Changes between two versions
What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text
From · plenary report· 11 Dec 2023
on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
To · adopted text· 17 Jan 2024
Security and defence implications of China's influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
Changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations and punctuation-only edits are left out; they are under “Every difference”.
The changes · 1
Change 1
Changed:14. Notes that Chinese companies are already leaders in key technologies used in sectors such as 5G wireless infrastructure, drones, batteries, hypersonic missiles, solar and wind energy, as well as cryptocurrency; expresses its concerns over the uses of these technologies and the dependencies they create; notes, in this regard, that 100 % of the 5G RAN in Cyprus is composed of Chinese equipment, and 59 % in the case of Germany; stresses that this runs counter to the EU’s ‘5G security toolbox’ guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks and calls on the Council and the Commission to exclude the use of equipment and software from manufacturers based in the PRC in core network functions; recalls that Huawei has been participating in 11 projects under Horizon Europe until June 2023, thus receiving EUR 3.893,89 million of funding in total; therefore, urges the EU and European institutions to carry out a systematic screening of Chinese companies benefiting directly or indirectly from European programmes of strategic importance for the EU and, where necessary, terminate their participation; furthermore, calls on the Commission to propose additional security standards for Chinese suppliers of 5G and the next generation 6G network;