What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Added:N. whereas the ongoing attacks in the Red Sea launched from the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, with the support of Iran, pose a significant threat to freedom of navigation, maritime security and international trade; whereas additional attacks by various Iran-backed militia in Iraq and Syria are further increasing the risk of regional escalation; whereas the risk of escalation in the region is the highest in decades;

Changed:Q.S. whereas CSDP missions and operations aim to strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood, such as in the Mediterranean, the South Caucasus and the Black Sea Region, the Western Balkans and in the Horn of Africa, by providing services such as military, police, coast guard, border management training and capacity building; whereas if CSDP missions are to achieve mission objectives, they must begin giving advice and training in coping with emerging and disruptive technologies that are rapidly entering the ‘frozen conflict’ environment;

Changed:T.V. whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM) has demonstrated the positive impact that CSDP missions and operations have with the necessary resources and contributions from Member States; whereas EUMAM has already reached the target of 30 000 Ukrainian soldiers trained; whereas, based on current results and trends, EUMAM stands ready to train more Ukrainian military personnel to reach the target of 4060 000 soldiers; whereas the mission is also prepared to integrate air and maritime training as appropriate and to react to any other urgent Ukrainian training requests;

Changed:W.Y. whereas following the July coup in Niger, the putschists have taken a decision to prepare a case to prosecute the legitimate NigerianNigerien President, Mohamed Bazoum, for ‘high treason’; whereas the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has followed a ‘two-track’ policy – mediation while applying sanctions (trade, banking and individual); whereas the EU has expressed strong support for ECOWAS, a readiness to prepare an autonomous sanctions regime and a willingness to look at any request that might come from ECOWAS for further support; whereas following the coup, both CSDP missions (EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger and the EU Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM) in Niger) have suspended their operational activities and have kept only necessary core staff in the country; whereas the ongoing four assistance measures from the EPF (EUR 74 million in total) have been suspended; whereas the EUTM and EUCAP missions in the Sahel and in the Central African Republic have not yielded the expected results;

Changed:Aa.AC. whereas hybrid threats in the years to come will see increased use of the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyber warfare and emerging and disruptive technologies, from seabed to space, with the deployment of advanced space-based surveillance and strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, and nano-tech and bio-warfare;

Changed:Ab.AD. whereas approximately 90 % of the Union’s external trade is transported by sea; whereas around two thirds of the world’s oil and gas supply is extracted at sea or transported by sea; whereas up to 90 % of international data and communications transfers are carried via undersea cables; whereas organised crime and drug traffickers carry out a significant part of their activities by sea, and even use submersible or semi-submersible vehicles or equipment that are difficult for law enforcement agencies to apprehend;

Changed:Ac.AE. whereas security and defence cooperation with partners and allies are crucial to the EU’s ambition to become an international security provider; whereas cooperation with organisations such as the UN, NATO, the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as numerous allies and like-minded partners, is crucial to the successful implementation of the CSDP;

Changed:Ad.AF. whereas the United States is the EU’s most important ally; whereas joint EU-US cooperation, partnership and friendship, mirrored, among other things, through our joint cooperation within NATO, are the backbone of our shared freedom, prosperity, democracy and security;

Changed:Ae.AG. whereas Latin America is a strategic partner for the EU and whereas there is a lot of untapped potential for building a true strategic partnership, including in security cooperation;

Changed:Af.AH. whereas the Commission and Parliament are committed to reinforcing the EU as an external actor that is able to act more strategically and autonomously;

Changed:Ag.AI. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while at the same time it is facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation;

Changed:Ah.AJ. whereas China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas China has for many years promoted an alternative narrative, challenging democratic values, open markets and the rules-based international order; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation;

Changed:Ai.AK. whereas the United States, Japan and South Korea held a historic first trilateral meeting on 18 August 2023; whereas mutual cooperation among like-minded countries, in particular in the Indo-Pacific region, is fundamental to ensuring the peaceful and prosperous development of the region; whereas the EU should also strive to enhance its security collaboration with these like-minded countries in the region;

Changed:Aj.AL. whereas Kosovo and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue are facing threats of destabilisation; whereas the operation EUFOR Althea plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region;

Changed:Ak.AM. whereas cultural heritage has a universal dimension as a testimony of history inseparable from peoples’ identity, which the international community has to protect and preserve for future generations;

Removed:Providing Ukraine with the defence capabilities it needs

Added:AN. whereas there is a need for a comprehensive peace-building approach involving civilian specialists in order to implement practical measures for peace; whereas local and international non-governmental organisations perform crucial activities aimed at preventing conflicts and resolving conflicts peacefully, and it is of the utmost importance to make the most of their experience;

Changed:3. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the despicable terrorist attacks committed by the terrorist group Hamas against Israel, including the taking of hostages, andhostages; expresses its support for the State of Israel and its people;people and for the Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages who have been taken by the terrorist group Hamas and for the bodies of deceased hostages to be returned; emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law; callsstresses forthat continued,all rapid,parties safemust distinguish, at all times, between combatants and unhinderedcivilians humanitarianand accessthat parties may only attack combatants and aidmilitary targets; asks the Israeli Government not to reachtake thosemilitary action in needRafah throughthat allwould necessaryworsen measuresan includingalready catastrophic humanitarian corridorssituation and pausesprevent forthe urgently needed provision of basic services and humanitarian needs;assistance; expresses its deepest sorrow and full solidarity with the innocent victims on both sides, their families and loved ones; calls for those responsible for terrorist acts and for violations of international law to be held to account; calls for a thorough investigation into the role played by third countries, including Iran and Qatar, and non-state entities in providing financial, material and operational support to Hamas;

Added:4. Strongly condemns the ongoing attacks on maritime activities in the Red Sea launched from Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen, with the support of Iran; welcomes the decision by the Member States to launch a maritime CSDP operation, under the name ASPIDES, to protect merchant vessels, by strengthening maritime situational awareness and accompanying vessels to deter attacks; further condemns the attacks by Iran-backed military groups from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq;

Added:Providing Ukraine with the defence capabilities it needs

Removed:6. Welcomes, in this regard, VP/HR Borrell’s proposal, building on Parliament’s previous call, for the creation of a EUR 20 billion assistance fund within the EPF, dedicated to supporting the Ukrainian armed forces with up to EUR 5 billion per year between 2023 and 2027, and calls on the Member States to rapidly approve it; strongly condemns efforts made by Hungary to block recent attempts to top up the EPF and the VP/HR’s proposal for the special assistance fund for Ukraine; emphasises that all military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF must fully comply with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, and must provide adequate transparency and accountability;7. Welcomes the setting up of the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) and its role in enhancing the military effectiveness of Ukraine’s armed forces so that they can defend their territorial integrity within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders and allow the country to effectively exercise its sovereignty and protection of civilians; stresses the need to provide the necessary personnel and infrastructure to the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to exercise planning and command of this important training mission;

Added:7. Urges the larger Member States with significant defence industry capacities, such as France, Spain and Italy, to significantly and urgently increase military assistance to Ukraine;

Removed:8. Welcomes EUMAM Ukraine’s capacity to address Ukrainian training needs in a flexible way; expects it to bring added value by expanding training offers and to be synchronised with other training initiatives already underway; insists on adapting training modules to lessons learnt in order to adequately correspond to the Ukrainian forces’ needs; congratulates the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States for the projected successful training of up to 30 000 troops before the end of 2023; welcomes the VP/HR’s proposal of an increased target of 40 000 Ukrainian soldiers to be trained by the end of 2023; stresses the importance of continuously adjusting and reviewing training modules based on the lessons learnt from the battlefield, as well as of a sustained focus on addressing current and future challenges, including counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), UAV system training, air defence, mine detection, combined arms and specialised training, and developing the capacities of current and future officers of the Ukrainian armed forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; welcomes, further, the rapid conclusion of deliberations and strong participation by Member States in launching EUMAM Ukraine, which can be described as a template for future military training missions, and calls on them to demonstrate similar ambition and contributions to other current and future CSDP missions and operations;

Added:8. Urges the Member States’ governments to immediately enter into dialogue with defence companies in order to guarantee that production and delivery, in particular, of ammunition, shells and missiles for Ukraine are prioritised over orders from other third countries;

Changed:10.13. Underlines the EU’s concrete support to Ukraine through the ‘three ammunition tracks’; urges faster delivery of ammunition from Member States’ existing stocks through the EPF; draws attention to track two of the ‘three ammunition tracks’, which aims to provide one million artillery rounds to Ukraine by March 2024, and expresses concern about recent statements which indicate that the deadline will not be met; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States for the joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine to be sped up and stresses the need to ramp up the manufacturing capacities of the European industry by ensuring rapid and effective implementation of the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP); encourages the Member States to provide specialised opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the European defence sector so that they have the capacity to participate in the bidding process; calls on the EU Member States to accelerate the development of military ammunition production capacities, with particular focus on joint projects with Ukraine;Ukraine and to make sure that orders for Ukraine are prioritised without any further delay; further stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration in EU defence and cybersecurity policies and programmes during the EU membership process, building on cooperation and exchanges with the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), on the existing agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and on the possibility for Member States to procure on behalf of Ukraine as a recipient of additional quantities within the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA); calls on the EEAS and the Commission to come forward with a plan for a sustainable and long-term package of security commitments for Ukraine that is complementary to ensuring the increasing security requirements of the EU; welcomes the proposalssetting forup of the ‘Ukraine Facility’ and urges all actors to work for its speedy conclusion and implementation;

Added:19. Takes note of the debate on nuclear deterrence in Europe and calls for a constructive and open-minded European discussion on this core element of territorial defence and deterrence, which is needed to ensure the long-term security of the European continent and its peoples;

Changed:22.26. Highlights that the RDC should be established as one of the types of EU military capability for crisis response with its own legal identity, to allow for setting up the RDC as a force that is permanently available and trains together with the goal of becoming a standing force; notes that the RDC should conduct regular joint exercises at strategic, joint forces and tactical level within an EU framework based on operational scenarios and following uniform training and certification standards, such as within NATO, in order to improve readiness and interoperability; stresses that the exercises should be scheduled by the EUMS and planned and conducted by the MPCC; calls on the Member States to commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps in strategic enablers by 2025, in particular those linked to the RDC, such as strategic airlift, space communication assets, medical assets, cyber-defence capabilities and intelligence and reconnaissance; welcomes the force generation gap recently filled by the Member States, enabling the RDC and its battlegroups to become fully operational by 2025;

Changed:24.28. Highlights the urgent need to substantially enhance and invest in the military mobility of our armed forces, prioritising investments and removing bottlenecks and missing links; commends efforts made by Member States, allies, the EU and NATO in advancing military mobility across central and eastern Europe; calls on the Members States to further act to simplify and harmonise procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines for granting permissions to enable the EU Member States to act faster and increase their efficiency of response, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of CSDP missions and operations, as well as national and multinational activities;

Changed:25.29. Calls to strengthen the EDA, to manage advanced research and capability development and to foster joint procurement in order to strengthen the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB);(EDTIB), while not obstructing procurement of any equipment from like-minded countries; calls for improving defence financing through exploring a potential reform of the European Investment Bank’s lending policy; calls for the strengthening of the industries’ access to private funding to ensure that the European defence industry has sufficient access to public and private finance and investment on a sustainable basis; calls on the CommissionCommission, in cooperation with the Member States, to consider developing parameters for a financial product that aims to support investments in European security, including actions by the defence industry; welcomes the joint effort by the European Investment Bank and the Commission to launch the Defence Equity Facility, with EUR 175 million, to stimulate the development of dual-use technologies; welcomes the new revamped fiscal rules on budget deficits, which enable extra military spending in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine;

Changed:35.39. Emphasises the importance of adequate, flexible and sustainable funding for all security and defence programs and initiatives, including the CFSP budget and the EPF; regrets the fact that the CFSP budget has only marginally increased from the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020 to the MFF 2021-2027, while the number of CSDP mission tasks has increased; calls for a substantive increase in funding for the CFSP budget, including a dedicated CFSP budget line establishing a civilian support facility to provide partner countries with equipment and services to enhance their civilian capabilities; urgeswelcomes the Member States toagreement increaseby the resourcesEuropean allocatedCouncil to security andreinforce defencenew inpriorities theby nextEUR MFF64,6 review,billion in view of the depletion of Heading 5 and ina lightrevised ofEU theMFF, growingincluding securityan needsincrease of the Union, which will require furtherEUR initiatives1,5 suchbillion asallocated theto EDIPEuropean andDefence furtherFund funding(EDF) forunder the EDF as proposed in thenew Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP);(STEP)); invites the Member States to bring forward the re-assessment of the scope and definition of common costs to enhance solidarity and stimulate participation in military missions and operations, as well as exercise-related costs in line with the Strategic Compass; calls, further, on the Member States to amend the EPF financing process to ensure adequate and sustainable support for partners, allies and CSDP operations;

Changed:38.42. Welcomes the revision of the CDP and the envisaged presentation of the resultsCDP thisfor year;2023; regrets the limited progress in capability development since the first CDP in 2008; stresses that, especially in the light of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and the threat to European security, stronger and more joint efforts by EU Member States are needed in order to deter aggressors and protect European citizens and interests;

Changed:39.43. Considers that the EDF is regrettably still underfinanced, yet shows the added-value of EU-level action in European defence; recommends the extension of Commission proposals in all defence-related fields of EU policy in coordination with Member States; calls for a further increase of EUR 1 billion to the EDF budget, in addition to the Commission’s suggestedagreed EUR 1.51,5 billion, as part of the proposal for STEP; urges maximum consistency and coordination between various initiatives in the field of security and defence, such as the CARD, EDF, EDIRPA, ASAP, PESCO and Military Mobility among others, to prevent overlaps, guarantee efficient public investments and address the critical capabilities gap;

Changed:41.45. Points out that the EDIRPA and ASAP can only be a first step towards improving the EDTIB’s capacities to supply Member States with the products and quantities needed and should be complemented with further initiatives, including a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) coupled with the envisaged long-term and comprehensive EDIP for which adequate funding needs to be ensured, as well as an effective regulatory framework aimed at encouraging innovation, boosting production and ensuring smarter and more efficient public investments; calls, in that regard, on the EU Member States to provide the necessary funds to all European defence instruments in the upcoming MFF revision; regrets that the EDIP has still not been proposed by the Commission; calls for the fast and efficient implementation of the EDIRPA and ASAP; fully supports the proposed creation of a EUR 100 billion common defence fund aimed at immediately ramping up domestic arms and ammunition production;

Added:50. Calls on the Council to launch the project to establish a European Civil Peace Corps bringing together the expertise of institutional and non-institutional actors in conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation with a view to making EU civilian crisis management more credible, consistent, effective, flexible and visible;

Changed:47.52. Calls, in that regard, on all Member States and EU candidate countries to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation;

Changed:58.63. Welcomes the establishment of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), which aims to help increase security in the region by decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas in Armenia, to reduce the level of risks for the population living in such areas and thereby to contribute to the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the ground, while at the same time increasing the visibility of the EU in the region; calls onwelcomes the CouncilCouncil’s agreement to increasestrengthen the numberobservation ofcapacity expertsof deployedthe asmission partby ofincreasing EUMA,its topresence increaseon the mission’sground; capacitycalls andon the Council to extend its deployment timeframe for five more years and its geographical scope to potentially include the Armenia-Türkiye border;

Changed:59.64. Calls on the EEAS to be prepared to provide the necessary technical assistance to Armenia through the EPF instrument, in order for Armenia to reconsider its current military alliances, as this would strengthen the resilience of Armenia in the context of ensuring security, independence and sovereignty and lead to more comprehensive and enhanced defence cooperation between the sides; welcomes Armenia’s decision to join the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute; requests the EEAS to provide, in confidential mode, the EUMA reports on the situation on the ground to Parliament’s Committee of the Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Subcommittee on the Security and Defence (SEDE);

Changed:60.65. Calls on the Council to be prepared to impose targeted and individual sanctions against perpetrators of aggression, including but not limited to the political and military entourage of President Aliyev, and suspend imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, in the event of any military aggression against Armenian territorial integrity by Azerbaijan;;Azerbaijan;

Changed:64.69. Strongly condemns the illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia by the Russian Federation and stresses that the Russian Federation continues its illegal occupation and effective control over the occupied territories of Georgia through its military presence, continued installation of barbed wire fences and other artificial barriers along the occupation line, frequent illegal detentions and kidnappings of Georgian citizens and other human rights violations on the ground; strongly condemns Russia’s plans to build a permanent naval base at the Black Sea port of Ochamchire in the occupied region of Abkhazia and calls on the international community to support all efforts to punish this gross violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls on the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular its obligation to withdraw all of its military and security personnel from Georgia’s occupied territories and to allow the establishment of international security mechanisms therein, and to allow the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate; reiterates its calls for the EU to continue to pursue its engagement for the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Georgia conflict by effectively using all the instruments available, including the Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Geneva International Discussions, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms, the EUMM, and its policy of non-recognition and engagement; welcomes EU’s assistance to Georgia under the EPF and calls for the EU to further engage in security cooperation with Georgia across the priority areas identified in the Strategic Compass, in particular to strengthen the resilience of Georgia’s security sector in the area of crisis management, counter hybrid threats and upgrade defence capabilities;

Changed:77.82. Condemns the presence of PMCs and/or state sponsored proxies, such as the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, which hashave played a destabilising role in the Sahel region and hashave supported various repressive regimes in an attempt to increase Russian influence in Africa; considers that all coup d’états are the result of various, multi-dimensional causes which are not identical in each country and therefore require careful considerations; is nevertheless appalled by expressions of strong anti-European sentiments in certain countries and calls on the Member States and the EEAS to consider increasing people-to-people contact through closer exchanges with local populations and national authorities, more targeted strategic communication in local languages to counter-balance adverse effects and honestly addressing their colonial past where necessary;

Changed:79.84. Underlines that of the EU’s five training missions (EUTM) and military partnership missions (EUMPM) in Africa, three of them (Central African Republic, Mali, Niger) are now proceeding at a much slower pace or have been officially suspended; also points out that some civilian missions providing assistance to domestic security forces are at a standstill (EUCAP Sahel Mali) orMali), functioning poorly (EUAM RCA);RCA) or withdrawing (EUCAP Sahel Niger); underlines the urgent need for deployed personnel to have access to tools, training, equipment and resources enabling them to provide information and intelligence to the EU and its Member States; considers that the concept of support remains essential in training missions in order to allow European advisers to verify as accurately as possible, on the ground, whether training programmes have been properly conducted and whether they are in line with the operational needs of local armed forces;

Added:86. Welcomes the launch of the EU security and defence initiative in support of West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea, for an initial duration of two years, in close coordination with Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin;

Changed:82.88. Welcomes the update of the EU Maritime Strategy and Action Plan and the commitment to strengthen the Union’s role as a provider of international maritime security; welcomes the fact that the review includes the reinforcement of current naval operations; is pleased that the update proposes to explore new areas of interest at sea in which to implement the CMP concept based on the experience gained in the Gulf of Guinea and the North-West Indian Ocean; calls on the Member States to engage actively with those initiatives and to build up their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Atlantic, the Indo-Pacific and the global maritime sector;sector as well as to effectively tackle threats and challenges in the Baltic Sea;

Changed:83.89. Highlights the need to ensure the security of the Black Sea region by assisting in demining Ukraine’s seawaters and to encourage Member States to offer training exercises in this regard with an emphasis on the development of maritime mine counter measure capabilities and critical seabed infrastructure protection; underlines the fact that similar technology should be tested and deployed in other European seas in which the problem of unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons dumped in the previous century already constitute a threat to security, the environment, health and the economy, such as in the Baltic, Adriatic and North seas; calls on the Commission to increase funding to tackle this growing challenge;

Changed:88.94. Deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues its unilateral provocative actions and non-compliance with the UN Security Council resolution on the arms embargo on Libya with regard to operation IRINI, violating international law, including UNCLOS and the sovereign rights of EU Member States, in particular Greece and Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the recent joint declaration of the leaders of Türkyie and Greece on pursuing good neighbourly relations, opening communication, lessening tension through military confidence-building, increasing trade and working to resolve issues in the Aegean Sea; notes that Türkiye is increasingly present in areas where the EU has key security interests and CSDP missions, and calls upon Türkiye to refrain from undermining EU interests and missions in these areas; reiterates its condemnation of the signature of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are interconnected and are clear violations of international law, the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the sovereign rights of EU Member States;

Changed:96.102. Welcomes the accession of Finland to NATO; strongly deplores the delaying of the ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession; denounces, in this context, further, attempts to undermine democratic freedoms in EU Member States through the instrumentalisation of granting consent to Sweden’s accession to NATO; takes note that Türkiye finally agreed on 10 July 2023 to forward the NATO Accession Protocol of Sweden to its Grand National Assembly and to work closely with the Assembly to ensure ratification; regrets, however,welcomes, thatin this process is stillregard, pendingTürkiye’s and that there is no clear timeline, as is the case in Hungary; urges HungaryHungary’s andlong-delayed Türkiyedecision to ratifyapprove Sweden’s NATO membership without anyaccession furtherto delay;NATO; urges the Turkish authorities to deliver on their promise of a more constructive partnership in NATO, including in the Eastern Mediterranean:Mediterranean;

Changed:98.104. Underlines the importance of developing security and defence dialogues with partners around the world, in particular in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, but also with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as those stretching from the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific, from the east coast of Africa to the South Pacific and from the Arctic to the Far East; calls for deepening military-security cooperation with countries in the immediate European neighbourhood by strengthening the security dimension and enhancing security and defence policy dialogues; reiterates the call for deeper cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the AU and its peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security;

Changed:100.106. Strongly condemns the numerous missile tests conducted by North Korea in 2023; underlines the particular responsibility of China and Russia when it comes to North Korea and calls on them to use their influence to prevent any further escalation; expresses its profound concern about the recent meeting between the North Korean and Russian leaders; expresses grave concernstrongly aboutcondemns likelythe deliveries of North Korean arms and ballistic missiles to RussiaRussia, andwhich raisesare considerablebeing concernsused in the war of aggression against Ukraine, and notes that, through its likely enhanced military cooperation, Russia is violating UN sanctions and resolutions on North Korea; strongly condemns Iran for supplying Russia with drones and missiles to use in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and underlines that further international efforts, in close cooperation with our partners, are needed regarding Iran;