forced to work in unsafe and degrading conditions;
Removed:H. whereas on 8 February 2023, a regional court in Grodno sentenced Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist and Deputy Chair of the Union of Poles in Belarus, to eight years’ imprisonment in a hard labour penal colony; whereas Poczobut had been charged with ‘calling for actions that threaten the national security of Belarus’ and ‘inciting hostility and conflict’ after he was arrested on 25 March 2021; whereas despite suffering from hypertension and arrhythmia while in detention, Andrzej Poczobut was, according to his wife, recently moved to a high-security prison cell;
Added:G. whereas female political prisoners, of whom there are over 175, face targeted abuse, humiliation and threats of losing their children, while international monitors are barred from prisons;
Removed:I. whereas Nobel Peace Prize laureate and prominent human rights defender Ales Bialiatski remains unjustly imprisoned and has been subjected to grievous mistreatment while in state custody – including the denial of essential medical care and the need for surgery performed in a prison clinic – as documented by human rights organisations and independent media; whereas the ongoing medical neglect, repeated solitary confinement, and blocking of medicine and correspondence sent by families constitute deliberate, inhumane treatment intended to break prisoners physically and morally; whereas the targeting of Bialiatski – a peaceful rights activist recognised internationally for his work documenting abuses – epitomises the Lukashenka regime’s campaign of punitive repression against civil society, designed to terrorise dissenting voices, erase independent oversight and silence the last remaining voices;
Added:H. whereas the regime employs mass surveillance, censorship and disinformation, targeting both domestic audiences and the EU; whereas ‘extremism’ is the most common pretext for prosecuting political prisoners, and the regime’s ‘list of extremists’ now includes more than 5 800 people; whereas the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies have been instrumentalised to commit human rights violations and crimes against humanity;
Removed:J. whereas systemic pressure on the regime, including the consistent application of effective restrictive measures such as sanctions, remains the key instrument to compel it to make concessions to the democratic world, including the release of political prisoners;
Added:I. whereas at least five political prisoners are still being held incommunicado, namely Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Kniha, Aliaksandr Aranovich and Mikalai Statkevich; whereas Maria Kalesnikava was long held incommunicado, with a letter from her recently reaching the outside world for the first time in 2.5 years; whereas Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist and a member of the Union of Poles in Belarus, who has serious health problems, was sentenced to multiple years in prison and remains imprisoned under harsh conditions, in an isolation cell; whereas Andrzej Poczobut is one of the finalists for Parliament’s 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; whereas Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski is being subjected to forced labour and punishments while imprisoned, while being denied essential medical care;
Removed:K. whereas, despite physical danger and threats to their lives, Belarusian democratic leaders in forced exile continue their tireless work for freedom and democracy;
Added:J. whereas Lukashenka ‘pardoned’ over 200 political prisoners in 2024 in an attempt to have certain Western sanctions lifted, yet political arrests continued, with at least 1 721 convictions on political charges in 2024 alone; whereas the regime continued to release prisoners in 2025 but also arrested many others, using detainees as bargaining chips to extort concessions from Western countries; whereas the political prisoners who were released have shared accounts of torture;
Removed:L. whereas the Lukashenka regime uses transnational repression as a tool to persecute and intimidate Belarusian citizens living abroad, including exiled opposition figures, journalists, human rights defenders and members of the diaspora; whereas it engages in harassment, surveillance, forced repatriation attempts, and threats against relatives remaining in Belarus in order to spread fear and silence critical voices beyond its borders;
Added:K. whereas Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a laureate of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize, was released on 21 June 2025 after more than five years of imprisonment and solitary confinement, along with 13 other political prisoners; whereas 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikalai Statkevich, who was among those released, refused to cross the border to Lithuania, was imprisoned again and is being held incommunicado;
Removed:M. whereas the Lukashenka regime, from its very beginning, has been marked by the deliberate destruction of the national identity of Belarusians, including their language and culture; whereas it is pursuing an aggressive policy of Russification, through the persecution of cultural figures – including writers, artists, and musicians – and of citizens who speak Belarusian in public, as well as through the banning of the national and historical symbols of Belarus, such as the white-red-white flag and the Pahonia coat of arms, and the closure of publishing houses, private schools and Belarusian-language courses;
Added:L. whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on Belarus has noted the systematic purging of civil society organisations since 2020, targeting human rights groups, independent trade unions, political parties and religious organisations; whereas nearly 2 000 civil society groups, including non-governmental organisations and labour unions, have been shut down; whereas the Lukashenka regime employs anti-extremism laws to obstruct independent media, most of which are now labelled ‘extremist’; whereas, according to the Belarusian Association of Journalists, 33 media representatives, including journalists, reporters and bloggers, are currently imprisoned, 83 media workers have been prosecuted over the past five years and over 400 remain in exile ; whereas independent media, such as Belsat TV, Charter 97, Nexta, Radio Racyja, Radio Svaboda and Nasha Niva, provide essential information and platforms for democratic voices;
Removed:N. whereas the repression in Belarus extends beyond the political opposition, affecting a wide spectrum of societal groups such as independent journalists, human rights defenders, trade union leaders, national, ethnic and religious minorities, and ordinary citizens who are all facing censorship, forced exile, economic coercion and confiscation of property; whereas peaceful protests are effectively impossible across the country, with individuals facing severe persecution for expressing dissent online or in public as the regime’s actions have fostered a culture of impunity within the state apparatus, enabling widespread human rights violations without accountability;
Added:M. whereas the Lukashenka regime has been marked by the deliberate destruction of the national identity of Belarusians, including their language and culture; whereas since 2020, more than 6 000 teachers have lost their jobs as a result of repression, more than 50 have been imprisoned, and education in the Belarusian language is being dismantled amid the increasing militarisation of schools; whereas higher education institutions and academics in exile are being intimidated and labelled ‘extremist organisations’;
Removed:O. whereas the Belarusian regime employs anti-extremism laws to obstruct media outlets, whereby most independent media have been labelled as ‘extremist’, with at least 45 media representatives detained, around 400 in exile and others facing harassment and mistreatment; whereas independent media, such as Belsat TV, Charter 97, Nexta, Radio Racyja, Radio Svaboda, Nasha Niva and others, play a crucial role in providing essential information and serving as a platform for democratic voices; whereas the Belarusian authorities employ surveillance, online censorship and disinformation, escalating digital authoritarianism and undermining the prospects for free and fair elections in 2025; whereas Belarusian propagandists regularly spread disinformation about EU Member States and their officials and suppress access to information;
Added:N. whereas under Lukashenka, more than 250 people sentenced to death have been executed; whereas Belarus remains the only country in Europe and Central Asia to retain the death penalty, with its scope expanded in 2022 to include vaguely defined acts of terrorism and in 2023 to include ‘treason against the state’;
Removed:P. whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on Belarus has noted the systematic purging of civil society organisations since 2020, targeting human rights groups, independent trade unions, political parties and religious organisations;
Added:O. whereas more than 500 000 Belarusians have fled the country since 2020, with some continuing to face persecution and intimidation from the Lukashenka regime, including through trials in absentia, threats from the security forces and pressure on relatives, confiscation of property and other restrictions; whereas restrictions on renewing Belarusian documents from outside Belarus leave exiles in legal limbo; whereas returning to Belarus is dangerous, as many of those who have returned since 2020 have been convicted on politically motivated charges; whereas the Belarusian regime is among the top ten perpetrators of transnational repression;
Change 4
Changed:Q.P. whereas the freedom of religion and belief in Belarus continues to deteriorate; whereas Belarusian clergy members and believers face systematic pressure, including criminal and administrative prosecutions,prosecution, raids on places of worship, and branding of independent religious initiatives as ‘extremist formations’; whereas the mandatoryseveral re-registrationmembers of all religious organisations has been systematically used as an administrative tool to restrict religiousthe pluralism,Christian resultingclergy inremain abehind reductionbars offor registeredtheir religious communities; whereas the re-registration processwork, lacksincluding transparency,Siarhei andRezanovich, manyAndrzej communitiesJuchniewicz, –Henryk particularlyOkołotowicz, smallGrzegorz ProtestantGaweł and Greek-Catholic parishes – have been denied recognition due to unjustified restrictions under the new Belarusian law on freedom ofAleh religion;Loika;
Change 5
Removed:R. whereas the Belarusian Greek-Catholic Church has suffered particularly harsh treatment, being unable to re-register sufficient parishes to retain its legal status as a religious union, thereby losing rights guaranteed under Belarusian law; whereas several Christian clergy remain behind bars for their religious work, including Siarhei Rezanovich, Andrzej Juchniewicz, Henryk Okołotowicz, Grzegorz Gaweł and Aleh Loika;
Added:Q. whereas the LGBTQ+ community in Belarus continues to face harassment, including arbitrary arrests; whereas in an effort to copy Russia’s brand of discriminatory propaganda legislation, Belarus has conducted further attacks against the LGBTQ+ community; whereas a new draft law proposes imprisonment for sharing information on LGBTQ+ issues, childlessness or ‘recognising paedophilia as acceptable’, posing a serious risk of mass censorship and harassment; whereas including paedophilia in the same list as LGBTQ+ and childlessness is a deliberate manipulation;
Removed:S. whereas the regime in Minsk’s continued support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the regime’s weaponisation and instrumentalisation of illegal migration remains a significant geopolitical concern for the EU; whereas Lukashenka has accepted the Russian Federation’s permanent militarisation of Belarusian territory; whereas Lukashenka has allowed the Kremlin to exploit Belarusian territory and state institutions for its imperial ambitions, turning Belarus into a tool in Putin’s confrontation with the democratic West;
Added:R. whereas in recent years, the Lukashenka regime has stepped up pressure on the staff of Western diplomatic missions accredited in Belarus and on other foreigners in the country;
Removed:T. whereas Belarusian airspace is routinely filled with Russian drones used to carry out attacks on Ukraine, and was also used when Russian drones intentionally violated Poland’s airspace on 10 September 2025;
Added:S. whereas, despite persecution and threats, Belarusian democratic leaders in exile continue their work with courageously, advocating for human rights and representing the aspirations of the Belarusian people for a free, democratic and independent Belarus; whereas the European Parliament and the Belarusian democratic forces remain committed to restoring democracy through free and fair elections, the rule of law and European integration;
Removed:U. whereas the Lukashenka regime continues to orchestrate and facilitate the smuggling of migrants across its borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and incites violence against European border guards, which has already resulted in the death of a Polish soldier; whereas the regime has concealed and protected those responsible for these acts;
Added:T. whereas the Lukashenka regime has enabled Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by giving Russian forces access to Belarusian territory and supplying them with ammunition, fuel and other supplies; whereas Article 133 of the Belarusian Criminal Code provides that mercenary activity is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment, yet no Belarusian fighting for Russia has been convicted of this offence since 2014; whereas the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil increases regional instability and threatens European security; whereas the Lukashenka regime, with Russian assistance, circumvents certain sanctions through preferential market access and the use of Russian infrastructure;
Change 6
Changed:V.U. whereas the clearBelarusian stancepeople ofoverwhelmingly Belarusianoppose societyRussia’s war against theUkraine, wara instance Ukrainewhich has beenhelped ato cruciallimit factorBelarus’s preventingdirect Belarusinvolvement fromin beingthe drawnconflict furtherand intodemonstrates the conflict;Belarusian nation’s commitment to peace, independence and European values;
Change 7
Removed:W. whereas in September 2025, the Lukashenka regime once again joined Russia for the ‘Zapad 2025’ joint military exercises, posing a clear threat to EU and NATO members along the alliance’s eastern flank;
Added:V. whereas, according to the US State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report, Belarus is one of the main hubs for human trafficking and continues to inflict forced labour on Belarusians and foreign citizens; whereas the Belarusian authorities have transferred more than 2 400 unaccompanied children from vulnerable Ukrainian communities to Belarus, placing them in institutions where many have been subjected to ‘re-education’ and military training; whereas the Belarusian regime is actively copying Russian policies to destroy Ukrainian identity through the indoctrination of Ukrainian children;