What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint

Removed:22. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU with necessary propositions; urges the Member States to take urgent decisions to ensure its full implementation; reiterates its call for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability to finally benefit from adequate premises and staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; insists on the fact that the Rapid Deployment Capacity has to achieve full operational capability in 2025; strongly believes that more substantial progress must be made in bringing Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) into operation;

Added:12. Expects the white paper on the future of European defence to identify the most pressing threats, structural risks and competitors, and define the extent to which the EU can develop contingency plans to ensure mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and help Europe anticipate, prepare for and deter potential aggressors and defend itself in the short and long term, in order to become a credible power and European pillar within NATO;

Removed:23. Reiterates its call to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation with actions and not only words, including in the domains of information exchange, planning coordination, improved cooperation on their respective military operations, and joint efforts to significantly improve on military mobility initiatives, building on lessons learnt from military assistance to Ukraine;

Added:13. Calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

Removed:24. Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority ordering mechanism for defence production to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations; underlines that such a mechanism should apply beyond current defence applications to encompass other essential resilience-building infrastructure such as energy, transport and telecommunications;

Added:14. Stresses the need to enhance capabilities and resources, while overcoming the fragmentation of the defence market; fully agrees with the Draghi report’s view that the EU and its Member States must urgently decide on incentives for the EU defence industry and find creative solutions for large-scale public and private investments in security and defence;

Removed:25. Calls for the EU, in cooperation with NATO and with the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA), to identify and address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU and focus efforts on European strategic enablers to provide genuine EU added value; notes that in order to address the most extreme military contingencies, the EU must use the same force requirements as those set by NATO for critical military capabilities, particularly for air defence, ammunition, long-range fire capabilities, logistics and enablement;

Added:Short-term: defending Ukraine against an existential threat to Europe’s security

Removed:26. Urges the EU and its Member States to move from a ‘flow’ approach to their military capabilities, which has prevailed during peacetime, to a ‘stock’ approach, with stockpiles of defence equipment ready for a sustained increase in demand; believes that the Commission should take all possible action to increase trust between Member States and encourage greater exchange and transparency on long-term planning, more proactive measures aimed at securing raw materials, and policies to close gaps in production processes and on the labour market;

Added:15. Urges the EU and its Member States to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine; recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided and that the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine will be decisively shifted; underlines that such a shift now depends almost entirely on Europe; urges the Member States, therefore, to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine before negotiations are concluded; warns that, if the EU were to fail in its support and Ukraine were forced to surrender, Russia would then turn against other countries, including possibly the EU Member States; calls on the EU Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

Removed:27. Calls for the EU to adopt a global and coherent approach to external aid in all its aspects, with much closer alignment between the common foreign and security policy and the objectives and instruments of the CSDP;

Added:16. Strongly believes that the EU must further expand and improve its tailor-made training operations to respond to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, in return, create conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons and strategic practices from them; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including in Ukrainian territory;

Removed:28. Considers that the CSDP must become the EU’s armed wing in the fight against the hybrid war being waged against it, its Member States and its partners, in particular candidate countries; is deeply worried by the sharp increase in hybrid attacks including sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation and interference in elections, with the objective of weakening the EU and candidate countries; calls on the Member States to consider appropriate forms of deterrence and countermeasures, including the use of Article 42(7) TEU; insists on the need to improve the CSDP’s ability to identify, prevent and counter information manipulation aimed at hindering the EU’s external action; reiterates its call to establish an effective horizontal strategic communications strategy adapted to all EU communication channels;

Added:17. Urges the EU to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine; proposes the allocation of a specific multi-billion euro budget to the European Defence Industry Programme’s (EDIP) Ukraine Support Instrument reserved exactly for this purpose; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy;

Removed:29. Calls for the creation, under the CSDP, of an EU crisis response air fleet comprising military transport aircraft held at EU level and made available to Member States for EU deployments, transport of equipment or troops (military mobility), or emergency evacuation – the need for which was demonstrated by the capability gap during the withdrawal from Afghanistan – as well as for civilian security missions, based on the model of the European Air Transport Command;

Added:18. Praises the ‘Danish model’ for support for Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics, and greater ease of training and maintenance;

Removed:30. Expects the European External Action Service to carry out comprehensive and uncompromising reviews of CSDP missions and operations taking into account, in particular, the realism of their respective mandates in relation to the resources allocated, the recruitment method for the staff of missions and operations, particularly with regard to the link between the skills required and the different profiles, the rationalisation of resources and the management of missions and operations, the transparency of calls for tender, activities and results obtained, best practice and lessons learned, and difficulties encountered; asks the Council, on the basis of these reviews, to take the decisions required to adapt or abandon ineffective missions and to strengthen the most useful missions; believes that the evaluation and control of CSDP missions and operations must be improved;

Added:19. Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the EU Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets to serve as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase our support for Ukraine’s military needs;

Removed:31. Believes that the EU should develop wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners to provide early warning of hard, hybrid, and cyber threats, to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure and maritime safety;

Added:20. Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and non-EU states facilitating the circumvention of sanctions, providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;

Removed:32. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with NATO, to remove all unnecessary regulatory obstacles that slow down the speed at which Europe is able to develop its military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from the logic of ‘mobility’ to that of ‘military logistics’; considers that the definition of military mobility should apply to infrastructure that covers all logistical aspects of mobility, including but not limited to logistics hubs, fuel, spare parts, repair capacity and ammunition; stresses the need for significant investments in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, for increased development of logistical infrastructure such as camps, depots, ports, air, sea and rail platforms, railways, waterways, roads and bridges; insists on the need to adapt regulations with the rapid implementation of the technical arrangement signed under the aegis of the EDA Cross Border Movement Permission, the harmonisation of customs formalities and the preparation of a centralised and reasoned lifting of road and rail traffic standards in the event of a crisis situation;

Added:21. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EDTIB, which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for its speedier integration; highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIP’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; further proposes the provision of war insurance for critical EDTIB projects inside Ukraine; proposes the regular inclusion of Ukrainian Defence Ministry officials with observer status at meetings of relevant Council configurations;

Removed:33. Believes that, in order to build a favourable ecosystem for the European defence industry, the EU must provide it with a united and clear long-term vision, giving it visibility and ensuring that priority needs are addressed;

Added:22. Urges the Commission and the Member States to make full use of the lessons learnt from Ukraine’s advanced modern warfare capabilities, including drones and electronic warfare;

Removed:34. Urges the EU to increase the coherence between existing and future EU instruments, in particular between Permanent Structured Cooperation on demand consolidation, and the European Defence Fund (EDF) on programmatic roadmaps, between the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) on joint procurement, and the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP) on industrial ramp-up, between the EDIP on identification of dependencies, and the EDF on the resolution of identified dependencies; and within the EDIP itself on the coherence of actions related to the consolidation of demand and supply;

Added:‘Ready for the most extreme military contingencies’– a new long-term approach

Removed:35. Insists on the importance of EU flagship projects, in the form of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI), which are critical to the European defence industry; believes that EDPCIs should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities underpinning major priorities shared by several Member States and in fields such as strategic enablers – particularly in space and European air defence – so as to act on the whole spectrum of threats, develop military mobility, in particular strategic and tactical air transport, deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, as well as to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that realism must prevail in view of the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focus on rapidly available and proven European technologies that reduce its dependencies and improve its security; calls for the creation of European defence industry champions as an objective to consolidate the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and increase its global competitiveness; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair returns, EU defence policies should encourage the growth of European centres of excellence;

Added:Preparedness

Removed:36. Calls on the further development of the EU defence industrial policy to improve existing defence-specific instruments and develop new instruments where necessary, and to optimise the use of non-defence-specific instruments for the purposes of the EDTIB;

Added:23. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive EU risk assessment to help identify the major cross-sectoral threats and hazards, as well as the concrete risks facing the EU as a whole, building on current sector-specific risk assessment procedures;

Removed:37. Recalls the need to ensure the consistency of EU public policies, which must not generate obligations contradictory to the overall defence objectives, especially in a period of security crisis where the concept of ‘strategic exception’ should be introduced; calls for the creation of a genuine defence environment that supports industrial ramp-up efforts by taking better advantage of the Commission’s existing multi-sectoral instruments, screening, reviewing and, where needed, revising them to ensure that they do not undermine EU defence policy objectives;

Added:24. Insists on the importance of using the upcoming ‘Preparedness Union Strategy’ to put the EU on track for comprehensive preparedness;

Removed:38. Proposes that relevant defence-related entities/activities be allowed access to InvestEU, and other EU funds taking advantage of the EU defence industry as a job creator; insists on the prioritising of defence-related entities/activities as appropriate with the support of the Chips Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act; believes that simplification efforts announced by the Commission must fully encompass the defence sector;

Added:25. Supports a ‘Preparedness by Design’ principle being embedded horizontally and consistently across the EU institutions, bodies and agencies; insists on the need to develop a mandatory ‘security and preparedness check’ for future impact assessments and ‘stress-tests’ for existing legislation; stresses the need to reduce the obstacles in current national and EU legislation that undermine the efficiency of European defence and security;

Removed:39. Insists on the need to ensure geographical coherence by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK to work together, first and foremost to build security guarantees for Ukraine and to become closer security partners, but also to sign a joint declaration with concrete commitments and structured dialogue to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges the continent faces, the budgetary and regulatory conditions of which remain to be negotiated, and keeping in mind the importance of the EU’s decision-making autonomy;

Added:26. Recommends, in particular, the Niinistö report recommendations aimed at empowering citizens to make societal resilience work, inspired by the Finnish concept of total defence;

Removed:40. Calls for the coherence of the support offered to companies to be improved by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access to support for small and mid-cap companies;

Added:27. Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act, setting joint standards and long-term guidelines to align EU and national efforts when possible;

Removed:41. Calls for greater coherence in governance, as the CSDP must become the instrument of a powerful Europe; considers that this requires a real link in governance between the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other European Commissioners; urges the Member States to overcome the complexity of decision-making on European defence; calls for the creation of a Council of defence ministers and the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions in the European Council, the Council of Ministers and EU agencies such as the EDA, except for those on military operations with an executive mandate; until then, calls for the use of Article 44 TEU and the creation of a cross-sectoral task force on defence in the Commission; calls for increased democratic accountability through enhanced control by Parliament;

Added:28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to establish and regularly conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to horizontally test both high-level decision-making and operational coordination in order to build strong links between actors and across sectors;

Removed:42. Stresses that the creation of a single European defence market is a priority as the fragmentation and lack of competitiveness of the European defence industry have so far hampered the capacity of the EU to take more responsibility as a security provider; recalls that the notion of a ‘defence market’ implies a full recognition of its specificity and an appropriate and consistent application of EU public policies; recalls that this single market should aim for European preference by strictly linking it to territoriality and added-value generated in the EU;

Added:29. Calls for the EU and its Members States to facilitate the use of CSDP instruments in complementarity with internal security tools in the immediate vicinity of the EU’s territory and territorial waters, and to strengthen dual-use and civil-military cooperation at EU level, based on a whole-of-government approach; reiterates its call for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure via the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection, operating in alignment with NATO; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

Removed:43. Strongly believes that European preference should be the cornerstone of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European know-how and strengthening European defence capabilities on a long-term basis, and to ensure that EU taxpayer money is used to create added value on EU territory;

Added:Readiness: the Strategic Compass and the European Defence Industrial Strategy as the right tools

Removed:44. Calls for the notion of the internal market to be linked to that of territoriality, as defence is driven by Member State policy rather than the market, and as the defence industry is under authorisation to produce and under exemption to sell;

Added:30. Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to move much faster through the procedures when faced with wars or other large-scale crises, and to adopt the appropriate tools;

Removed:45. Insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU by reviewing the directives on the transfer of defence-related products and defence procurement;

Added:31. Considers regular threat analyses, such as the one first conducted in the Strategic Compass, as an absolute necessity; recommends, therefore, updating the EU’s Strategic Compass and adapting the measures within it accordingly in order to reflect the magnitude of our threat environment, and conducting more frequent threat assessments, as they are a precondition for realistically and successfully planning our capabilities and operations; considers that the Strategic Compass, the CSDP, the white paper and the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) should form the basis for a comprehensive vision of European defence;

Removed:46. Underlines that the European preference principle must be reflected in EU defence regulations by clear and unambiguous eligibility criteria both for entities and for products;

Added:32. Insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in 2025 and should be upgraded to be able to face the most extreme military contingencies; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity;

Removed:47. Calls on the Commission to design a better resourced, more strategic and more efficient successor to the EDF that supports common research and innovation in defence all along the supply chain and lays down the conditions for addressing technological challenges such as advanced persistent threats, artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum computing, military internet of things, security, supply chain attacks, zero-day exploits and cloud security; calls for the establishment of an EU agency inspired by the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), adapted to the EU’s specific characteristics, in order to fund strategic, groundbreaking projects designed to promote European technological and economic superiority;

Added:33. Strongly believes that, in the current geopolitical context, the operationalisation of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance is of utmost importance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether they are NATO members;

Removed:48. Is concerned that, without a substantial increase in investment in defence, the EU will not reach its objectives on security and defence, either for military support to Ukraine or to bolster the EU’s common security; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness for most extreme military contingencies would then be much higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; recalls that aggregate EU defence spending is inadequate and lacks sufficient focus on innovation; calls for the EU and the Member States to work and agree on the concrete ways and means for short- to long-term massive public and private investments in defence and security; recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine;

Added:34. Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular, in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and the exchange of best practice, and to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls, nonetheless, for the development of a fully capable European pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary; reiterates its call to strengthen cooperation – through action, not only words – on military mobility, information exchange, coordination of planning, improved cooperation on their respective military operations and enhanced response to hybrid warfare aimed at destabilising the whole EU continent;

Removed:49. Considers that, in the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF), defence spending lines will have to reflect the new priority of being ‘ready for the most extreme military contingencies’ and include ambitious financing for military mobility, counter-mobility measures and defence industrial capacity building;

Added:35. Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority-ordering mechanism for defence production to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations; underlines that the Member States should go beyond their current defence applications to encompass other essential resilience-building infrastructure such as energy, transport and telecommunications;

Removed:50. Strongly supports the five-point Re-Arm Europe plan proposed by the Commissions President on 4 February 2025, which includes the possibility of triggering the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments in order to allow Member States to increase their defence spending, a new instrument to provide EUR 150 billion of loans to Member States for defence investment, possibilities and incentives for Member States that choose to use cohesion policy programmes to increase defence spending, as well as the mobilisation of private capital through the completion of the capital markets union and the widening of the scope of the European Investment Bank (EIB); urges the Member States to support this plan;

Added:36. Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in order to ramp up defence industry production; underlines the need to ensure the coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and NATO’s capability targets in order to identify and address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU and focus efforts on European strategic enablers to provide genuine EU added value in order to address most extreme military contingencies; calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations of the European Court of Auditor’s Special Report 04/2025 on military mobility and to give greater importance to the military assessment during the selection process for dual-use projects;

Removed:51. Strongly supports the notion that Member States must increase financing for their defence and security to new levels; notes that some Member States are already increasing their defence spending to 5 % of GDP and insists that the current security environment and multiple, complex and evolving security threats require Member States to spend at least 3 % of GDP on defence;

Added:37. Urges the EU and its Member States, with regard to armed forces, to move from the ‘flow’ approach that prevailed during peaceful times to a ‘stock’ approach, with a stockpile of defence equipment ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; believes that the Commission should take any actions necessary to encourage the Member States to increase exchanges and build trust among them regarding long-term, transparent planning, more proactive measures aimed at securing raw materials, and policies to close gaps in production processes and on the labour market;