What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Added:AB. whereas Indigenous peoples and local communities hold irreplaceable traditional knowledge, act as primary stewards of Arctic ecosystems and are already disproportionately affected by climate change, socio-economic marginalisation and environmental degradation, while often remaining excluded from decision-making processes; whereas there is a wide acceptance among European policymakers that Indigenous peoples must be further supported and their interests given higher priority in policymaking, while at the same time ensuring that their community-based knowledge is respected and considered in all policy developments; whereas the Arctic Council has taken significant steps to address this issue;

Added:AC. whereas Denmark, Sweden and Finland are signatories to the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, which confirms their commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, including recognition of the special relationship and unique contributions of Indigenous peoples and their communities, acknowledges the traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples and calls for them to be fully consulted and involved in decision-making;

Added:AD. whereas the EU’s Arctic regions serve as the gateway to its engagement and presence in the wider Arctic, providing resources for European strategic autonomy while meeting local interests, such as the growing demand for natural resources and the rights of Indigenous populations; whereas EU support under cohesion policy, Interreg, Horizon Europe and rural development programmes to areas such as the Northern Sparsely Populated Areas and networks such as the Arctic Mayors’ Forum and the Arctic Six, are crucial to the EU’s Arctic interests;

Added:AE. whereas initiatives such as the Summit of Barents Euro-Arctic Indigenous Sámi People, held at the European Parliament in 2023, can further enhance cooperation with the Sámi community;

Added:AF. whereas Greenland will chair the Arctic Council for the 2025-2027 period on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark, providing a pivotal opportunity to reinforce inclusive, rules-based Arctic governance;

Added:AG. whereas Greenland’s strategy is to strengthen its diplomatic representation worldwide, including plans to open offices in Ottawa and New York, while maintaining its representations in Washington, Beijing, Reykjavik and Brussels; whereas the strategic importance of the US Pituffik Space Base in Greenland is essential to NATO’s missile-defence system and space-monitoring activities;

Added:AH. whereas after repeated recommendations from Parliament, the EU finally established an EU Office in Nuuk in March 2024, enhancing its diplomatic presence and fostering closer cooperation with Greenland; whereas the EU and the Faroe Islands have agreed on an enhanced partnership, including cooperation on fisheries, climate and other strategic issues;

Added:AI. whereas the Arctic’s abundant hydrocarbons, rare earth elements, fisheries and other resources are increasingly coveted, necessitating stringent sustainability standards and equitable benefit-sharing;

Added:AJ. whereas the Arctic holds diverse energy resources crucial for the EU’s green and digital transitions, including green hydrogen, hydropower, wind and geothermal energy, which can help diversify and decarbonise the EU’s energy mix; whereas strategic investments are necessary to secure critical raw materials essential for the EU’s industrial competitiveness and defence capabilities;

Added:AK. whereas initiatives such as Polar Connect and the ‘Vision 2030’ concept envisage resilient trans-Arctic submarine cable routes linking Greenland and Iceland with continental Europe; whereas such projects are vulnerable to hybrid threats by malign actors such as Russia and China;

Added:AL. whereas the development of Arctic subsea fibre-optic cables linking Europe with Japan and South Korea represents a strategic opportunity to enhance secure, high-speed digital connectivity, strengthen the EU’s digital sovereignty and deepen EU-Asia cooperation; whereas protecting submarine cables, pipelines, communication systems and transport corridors in the Arctic is vital for the digital, energy and economic security of the EU and the EEA;

Added:AM. whereas Greenland, Iceland and Norway manage the Arctic’s largest sustainable fisheries, and the region is developing expertise in biotechnology and innovation, which are vital for the EU’s food security, blue economy and scientific leadership; whereas the UNCLOS contains provisions on the rights, duties and responsibilities of states to safeguard environmental considerations;

Added:AN. whereas the Arctic’s economic potential extends beyond natural resources to sectors such as sustainable tourism, space technology, and data centre infrastructure, offering the EU opportunities to develop strategic partnerships that leverage the region’s unique geography, renewable energy resources and proximity to key allies;

Added:AO. whereas the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ means not supporting or carrying out economic activities that cause serious damage to environmental objectives within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852;

Added:AP. whereas energy connections with the Arctic – including oil and gas imports from Norway’s Barents Sea, liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments via Arctic shipping routes during the transition period towards the EU’s energy autonomy, renewable energy exports and green hydrogen potential from Iceland and Greenland, EU-backed infrastructure projects such as submarine cables and pipelines, and cooperation in research and innovation for sustainable development – are crucial for the EU’s energy security and future economic development and to ensure investments in local Arctic economies and infrastructure; whereas reliable energy partners and supplies are key to achieve overall security, as shown by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis;

Added:AQ. whereas the Arctic suffers from a shortage of infrastructure, placing local populations and others at a disadvantage; whereas the development of multipurpose infrastructure projects could help address both these shortcomings and broader security challenges;

Added:AR. whereas newly constructed and planned LNG terminals – in particular floating storage and regasification units to which EU Member States have committed in recent years – provide an essential gateway for Norwegian LNG, further strengthening the diversification and security of supply; whereas the further development and production of icebreakers is key for the exploration and safety of the Arctic, and Finland has particular expertise in this regard;

Added:AS. whereas EU-funded research, Horizon Europe partnerships and Copernicus satellite services provide essential data for security, climate resilience, navigation safety and environmental stewardship in the High North;

Added:AT. whereas secure, resilient and autonomous satellite connectivity constitutes a strategic asset for safeguarding communications, enhancing situational awareness, protecting critical infrastructure and reinforcing the EU’s capacity to prevent, deter and respond to hybrid and conventional threats in the Arctic;

Added:AU. whereas space technologies, including positioning, navigation, Earth observation and satellite communication, are essential for Arctic situational awareness, environmental monitoring and connectivity; whereas Norway’s geographic location and facilities, such as the Andøya Spaceport and the Arctic satellite broadband mission, provide critical infrastructure supporting EU interests and enable independent European access to space; whereas enhanced cooperation with Norway on space capabilities is vital for advancing the EU’s Arctic strategy and security;

Added:AV. whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) plays a central role in shaping and coordinating the EU’s Arctic policy;

1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

Change 2

Changed:a) acknowledgecondemn the growing militarisation of the Arctic, particularly due to Russia’s extensive military restructuring, including the establishment of the Maritime Collegium, which has further escalated regional tensionswhich, andin underminedcombination regionalwith stability;China’s workclear togetherinterest within the Member Statesregion, andhas NATOfurther alliesescalated toregional strengthentensions deterrentand capabilitiesundermined inregional response;stability;

Change 3

Removed:b) in the light of recent incidents in the Baltic sea, substantially strengthen protection of essential underwater infrastructure in the Arctic, particularly submarine cables and pipelines, to uphold and enforce obligations under Articles 112–115 of the UNCLOS, which are essential to safeguard Europe’s digital and energy interconnectivity from geopolitical disruption;

Added:b) closely monitor China’s growing strategic interest and activities in the Arctic region under the framework of the ‘Polar Silk Road’; acknowledge that China’s declared ambition to become a ‘polar great power’ by 2030 and the expansion of its presence through research missions, strategic infrastructure investments and dual-use partnerships may challenge established governance principles;

Removed:c) recognise increased geopolitical competition along Arctic maritime routes, particularly the Northern Sea Route; support, therefore, diplomatic dialogues aimed at establishing clear international agreements regarding freedom of navigation and peaceful maritime cooperation, resisting unilateral claims and promoting the application of international maritime law in accordance with UNCLOS;

Added:c) take into account all potential threat scenarios related to the situation in Ukraine, including the possible strengthening of Russia’s presence in the Arctic as a consequence of a potential frozen conflict in Ukraine; therefore fully implement EU sanctions on dual-use technologies destined for Russia’s Arctic military expansion, while supporting Ukraine’s engagement with Arctic governance structures, including the prospect of observer status in relevant forums; strengthen sanctions against shadow fleet vessels using flags of convenience to evade sanctions in the Arctic; upgrade the monitoring and enforcement thereof, including through international cooperation to ensure that ports and insurance companies blacklist such vessels; hold flag states fully accountable for ensuring compliance with environmental and safety standards;

Removed:d) given the disproportionate impact of climate change on the Arctic, in cooperation with international partners, urgently enhance adaptation strategies, support extensive monitoring initiatives and significantly increase investments in research programmes;

Added:d) appreciate to its full extent the importance of the GIUK gap as a maritime transit corridor indissociable from EU interests, and the risks associated with its emergence as a theatre for grey-zone operations; accordingly, seek to build the institutional resilience of these countries and territories in cooperation with constructive partners;

Removed:e) given the significance of Arctic natural resources, including hydrocarbons, rare earth elements and fisheries, and together with the Member States, strengthen partnerships with Greenland and other Arctic stakeholders on sustainable resource extraction, adhering strictly to environmental regulations;

Added:e) work together with the Member States and NATO allies to strengthen deterrent capabilities in response, including through enhanced EU-NATO strategic dialogues on Arctic domain awareness, intelligence sharing and defensive joint exercises in the High North, following the examples of the Arctic Challenge 2023 hosted by Sweden, Finland and Norway and the Danish-led military exercise Arctic Light 2025; enhance cooperation with NATO structures and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats to build resilience and develop common standards for infrastructure protection in the Arctic; deepen practical EU-NATO cooperation in the Arctic in areas of shared concern – including maritime domain awareness, protection of critical infrastructure, logistics and search and rescue interoperability; enhance vigilance in the EU’s engagement with external partners and establish EU-level security screening mechanisms for foreign Arctic research and infrastructure projects;

Removed:f) in the light of Parliament’s deep concern about Greenland’s growing geopolitical significance, exacerbated by external actors’ statements questioning Denmark’s constitutional arrangements, reaffirm respect for Greenland’s right to self-determination, emphasising that decisions regarding Greenland’s constitutional future and international relations must be made exclusively by Greenlandic citizens without external pressure;

Added:f) in parallel, continue working to prevent a spillover of geopolitical conflicts into the region, while assuming a more prominent role in the Arctic and pursuing a comprehensive re-articulation of Arctic policy that moves beyond the outdated notion of Arctic exceptionalism, and instead employing it as a method for assessing evolving challenges in the current geopolitical context;

Removed:g) given the need to respect and promote the rights of Indigenous peoples across the Arctic, work towards the incorporation of Indigenous knowledge in environmental and policy-making processes;

Added:g) with all that in mind, ensure that EU actions in the High North are complementary to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and benefit from the Alliance’s reinforced maritime posture; promote NATO-EU deconfliction and shared situational awareness and call for strengthened interoperability between the EU Member States and other NATO allies in Arctic security, maritime surveillance, search and rescue operations and the protection of critical infrastructure;

Removed:h) in the light of the critical role played by international scientific cooperation in Arctic governance and climate understanding, support continued EU funding and active participation in Arctic research projects and scientific dialogues, and promote open data sharing and the integration of scientific findings into policy-making processes;

Added:h) take note that the European Arctic region is part of a continuum that includes the Baltic Sea region within the Arctic, sharing common challenges and interests; acknowledge that the EU’s activities in the Arctic need to be aligned with, and support, the EU’s development activities implemented within the EU’s eastern border areas in the north to maximise their impact;

Removed:i) in the light of the growing support for EU accession in Iceland, welcome the intention expressed by local authorities to hold a referendum on EU accession by 2027 and pledge to respect the outcome thereof, as democratically expressed by the Icelandic people; meanwhile, engage proactively with the Icelandic Government to promote the benefits of EU membership and enhance preparedness for a renewed accession process should Iceland formally reactivate its application;

Added:i) against this backdrop and in the light of recent incidents in the Baltic Sea attributed to Russia’s shadow fleet and Chinese vessels, substantially strengthen the protection of essential underwater infrastructure in the Arctic, particularly submarine cables and pipelines, including those in the proximity of Greenland, and tighten the regulatory framework for sanctions and countermeasures; uphold and enforce obligations under Articles 112 to 115 of the UNCLOS, which are essential to safeguard Europe’s digital and energy interconnectivity from geopolitical disruption; develop an EU and EEA strategy to monitor and counter Sino-Russian cooperation in the High North, which potentially undermines freedom of navigation and international law;

Removed:j) considering that Norway’s EU membership would strengthen both its national interests and the EU’s geopolitical resilience by closing critical gaps in the latter’s collective defence (notably on the GIUK gap), explore deeper cooperation with Norway, including the possible extension to Norway of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union and Norway’s potential EU accession;

Added:j) support the establishment of common cybersecurity and resilience standards for submarine cables, landing points and critical digital infrastructure in the Arctic, including through joint risk assessments, incident reporting requirements and periodic stress-testing exercises, recognising their strategic role in the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

Removed:k) given Norway’s crucial role for the EU’s energy security, enhance cooperation on energy resilience and supply diversification as a key tool towards the EU’s strategic autonomy;

Added:k) address hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, GPS jamming and spoofing and undersea cable sabotage, which require enhanced monitoring and response mechanisms through a joint EU-NATO monitoring and response framework and increased investment in upgraded, secure and autonomous satellite communications, including launch capacity, as well as investments, underwater drones and sea-floor mapping; in that regard, support research, testing and phased deployment of EU-funded hybrid surveillance technologies, including unmanned systems, in coordination with Nordic partners, to monitor and respond to hybrid threats;

Removed:l) in the light of the increasing relevance of Greenland in Arctic and European security frameworks, alongside increasing support for EU accession among Greenlanders, evidenced by polling suggesting that around 60 % of Greenlanders now favour rejoining the EU, welcome any potential initiative by the Government of Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU, and encourage the EU to engage in deeper strategic and economic partnerships, including in the context of eventual accession, if and when desired by the Greenlandic people; in this regard, underlines that EU membership would give Greenland a stronger voice in Arctic governance and the means to develop critical infrastructure as new northern trade routes emerge while bolstering its security;

Added:l) considering the growing strategic importance and reliance on Arctic space-based capabilities for European security, strengthen collective situational awareness, resilience and regional stability in the Arctic; in addition, promote EU-led investments and partnerships with trusted allies to secure critical Arctic infrastructure and reduce dependency on authoritarian powers, including the production of icebreakers, if possible, in cooperation with the EU’s strategic partners;

Removed:m) strengthen collaboration with Canada;

Added:m) recognise the increasing geopolitical competition along Arctic maritime routes, particularly the NSR; support, therefore, diplomatic dialogues aimed at establishing clear international agreements regarding freedom of navigation and peaceful maritime cooperation, resisting unilateral claims and promoting the application of international maritime law in accordance with the UNCLOS; accordingly, publicly condemn Russia’s restrictions on free navigation in the NSR and its reinforcement of military infrastructure along the NSR; support the application of international law to counter attempts to legitimise contested shipping corridors or to project geopolitical influence under the pretexts of scientific or economic cooperation; engage in regional dialogues on the implementation of the Agreement under the UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction in the Arctic;

Removed:2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and, for information, to the governments and parliaments of Arctic states, as well as to Indigenous representative organisations.

Added:n) given the disproportionate impact of climate change on the Arctic, and in cooperation with international partners and Arctic Indigenous peoples, urgently enhance adaptation strategies that also have a security policy dimension, support extensive monitoring initiatives and significantly increase investments in research programmes that prioritise the need to balance economic growth while protecting critical ecosystems in the Arctic, in line with the ‘do no significant harm’ principle enshrined in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852; recognise that, while climate change threatens Arctic ecosystems, rising temperatures also have major societal impacts in the Arctic regions, emphasising the need to place the people living in the Arctic at the centre of research and to ensure that the benefits of research activities help local communities adapt and become more resilient;

Added:o) given the significance of Arctic natural resources, including hydrocarbons, rare earth elements and fisheries, and together with the Member States, strengthen consensual partnerships with Greenland and other Arctic stakeholders, including Indigenous communities, on sustainable resource extraction and processing while strictly adhering to the highest environmental standards to avoid disastrous consequences, such as the ones caused by the 2020 Norilsk (Russia) oil spill; ensure that such cooperation, on the one hand, contributes to population growth and the revitalisation of local communities in the Arctic and, on the other hand, reduces the EU’s dependence on China and other unreliable providers; take into account the EU’s strategic interests in securing access to critical raw materials from reliable, like-minded partners, as well as the EU’s economic growth;

Added:p) in parallel, work towards the establishment of a binding international environmental liability regime to ensure that polluters bear full responsibility for accidents and ecological damage in Arctic waters, in the light of the potential opening of new trans-Arctic shipping lanes;

Added:q) given the need to respect and promote the rights of Indigenous peoples across the Arctic, work towards the incorporation of Indigenous knowledge in environmental and policymaking processes, ensuring that Indigenous interests and expertise are well integrated in all levels of EU policymaking alongside all other relevant sources of knowledge, and that their languages and culture are protected;

Added:r) prioritise mental health, literacy, language and youth programmes in EU Arctic cooperation, responding to recommendations from Arctic Indigenous and youth forums;

Added:s) respect Article 19 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which states their rights; similarly, ensure that the EU’s and Member States’ activities in the Arctic contribute to, and do not harm, the well-being and rights of Indigenous communities, in accordance with the 1996 Ottawa Declaration; consider and counteract Indigenous peoples’ heightened exposure to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns that seek to weaponise complex and unique contexts;

Added:t) fully integrate the recommendations of the 2013 Kiruna Declaration into the EU’s Arctic policy, including by supporting increased funding for renewable energy and sustainable waste management in Arctic communities, strengthening mechanisms for the meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples in Arctic governance and decision-making, enhancing civil security and emergency response capacities in Arctic regions – including search and rescue and disaster preparedness infrastructure – and promoting interdisciplinary research and education partnerships, including support for Arctic youth and local and Indigenous institutions;

Added:u) promote the full implementation of the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, requiring the signatories to establish a joint programme of scientific research and monitoring and to integrate Indigenous knowledge before allowing any future commercial fishing activities in the region;

Added:v) acknowledging that a populated Arctic, cross-border infrastructure and resilient societies are of strategic importance for European security, strengthen cooperation within and with the European Arctic; support, in particular, the development of north-to-north and east-to-west infrastructure projects in the Swedish and Finnish Arctic, with particular emphasis on facilitating increased capacity on the existing railway from Finland to the Arctic Ocean and exploring new multimodal transport links, to strengthen EU-Nordic connectivity and military mobility;

Added:w) recognising the importance of resilient connectivity for Arctic communities and EU security, devise EU instruments that actively promote increased economic integration in the Arctic region, as investments in cross-border infrastructure increase mobility, stimulate innovation and business development and strengthen the security of supply and preparedness through cooperation between public and private actors;

Added:x) acknowledge that the EU’s support of Arctic development and collaboration is vital for fostering relations, trust and development capacity in sparsely populated and vulnerable northern areas;

Added:y) recognise that competitiveness and crisis management in a complex security policy environment depend on strong, innovative societies and local businesses with their own capabilities, and on cross-border cooperation between policymakers, researchers, businesses and communities; recognise that the EU should continue to, in close dialogue with relevant states and regional bodies, support the capacity building of more resilient and sustainable Arctic communities;