What changed between the resolution motion and the resolution motion joint

Removed:A. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental rights enshrined in the Georgian Constitution;

Added:A. whereas the past months have seen significant attacks on democracy in Georgia, which have been characterised by the hasty adoption of anti-democratic legislation criticised by the UN, the Venice Commission and the EU, concurrent with attacks on civil society and independent media, prolonged mass protests and the subsequent violent suppression of those peaceful protests, and deep political and societal tensions and polarisation;

Added:B. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental right enshrined in the Georgian Constitution;

Removed:E. whereas on 20 February 2024 the Parliament of Georgia passed amendments to the electoral code, changing the procedure for the election of chairman and so-called professional members of the Central Election Commission and abolishing the post of deputy chairman, which is filled by an opposition representative;

Added:F. whereas civil society in Georgia has traditionally been very vibrant and active and played a pivotal role in soliciting and promoting democratic changes in the country, as well as in safeguarding and watching over their implementation;

Changed:F.G. whereas on 420 AprilFebruary 20242024, the Georgian Parliament adoptedof Georgia passed amendments to the country’s electoralElectoral codeCode andchanging abolishedthe mandatoryprocedure parliamentaryfor quotasthe forelection women,of whichchair requiredand thatso-called atprofessional leastmembers oneof inthe fourCentral candidatesElection onCommission aand partyabolishing listthe bepost of adeputy differentchair, genderwhich thanis filled by a representative of the majority;opposition;

Removed:G. whereas on 28 May 2024, the Georgian Parliament adopted the so-called transparency of foreign influence law, which requires organisations receiving over 20 % of their funding from abroad to register within two months as ‘organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power’ and label themselves as such; whereas these organisations are subjected to additional scrutiny, reporting requirements and possibly sanctions, including administrative penalties of up to GEL 25 000; whereas this law seriously restricts media and civil society organisations’ ability to operate freely; whereas adopting this law has led to the suspension of EU financial assistance for Georgia;

Added:H. whereas on 4 April 2024, less than a year before the elections, the Georgian Parliament adopted amendments to the country’s Electoral Code that modified fundamental aspects of the country’s electoral legislation, abolishing mandatory parliamentary quotas for women, which required that at least one out of four candidates on a party list be of a different gender than the majority;

Removed:H. whereas on 6 June 2024 the US imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian officials over the adoption of the ‘foreign agents law’;

Added:I. whereas on 28 May 2024, the Georgian Parliament adopted the so-called transparency of foreign influence law, after overriding the veto of President Salome Zourabishvili and despite mass protests by Georgian citizens and repeated calls from Georgia’s European partners to withdraw the draft law which, in spirit and content, contradicts EU norms and values; whereas adopting this law has effectively frozen Georgia’s accession process and led to the suspension of EU financial assistance for Georgia;

Removed:I. whereas on 11 July 2024 the US Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted Georgia sanctions legislation known as the Megobari Act, which imposes sanctions against Georgian officials responsible for undermining the country’s democratic system;

Added:J. whereas the law was adopted in a procedure which, according to the Venice Commission, left no space for genuine discussion and meaningful consultation, in open disregard for the concerns of large parts of the Georgian population; whereas the restrictions set by that law to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association and the right to privacy are incompatible with the strict test set out in Articles 8(2), 10(2), and 11(2) of the ECHR and Article 17(2), 19(2) and 22(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as they do not meet the requirements of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality in a democratic society, and they are also incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination set out in Article 14 of the ECHR;

Removed:J. whereas on 17 September 2024 the Georgian Parliament passed a law on ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which strips the LGBTI community of its rights and bans Pride events and public displays of the rainbow flag;

Added:K. whereas this legislation comes at a time of increasing and ongoing attacks against civil society in Georgia in a seeming effort to narrow civic space by starving independent groups of funds; whereas this legislation is modelled on the foreign agent legislation in Russia;

Removed:K. whereas a parliamentary election will take place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas there is growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric from the Georgian Dream party against Georgia’s democratic partners, as well as promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation; whereas the Georgian Dream party is pursuing a narrative of the West as a ‘global war party’ trying to push Georgia back into a war with Russia;

Added:L. whereas on 6 June 2024, the US imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian officials over the adoption of the ‘foreign agents law’;

Removed:L. whereas on 28 August 2024, the leader of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, at the inauguration of his party’s electoral campaign, spoke of his desire to ban democratic opposition parties; whereas he was seconded by the Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, who stated that if their party achieved a majority in the Georgian Parliament, it would ban certain opposition parties;

Added:M. whereas the European Council, in its conclusions of 27 June 2024, called on Georgia’s authorities to ‘clarify their intentions by reversing the current course of action which jeopardises Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process’;

Removed:1. Strongly condemns the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the electoral code; considers that the foregoing are incompatible with EU values and democratic principles, run against Georgia’s ambitions for EU membership, damage Georgia’s international reputation and endanger the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; strongly underlines that unless the abovementioned legislation is rescinded, progress cannot be made in Georgia’s relations with the EU; regrets that Georgia, once a champion of democratic progress with Euro-Atlantic aspirations, has been in a democratic backsliding free fall for a considerable period;

Added:N. whereas on 11 July 2024, the US Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted Georgia sanctions legislation known as the Megobari Act, which imposes sanctions against Georgian officials responsible for undermining the country’s democratic system;

Removed:2. Expects Georgian Dream to respect the will and free choice of the Georgian people in the upcoming parliamentary election and to relinquish power peacefully if defeated; demands that Georgian Dream and its leaders immediately stop the violence, intimidation, hate speech, persecution and repression that it is committing against the opposition, civil society and independent media;

Added:O. whereas on 17 September 2024, the Georgian Parliament passed a law on ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which aims to ban reliable information about sexual orientation and gender identity;

Removed:3. Strongly believes that the EU should consider temporarily suspending its visa-free regime with Georgia if the conduct of the election is not in line with accepted international standards and if Georgia’s fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks is questioned, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark;

Added:P. whereas the Georgian authorities have not taken into account a single recommendation of the Venice Commission regarding the annulment or modification of the above-mentioned laws on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and the protection of minors’, the abolition of gender quotas in local and parliamentary elections, and the formation of the Central Election Commission;

Removed:4. Strongly believes that the upcoming election will be decisive in determining Georgia’s future democratic development and geopolitical choice, as well its ability to make progress with its EU member state candidacy; considers that the result of the Georgian election should allow the country to return to its pro-Western democratic agenda, implement the necessary reforms and launch accession negotiations with the EU;

Added:Q. whereas there is growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric from the ruling Georgian Dream party against Georgia’s democratic partners, as well as promotion of Russian disinformation, manipulation and conspiracy theories; whereas that hostile rhetoric also targets Ukraine, as the ruling party uses despicable political banners depicting Ukrainian cities destroyed by Russia, thus capitalising on the suffering of brave Ukrainians; whereas the Georgian Dream party is pursuing a narrative of the West as a ‘global war party’ which is trying to push Georgia back into a war with Russia;

Removed:5. Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society and independent media; underlines that the decision to grant Georgia EU candidate country status was motivated by the wish to acknowledge the achievements and democratic efforts of Georgia’s civil society, as well as the overwhelming support for EU accession among its citizens; appreciates the efforts made by Georgia’s President Salome Zourabishvili to return Georgia to the democratic and pro-European path of development;

Added:R. whereas an increasing number of incidents indicate that Georgia is experiencing an insecure media environment, which poses a threat to its democracy; whereas Reporters Without Borders’ annual index on press freedom ranks Georgia 103rd out of 180 countries, a drop of 26 places from the previous year;

Removed:6. Deplores the personal role played by Georgia’s sole oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who returned to active politics on 30 December 2023 when he became ‘honorary chairman’ of the Georgian Dream party, in the current political crisis and in yet another attempt to undermine the country’s Western-oriented course in favour of pivoting towards Russia; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in bringing about the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and in working against the interests of its people;

Added:S. whereas on 28 August 2024, the leader of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, at the inauguration of his party’s electoral campaign, spoke of his intention to ban democratic opposition parties; whereas he was seconded by the Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, who stated that, if the party received a majority in the Georgian Parliament, it would ban certain opposition parties, and referred to the opposition as a ‘criminal political force’;

Added:T. whereas the Russian Foreign Minister’s statement expressing his readiness to help Georgia normalise its relations with ‘the neighbouring ... states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ was praised by the leaders of the ruling party, demonstrating the Georgian Government’s departure from its policy of non-recognition of the occupied regions of Georgia;

Added:U. whereas parliamentary elections will take place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ has effectively blocked the requirement to have domestic observers, whose presence, according to OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights principles, would contribute to an increase in the transparency of and trust in the electoral process;

Added:1. Expresses its deep concern about the democratic backsliding in Georgia, which has occurred exponentially throughout this year and especially ahead of the parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024; strongly condemns the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the Electoral Code; considers that the above are tools used by the government to violate freedom of expression, censor media, impose restrictions on critical voices in civil society and the NGO sector or to discriminate against vulnerable people; underscores that the foregoing are also incompatible with EU values and democratic principles, run against Georgia’s ambitions for EU membership, damage Georgia’s international reputation and endanger the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; strongly underlines that unless the above-mentioned legislation is rescinded, progress cannot be made in Georgia’s relations with the EU; regrets that Georgia, once a champion of democratic progress with Euro-Atlantic aspirations, has been in a democratic backsliding free fall for a considerable period;

Added:2. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to investigate the consequences of the democratic backsliding that these laws represent for their donor role in Georgia and to communicate this possible impact to the Government and Parliament of Georgia; calls for all EU funding provided to the Georgian Government to be frozen until the above-mentioned undemocratic laws are repealed and for strict conditions to be placed on the disbursement of any future funding to the Georgian Government;

Added:3. Expresses its concern about the climate of hatred and intimidation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by the government’s attacks on political pluralism; condemns comments by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and leading figures of the government threatening to ban opposition parties and referring to the opposition as a ‘criminal political force’; notes that such intimidation seriously undermines the political process and the freedom of expression, and contributes to an environment of fear;

Added:4. Calls for a thorough investigation of police brutality against peaceful protestors during the spring protests against the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia;

Added:5. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to promptly assess how Georgia’s ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’ laws, its abolition of gender quotas and other changes in its electoral legislation, the implementation of the Venice Commission’s recommendations in general and the conduct of the elections in line with accepted international standards, affect Georgia’s continuous fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark, which is a crucial component of the EU visa liberalisation policy;

Added:6. Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society and independent media; underlines that the decision to grant Georgia EU candidate country status was motivated by the wish to acknowledge the achievements and democratic efforts of Georgia’s civil society, as well as the overwhelming support for EU accession among its citizens, with over 80 % of the Georgian people consistently in favour; appreciates the efforts made by Georgia’s President Salome Zourabishvili to return Georgia to the democratic and pro-European path of development;

Added:7. Deplores the personal role played by Georgia’s oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who returned to active politics on 30 December 2023 when he became ‘honorary chairman’ of the Georgian Dream party, in the current political crisis and in yet another attempt to undermine the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the country in favour of pivoting towards Russia; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia;