What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint

Removed:B100191/2024

European Parliament resolution on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

(2024/2940(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Removed:– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),

Added:– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular those of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine and of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States, and to its previous resolutions on the situation on the Korean Peninsula,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

Changed:– having regard to all Unitedthe NationsHelsinki SecurityFinal CouncilAct, resolutionsthe onCharter Northof Korea,Paris infor particulara ResolutionsNew 1874Europe and 2094,the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,

Change 1

Removed:– having regard the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 25 October 2024 on reports of the DPRK sending troops to Russia,

Added:– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility, to Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2024 establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

Changed:– having regard to the EUjoint statement ofby 20Minister Novemberof 2024Foreign atAffairs of the InternationalRepublic Atomicof EnergyKorea AgencyCho (IAEA)Tae-yul Boardand ofHigh GovernorsRepresentative onof the ApplicationUnion offor safeguardsForeign inAffairs theand DemocraticSecurity People’sPolicy RepublicJosep Borrell of Korea,4 November 2024 on DPRK-Russia Cooperation,

Change 2

Removed:– having regard to the joint statement by the foreign ministers of Finland and Germany of 18 November 2024 on the severed undersea cable in the Baltic Sea,

Added:– having regard to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address to the European Parliament on 19 November 2024, marking 1 000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,

Removed:– having regard to the joint declaration of 19 November 2024 by the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom in Warsaw,

Added:– having regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, including UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006,

Removed:– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

Added:– having regard to the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 8 November 2024 on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

Removed:A. whereas over a thousand days have passed since the Russian Federation, on 24 February 2022, launched another continuous and unprecedented assault as part of its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea; whereas according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, there was almost daily artillery shelling and small arms fire on a low level by Russian military personnel along the line of contact between 2014 and 2022;

Added:– having regard to the 2010 EU-Republic of Korea Strategic Partnership,

Removed:B. whereas Russia’s forces continue to conduct systematic and indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting have continued throughout 2024; whereas waves of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure disrupting power and water supplies have seriously limited access to essential services for civilians, healthcare facilities and schools, with longer-term implications anticipated and the situation expected to worsen over the course of the winter;

Added:– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed:C. whereas on 17 November 2024 Russia launched a massive attack against civilian infrastructure and residential areas using around 120 missiles and 90 drones, killing and wounding many; whereas some of the strikes were aimed at electricity substations, which are critical to the operation of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants; whereas on the same day, the IAEA reported that power lines from four substations to three nuclear power plants had been cut and that output had been reduced in six of the nine nuclear reactors on the three sites;

Added:A. whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in a continuation of its aggression since 2014, including the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, persistently, blatantly and grossly violating the principles of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

Removed:D. whereas one of the major threats to Ukrainian critical infrastructure, civilian populations and defence forces is bombardment by large numbers of glide bombs, which can be launched by Russian aircraft from great distances that make them difficult for Ukrainian air defences to defend against;

Added:B. whereas Russia’s forces have systematically and indiscriminately attacked residential areas and civilian infrastructure, causing the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction of public and private property; whereas Russian forces are responsible for forced deportations, disappearances, including of children, illegal imprisonments, torture, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war, and they continue to alter the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine;

Removed:E. whereas Russia still has an advantage in the air and in troops on the ground as it currently fields some 520 000 troops in Ukraine and plans to raise this number to 690 000 by the end of 2024; whereas Ukraine is experiencing severe and growing personnel shortages; whereas the Ukrainian, South Korean and US authorities have reported that around 11 000 North Korean troops have arrived in Russia to take part in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; whereas reports indicate that these soldiers are already taking part in battles in Russia’s Kursk region; whereas according to media reports, North Korea may actually deploy as many as 100 000 troops;

Added:C. whereas Russia has escalated its air attacks against Ukraine, deploying significant numbers of missiles and drones to target electricity generation and transmission infrastructure nationwide, leading to power disruptions and necessitating nationwide rationing measures announced by Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s primary electricity provider, to stabilise the energy system;

Removed:F. whereas North Korea and Russia have recently signed and ratified the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which requires both countries to use all available means to provide immediate military assistance if either is attacked; whereas the treaty also commits the two countries to actively cooperate in their efforts to establish a ‘just and multipolar new world order’ and strengthen cooperation on atomic energy, space, food supply, trade and economy;

Added:D. whereas the EU and its Member States stand in solidarity with Ukraine, committing significant humanitarian, financial and military support to aid Ukraine’s defence until its victory and recovery; whereas, however, there continues to be an insufficient level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity, and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered;

Removed:G. whereas Russia is rapidly increasing its own military production, with military spending reaching around EUR 140 billion in 2024; whereas Russia is also using Belarus’s ammunition stockpile and artillery shells and ballistic missiles from North Korea, as well as Iranian drones and missiles; whereas Iran has transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas the EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have introduced new sanctions against Iran in response;

Added:E. whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, North Korea and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunitions, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine;

Removed:H. whereas media reports indicate that Russia’s armed forces have recruited hundreds of Yemeni men to fight in Ukraine; whereas according to further reports, Moscow is providing assistance to the Houthis, including targeting data for missile launches and possibly sales of advanced Russian anti-ship missiles;

Added:F. whereas the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, signed on 18 June 2024, mandates mutual military assistance, including nuclear and conventional support, in the event of armed aggression, thereby deepening military ties between the two nations; whereas this development combines significant security challenges in both Asia and Europe, further complicating global stability;

Removed:I. whereas US President Joe Biden has recently decided to lift some restrictions on the use of longer-range missiles by Ukraine against legitimate military targets in Russia; whereas it has been reported that restrictions on the use of ATACMS missiles, with a maximum range of around 300 km, have been lifted for Russia’s Kursk region; whereas according to media reports, the US administration took the decision in response to the deployment of North Korean troops, with the aim of deterring North Korea from sending more troops;

Added:G. whereas North Korea and Russia have directly escalated the conflict in Ukraine with the deployment of North Korean troops alongside Russian forces, marking a dangerous expansion of the war with severe implications for regional and global security; whereas North Korea’s arms transfers to Russia, including the provision of munitions and military equipment, constitute a clear violation of UN Security Council sanctions aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons from North Korea;

Removed:J. whereas media reports also indicate that France and the UK have lifted some restrictions on the use of Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles against legitimate military targets in Russia that are within the 250 km range of that weapon;

Added:H. whereas Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has reported that 11 000 North Korean soldiers have already been deployed near Ukraine’s borders, with this contingent potentially increasing further; whereas North Korea, in exchange for supplying ammunition and troops, receives much-needed food, oil and money from Russia, and possibly assistance in developing nuclear weapons and missile technology know-how;

Removed:K. whereas there continues to be a low level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered;

Added:I. whereas North Korea has escalated its threats, abandoned its unification policy and continued provocations in the region, particularly through missile tests and military demonstrations, which increase the risk of military conflict and undermine efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict;

Removed:L. whereas, at the February 2024 meeting of EU defence ministers, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell announced that Member States had undertaken to send at least EUR 21 billion of military aid to Ukraine during 2024;

Added:J. whereas Russia’s armed forces have reportedly recruited hundreds of Houthi Yemeni mercenaries to fight in the conflict in Ukraine, facilitated by a shadowy trafficking operation that shows the increasing ties between Moscow and the Houthi rebel group;

Removed:M. whereas Hungary is blocking both the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have been delivering military aid to Ukraine for nearly two years;

Added:K. whereas Iran has transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas the EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have introduced new sanctions against Iran in response;

Removed:N. whereas the Hungarian prime minister and foreign minister have abused their Council Presidency by travelling to Moscow and engaging in diplomatic talks with an aggressor state; whereas Hungary has repeatedly vetoed, delayed or watered down various rounds of EU sanctions on Russia, directly contributing to the ability of the Russian state to maintain its war economy;

Added:L. whereas China is today the biggest supplier of dual-use goods and military items sustaining Russia’s military base and war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the EU has conclusive evidence that armed drones are being produced for the Russian military in China’s western Xinjiang region;

Removed:O. whereas on 18 November 2024 the 1 200 km cable connecting Helsinki to the German port of Rostock stopped working; whereas a 218 km internet link between Lithuania and Sweden’s Gotland island went out of service on 17 November 2024; whereas European authorities suspect the Chinese-flagged ship Yi Peng 3 of being responsible for the damage to both undersea cables; whereas the Danish navy has stopped the vessel in its territorial waters and several European authorities are investigating the incident;

Added:M. whereas the newly elected European Parliament and Commission Presidents each immediately pledged to uphold their unwavering support for Ukraine; whereas the President-elect of the United States is expected to do the same; whereas anything but victory for Ukraine would be widely perceived as a strategic defeat for both Europe and the United States and would have far-reaching consequences for their security;

Removed:P. whereas the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House has raised serious concerns about an unpredictable future US policy towards Russia and a reduction in US political support and military aid to Ukraine;

Added:N. whereas US President Joe Biden has authorised Ukraine to use US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation; whereas France and the United Kingdom have provided Storm Shadow / SCALP cruise missiles to Ukraine, with both countries allowing their use against Russian targets; whereas Germany continues its policy of refraining from the delivery of Taurus long-range missiles to Ukraine;

Removed:Q. whereas President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine’s Peace Formula in September 2022, outlining 10 requirements for a just peace for Ukraine and for restoring the rules-based order; whereas as a follow-up to this, a first Summit on Peace in Ukraine was held in Switzerland in June 2024 and attended by more than 90 states; whereas Ukraine announced plans for a second Summit on Peace to which Russia would be invited, but Moscow immediately rejected the invitation; whereas earlier this year, President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine’s Victory Plan, outlining steps that will create conditions to strengthen Ukraine’s position for ending the war on favourable terms for Ukraine and improving global peace and stability;

Added:O. whereas under international law, Ukraine’s right to self-defence includes proportional military action extending beyond its own territory; whereas Ukraine has reportedly used the donated long-range weapons systems against military targets within Russian territory following the recent lifting of restrictions by donor countries;

Removed:1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

Added:P. whereas Russia attacked the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on 21 November 2024 with an intermediate-range ballistic missile;

Removed:2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law; stresses that the ultimate goal remains the achievement of a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine’s terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of the Ukrainian people within a peaceful and stable Europe;

Added:Q. whereas since February 2022, the EU has adopted 14 packages of sanctions aimed in particular at limiting as far as possible the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war it has unleashed; whereas these sanctions are set for a period of six months at a time; whereas a proposal to extend the duration of sanctions to three years has not been adopted; whereas the proposal has been blocked by Hungary’s veto, which hampers secure, longer-term stability and support for this loan structure;

Removed:3. States its firm support for Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan as the best basis for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for the people of Ukraine and the wider region; stresses that the EU and its Member States, alongside its NATO and non-NATO partners, possess the means to achieve the goals outlined in those two strategies;

Added:R. whereas the EU’s overall military support for Ukraine – provided through the European Peace Facility (EPF) and by Member States directly – amounts to around EUR 43.5 billion; whereas in August 2024, the EU mobilised only the first tranche – EUR 1.4 billion – of windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia through the EPF to support further military assistance for Ukraine;

Removed:4. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to proactively support Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan as a matter of utmost urgency, and to develop, without further delay, a clear strategy with specific goals, identify the tools and actions needed to achieve those goals in the coming months and years, and ensure that the EU plays a central role in achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for Ukraine;

Added:S. whereas the EU, together with the G7 countries, adopted the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which uses the windfall profits from the frozen Russian assets to pay back the loans provided by the EU to Ukraine; whereas these frozen assets are not yet being used directly to support Ukraine financially, but only the windfall profits of these frozen assets; whereas the EU will provide up to EUR 35 billion in new macro-financial assistance as part of the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism;

Removed:5. Stresses, in this regard, the importance of global support for Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan; urges the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to engage with countries in the Global South in this context and to prepare the ground for holding the second Summit on Peace;