Skip to content
EU Parl Watch

Changes between two versions

What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

From · draft committee report· 10 Sept 2025

AFET-PR-776921

on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025

To · plenary report· 17 Dec 2025

A-10-2025-0253

on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025

These two texts have too little in common to compare paragraph by paragraph: they are different documents rather than versions of one (for example one group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted).

+187 added · −35 removed · 11 changed paragraphs, packaging included.

Part 1 of 6: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

5 unchanged paragraphs

on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2164(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,

– having regard to the report of 25 June 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2025’,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 8 May 2025 on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred and deported by Russia,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2025 on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

Added:– having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s remarks of 22 September 2025 to the General Assembly marking the 80th Anniversary of the United Nations,

Added:– having regard to the State of the Union address of 10 September 2025 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2025 on EU political strategy on Latin America,

Added:– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021-2025 (GAP III),

Added:– having regard to the Declaration of the third summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), adopted on 18 July 2023,

Added:– having regard to the joint declaration of the fourth EU-CELAC summit of 9 November 2025,

Added:– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,

Added:– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,

Added:– having regard to The Hague NATO Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025,

Added:– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004, updated in 2008 and further specified in 2020 with a guidance note on their implementation,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 23 January 2025 on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine,

Added:– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations of 26 June 1945,

Added:– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998,

Added:– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy,

Added:– having regard to its previous resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

Added:– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 9 September 2025 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023,

Added:– having regard to the Joint Statement of the EU-UK Leaders’ Summit of 19 May 2025,

Added:– having regard to the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit of 4 April 2025,

Added:– having regard to the Kiruna Declaration of 15 May 2013,

Added:– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 27 November 2025 on the EU position on the proposed plan and EU engagement towards a just and lasting peace for Ukraine,

Added:– having regard to its resolution of 11 September 2025 on Gaza at breaking point: EU action to combat famine, the urgent need to release hostages and move towards a two-state solution,

Added:– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025) welcoming the comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0253/2025),

Change 1

Changed:A. whereas the core objectives of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includeshould preservingpreserve peace, reinforcing international security and promoting international cooperation, thereby serving Europe’s strategic interests as set out in Article 21 TEU by safeguarding the Union’s security and the interests of all Member States, including through credible deterrence; whereas these objectives must be pursued while fostering democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including women’s and minority rights;

Change 2

Removed:B. whereas certain historic and emerging powers exhibit complex behaviours ranging from close cooperation to sectoral confrontation; whereas in the current geopolitical climate, the EU, in some cases, has little choice but to opt for transaction-based agreements;

Added:B. whereas over the past year, wars and armed conflicts, including direct confrontations and rising tensions as well as hybrid attacks, have affected almost every continent; whereas the intensifying geopolitical and economic confrontation constitutes a factor conducive to the re-escalation of frozen conflicts and to the outbreak of new ones; whereas the international organisations established to prevent such tensions from arising have encountered challenges in their endeavours to fulfil their mandates, making their reform urgent and indispensable and requiring greater collective engagement among democracies in strengthening defence;

Removed:.

Added:C. whereas there is an urgent need to continue to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order and its institutions, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders; whereas the EU is, by nature, a promoter of the multilateral interdependence of different institutional actors;

Removed:1. Echoes the concerns raised in the report by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and is alarmed by the rapid pace of geopolitical change driven by the assertive military, political and economic pressures of authoritarian powers; notes with concern that the international system is more multipolar and less multilateral, where competition is replacing cooperation and trade, and where investment, information and migration flows are increasingly being weaponised; warns that such fragmentation threatens our strategic interests, security, prosperity and unity, and necessitates the mobilisation of our regional and global partnerships and alliances;

Added:D. whereas certain historic and other emerging powers exhibit complex behaviours ranging from close cooperation to sectoral confrontation and coercion; whereas Russia, which is waging an unlawful and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, plays the leading role in undermining the rules-based international order; whereas Russia is deliberately prolonging its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine with the aim of exhausting Ukraine and destabilising the EU and NATO; whereas the protection of the entire eastern flank of the EU is essential for the stability, security and resilience of the EU as a whole; whereas the currently fragmented geopolitical climate compels the EU to adapt and better defend its interests and those of its Member States;

Removed:2. Calls, in this context, on the VP/HR to develop a forward-looking CFSP that pursues the objectives outlined in the following paragraphs;

Added:E. whereas the EU engages with transatlantic partners and like-minded countries to bolster its economic security;

Added:F. whereas the EU and the UK, in their Joint Statement of 19 May 2025, assume a shared commitment to the stability of the Western Balkans; whereas the EU and the UK should define concrete areas of cooperation in the region, in particular to ensure respect for the power-sharing principle of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement;

Added:G. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability by employing a vast set of hybrid tactics, notably the sabotage of critical infrastructure and interference in the democratic functioning of our societies as well as fully fledged security threats such as drone incursions and attacks on rail networks; whereas addressing such threats forms part of the EU’s CFSP, necessitating a credible, first-hand intelligence information system on external threats that contributes to the EU’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively, as well as to safeguard its interests abroad;

Added:H. whereas enlargement represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires internal EU reforms and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity; whereas a credible enlargement policy strengthens the EU’s geopolitical influence and resilience; whereas compliance with the fundamental principles of the Union and respect for international law is a prerequisite for accession to the EU;

Added:I. whereas the EU continues to promote its own autonomous European diplomacy in all areas, including public, cultural, economic, climate, artificial intelligence, digital and cyber diplomacy; whereas achieving an EU diplomatic service shaped by a common diplomatic culture nurtured from a predominantly EU perspective is an essential step in this regard; whereas the European Diplomatic Academy contributes to this objective;

Added:J. whereas the EU prioritises partnerships with like-minded democracies; whereas the conclusion of new global partnerships is based on political due diligence in order to avoid dependencies that expose the EU to coercion and to guarantee that cooperation does not undermine human rights, sustainable development or EU solidarity; whereas sectoral cooperation cannot be pursued to the detriment of EU fundamental values; whereas divisions within the EU or the transatlantic alliance, as well as with our strategic partners, make us all weaker, and benefit our opponents, rivals and competitors;

Added:K. whereas the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) associated with the EU share close constitutional, historical and cultural ties with the Member States; whereas they provide the EU with a unique global presence and geostrategic advantages, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as in the Arctic and Antarctica; whereas the CFSP should strengthen the structured cooperation with the OCTs in areas such as security, strategic commercial routes, resilience to climate change, maritime security and critical raw materials, thereby ensuring that the OCTs are more closely integrated into the Union’s external action priorities;

Added:L. whereas the space for civil society is shrinking worldwide and human rights defenders and civil society organisations are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors;

Added:M whereas vibrant civil societies worldwide play an essential role in advancing human rights, democracy and pluralism, as well as in promoting good governance and social progress;

Added:N. whereas Parliament recently expressed its unequivocal position on the human rights violations in Cuba and on the state of affairs in Venezuela, in particular, its recognition of Edmundo González Urrutia as the President-elect of Venezuela following the elections of 28 July 2024; whereas it has repeatedly condemned the regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo in Nicaragua;

Added:O. whereas on 10 January 2025, Nicolás Maduro claimed a new term in office and illegally maintained his grip on power despite widespread electoral fraud; whereas it recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic opposition by awarding them the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; whereas María Corina Machado was further honoured as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate for 2025;

Added:P. whereas the principles of the UN are being challenged to an extent never seen before; whereas Parliament has repeatedly called on the international community to defend and strengthen the UN;

Added:Q. whereas the multilateral world order has not adequately adapted to the current geopolitical realities; whereas the UN80 Initiative launched by the UN Secretary-General is an indispensable part of the UN reform and would imply ending the veto system in the UN Security Council; whereas the dire financial situation of the UN raises serious concerns; whereas the UN is facing a USD 500 million budget cut and the loss of 20 % of its staff; whereas the UN is facing further significant cuts to its peacekeeping, humanitarian and health agencies following the withdrawal of US financial support; whereas the UN reform process necessitates sufficient financial resources and political support to sustain multilateralism as the basis for global governance;

Added:R. whereas organised crime, particularly drug trafficking, poses a serious threat to the EU’s security; whereas since 2020, the EU has become the world’s largest market for cocaine; whereas this cocaine comes largely from Latin America and enters the EU chiefly through its Atlantic ports;