What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Changed:MOTION FOR ADRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTIONRECOMMENDATION

Changed:on the recommendation forto the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy onconcerning the EU’s diplomatic strategy and geopolitical cooperation in the Arctic

(2025/2116(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Arctic issues, notably its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges,

Changed:– having regard to the United Nations Convention of 16 November 1994 on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’ (JOIN(2021)0027),

Added:– having regard to the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,

Added:– having regard to the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, adopted on 19 June 2023,

Added:– having regard to the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States,

Added:– having regard to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of the International Labour Organization, adopted on 27 June 1989,

Added:– having regard to the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean of 3 October 2018 (Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement),

Added:– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,

Added:– having regard to the Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920 (previously the Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen),

Added:– having regard to the Declaration of 19 September 1996 on the establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration),

Added:– having regard to the three legally binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, namely the Agreement of 12 May 2011 on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, the Agreement of 15 May 2013 on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic and the Agreement of 11 May 2017 on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation,

Added:– having regard to the Joint Statement following the European Union – Canada 2025 Summit: Enduring Partnership, Ambitious Agenda,

Added:– having regard to the inauguration of the EU Office in Nuuk, Greenland, on 15 March 2024,

Added:– having regard to the speech delivered by the Prime Minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, in Parliament on 8 October 2025,

– having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0229/2025),

Change 1

Removed:A. whereas the Arctic must remain a zone of peace and constructive cooperation;

Added:A. whereas the Arctic is a region inhabited by over four million people, with diverse cultures, communities and economies, and as such must remain a zone of peace, with its biodiversity and fragile ecosystems respected; whereas constructive cooperation in the Arctic should be shielded from intensifying global rivalries;

Removed:B. whereas scrupulous respect for international law – notably the UNCLOS – is essential;

Added:B. whereas the EU has been engaged in both the European Arctic and wider Arctic region for decades as an Arctic actor with strategic interests, and has a fundamental stake in contributing strategically to positive security, socio-economic and environmental outcomes, notably through multilateral cooperation;

Removed:C. whereas the region is warming at roughly four times the global average;

Added:C. whereas Russia has been intensifying its military build-up in the Arctic ever since its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russian militarisation, paired with increased Chinese presence, has changed the political and security situation in the region; whereas Russia has adopted a unilateral and illegitimate regime governing navigation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), including the law of 5 December 2022 restricting the passage of foreign warships, raising serious concerns under international law, notably the UNCLOS, and risking the exacerbation of geopolitical tensions in the Arctic;

Removed:D. whereas the rapid retreat of sea ice is opening seasonal, and potentially year-round, commercial corridors such as the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage and a future trans-polar route, which could reshape global trade patterns while posing profound environmental, security and governance challenges for the Arctic;

Added:D. whereas the use of the Arctic region for military purposes is accelerating at the same time as international regulatory frameworks surrounding arms control, including nuclear weapons, are being weakened, notably through the actions of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes such as Russia;

Removed:E. whereas Russia has markedly expanded its Arctic force posture and heightened regional military tension;

Added:E. whereas scrupulous respect for territorial integrity and international law – notably the UNCLOS and the conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) – is essential to preserving the Arctic as a safe and stable region; whereas the IMO is the leading global authority on maritime safety and environmental protection, with its legally binding conventions and voluntary guidelines applying globally, including in the Arctic;

Removed:F. whereas China proclaimed a ‘Polar Silk Road’ and is steadily increasing its footprint north of the Arctic Circle;

Added:F. whereas all Arctic policies must reflect the diverse realities of the region, including different governance systems, legal frameworks, infrastructure capacities and socio-economic conditions;

Removed:G. whereas Indigenous peoples hold irreplaceable traditional knowledge, act as primary stewards of Arctic ecosystems and are disproportionately affected by climate change, socio-economic marginalisation and environmental degradation, while often remaining excluded from decision-making processes;

Added:G. whereas the Arctic Council is the pre-eminent forum for circumpolar cooperation; whereas three EU Member States and two additional members of the European Economic Area (EEA) are part of the Arctic Council, while seven of its members are NATO states;

Removed:H. whereas Greenland will chair the Arctic Council for 2025-2027 on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark, providing a pivotal opportunity to reinforce inclusive, rules-based Arctic governance;

Added:H. whereas, despite the Arctic Council being based on voluntary commitments and lacking binding authority, it has facilitated constructive cooperation and several binding agreements; whereas its limited mandate reduces its ability to address major challenges, such as environmental disasters or rising geopolitical tensions, which could threaten the Arctic’s status as a low-tension region; whereas, due to Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, the Arctic Council’s political meetings have been suspended, undermining the ability of the Arctic Council to fulfil its mandate and properly operate;

Removed:I. whereas the Arctic’s abundant hydrocarbons, rare-earth elements, fisheries and other resources are increasingly coveted, necessitating stringent sustainability standards and equitable benefit-sharing;

Added:I. whereas there has been no progress on the EU’s application to become a full observer to the Arctic Council;

Removed:J. whereas energy connections with the Arctic, including oil and gas imports from Norway’s Barents Sea, liquefied natural gas shipments via Arctic shipping routes, renewable energy exports and green hydrogen potential from Iceland and Greenland, EU-backed infrastructure projects such as submarine cables and pipelines, and cooperation in research and innovation for sustainable development are crucial for the EU’s energy security and future economic development;

Added:J. whereas the Arctic Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap constitutes a strategic corridor that enables the control of maritime traffic and the detection of hybrid threats; whereas Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has deepened the Arctic orientation of the Alliance and will enhance its posture in the region;

Removed:K. whereas initiatives such as Polar Connect and Vision 2030 propose undersea cables across the Arctic Ocean, linking Greenland and Iceland to continental Europe by 2030;

Added:K. whereas the Arctic region is warming at roughly three times the global average, accelerating ice loss and threatening planetary climate stability; whereas summer sea ice is rapidly disappearing, causing extensive habitat destruction and declines in populations of species that depend on snow and ice;

Removed:L. whereas EU-funded research, Horizon Europe partnerships and Copernicus satellite services provide essential data for climate resilience, navigation safety and environmental stewardship in the High North;

Added:L. whereas in 2022, NATO recognised climate change as a defining challenge and a threat multiplier with profound implications for security and military operations, including in the High North, and identified the High North as a region of strategic importance in which Russia’s ability to disrupt allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic poses a direct challenge to the Alliance; whereas the Arctic can be seen as a primary area for the climate-security nexus; whereas the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal remains necessary in order to prevent the worst consequences of climate change;

Added:M. whereas the thawing of permafrost constitutes a transboundary security, environmental and biological threat due to its destructive impact on infrastructure, the release of climate-damaging methane, the re-emergence of dormant and unknown viruses and bacteria and its contributions to disruptions in weather patterns across Europe and beyond; whereas subsea permafrost in the East Siberian Arctic Shelf might become yet another source of methane emissions;

Added:N. whereas the diminishing sea ice is raising global interest in the Arctic and its resources; whereas, in particular, the rapid retreat of sea ice is opening seasonal, and potentially year-round, commercial corridors such as the NSR, the Northwest Passage and a possible future trans-polar route, which could reshape global trade patterns while posing profound environmental, security and governance challenges for the Arctic; whereas harsh weather conditions, limited search and rescue capabilities, high insurance costs and unresolved questions regarding the international legal status of these new sea routes constitute major obstacles to their full realisation, and many stakeholders demand that these routes be treated as part of the ‘global commons’;

Added:O. whereas, due to the climate crisis, changes in the Arctic are intrinsically connected with Europe; whereas higher temperatures, rising sea levels, diminishing biodiversity and extreme weather events affect people and ecosystems in Europe, underlining the need for knowledge-based and science-based policies that involve local Arctic communities and research institutions;

Added:P. whereas Russia has markedly expanded its Arctic force posture and military infrastructure, thus heightening regional military tension; whereas the 2023 Russian foreign policy concept identifies the Arctic as one of Russia’s priority regions; whereas the militarisation of the Arctic runs counter to the spirit of cooperation that has so far guided relations between Arctic states;

Added:Q. whereas the deepening cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic, through joint energy projects, infrastructure investments and shipping ventures along emerging Arctic routes, risks consolidating a geopolitical axis of resource exploitation and restricted access, to the detriment of Arctic coastal communities, Indigenous peoples and global environmental safeguards; whereas Russia’s breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states, coupled with its obstruction of navigation in the Azov, Black and Baltic Seas, raise serious concerns that must be factored into any assessment of the prospects for sustaining peaceful coexistence in the Arctic;

Added:R. whereas, in particular, Russia is enhancing its Arctic infrastructure through the construction and deployment of the Chukotka universal nuclear-powered icebreaker (Project 22220) as part of its broader programme to ensure year-round navigation along the NSR; whereas Russia is building additional icebreakers to support its strategic ambitions in the Arctic;

Added:S. whereas satellite imagery from 2023 revealed significant new construction of buildings and infrastructure on Novaya Zemlya, a remote Arctic island historically used by Russia for nuclear weapons testing; whereas such developments raise serious concerns about renewed nuclear activities in the Arctic and their implications for regional security and environmental safety; whereas Russia’s expansion of military construction, including on Wrangel Island, a UNESCO World Heritage site and nature reserve, is raising serious environmental, security and legal concerns;

Added:T. whereas in March 2024, Russia adopted a decree expanding the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation to include the Berezovsky and Beloyarsky municipal districts of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra; whereas this expansion forms part of Russia’s strategy to consolidate federal control over natural resources, reinforce its territorial claims and attract investors through special economic zone incentives;

Added:U. whereas Russia has intensified hybrid threats in the Arctic region, including cyber operations and GPS jamming; whereas the Arctic waters are increasingly used by Russia’s ageing and poorly maintained ‘shadow fleet’, which operates under flags of convenience to circumvent international sanctions, posing significant environmental, safety and security risks in this fragile region;

Added:V. whereas China has declared itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, has proclaimed a ‘Polar Silk Road’ as an extension of its Belt and Road Initiative and is steadily and rapidly increasing its footprint north of the Arctic Circle, including through investments in Russian companies; whereas China’s 2025 White Paper on National Security in the New Era identifies ‘polar security’ as part of its comprehensive national security concept;

Added:W. whereas China’s proclamation as a ‘near-Arctic state’ is a misleading self-designation with no legal foundation, privileges or justification for a military presence in the High North; whereas China has been disguising its military and political outreach under the cover of scientific research since Chinese research facilities in the Arctic, such as the Yellow River Station in Svalbard and the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in Kárhóll, carry potential dual-use applications; whereas in October 2024 the Chinese Coast Guard claimed to have entered the Arctic Ocean for the first time during a joint patrol with Russia, further signalling a coordinated Chinese-Russian push to expand their strategic footprint in the High North;

Added:X. whereas in recent years several European countries have blocked attempted Chinese acquisitions of sensitive Arctic infrastructure on national-security grounds, including Denmark’s 2016 decision to block the purchase of the Grønnedal naval base in Greenland, Finland’s 2018 decision to block the purchase of Kemijärvi Airport near a military zone, and Norway’s 2024 decision to halt the sale of Søre Fagerfjord to Chinese buyers;

Added:Y. whereas Russia and China have in recent years deepened their cooperation in the Arctic through the signing of a coast guard cooperation agreement, the conduct of joint military drills, such as ‘Ocean-2024’ and ‘Pacific Patrol-2024’, near the Arctic, and technological and shipbuilding projects and new trade corridors along the NSR, thereby reinforcing their strategic alignment in the High North; whereas despite Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, China has continued Arctic cooperation with Russia, substituting lost investments from Western companies following the Western sanctions adopted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine;

Added:Z. whereas China is testing, via a cargo ship, an express route to Europe through the Arctic to establish a regular service via Russia’s NSR, which would link multiple ports in Asia and Europe;

Added:AA. whereas the United States’ approach to the Arctic is evolving towards expanded involvement, preceded by certain regrettable statements involving Greenland;