What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint

Removed:B100148/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Changed:– having regard to RuleRules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas over the last decade, major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale wars inwar theto EU’sour neighbourhood, have threatenedbeen threatening the security of the EU, its Member States and its citizens; whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action; whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and the global order as a whole;

Change 2

Changed:B. whereas the global order is fragmenting and is increasingly characterised by complex and entrenched instabilities;

Change 3

Changed:C. whereas the EUthere cannot be secureany European security without security in its immediate neighbourhood;neighbourhood, whereasstarting with Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russia’s war of aggression is vital to EU security;aggression;

Change 4

Changed:D. whereas recent statements by members of the US Administration,administration, accompanied by the behaviourheavy ofpressure theexerted USon leadershipUkraine towardsby Presidentthe Zelenskyy,US leadership, reflect a shift in US foreign policy;policy whereasas the Trump administration is proposing the normalisation of ties with Russia and it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its own security and defence and mustto be in a positionable to help Ukraine winto thedefend war;itself;

Change 5

Changed:E. whereas the biggestquickest and fastestmost growthextensive inexpansion Russia’sof militaryRussia’s capabilities is taking place close tonear Russia’sits borders with the West, while the EU is taking its time to enhance its defence capacity;

Change 6

Added:F. whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests;

Added:G. whereas the impact of wars, terrorism, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to EU security; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with, and remain an ongoing challenge for, the EU’s management of its external borders;

Added:H. whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter these challenges and protect the EU’s strategic interests;

Added:I. whereas, in the light of the worsening external environment and despite the efforts made in recent years to enhance the EU’s crisis preparedness through new legislation, mechanisms and tools across various policy areas, the EU and its Member States remain vulnerable to multiple crisis scenarios;

J. whereas there is an urgent need to further reform and strengthen the EU’s defence policy in the light of Ukraine’s recent war experience and the use of new war technologies;

K. whereas it is in the EU’s interest to see Ukraine as an integral part of a genuine European security system;

Change 7

Removed:H. whereas, in their mission letters from the President of the European Commission, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were tasked with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of their mandate;

Added:L. whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and alongside the Baltic Sea, it has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

Removed:1. Considers that the EU must take urgent action to ensure its own autonomous security, strengthen useful partnerships with like-minded partners and significantly reduce its dependencies on other countries; stresses, therefore, that the EU is now facing a turning point in its history and construction; insists that ‘business as usual’ is no longer an option as it would mean the end of a safe and secure Europe; considers that the EU and its Member States have to choose between pulling together in a synchronised way and joining forces to overcome the threats and attacks against EU security, or standing alone at the mercy of aggressive adversaries and unreliable partners; recalls that Russia is the most significant direct threat to Europe’s security; emphasises, however, the fact that the instability in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood must also be fully taken into consideration;

Added:M. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while, at the same time, facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

Removed:2. Underlines that the EU must now adopt a holistic and cross-cutting approach, integrating a defence and security dimension into most European policies, including adequate regulatory and financial instruments to address identified capability needs and gaps;

Added:N. whereas as a result of investment in military equipment and ammunition, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

Removed:3. Believes therefore that the time has come for renewed political ambition to act and turn the EU into a genuine security provider, increase the EU’s defence readiness and build a true European Defence Union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was a good starting point, but that it must still be implemented in a timely manner; welcomes the recent EU defence instruments; insists on the urgent need to change scale, as EU defence efforts cannot remain limited in size, fragmented in scope and lengthy in delivery; calls for a quantum leap and a new approach on defence, accompanied by strong choices and decisions, an action plan and a short-to-long-term defence investment plan to enhance the bloc’s security infrastructure, improve deterrence, respond to hybrid threats and attacks, guarantee the mobilisation of equity and private capital and develop strategic enablers and strategic weapons systems to enhance Europe’s collective military power and thus reduce its dependency on others;

Added:O. whereas the Strategic Compass was mainly drafted and negotiated before 24 February 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass is a very broad strategy that provides little guidance with regards to the urgent need to accomplish defence readiness and provide deterrence and defence capabilities to prepare for the most urgent military contingencies;

Removed:4. Urges the EU to adopt a coherent, robust and comprehensive framework to strengthen its security and the security of its partners, to better identify potential future breaking points and prevent further crises, and, together with the Member States, to marshal responses similar to those required in times of war;

Added:P. whereas the 2024 Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade, and underlines a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB;

Removed:5. Expects the white paper on European defence to define this new framework and the extent to which the EU can help Europe anticipate and ready itself for the most extreme military contingencies, deter potential aggressors and defend itself both in the short and long term with a view to becoming a credible power and a European pillar within NATO;

Added:Q. whereas the Niinistö report underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios;

Removed:6. Considers that common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations have to be reassessed and reviewed with this perspective in mind; insists that, to fulfil its role as an insurance policy for Europe’s security, the CSDP must become stronger and more agile, including by becoming the EU’s instrument to fight against hybrid warfare;

Added:R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

Removed:7. Stresses that capabilities and resources must be increased, and that the fragmentation of the defence market must be overcome; fully agrees with and shares the Draghi report’s view that the EU and its Member States must urgently decide on incentives directed towards the EU defence industry and find creative solutions for large-scale public and private investments in security and defence;

Added:S. whereas the EU’s ability to take decisive action in response to external threats has been repeatedly hampered by the requirement for unanimity, with certain Member States and candidate countries blocking or delaying critical military aid to Ukraine and hence undermining European security;

Removed:8. Urges the EU and its Member States to significantly increase their efforts to decisively shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine; underlines that such a shift depends now almost entirely on Europeans; urges the Member States, therefore, to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine; warns, ahead of any negotiations, that if the EU should fail in its support, and if Ukraine were to be forced to surrender, Russia would turn against other countries, including possibly EU Member States; calls on the Council to work with Ukraine to identify a peaceful solution to the war, and to actively engage in implementing Ukraine’s Peace Formula; urges the EU and its Member States, first and foremost, to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

Added:T. whereas, in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of their term of office;

Removed:9. Believes that the EU can play a crucial role in identifying the gap between Ukraine’s military capabilities and its needs, after three years of war, as well as in identifying the available defence capabilities of the Member States, with a view to coordinating the ramping up of defence industry production as well as ensuring the constant production of certain equipment in order to respond to foreign aggressions or the specific needs of its strategic partners;

Added:U. whereas Parliament and experts have been calling for a white paper on defence for more than a decade;

Removed:10. Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the Member States to take the decision, together with their G7 partners, to use frozen assets as a basis for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally robust and financially substantial way to maintain and increase Europe’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

Added:A historic time for European defence: ‘become a genuine security provider’

Removed:11. Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and countries facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and helping to provide Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;

Added:1. Considers that the EU must act urgently to ensure its own autonomous security, strengthening its partnerships with like-minded partners and significantly reducing its dependencies on non-EU countries; stresses, therefore, that the EU is now at a turning point in its history and construction; insists that a ‘business as usual’ approach is no longer an option as it would lead to the end of a safe and secure Europe; considers that the EU and its Member States must choose between joining forces and working in unison to overcome the threats and attacks on EU security, and standing alone at the mercy of aggressive adversaries and unpredictable partners;

Removed:12. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with the Ukrainian defence industry and its integration, in the long term, into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base; recalls the urgency to properly finance the Ukraine instrument under the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP), which is not currently budgeted for;

Added:2. Recalls that the EU is a peace project and should strive towards peace and stability, while condemning aggression; underlines that in order to achieve peace and stability, we must support Ukraine and become more resilient ourselves;

Removed:13. Strongly believes that the EU must further expand and improve its tailor-made training operations to respond to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, in return, create the conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons and strategic practices from them;

Added:3. Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European values, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the end of the Cold War;

Removed:14. Calls for the EU and its Members States to facilitate the use of CSDP instruments to complement national security tools in the immediate vicinity of the EU’s territory and territorial waters, and to strengthen dual-use and civilian-military cooperation at EU level, based on a whole-of-government approach; reiterates its call for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure and the development of protective countermeasures;

Added:4. Believes that Russia, supported by its allies including Belarus, China, North Korea and Iran, is the most significant direct and indirect threat to the EU and its security, as well as that of EU candidate countries and partners; reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, the need to consider fully the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power and the increased aggressiveness of the middle powers, which appear ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same; notes that the recent actions and statements of the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

Removed:15. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive EU risk assessment to help identify the major cross-sectoral threats and hazards and the concrete risks facing the EU as a whole, building on current sector-specific risk assessment processes;

Added:5. Insists that Europe must take on greater responsibilities within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent;

Removed:16. Insists on the importance of using the upcoming Preparedness Union strategy to put the EU on track towards comprehensive preparedness;

Added:6. Underlines that the EU must now adopt a holistic and horizontal approach that integrates a defence and security dimension into most EU policies, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments and identified capability needs and gaps;

Removed:17. Calls for a principle of ‘preparedness by design’ to be embedded consistently in a cross-cutting way across the EU institutions, bodies, and agencies; insists on the need to develop a mandatory security and preparedness check for future impact assessments and stress-tests of existing legislation; stresses the need to reduce the obstacles in current EU legislation that undermine the efficiency of European defence and security;

Added:7. Believes, therefore, that the time has come for a renewed political ambition to act and turn the EU into a genuine security provider, increase the EU’s defence readiness and build a true European Defence Union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was a good starting point, but notes that its timely implementation remains necessary; welcomes the recently introduced EU defence instruments and insists on the urgent need to scale up as EU defence efforts cannot remain limited in size, fragmented in scope and lengthy in delivery; calls for a quantum leap and a new approach to defence, including strong decisions, an action plan and both short- to long-term defence investment plans; underlines that this requires vision, concreteness and shared commitments, both in the strictly military field and in the industrial, technological and intelligence sectors;

Removed:18. Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act, setting joint standards and long-term guidelines, to align EU and national efforts wherever possible;

Added:8. Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to addressing deep structural challenges of the European defence industrial landscape and the lack of ambition as regards cooperation at EU level between the Member States’ armed forces; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a major step towards a very ambitious and comprehensive framework on defence;

Removed:19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to set up and regularly conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to test both high-level decision-making and operational coordination, in order to encourage the building of strong horizontal links between actors and across sectors;

Added:9. Urges the EU to adopt a coherent and robust comprehensive framework to strengthen its security and that of its partners, better identify potential future breaking points and prevent further crises, and coordinate joint responses with its Member States similar to those used in wartime;

Removed:20. Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to fast-track procedures during wars or other large-scale crises, and to adopt the appropriate tools;

Added:10. Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence should put forward concrete measures and options to the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and necessary efforts can be undertaken, differentiating between short- and long-term plans and objectives, addressing defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs, and framing the overall approach to EU defence integration; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

Removed:21. Considers regular threat analyses, like the one that was first conducted in the Strategic Compass, to be an absolute necessity; considers that the Strategic Compass, the CSDP, the white paper and the European defence industrial strategy should form the basis of a comprehensive vision for European defence;

Added:11. Considers that common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations need to be reassessed and reviewed from this perspective; insists that the CSDP must be strengthened and made more agile, including by becoming the EU’s main instrument to fight hybrid warfare, in order to fulfil its role as an insurance policy for Europe’s security, as well as a power and security provider;