Changes between two versions
What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report
From · draft committee report· 17 Mar 2025
on the Institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report)
To · plenary report· 17 Oct 2025
on the institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report)
AI:What changed, in short
The report shifts focus from treaty change to improving decision-making within existing frameworks, emphasising efficiency and targeted adjustments.10121314 It adds detailed proposals on investment levels, capital markets, and defence, while dropping earlier calls for a permanent fiscal capacity and social progress protocol.372729 Enlargement and the need to prepare for future rounds become a new priority, replacing earlier emphasis on the Competitiveness Compass.926 The report now stresses the need for democratic legitimacy and communication, and includes an explanatory statement.141730 Other changes are formal or wording: updated references and rephrased sentences without altering substance.1456
27 changes of substance · 0 formal · 3 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+25 added · −23 removed · 25 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 1 of 3: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
15 unchanged paragraphs
on the institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report)
(2025/2013(INI))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),
– having regard to the address by Mario Draghi on presentation of the Draghi report to the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,
– having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’ (Letta report),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),
– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report),
– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE),
– having regard to its resolution of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe,
– having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties,
– having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties,
– having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the implementation of the passerelle clauses in the EU Treaties,
Added:– having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2025 on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world,
– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,
– having regard to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
– having regard to the passerelle clauses in the EU treaties,
Changed:– having regard to the procedure of enhancedtreaty cooperation,provisions ason setenhanced outcooperation inand thepermanent EUstructured treaties,cooperation,
– having regard to Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
Changed:– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0196/2025),
Change 1
Changed:A. whereas the Draghi report, drafted by Mario Draghi and commissionedprepared byat the Europeanrequest Commission,of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, offers a comprehensive diagnosis of the structural challenges the EU is facing, warning that the EU risks prolonged sluggish economic growth that could ultimately threaten prosperity and social welfare; whereas the Draghi report outlines how Europe can no longer rely on many of the factors that have supported growth in the past;
Change 2
Changed:B. whereas a wide gap in GDP has opened between the EU and the United States, increasing from over 15 % in 2002 to approximately 30 % in 2023 as measured at 2015 prices; whereas this is primarily caused by a more significant slowdown in productivity in Europe and the EU’s failure to capitalise on the digital revolution led by the internet and the associated potential productivity gains, partly due to the fragmentation of the European single market;
Change 3
Changed:C. whereas the Draghi report identifies closing the innovation ingap, advanceda technologies,joint decarbonisation,plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness, increasing security and reducing dependenciesdependencies, and delivering on the EU’s economic, environmental and social objectives as the fundamental bases for Europe’s future growth; whereas achievingit themassesses that this will require an increase in investment levels of around 5 % of GDP;the EU’s total GDP, amounting to a minimum of EUR 750-800 billion of additional annual investment;
Change 4
Changed:D. whereas global demand for critical raw materials is rapidly increasing owing to the clean energy transition, while Europe is also hugely reliant on imports of digital technology, notably for chip production, since 75-80 % of global wafer fabrication capacity is in Asia; whereas a genuine EU ‘foreign economic policy’ should be developed to retain the EU’s freedomautonomy and competitiveness in this critical fieldfield, as well as in other strategic sectors;
Change 5
Changed:E. whereas both the Letta report, drafted by Enrico Letta and commissioned by the European Council, and the Draghi report highlight that the single market proved, from the beginning, to be a formidable boost for the EU’s economy and a powerful factor in its attractiveness, and continues to be a cornerstone of European integration and values, serving as a powerful catalyst for growth, prosperity and solidarity; whereas the international landscape has profoundly changed, however, highlighting the need to developfurther adeepen newand complete the single market;market in order to achieve its full potential;
F. whereas the Draghi report identified that a minimum of EUR 750-800 billion of additional annual investment is required to restore EU productivity and deliver on the EU’s environmental and social objectives;
Change 6
Changed:G. whereas EU support for both public and private investment is constrained by the size of the EU budget, its lack of focusfocus, its complex governance framework, and an overly conservativecautious attitude to risk; whereas common EU investment, including jointly financed market-based initiatives, is essential for challenges that transcend national borders to be addressed, by enabling economies of scale, fostering strategic autonomy,autonomy ensuringwhile protecting and promoting cohesion across the Union, attracting private capital, enhancing the EU’s global competitiveness in critical sectors, andas well as by financing and providing other European public goods;
Change 7
Changed:H. whereas the attempt to create the capital markets union (CMU)(CMU), set by Commission President von der Leyen as a strategic priority, has yet to achieve its objectives over the past decadedecade; haswhereas notthe beenwork successful,on butthe fullyCMU integratingto date highlights that the full integration of financial services within the single market is essential for the fulfilment of the EU’s strategic economic policy objectives;
Change 8
Changed:I. whereas the Draghi report provides a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s economic governance and competitiveness; whereas Parliament has consistently stressed the need to ensure that economic growth and competitiveness are accompanied by social, economic and territorial cohesion, equality and the protection of citizens’ rights;
Change 9
Removed:J. whereas the Competitiveness Compass, published by the Commission and built on the analysis of the Draghi report, proposes a new roadmap to restore the EU’s dynamism and boost its economic growth, addressing the challenges of the green and digital transitions, and including measures to improve the regulatory framework, support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and promote a low-carbon economy; whereas Parliament has consistently emphasised the need for a comprehensive approach to industrial policy that takes into account the social, environmental, and economic dimensions of sustainability;
Added:J. whereas the accession processes of a number of countries have gained new momentum since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, leading to a situation in which the EU has to prepare itself for the next enlargement rounds and improve its decision-making processes to ensure that it is able to function efficiently with an increased number of Member States; whereas the Draghi report notes that the Commission’s legislative activity has been growing and that the EU should be rigorous in applying the subsidiarity principle; whereas the Draghi report also points out that the EU’s decision-making rules have not substantially evolved with EU enlargement and that they need to be strengthened and streamlined in view of future enlargements and the complex global environment; whereas enlarging the single market has considerable potential to grow the EU’s economy and strengthen its geo-economic position;
Change 10
Changed:K. whereas the Draghi report pointsalso outconsiders that the EU’snational decision-makingveto rulesis haveinstrumentalised notby substantiallymultiple evolvedgovernments withto EUdelay enlargementor anddilute that,action therefore,through asthe decision-making process; whereas the globalreport environmentalso hasunderlines, becomehowever, morethat complex,while strengthening the legislativeEU andrequires decision-makingtreaty procedureschange, needmuch tocan be accelerated;done through targeted adjustments; whereas the Draghi report underlinestherefore argues that a new industrial strategy for Europe willneeds notto succeedbe withoutaccompanied by parallel changesimprovements to the institutional set-up and functioning of the EU;
Change 11
Changed:L. whereas the Draghi report highlights the need to extend qualified majority voting (QMV) insimplify the Council toEuropean moredecision-making areasprocess to overcome blockages and facilitate the adoption of measures to enhance the EU’s competitiveness and economic growth, as well as to ensure that decisions are taken in a timely and efficient manner;
Change 12
Removed:M. whereas the CoFE provided a unique opportunity for citizens, civil society, social partners, and relevant stakeholders and institutions to reflect on the future of the EU and to identify key priorities for its development; whereas the Draghi report’s proposals for treaty changes, institutional reforms and policy initiatives build on the CoFE’s emphasis on the need for a more democratic, efficient and effective EU with an enhanced ability to respond to the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century;
Added:M. whereas the Draghi report clarifies that strengthening the EU’s political and institutional model is possible within the existing legal framework, by applying targeted streamlining measures, without the need for treaty change; whereas the report argues that such measures should focus on deregulation rather than increasing the number of EU rules and procedures;
N. whereas the Draghi report identifies digital transformation and the development of artificial intelligence (AI) as key drivers of future European competitiveness; whereas the EU has so far missed critical opportunities in the digital revolution, and continues to lag behind global leaders in AI capabilities, data infrastructure and the scaling of deep tech;
O. whereas the Draghi report stresses that the EU must strengthen its strategic autonomy and defence capacity by overcoming market fragmentation, enhancing interoperability and consolidating the European defence industry; whereas the Niinistö report complements this vision by highlighting the need to improve risk preparedness, crisis response and the resilience of critical infrastructure and supply chains; whereas both reports underline that a credible European defence union requires an integrated governance framework and sustained, coordinated investment at EU level;
General considerations
Change 13
Changed:1. Welcomes the Draghi report, its findings and its call for action; supports the analysis that Europe is facing an existential challenge which requires aan renewedunprecedented Europeaninstitutional agendaeffort to remain competitive and growdeliver growth in today’s rapidly changing geopolitical context,context; whilestresses ensuringthat employment,such sociala andresponse environmentalmust sustainability,be democracyanchored andin peace;the welcomesUnion’s ademocratic newgovernance, Europeanthe strategybalance basedof onpowers innovation,between decarbonisationthe institutions, and defence,respect requiringfor athe newtreaties; coherentcalls for a renewed European industrialstrategy policythat andenables significantthe privateUnion to take timely and publiceffective investment;decisions to ensure its competitiveness and sustainability;
Change 14
Changed:2. Highlights the fact that, as stated in the Draghi report, allthe thisEU canurgently needs to improve its institutional governance; stresses that these improvements should be achievedaccompanied onlyby ifa clear and inclusive communication strategy aimed at keeping citizens involved and informed about the EUbenefits urgentlyderiving reorganisesfrom itsthem, institutionalto ensure full public support and economicfoster governance,a abandonssense of belonging and common responsibility; underlines that this, together with the need to abandon fragmented national approaches and strengthensstrengthen a refocused, accelerated and simplified supranational decision-making process at EU level, inwill orderenable the Union to act more efficiently and effectively where it matters most, as a true global actor; acknowledges the importance of addressing blockages in the Council in several areas; supports all initiatives aimed at developing a more effective decision-making process, which is key to enhancing the EU’s competitiveness, while fully respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as laid down in Article 5(3) and (4) TEU;
Change 15
Changed:3. Stresses that the key domains needing strategic policy reform to boost the EU’s competitiveness are the completion of the European single market, the creation of the savings and investments union (SIU);(SIU), improvements to the strengtheningefficiency of the EU budget,budget and its implementation, the maintenance of high levels of social protection and social and labour rights, the deepening of a European model of AI and digital transformation, and the development of a European energy union and a European defence union;
4. Stresses that the strategic policy reforms and the proposed changes in the EU’s institutional architecture should be seen as inextricably linked aspects to be implemented hand in hand, to boost a more competitive EU;
Change 16
Changed:Refocusing, accelerating and simplifying the workgovernance of the EU: new supranational EU governance
Change 17
Changed:5. Welcomes the efforts to refocus and simplify the EU’s work through strategic prioritisation and institutional efficiency; calls for a strengthening of the EU’s capacity to act where it adds clear value, grounded in the principles of subsidiarity principle;and proportionality; underlines that simplificationsimplification, subsidiarity and subsidiarityproportionality must lead to smarter, more effective legislation, and should not lead to deregulation or disengagement from areas needing EU-level action; highlights that effective interventions in policy areas conducive to higher economic competitiveness require the adaptation of the competences conferred on the Union in the treaties; stresses that this simplification and renewed focus must also be reflected in a more efficient and leaner institutional set-up, including a reorganisation of the Commission and the College of Commissioners to enhance the EU’s effectiveness and capacity to address evolving challenges and strengthen its role on the global stage;
Change 18
Changed:6. Takes note of the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, built on the vision of the Draghi report, and its focus on the need for greater strategic autonomy and resilience and the urgency of boosting the EU’s competitiveness, based on sustainability, innovation,innovation and energy securitysecurity, as well as social, economic and socialterritorial cohesion; stresses, however,acknowledges that the emphasis of the Competitiveness Compass fallson shortregulatory ofefficiency itsis ambitionessential for driving innovation, attracting investment and structuralenabling depth,sustainable asgrowth; itsupports remainsthe limitedintroduction of tools to aassess coordination-basedthe approachimpact andof lacksnew bindingproposals mechanisms,on substantialsmall EU-leveland investmentmedium-sized toolsenterprises and fiscalon capacity,competitiveness, and recommends the protectionregular monitoring of socialprogress and economicthe rights,promotion of digital solutions to ease administrative procedures; underlines the need to address labour and proposalsskills forshortages institutionalas reforma towardsstructural supranationalchallenge governance;to competitiveness across Member States; stresses, however, that the Competitiveness Compass needs to be further improved by strengthening the EU’s institutional set-up;
Change 19
Changed:7. Welcomes the idea of strengthening the EU’sEU decision-making on targeted and strategic European competitiveness priorities; suggests, however,considers that theany competitiveness coordination frameworktool proposedshould inserve theas Draghian reportoverarching andinstitutional theframework, competitivenessenabling coordinationthe toolEU proposednot inonly theto Competitivenesscoordinate CompassEU beand transformednational intopolicies abut Europeanto competitivenessact tool,as whicha wouldsingle constituteentity; astresses supranationalthat governancesuch instrumenta withtool bindingshould authority,be led by the Commission, overseen by Parliament,Parliament and involving the activeCouncil, participationand subject to independent evaluation based on its effectiveness and transparency and the achievement of civilits societyobjectives; organisations,highlights socialthat partnerscooperation with national parliaments and relevantregulatory stakeholders,authorities is necessary to ensure ademocratic broadlegitimacy; underlines that the involvement of social partners and inclusivestakeholders approachmust tobe enableembedded in the EUEU’s togovernance actto asensure ainclusiveness singleand entity;accountability;
Change 20
Removed:8. Welcomes the objective of accelerating the work of the EU and reiterates its call to go beyond unanimity and move as soon as possible to QMV and the ordinary legislative procedure in all policy fields, in order to have more streamlined and decisive decision-making, including on social, fiscal and economic policies, digitalisation, the green transition and defence;
Added:8. Welcomes the objective of accelerating the work of the EU and reiterates its call to progress towards greater efficiency in decision-making, including moving to qualified majority voting (QMV) and the ordinary legislative procedure, when it is needed, in key policy fields; notes that higher voting thresholds should be envisaged in some areas of vital importance; notes that in the past, solutions have been found that made decision-making processes more decisive; highlights, for example, the fact that the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced qualified majority voting, while also including the possibility of constructive abstention in certain policy fields;
Change 21
Changed:9. Urges the European Council to discuss the proposals set out in theParliament’s resolutions of 9 June 2022 and 22 November 2023 and toregarding conveneconvening a convention in accordance with the ordinary revision procedure provided for in Article 48 TEU;TEU, and to consider, where possible, targeted amendments to the treaties via the simplified procedure established under Article 48(6) TEU to speed up essential and urgent reforms; recalls the conclusions of the CoFE, and urges the Commission and the Council to take concrete and timely steps to follow up on these recommendations; considers that the run-up to a compromise on the next multiannual financial framework constitutes an important window of opportunity to intensify work on strengthening of the EU’s institutional set-up;
Change 22
Changed:10. Recalls the conclusions of the CoFE, in particular the need for treaty reform;reform, and urges the Commission and the Council to take concrete and timely steps to follow up on these recommendations;
Change 23
Changed:11. Reiterates its callcommitment forto theenhancing extensionthe ofEU’s QMVcapacity to moreact policyswiftly areasand usingeffectively theand passerelleto clauses,improve asthe providedefficiency forof decision-making in thekey treaties,policy toareas; improvereiterates theits EU’scall abilityfor tothe actextension rapidlyof QMV and effectively;the callsordinary forlegislative theprocedure activationto ofkey passerellepolicy clausesfields, throughwhen reinforcedrequired, QMVusing andthe callspasserelle clauses as provided for in the treatiestreaties, to beimprove amendedthe EU’s ability to allowact forrapidly this;and effectively;
Change 24
Removed:12. Calls on the Commission and the Council to use the enhanced cooperation tool, which offers two important safeguards, namely the consent of Parliament and the judicial review by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), and which is based on a Commission proposal;
Added:12. Calls on the Council to consider the recourse to enhanced cooperation pursuant to Article 20 TEU in cases where unanimity voting does not allow important decisions to be taken for the EU as a whole in key policy areas; underlines that enhanced cooperation is based on the legitimate needs of the Member States, when the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole; highlights that enhanced cooperation offers two important safeguards, namely the consent of Parliament and judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and that decisions taken under enhanced cooperation are based on a Commission proposal; underscores that the core purpose of enhanced cooperation is the simplification of decision-making; advises participating Member States to activate the specific passerelle clause enshrined in Article 333 TFEU to switch to QMV and to the ordinary legislative procedure in enhanced cooperation; notes that the Draghi report proposes that where unanimous agreement to introduce QMV cannot be reached, willing Member States could also consider resorting to intergovernmental cooperation;
Change 25
Changed:13. CallsStresses onthat improving the MemberEU States,decision-making whenprocess unanimousrequires agreementthe onempowerment treatyof changeParliament toby introduceplacing QMVit cannoton bean reached,equal tofooting considerwith intergovernmentalthe cooperationCouncil outsideand thecalls treaties,for throughParliament’s anrole additionalin treatythe amonglegislative willingprocess Memberto States,be withoutstrengthened; prejudicereiterates toits existingcall treatyfor lawParliament andto pavinggain the way for differentiatedfull integrationright withinof thelegislative EU;initiative; emphasiseshighlights the importance of Parliament’s fullmodernising involvementParliament’s inright theof processinquiry to ensurestrengthen democratic oversightcontrol andover scrutiny;the EU executive;
Change 26
Removed:14. Stresses that reforming the EU decision-making process requires the empowerment of Parliament by placing it on an equal footing with the Council; reiterates its call for Parliament to gain the full right of legislative initiative – the power to introduce, amend or repeal Union law – and full codecision powers over both the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budget, including the adoption of the multiannual financial framework and the system of own resources;
Added:14. Considers the potential of Article 122 TFEU as a tool for swift EU action strictly in crisis situations, but stresses that its use requires strong oversight, not only by the CJEU but also by Parliament; stresses the need to ensure close cooperation between the Commission, Parliament and other relevant EU institutions and bodies; calls for the procedures for activating Article 122 TFEU to be clarified and made more systematic, notably by empowering both co-legislators to decide on its activation;