What changed between the draft committee report and the plenary report

Changed:4. Underlines that the creation of a European ‘demos’ and shared democratic space firstly requires a cultural shift on the basis of a long-term strategy and adequate resources for the strengthening of European awareness and citizenship, in close cooperation with civil society and societal stakeholders; regrets that campaigns conducted in the Member States for the European elections are all too often approached from a purely national policy angle, even when these campaigns address common European issues; calls on national political parties and candidates in the European elections as well as national media outlets to adequately and truthfully inform citizens about governance at EU level, including about the European political parties and Parliament’s political groups of the European Parliament that national parties are affiliated with; encourages national parties to intensify the cooperation with their European counterparts in this regard and to improve their European visibility; undertakes to create an enabling regulatory environment for this;

Changed:5. Stresses that more work must be done to increase the participation of under-represented and vulnerable groups in the European elections; is concerned by the decrease in turnout among young people and undertakes to ramp up policy efforts to increase electoral campaign outreach to this key demographic; notes that young peoples’ involvement in the future of the EU is crucial; encourages the Member States to adopt dedicated policy frameworks addressing both voting and candidacy facilities, including through specific information campaigns, and alternative voting methods such as postal and proxy voting; recognises the need to continue progressing towards a more inclusive electoral process to ensure that every citizen has an equal opportunity to participate in the democratic process; notes that only a few Members of the European Parliament belong to national and ethnic minorities that are officially recognised as minorities in the Member States in accordance with their constitutional or legal frameworks and relevant Council of Europe instruments; underlines that the fight against racism, discrimination and exclusion is a duty that derives from the EU’s fundamental values and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; calls on the Member States and national political parties to adopt proactive and proportionate measures to foster the effective inclusion and representation of such minorities, including Roma communities, in the European elections, in full respect of national constitutional orders;

Added:6. Highlights that the elections to Parliament might not have been fair in Hungary; stresses in this context that the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Election Observation Mission Final Report for the parliamentary elections and referendum in Hungary on 3April 2022 found the ‘absence of a level playing field’”; stresses that the Hungarian Government bears responsibility for the restoration of compliance with EU law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and expresses deep regret that the lack of decisive EU action has contributed to a breakdown in democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary, turning the country into a hybrid regime of electoral autocracy, according to the relevant indices; expresses concern about several requests by the Hungarian Central Investigative Prosecutor to lift the immunity of MEPs;

Added:7. Reiterates its long-held view that further reforms of and adjustments to the EU electoral framework are necessary to make the European elections more democratic, resilient, inclusive and truly European; points to several pending policy initiatives in this regard and repeats its calls on the Council of the EU and the European Council to collaborate constructively with Parliament to find policy solutions that work in the interest of European citizens;

Removed:6. Reiterates its long-held view that further reforms of and adjustments to the EU electoral framework and institutional set-up are necessary to make the European elections more democratic, resilient, inclusive and truly European; points to several pending policy initiatives in this regard and repeats its calls on the Council of the EU and the European Council to collaborate constructively with Parliament to find policy solutions that work in the interest of European citizens;

Added:8. Is convinced that the regulatory framework for the European elections must be revised and modernised to increase the electoral footprint of citizens and reduce the regulatory fragmentation among the 27 Member States, including through a single common voting day as well as a uniform minimum voting age; recalls that Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 is expected to bring significant positive steps in this sense, as would a number of submissions from the pending proposal of 3 May 2022 for a new electoral law; reiterates its call on the Council to engage constructively with Parliament to enable a swift approval; recalls that 26 of the 27 Member States have already ratified the 2018 revision and undertakes to critically evaluate why its implementation was delayed in various Member States;

Removed:7. Is convinced that the regulatory framework for the European elections must be revised and modernised to increase the electoral footprint of citizens and reduce the regulatory fragmentation among the 27 Member States, including through a single common voting day as well as a uniform voting age; reaffirms its support for the pending proposal of 3 May 2022 for a new electoral law and reiterates its call for swift approval by the Council; undertakes to critically evaluate why the implementation of the 2018 revision was delayed in various Member States;

Added:9. Regrets that new proposed rules regarding the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to Parliament for ‘mobile citizens’ were not adopted by the Council in time for the 2024 elections; points out that the full exercise of the electoral rights granted by the Treaties to mobile citizens in elections to Parliament is still hampered by unjustified barriers to democratic participation, including a lack of awareness about the applicable conditions and rules; acknowledges that the pending draft Council directive would address some of these barriers; regrets, however, that the Council, while formally in compliance with Article 22(2) TFEU, has not engaged with the substance of Parliament’s opinion in any meaningful way; reiterates, in particular, its proposals to enable registration on the electoral roll as soon as voters register their place of residence and to strengthen language and information requirements for local authorities, as well as to facilitate the exercise of the right to vote by under-represented groups of voters and to enhance awareness-raising campaigns by Member States with the active involvement of civil society; calls on the Member States to ensure that their citizens living abroad can participate in European elections, including by strengthening consular services and enabling postal voting; stresses the importance of all Member States in ensuring unhindered access to polling stations for elderly people and persons with disabilities;

Removed:8. Regrets that new proposed rules regarding the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for so-called ‘mobile citizens’ were not adopted by the Council in time for the 2024 elections; points out that the full exercise of the electoral rights granted by the treaties to mobile citizens in elections to the European Parliament is still hampered by unjustified barriers to democratic participation, including a lack of awareness about the applicable conditions and rules; acknowledges that the pending draft Council directive would address some of these barriers; regrets, however, that the Council, while formally in compliance with Article 22(2) TFEU, has not engaged with the substance of Parliament’s opinion in any meaningful way; reiterates in particular its proposals to enable registration on the electoral roll as soon as voters register their place of residence and to strengthen language and information requirements for local authorities;

Added:10. Strongly supports efforts by political parties to further develop the implementation of the lead candidate (Spitzenkandidaten) process to establish a link between the election, the composition of Parliament, and the nomination of the President of the Commission so as to make the appointment of the EU executive more transparent for citizens; underlines that this process enabled citizens to effectively influence the nomination of the Commission President, marking a significant step forward, with a direct role for citizens; commends the European political parties for nominating their candidates well in advance of the election; notes that this process this time around was relatively successful as the Commission President, while not being directly electable through a ballot, ran as the lead candidate for the political group that received the most votes; points out that the election, through the European elections, of the Commission President would increase their accountability and democratic legitimacy; remains convinced, however, that several key success factors – such as the continued development and consolidation of the European democratic sphere – are still lacking, preventing the full realisation of the potential of this informal and unregulated political process;

Removed:9. Welcomes efforts by political parties to further develop the implementation of the lead candidate (Spitzenkandidaten) process to establish a link between the election, the composition of Parliament, and the nomination of the President of the European Commission so as to make the appointment of the EU executive more transparent for citizens; commends the European political parties for nominating their candidates well in advance of the election; notes that this process this time around was relatively successful as the Commission President, while not being directly electable through a ballot, ran as the lead candidate for the biggest political group; points out that the direct election of the Commission President would increase their accountability and democratic legitimacy; remains convinced, however, that several key success factors – such as the continued development and consolidation of the European democratic sphere – are still lacking, preventing the full realisation of the potential of this informal and unregulated political process;

Added:11. Emphasises the important role of European political parties in contributing to the debate on European public policy issues and in forming European political awareness; believes that these parties can offer a much-needed counterweight to the spread of disinformation and misinformation in the run-up to the elections; welcomes the agreement reached on the recast of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, which closes remaining loopholes, brings legal clarity and helps unshackle European political parties and empower them to assume the role they are given by the Treaties, including by boosting their visibility in the Member States during the electoral campaign and in the promotion of lead candidates;

Removed:10. Emphasises the important role of European political parties in contributing to the debate on European public policy issues and in forming European political awareness; regrets however, that restrictions under the current EU and national regulatory frameworks prevented European political parties from fully participating in the 2024 European election campaign; believes that these parties can offer a much-needed counterweight to the spread of disinformation and misinformation in the run-up to the elections; reiterates its call on the Council to use the pending recast of Regulation 1141/2014 to unshackle the European political parties and empower them to assume the role they are given by the treaties, including by boosting their visibility in the Member States during the electoral campaign and in the promotion of lead candidates;

Added:12. Calls on the Member States to implement a ban on foreign donations, including both in-kind and cash contributions or benefits, and a limit on donations to political parties and candidates; considers that political actors who have been offered and/or accepted a financial or in-kind contribution by a foreign actor must be obliged to report it to the competent authorities and this information should be reported in turn at EU level to allow for EU-wide monitoring;

Removed:11. Underlines that further institutional work must be done to strengthen the impact of European voters on the governance of the EU; points in this regard to the pending treaty change procedure, which was triggered in the wake of the Conference on the Future of Europe; highlights its proposal to reverse the roles of the Council and Parliament in the nomination and confirmation of the President of the Commission to more accurately reflect the results of European elections; highlights also its proposal to grant Parliament the right of legislative initiative, the implementation of which would create a direct link between votes cast by citizens for parliamentary representatives and the policy output at EU level; highlights also its proposal to modernise the right of inquiry of the European Parliament to strengthen democratic control over the EU executive; calls on the European Council to comply with the treaties and hold a vote on the convening of the convention without undue delay to discuss these proposals;

Added:13. Stresses the need to strengthen the role and visibility of European political foundations in the European democratic sphere; recalls that these foundations play a key role in developing political debate, policy research and civic education across borders, thereby contributing to the formation of a truly European public opinion; calls for the provision of adequate tools and resources to enable them to support European political parties in their effort to engage citizens, promote European values and participate meaningfully in future electoral campaigns; recalls that the upcoming report of the Commission on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (pending recast) should pay particular attention to the rules governing the financing of European political foundations and should propose amendments to the Regulation if necessary;

Added:14. Underlines that further institutional work must be done to strengthen the impact of European voters on the governance of the EU; points in this regard to the pending Treaty change procedure, which was triggered in the wake of the Conference on the Future of Europe; highlights its proposal to reverse the roles of the Council and Parliament in the nomination and confirmation of the President of the Commission to more accurately reflect the results of European elections; highlights also its proposal to grant Parliament the right of legislative initiative, the implementation of which would create a direct link between votes cast by citizens for parliamentary representatives and the policy output at EU level; highlights also its proposal to modernise the right of inquiry of Parliament to strengthen democratic control over the EU executive; calls on the European Council to comply with the Treaties and hold a vote on the convening of the convention without undue delay to discuss these proposals;

Removed:12. Expresses deep concern about a growing number of internal and external threats that are eroding the fabric of European democracy; condemns the fact that some candidates, including those from governing parties in some Member States, openly campaigned on false and foreign-sponsored narratives about the EU while drumming up anti-EU sentiment;

Added:15. Underlines the importance of strengthening the link between local, regional, national and European issues; welcomes, in this regard, the active and positive involvement of local and regional leaders in European topics and debates, notably in the pre-electoral period, including through the work of the Committee of the Regions and its networks and campaigns;

Removed:13. Reiterates its deep and long-standing concern over the persisting trend of foreign interference in European democratic processes, including disinformation; condemns in particular the online disinformation campaigns sponsored by Russian and other third-country state and non-state actors undertaken to polarise and sow mistrust among the European electorate; notes that foreign interference occurs prior to elections and peaks in the pre-electoral period; denounces the naivety with which several extremist Members of the European Parliament willingly engaged with the Voice of Europe media platform, which is subject to a criminal investigation, to promote Kremlin-sponsored narratives about the war of aggression in Ukraine;

Added:16. Recalls that fighting anti-democratic rhetoric is most effective at the level closest to citizens, including through the active involvement of local and regional leaders; in this respect, especially in regions facing economic stagnation where long-term disparities intensify support for Eurosceptic parties, underlines the positive role of EU cohesion policy, which must prioritise essential regional needs, ensuring no one is left behind;

Removed:14. Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to ramp up efforts to combat foreign interference and disinformation through a multi-layer, coordinated and cross-sector strategy, supported by adequate financial resources, to equip the EU and its Member States with appropriate foresight and resilience policies and deterrence tools; in this regard, calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service, and Member States to further reinforce the Union’s strategic response to disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including through a full implementation and enforcement of transparency obligations for platforms, and increased support for independent media and fact checkers, enhanced digital and media literacy; points to numerous EU policy efforts undertaken in recent years, including the DSA, the strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation and the initiatives under the Democracy Action Plan; emphasises the importance of the full and effective implementation of the DSA to ensure transparency, accountability and due diligence by very large online platforms; calls for the Commission to be vigilant and proactive in enforcing the provisions of the DSA and overseeing compliance; acknowledges with concern that online platforms exert disproportionate influence over public discourse; notes with concern reports of politically motivated decisions by certain platforms that may threaten freedom of expression and democratic pluralism;

Added:17. Expresses deep concern about a growing number of internal and external threats that are eroding the fabric of European democracy; condemns the fact that some candidates, including those from governing parties in Member States, openly campaigned on false and foreign-sponsored narratives about the EU while drumming up anti-EU sentiment;

Removed:15. Underlines the importance of a free media environment as a key pillar of European democracy, notably in electoral cycles; acknowledges that, while the EU is a global leader in media freedom and 2024 saw the adoption of European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) and the coming into force of the anti-SLAAP directive, the increasing internal and external pressure on the EU’s media environment requires further strengthening of media freedom in the EU, including in the run-up to European elections; recalls that in certain Member States, 2024 saw an increase in attacks on journalists;

Added:18. Reiterates its deep and long-standing concern over the persisting trend of malicious interference in European democratic processes, including disinformation; expresses its deep concern that some Member States’ governments are actively contributing to the dissemination of disinformation; condemns in particular the online disinformation campaigns sponsored by Russian and other non-EU state and non-state actors undertaken to polarise and sow mistrust among the European electorate; notes that foreign interference occurs prior to elections and peaks in the pre-electoral period; denounces several Members of the European Parliament who willingly engaged with the Voice of Europe media platform, which is subject to a criminal investigation, to promote Kremlin-sponsored narratives about the war of aggression in Ukraine;

Removed:16. Condemns all forms of political violence in the strongest terms; expresses deep concern over a series of incidents that occurred in the run-up to the 2024 elections; encourages the Commission and the Member States to prioritise the prevention of political violence by strengthening laws, frameworks and policies that protect politicians, political candidates, activists, journalists and citizens from violence and harassment during the electoral period; underlines the importance of a comprehensive approach that includes prevention, protection and education in order to reduce the incidence of political violence, especially by promoting awareness of the dangers of political violence and fostering a culture of tolerance and respect for differing political opinions;

Added:19. Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to ramp up efforts to combat foreign interference and disinformation through a multilayer, coordinated and cross-sector strategy, supported by adequate financial resources, to equip the EU and its Member States with appropriate foresight and resilience policies and deterrence tools; in this regard, calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to further reinforce the Union’s strategic response to disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference, and points to numerous EU policy efforts undertaken in recent years, including the DSA, the strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation and the initiatives under the Democracy Action Plan; acknowledges with concern that online platforms exert disproportionate influence over public discourse; notes with concern reports of politically motivated decisions by certain platforms that may threaten freedom of expression and democratic pluralism;

Removed:17. Is deeply concerned by the rise and electoral success of anti-system and openly anti-EU parties during the 2024 elections; condemns any form of political rhetoric that promotes hate speech, discrimination, xenophobia or violence, and urges all political actors to engage in constructive, fact-based dialogue that respects democratic values, human rights and the rule of law; undertakes to further reform and improve the functioning of the Union to better deliver on the expectations of citizens; calls on all relevant players to communicate more proactively about the EU’s positive contribution to the daily lives of all European citizens through its policies;

Added:20. Underlines the importance of a balanced and free media environment in the Member States as a key pillar of European democracy, notably in electoral cycles; acknowledges that, while the EU is a global leader in media freedom and 2024 saw the adoption of the European Media Freedom Act and the coming into force of the anti-SLAAP Directive, the increasing internal and external pressure on the EU’s media environment requires further strengthening of media freedom in the EU, including in the run-up to European elections; recalls that in certain Member States, 2024 saw an increase in attacks on journalists;

Removed:18. Commits to an evaluation of these frameworks through its special Democracy Shield committee to identify possible loopholes, gaps and overlaps that could be exploited to enable malicious interference in democratic processes; calls in parallel on the Commission to enforce these regulatory frameworks in full and without undue delay, particularly in the case of those platforms that continue to openly defy EU regulatory authorities;

Added:21. Condemns all forms of political violence in the strongest terms; expresses deep concern over a series of incidents that occurred in the run-up to the 2024 elections; encourages the Commission and the Member States to prioritise the prevention of political violence by strengthening laws, frameworks and policies that protect politicians, political candidates, activists, journalists and citizens from violence and harassment during the electoral period; underlines the importance of a comprehensive approach that includes prevention, protection and education in order to reduce the incidence of political violence, especially by promoting awareness of the dangers of political violence and fostering a culture of tolerance and respect for differing political opinions; highlights that election fraud does not begin on election day, but with the dismantling of the rule of law, democratic principles, freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and with the spreading of foreign disinformation and propaganda; notes with concern that systemic challenges may impact the extent to which free and fair elections are upheld consistently across all Member States;

Removed:19. Recognises the importance of cybersecurity and cyber-infrastructure in protecting the integrity of European elections; warns against the potential risks of AI-enabled influence operations;

Added:22. Is deeply concerned by the rise and electoral success of anti-system and openly anti-EU parties during the 2024 elections; points out that this shift leads to the radicalisation of political discourse and further polarisation of Parliament, and moreover, also provides a wider platform for the dissemination of foreign disinformation and propaganda; condemns any form of political rhetoric that promotes hate speech, discrimination, xenophobia or violence, and urges all political actors to engage in constructive, fact-based dialogue that respects democratic values, human rights and the rule of law; undertakes to further reform and improve the functioning of the Union to better deliver on the expectations of citizens; calls on all relevant players to communicate more proactively about the EU’s positive contribution to the daily lives and security of all European citizens through its policies;

Removed:20. Concludes that European democracy can only thrive as long as European democratic and electoral processes are defended; in this respect, underlines the importance of promoting free and fair elections while protecting their integrity against both internal and external threats to the EU’s democracy; notes with concern that the spread of disinformation and some social media platforms’ influence remains unchecked; underlines the utmost importance of enforcing the entire legal framework currently in place in order to safeguard the integrity of the entire electoral process;

Added:23. Commits to an evaluation of these frameworks through its Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield, whose mandate, received from the plenary, includes addressing interference in democratic processes and policies, and implementing measures to preserve the fairness and integrity of elections as well as policies contributing to EU democratic processes; highlights that the committee thus serves as a key tool to prevent malicious interference by identifying possible loopholes, gaps and overlaps that could be exploited; calls in parallel on the Commission to enforce these regulatory frameworks in full and without undue delay, particularly in the case of those platforms that continue to openly defy EU regulatory authorities;

Added:24. Recognises the importance of cybersecurity and cyber infrastructure in protecting the integrity of European elections; warns against the potential risks of AI-enabled influence operations;

Added:25. Points out that the results of national elections also indirectly influence the composition of European institutions, e.g. through the nomination of Commissioners-designate or the participation of the sitting national political majorities in Council meetings; in this context, emphasises the importance of the democratic nature of general elections in every Member State;

Added:26. Concludes that European democracy can only thrive as long as European democratic and electoral processes are strengthened and defended; in this respect, underlines the importance of promoting free and fair elections while protecting their integrity against both internal and external threats to the EU’s democracy; notes with concern that the spread of disinformation and some social media platforms’ influence remain unchecked; underlines the utmost importance of enforcing the entire legal framework currently in place in order to safeguard the integrity of the entire electoral process;

Changed:I.K. whereas special measures foster electoral participation and representation of under-represented and vulnerable groups; whereas 11 countriesMember States have legislated a quota for women;

Changed:2. Welcomes the relatively high turnout for the 10th European Parliament elections, which, with an aggregate participation rate of 50.74 %, saw a slight increase compared to the 2019 elections; is convinced that these figures reflect stronger public engagement with the European project and the increasing importance of Parliament and its impact on the daily lives of citizens; is nevertheless concerned by the widely divergent participation rates among Member States and remains determined to strengthen policy efforts to close the gap and increase turnout among all groups across the EU;

Changed:A. whereas the 2024 European elections registered the highest turnout of any elections to the European Parliament in the past 25 years, at 50.74 % of the electorate, (a slight increase in comparison to 2019 with 50.66 %), sending a positive and significant signal about European citizens’ interest in EU affairs; whereas participation figures varied widely among Member States, ranging from 89.01 % in Belgium to 21.35 % in Croatia,%, underlining the need for continued political investment in election participation across the EU;

Changed:E.G. whereas around 18 400 candidates and 490 candidate lists stood on the ballots, campaigning under unequaldifferent conditionselectoral arrangements largely governed by national provisions across the Member States; whereas candidate registration and campaign periods ranged from several months to a few weeks; whereas independent individual candidacy was not possible in nine Member States;

Changed:G.I. whereas the most recent Eurobarometer suggests that nationalin campaignsthe converge2024 thematicallyEuropean andelections increasinglypeople focuswere onmotivated to vote for reasons concerning shared European issues such as the cost of living, the economy, migration, the rule of law and climate change; whereas in national debates these issues are all too often exclusively approached from a national policy angle; whereas political parties and candidates have a responsibility to adequately inform citizens about the policy response and governance at EU level, including informing citizens about the European political parties and political groups they are affiliated with in Parliament;

Changed:J.L. whereas around 11 million EU citizens living in another Member State were eligible to vote in their country of residence; whereas their participation in their country of residence is hampered bythey social,still culturalface andadministrative regulatorybarriers barriers,to includingtheir languageparticipation barriers,in atheir varietycountry of registration deadlines and administrative requirements;residence; whereas itsParliament’s position of 14 February 2023, which sought to address these barriers, was entirely ignored by the Council;

Changed:O.T. whereas the upcoming enlargement will require a deep reform of the institutional set-up andof electoralthe frameworkUnion, ofpossibly theinvolving Union;its electoral framework; whereas a Union of more than 30 Member States can only be a relevant and independent global player and can only properly function if its decision-making is made less bureaucratic and more efficient and is built on the basis of a truly EuropeanEuropean, transnational and transnationalshared democratic sphere;

Changed:The European Electoral Act of 1976 allows the EU Member States to set the minimum age for standing as a candidate in European elections. While in May 2022 Parliament proposed a uniform minimum age of 18, the next round of elections – in 2024 – will bewas governed by the existing rules. The minimum age therefore varies among the Member States, ranging from 18 (in the majority of countries) to 25 (Italy and Greece).

Changed:The existing rules on European elections are based on a combination of the common principles established in the European Electoral Act of 1976, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772, and the different national rules implementing those principles. The minimum age for standing as a candidate for the European Parliament is determined by the individual Member States, in line with Article 8 of the European Electoral Act. Across the EU, this age currently varies as follows: the rules in 15 Member States provide for 18 years of age, nine for 21 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia), one (Romania) for 23, and two (Italy and Greece) for 25. Through a law adopted in 2021, Belgium lowered the minimum age from 21 to 18, and those new rules will applyapplied for the 2024 elections.

Changed:An electoral threshold for the allocation of seats is the minimum percentage of votes that a political party or a coalition is required to collect in order to gain a seat in the legislative assembly. Thresholds are said to enable a better balance between governability and representativeness, by favouring the formation of stable majorities and avoiding excessive fragmentation of the legislative assembly. Thresholds are sometimes imposed by law, but in the absence of an explicit legal requirement, they can be the de facto result of the size of the constituency and the relevant electoral law determining the apportionment of seats between constituencies. Provisions for electoral thresholds are common in proportional electoral systems, which tend to favour multipartyism. Thresholds can, however, be problematic when they limit or impede the representation of regional parties and ethnic and linguistic minorities, for instance. The current European Electoral Act contains a set of common principles to be upheld by the different domestic laws applicable to the election of the European Parliament. The original act of 1976 did not contain any provisions on minimum thresholds. Following modifications introduced in 2002, Article 3 allows Member States to set a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats; this must not exceed 5 % of the votes cast. More recently, a draft legislative act, adopted by the European Parliament in May 2022 and seeking to repeal the 1976 Act, proposes to modify Article 3. Member States would remain free to establish an electoral threshold of no more than 5 % of the valid votes cast, but they would be obliged to establish a threshold – of no less than 3.5 % and no more than 5 % – for national constituencies comprising more than 60 seats. The electoral thresholds applied in the 2019 European elections ranged between 5 % of the valid votes cast, required in nine Member States (Czechia, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and 1.8 %, required in Cyprus, while 14 Member States set no threshold. Italy, Austria and Sweden applied a 4 % threshold; and Greece 3 %. At the time of writing, it appears that theseThese thresholds will still be applicableapplied for the 2024 European electionselections.

Changed:The Spitzenkandidaten process relies on the ambiguous wording of the Treaty provision (Article 17(7) TEU) applicable to the appointment of the President of the Commission, which neither explicitly provides for nor excludes such a process. The process is based on a reading of the provision that draws inspiration from the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, whereby the overall results of European elections should be politically reflected in the choice of the head of the executive. Declaration no 6 on Articles 15(5) and 15(6), Article 17(6) and 17(7), and 18 TEU, states that in choosing the persons called upon to take up the office of President of the Commission, due account is to be taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographical diversity of the Union and its Member States. Declaration no 11 clarifies that the selection of the candidate is the result of consultations between European Council and Parliament. The Spitzenkandidaten, or lead candidate process is a political process requiring that, before the European elections, the European political parties designate the personality they would propose as President of the Commission or who could marshal a parliamentary majority. This personality would campaign in the Member States, presenting the political programme of their own political party. The lead candidate process aims at establishing a political link between Parliament and the executive and, as the subsequent sections of this study will show, at acknowledging that, as it stands today,executive. theThe EU is the product of a deep integration process that needs a higher degree of democratic legitimation for its institutions and a more understandable system for its citizens.