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EU Parl Watch

Changes between two versions

What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

From · draft committee report· 11 Nov 2025

AFET-PR-778144

on the EU enlargement strategy

To · plenary report· 5 Feb 2026

A-10-2026-0016

on the EU enlargement strategy

AI:What changed, in short

The report expands significantly, adding new recitals and paragraphs on public support, trade benefits, and threats from Russia and China.3 It strengthens language on geopolitical urgency, the cost of non-enlargement, and the need for EU credibility and strategic autonomy.4568 It adds detailed provisions on rule of law, gender equality, civil society, and gradual integration, including visa liberalisation and institutional reforms.710 It introduces new sections on financial assistance, connectivity, and disinformation, with specific calls for action.12 The other changes are formal or wording updates, including renumbering and minor rephrasing.12911

8 changes of substance · 2 formal · 3 of wording only

Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem

+67 added · −17 removed · 12 changed paragraphs, packaging included.

Part 1 of 4: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

10 unchanged paragraphs

on the EU enlargement strategy

(2025/2110(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 49 thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23 to 24 June 2022, 29 to 30 June 2023, 26 to 27 October 2023, 14 to 15 December 2023, 27 June 2024 and 17 December 2024 and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21 to 22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on 30 years of Copenhagen criteria – giving further impetus to EU enlargement policy,

– having regard to the EU Association Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’), Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 4 November 2025 entitled ‘2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2025)0690) and previous annual communications thereon,

– having regard to its resolutions on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Türkiye,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2024 on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia,

10 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 entitled ‘Pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews’ (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova,

– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

Changed:– having regard to the Jointjoint Declarationdeclarations of the Eastern Partnership SummitSummits of 7 May 2009 in Prague, of 29 to 30 September 2011 in Warsaw, of 28 to 29 November 2013 in Vilnius, of 21 to 22 May 2015 in Riga, of 24 November 2017 in Brussels, and of 15 December 2021 in Brussels,

5 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit,

– having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2025 on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 February 2025 on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘State of Play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations’ (JOIN(2023)0050),

– having regard to the European Committee of the Regions’ opinion of 2 April 2025 on the Commission’s Enlargement Package 2024 – Western Balkans and Türkiye,

Changed:– having regard to European Court of Auditors’ specialSpecial reportReport 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

– having regard to the Commission’s 2024 and 2025 rule of law reports,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0016/2026),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas the EU enlargement process has progressed substantially in recent years in some candidate countries; whereas nine9 of the 10 countries currently aspiring to join the EU hold candidate status, and some ofhave themheld it for many years; whereas the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova has contributed to a renewed dynamic in the enlargement policy;

Change 2

Changed:BB. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s strongest foreign policy and geopolitical tools and remains a key driver of long-term security, peace, stability and prosperity in EuropeEurope, based on shared democratic values; whereas enlargement represents a historic and unique opportunity with significant socio-economic, political and security advantages for both the EU and the enlargement countries;

Change 3

Removed:C. whereas Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine poses a serious threat to security on the European continent and beyond;

Added:C. whereas the latest Eurobarometer report on enlargement indicates that 56 per cent of EU citizens support further enlargement of the European Union, with Ukraine being the most favoured candidate for accession once all EU membership criteria have been met;

Removed:D. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process, where irreversible progress on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental values remains the key cornerstone;

Added:D. whereas according to the Eurobarometer report, previous rounds of enlargement are perceived to have delivered the greatest benefits in the areas of economic growth and competitiveness, followed by strengthened global influence of the EU and enhanced security and defence;

Added:E. whereas the EU accession process delivers tangible results in itself, with the EU remaining the principal political, economic and trading partner of the enlargement countries; whereas the total trade volume of the Western Balkans with the EU increased by 62 per cent after the Stabilisation and Association Agreements came into force; whereas the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements had a transformative effect on Moldova and Ukraine in terms of both trade and economic development, increasing their trade by 65.4 per cent and 64.7 per cent respectively;

Added:F. whereas Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine poses a serious threat to security on the European continent and beyond, demonstrating that non-enlargement carries significant strategic costs and undermines security and stability across our continent; whereas stagnation in the enlargement process in recent years has created a vacuum, thus opening the space for Russia and China and other harmful non-EU actors; whereas Russia deliberately interferes in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans through hybrid threat operations, including election interference and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns, seeking to stall the EU accession process in these countries and posing a threat to security both for these regions, through its illegal occupation of parts of the territory of three candidate countries, and for the entire continent;

Added:G. whereas China’s influence is expanding dangerously, from economic dependency projects to security cooperation, particularly in the Western Balkans and Georgia, as it continues to exploit political instability and institutional weaknesses in several enlargement countries in order to undermine their path to EU integration and their democratic governance;

Added:H. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process, of which irreversible progress on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental values remains the key cornerstone; whereas each country’s accession to the EU is conditional on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions; whereas the quality of the necessary reforms undertaken by a country determines the timeline for accession;

Added:I. whereas the EU continues to be the biggest provider of investment and financial assistance through the pre-accession assistance instrument IPA III, the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the Western Balkan Facility, the Ukraine Facility, the Moldova Facility, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, and macro-financial assistance;

Added:J. whereas the candidate countries’ alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains one of the key preconditions for EU accession;

Added:K. whereas the decision-making process on enlargement is laid down in Article 49 TEU and in the negotiating frameworks drawn up for each candidate country;

Added:L whereas Parliament remains a reliable partner for accession countries and an advocate of the enlargement process, enabling institutional and socio-economic reforms for the benefit of citizens;

Geostrategic dimension of enlargement

Change 4

Changed:1. Reiterates that enlargement is a strategic response to the new geopolitical reality and an investment of the utmost strategic importance for the EUEU’s security and stability in the face of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against UkraineUkraine, repeated border violations, hybrid attacks and other hostile actions against its neighbours, as well as other common geopolitical challenges, requiring a long-term political democratic vision and bold decisions;actions and steps towards the completion of the European project;

Change 5

Changed:2. Reiterates that enlargement is a win-win for both current and future Member States; emphasises the political urgency of demonstrating the EU’s active commitment to the enlargement process;process, also with a view to safeguarding the EU’s credibility towards the enlargement countries and their societies; insists that EU enlargement will strengthen EuropeanEurope’s security;security and economy; stresses, yet again, that the future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova lies within the EU;EU, in accordance with the aspirations of their people; underlines that the cost of non-enlargement exceeds the cost of completing the process and would risk creating geopolitical grey zones vulnerable to malign influence by non-EU countries seeking to expand their political, economic and strategic influence;

Change 6

Changed:3. Underlines that accession is a key tool to promote lasting peace, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, and an essential anchor forto fosteringfoster regional reconciliation and stability, increasing resilience and protectingto protect candidate countries and the EU neighbourhood from malign foreign interference; considersinterference, thatparticularly maintainingfrom andRussia; enhancingconsiders enlargement policy is indispensable for the EU’s influence in times of heightened geopolitical instability; emphasises that the regionEU’s prosperity and beyond,security especiallyrests aton timesits ability to defend democracy, the rule of heightenedlaw, geopoliticalhuman instability;rights and the rules-based multilateral order; recalls the shared cultural, historical and human ties between the enlargement countries and the Member States;

Strategic priorities of EU enlargement: merit-based process and conditionality

Change 7

Removed:4. Reiterates its position that accession to the EU must always be a merit-based process and that each applicant must be assessed on its own merit in terms of meeting the Copenhagen criteria, ensuring alignment with the EU acquis and fulfilling all additional conditions set out in the enlargement framework;

Added:4. Welcomes the progress made in recent years, making EU enlargement likely in the near future; commends Montenegro and Albania for their significant progress, noting their ambitions to conclude negotiations by the end of 2026 and end of 2027 respectively; urges the EU institutions, particularly the Council, to reciprocate this ambition, remove obstacles on the EU’s side and thus enhance the credibility and predictability of the process, while fully respecting the ‘strictly merit-based’ principle; welcomes the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina holds candidate status and encourages the country to take further steps to reform;

Removed:5. Highlights that the rule of law, democratic reform, media freedom and respect for fundamental rights, including the rights of minorities, must remain at the forefront of the enlargement process, with judicial independence, the fight against corruption and the inclusion of and support for civil society being crucial preconditions for progress along the path to EU membership, particularly at a time of rising authoritarian tendencies;

Added:5. Commends Ukraine’s remarkable resilience and commitment to its European path, despite Russia’s war of aggression; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting Ukraine and regrets the Council’s failure to agree on the use of frozen Russian assets; praises Moldova for advancing significantly on its EU accession path and successfully completing the screening process despite continuous hybrid threats; calls for the swift opening of negotiating clusters with Ukraine and Moldova and urges the Hungarian Government to refrain from continuing to block negotiations;

Removed:6. Encourages enlargement countries to continue to resolutely implement the necessary reforms in a timely manner and to make tangible and irreversible progress, starting with the fundamentals of the EU accession process; insists on the need for continuous efforts to foster media pluralism, defend the rights of journalists and ensure freedom of expression in all enlargement countries;

Added:6. Reiterates that, in accordance with Article 49 TEU, any European state may apply to become a member of the EU provided it respects the values set out in Article 2 TEU, including human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including minority rights; takes note of the increased support for EU membership in several countries that were previously preparing to join the EU, including Iceland, which intends to hold a referendum by 2027 on restarting accession talks, and encourages the EU’s leadership to continue building closer links with such countries; notes that on 26 March 2025, the Armenian Parliament adopted a law formally supporting EU membership and calling on the country’s government to begin the EU accession process, and considers that sustained reforms consolidating Armenia’s democracy could open a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations; welcomes potential initiatives by Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU, amid growing support for EU accession;

Removed:7. Reiterates its position that alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is an essential indicator of a candidate country’s commitment to the EU’s fundamental values and principles and its readiness for future membership; urges all candidate and potential candidate countries to prioritise swift and full alignment with the CFSP and reiterates that the accession of a given country can proceed only once it fully aligns with the CFSP, including EU restrictive measures; emphasises that systematic divergence from alignment with the CFSP constitutes a fundamental barrier to EU accession; expects candidate and potential candidate countries to also fully align with the common security and defence policy (CSDP), including its principles, objectives and missions, as a key component of the accession process;

Added:7. Recalls that previous enlargement rounds fostered considerable economic growth in both new and old Member States; underlines that free movement improved job prospects and wages, and reduced poverty through remittances; stresses that enlargement has had a positive impact on living standards by improving labour laws, health and safety, gender equality, digital services, education and non-discrimination;

Removed:8. Emphasises that regional cooperation is a prerequisite for EU accession; stresses that reconciliation, leading to good neighbourly relations, is key to successful EU accession; underlines, furthermore, that outstanding bilateral issues between EU and non-EU countries should be resolved bilaterally and must not be used as leverage to block the accession process of candidate countries;