What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Added:O. whereas Israel has an internationally recognised right to defend itself against the terrorist threat posed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip; whereas the terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023 have underscored the volatile security situation in the Middle East; whereas the risk of escalation in the region is the highest it has been in decades, thus amplifying the need for the EU and other international actors to assume greater responsibility for a durable and sustainable peace, in particular by garnering support for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine;

Added:P. whereas there is a need for a comprehensive peace-building approach involving civilian specialists in order to implement practical measures for peace; whereas local and international nongovernmental organisations perform crucial activities aimed at preventing conflicts and resolving conflicts peacefully, and it is of the utmost importance to make the most of their experience;

Changed:7. Reiterates that Georgia experienced Russian military aggression as early as August 2008; strongly condemns Russia’s ongoing illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and similarly condemns the undermining of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova through the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria; reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova and underlines that Russia’s malicious attempts to forcibly change the borders of sovereign states in Europe pose a serious threat to the EU’s security; encourages the EU and the Member States to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in countering hybrid threats, disinformation and cybersecurity;

Changed:10. Calls for a more active communication strategy in order to promote the role and benefits of enlargement in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, as well as promoting the EU’s financial and technical assistance; recalls, in this context, that the EU is already the biggest trading partner and the largest provider of investment and financial assistance in the Western Balkans; notes that more than EUR 6,5 billion had already been committed from IPA III up to the end of 2023 and that the EU mobilised EUR 16,6 billion in investments to the region within the time frame 2021-2023;

Changed:16. Welcomes the additional funding for the European Peace Facility and calls on the Member States to improve the Facility’s ability to act through sustainable and appropriate funding; welcomes, in this regard, the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 January 2024 as well as the conclusions of the European Council on 1 February 2024 indicating an agreement on the modalities and the overall financial ceiling of a new ‘Ukraine Assistance Fund’; expects the final decision to be taken at the European Council on 21 and 22 March 2024; welcomes the decisions to establish the Act in Support of Ammunition Production and the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act in order to reinforce European defence capacities; reiterates its call to urgently launch a discussion with a view to establishing another off-budget financial facility that would address the entire life cycle of military capabilities at EU level;

Changed:17. Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; commends the Council and the Member States for the determined response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the mobilisation of unprecedented amounts of macroeconomic, financial, economic and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine, the delivery ofadoption, weaponsin andunison ammunitionwith bylike-minded Memberpartners, States,of whichtwelve waspackages alsoof madesanctions possiblethat byshould thehave Europeana Peacedevastating Facility,impact andon the adoption, inRussian unisoneconomy withand like-mindedthe partners,delivery of 11weapons packagesand ofammunition sanctionsby thatMember shouldStates, havewhich awas devastatingalso impactmade onpossible by the RussianEuropean economy;Peace Facility; is concerned, however, by the fact that Hungary is still blocking the eighth tranche of the European Peace Facility dedicated to Ukraine; calls for the Russian Federation to be isolated and pressured further by reinforcing the application of restrictive measures, also against Belarus; appeals to reinforce the diplomatic outreach towards all of the States that abstained or did not participate in the vote on the UN General Assembly resolutions of 13 October 2022 and 2 March 2023; appeals for proactive diplomacy with third countries, in concert with like-minded partners, most notably the US, Canada and the UK, in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions and close all remaining legal loopholes to stop this practice; regrets that the lackEU’s twelfth package of restrictivesanctions measuresextends onthe Russianwind-down diamonds;periods for the import of specific steel products;

Changed:19. Recalls that the consistent and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is a precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; calls on all third countries, and in particular EU candidate countries, to show unambiguous commitment to international law and EU strategic interests and values and to align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls for the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to third countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on third countries enabling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Iran;Iran or the DPRK;

Changed:20. Encourages the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to mobilise international support for the peace formula presented by Ukraine and to engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact; welcomes the bilateral security agreements signed between the UK, Germany, France and Ukraine respectively, fulfilling the commitments made by the G7 on 12 July 2023 to deter any new Russian attack on Ukraine in the foreseeable future; underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggressionaggression, crimes amounting to genocide and war crimes against Ukraine, including conflict-related sexual violence, perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies, in particular Belarus;Belarus, including their political and military leadership; calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian state-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; welcomes the newly established International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, hosted by the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), which will facilitate case-building for future trials; urges the Commission to locate and map immobilised Russian assets and to come up with a legally sound and effective proposal for using these assets to finance the defence and reconstruction of Ukraine, ensuring that this legally sound proposal is developed in close coordination with the G7 partner countries; highlights that demining and the clearance of unexploded ordnance are prerequisites for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including its agricultural production, which is vital for the country’s economy and for global food security; highlights that these efforts will require comprehensive, long-term funding;

Changed:22. Calls on the Member States to maintain the resolve and unity that they have already demonstrated and to provide Ukraine with further political, humanitarian, military, infrastructure-related, economic and financial support to win this war; welcomes, in this respect, the assistance provided by the Member States, both individually and through EU instruments, including the Commission proposal on establishing the Ukraine Facility; welcomes the interinstitutional agreement reached on 6 February 2024 ensuring predictable financial support for Ukraine amounting to EUR 50 billion over the 2024-2027 period to contribute to the country’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation; underlines the need for full transparency in the Facility’s implementation; calls on the Member States to continue to provide the necessary military aid for Ukraine to expel Russian forces from its territory; urges the Member States to produce ammunition and provide it to Ukraine’s armed forces, along with other necessary resources for Ukraine to service its military hardware; encourages the Member States to continue providing financial and political support for civil society in and around Ukraine;

Changed:36. Reiterates further that the EU and its Member States need to mainstream democracy support further into the programming of the EU financial instruments and stresses, in this context, the need to equip relevant EU delegations with appropriate means to increase public diplomacy activities and to develop their strategic communication capabilities to fight against disinformation and propaganda; calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU Delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of the appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges, such as increasing instability, more assertive authoritarianism and the climate emergency; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to pursue a feminist foreign and security policy that is in accordance with Parliament’s resolution of 10 March 2022 on the EU Gender Action Plan III;

Added:43. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the killing on 16 February 2024 of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate, who was incarcerated in a penal colony and subjected to ill treatment, including torture, arbitrary punishment and psychological pressure; calls for improved conditions for political prisoners in Russia, in line with its international commitments; denounces the Russian regime’s escalating human rights violations and condemns the ongoing suppression of government critics, human rights defenders and independent journalists; urges the EU and its Member States to provide assistance to Russian human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists and independent journalists both within and outside Russia; urges the Council to adopt restrictive measures against those responsible for the killing of Alexei Nalvany and for the arbitrary prosecutions and torture of anti-war protesters;

Added:46. Calls on the Council to launch the project to establish a European civil peace corps, bringing together the expertise of institutional and non-institutional actors in conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation with a view to making EU civilian crisis management more credible, consistent, effective, flexible and visible;

Changed:49.51. Emphasises the need to build strategic solidarity between like-minded partners as the best response to a more dangerous and unpredictable security environment; emphasises the need to strengthen existing partnerships with countries that share our values, particularly on issues such as strategic dependencies, economic coercion, political interference and disinformation, and highlights the significance of building new alliances, inter alia in the Global South, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with third countries, whereby the EU will develop stronger partnerships with those that uphold the principles of the CFSP and CSDP and the fundamental values of the Union; believes, conversely, that the ‘less for less’ principle should apply in relation to third countries which display a manifest disregard for human rights and international law, as well as to those which enable other third countries to commit these violations; recalls that the level and intensity of EU engagement should be adapted accordingly, in particular in terms of development cooperation, trade benefits and access to EU programmes;

Changed:54.56. Regrets the fact that the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement does not include provisions on cooperation on foreign policy and defence; calls, in this context, for greater involvement of the UK in European security and defence projects and for more structured and regular engagement with the UK on foreign affairs, building on the constructive experience of EU-UK cooperation in countering Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the adoption and monitoring of sanctions; welcomes the joint missions to third countries by representatives of the EU and the UK with a view to preventing the circumvention of sanctions; highlights shared interests and collective responsibilities and calls for more permanent forms of coordination with regard to foreign and security policy in various regions; welcomes the UK’s participation in the European Political Community;Community and its hosting of its fourth summit; is convinced that the European Political Community can facilitate trust between the UK and the EU, promote closer dialogue on shared challenges, particularly relating to security, and serve as an incubator for concrete cooperation projects;

Changed:55.57. Welcomes both the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and Belarusian democratic forces, and the ongoing support provided to Russian human rights defenders and to independent media inside and outside Russia; is shocked by the death of 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate Alexei Navalny, who was arrested and sentenced on dubious and politically motivated grounds and who sacrificed his life to defend democracy and oppose oppression and corruption in Russia; calls on the Russian regime to shed light on the circumstances of Alexei Navalny’s death without delay; reiterates its support for the Belarusian democratic opposition, all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader and the regime’s complicity in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine in spite of ongoing crackdowns, and who have expressed their desire to achieve the democratic development of Belarus and its membership of the EU, inter alia at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

Removed:57. Welcomes the 2023 enlargement package and the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans presented by the Commission and calls on the Council to demonstrate genuine political commitment to the EU membership perspective of the countries in Western Balkans; notes that this should include advancing accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; supports efforts to achieve, as a matter of priority, the relevant constitutional changes in North Macedonia and calls on all political forces to play a constructive role in this regard; asks, in particular, the governments of the Member States that set this additional requirement for North Macedonia to do their utmost to support these efforts; regrets the unjustified delays in the accession processes of North Macedonia and Albania and recalls that candidate countries should be assessed on the basis of their own merit in complying with the objective criteria for accession, including their implementation of EU-related reforms and their policy alignment with the CFSP, such as the positions and restrictive measures adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the fact that the majority of countries in the Western Balkans are aligned with the CFSP, while calling on Belgrade to urgently do the same, particularly considering that Serbia is one of the very few European countries not yet in line with the sanctions adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; recalls that accession can only proceed once the country in question aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on EU-related reforms; remains very concerned about the destabilising influence on the whole region of the Serbian authorities;

Added:59. Is shocked and appalled by the murder of 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate and Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny, who sacrificed his life to defend democracy and oppose oppression and corruption in Russia;

Removed:58. Regrets the fact that high political tensions and polarisation in Montenegro delayed progress on EU-related reforms and plunged the country into a deep political and institutional crisis, stalling Montenegro’s EU accession process; welcomes the formation of a new government and stresses the importance of it being able and committed to take forward EU-related reforms and keep Montenegro firmly on the EU strategic path;

Added:60. Welcomes the 2023 enlargement package and the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes a facility of EUR 6 billion in grants and loans to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU between 2024 and 2027; confirms that it is examining the proposal for the reform and growth facility for the Western Balkans and will cooperate with the Council to ensure rapid ratification; calls on the Council to demonstrate genuine political commitment to the EU membership perspective of the countries in Western Balkans; notes that this should include advancing accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; supports efforts to achieve, as a matter of priority, the relevant constitutional changes in North Macedonia and calls on all political forces to play a constructive role in this regard; asks, in particular, the governments of the Member States that set this additional requirement for North Macedonia to do their utmost to support these efforts; regrets the unjustified delays in the accession processes of North Macedonia and Albania and recalls that candidate countries should be assessed on the basis of their own merit in complying with the objective criteria for accession, including their implementation of EU-related reforms and their policy alignment with the CFSP, such as the positions and restrictive measures adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the fact that the majority of countries in the Western Balkans are aligned with the CFSP, while calling on Belgrade to urgently do the same, particularly considering that Serbia is one of the very few European countries not yet in line with the sanctions adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; recalls that accession can only proceed once the country in question aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on EU-related reforms; remains very concerned about the destabilising influence on the whole region of the Serbian authorities;

Removed:65. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendation to the Council to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Council to adopt the negotiation framework once Ukraine and Moldova have advanced on pending laws on anti-corruption and the verification of assets and undertaken further steps on de-oligarchisation; takes positive note of the recommendation to also open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved; welcomes Kosovo’s application for EU membership and asks the Commission to respond to it; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens, which will enter into force no later than January 2024;

Added:71. Regrets the numerous irregularities that were reported by observers during the Serbian early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023, including, but not limited to, misuse of public resources, pressure on public-sector employees, intimidation and pressure on voters, vote buying and media capture; calls for a prompt independent investigation into these irregularities; against this background, calls on the Serbian authorities to follow up on the recommendations from the international election observation mission; is concerned about the deep polarisation within Serbian society and the recent violent episodes, including the reported beating of an opposition politician by the Serbian secret services;

Removed:66. Takes positive note of the Commission’s recommendation to the Council to grant Georgia the status of candidate country on the understanding that further steps are taken on fighting disinformation, aligning with the CFSP, improving the implementation of parliamentary oversight and addressing political polarisation, de-oligarchisation and anti-corruption; underlines the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and accordingly stresses the importance of EU support for the country, with a focus on civil society actors working towards Georgia’s integration into the EU; points to the potential stabilising role that Georgia can play in the South Caucasus;

Added:72. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and with the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Council to adopt the respective negotiation frameworks once the relevant steps set out in the respective Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 are taken; takes positive note of the recommendation to also open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved; welcomes Kosovo’s application for EU membership and asks the Commission to respond to it; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens;

Changed:68.75. Believes that Ukraine’s and the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe; welcomes the support package and the launch of the civilian EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova; commends the progress already achieved on reforms and urges the Commission to present an ambitious roadmap for accession negotiations to start as soon as possible, as well as for Ukraine’s and Moldova’s gradual integration into EU policies and programmes; underlines the complexity and merit-based nature of the enlargement process, which requires steps to be taken steadily and in a timely manner; further insists that a continuous effort must be made to adjust existing accession tools and build the legal basis for the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III; looks forward to the European Council’s addressing internal reforms concerning enlargement at its upcoming meetings with a view to adopting, by the summer of 2024, the conclusions on a roadmap for future work;

Changed:70.77. Condemns,Regrets the fact that Azerbaijan chose a military solution over diplomacy with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, while recognising that Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as Azerbaijani territory; condemns, in the strongest terms, the pre-planned and unjustified attack by Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and the people who have remained in the region; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh and to offer solid guarantees regarding the protection of their rights; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; deplores the fact that Baku’s offensive represented a gross violation of international law and human rights and a clear infringement of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and of the commitments that Azerbaijan made in the negotiations mediated by the EU; believes that genuine dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the only sustainable way forward and calls for the EU and its Member States to support such efforts; supports the ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have been seriously hampered by the recent military operation against Nagorno-KarabakhNagorno-Karabakh, andwhich led to the deexodus factoof ethnicArmenian cleansing;population; highlights that a dignified and durable regional peace that maintains sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for both countries is a prerequisite for stability in the neighbourhood; is concerned by attempts by some leaders and regional powers to exploit the current situation in a way that could threaten the fragile prospects for peace; warns that any efforts to achieve goals by using force and violating the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries should be met with a decisive response by the EU and the international community;

Changed:72.79. Calls on the VP/HR and the EEAS to further support Armenia via the European Peace Facility, in particular with a view to strengthening its defence capabilities against hybrid threats in order to enlarge its security space beyond the Collective Security Treaty Organization; welcomes the establishment of the EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue and its firstsecond meeting on 2615 JanuaryNovember 2023;

Changed:73.80. Stresses that Parliament’s multiple warnings about the situation have not led to any change in the EU’s policy regarding Azerbaijan; insists that any deepening of EU relations with Azerbaijan must remain conditional on the country making substantial progress on respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and fundamental freedoms, including the protection of ethnic minorities; expresses, in this regard, its serious concern about the recent worsening crackdown on independent journalists and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan; further calls on the EU to immediately impose sanctions on Azerbaijan and to suspend the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy; further, questions the suitability of Azerbaijan hosting COP29 in 2024 while the country plans to increase its fossil fuel production by a third over the next decade;

Changed:74.81. Reiterates its support for the democratically elected government of Armenia and its full respect of the country’s sovereignty, democracy and territorial integrity; praises Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s declaration that Armenia will not be dragged into a new war with Azerbaijan and his recent calls for the resumption of peace talks at the highest level with Azerbaijan; condemns Russian’s interference in Armenia, which are aimed at spreading unrest; calls for the EU to strengthen its engagement in the South Caucasus; welcomes Armenia’s decision toratification ratifyof the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

Changed:75.82. Remains concerned by the fact that Türkiye’s Government has not reversed the negative trend of deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary, that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP and that Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; strongly disagrees with and expresses its disappointment about the statements made by the President of Türkiye claiming that Hamas is not a terrorist organisation;

Changed:77.84. Welcomes the partial de-escalation of tensions in the East Mediterranean and Aegean and calls on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive or aggressive, approach with its partners in these regions; callswelcomes, onin thethis Grandregard, NationalTürkiye’s Assemblyand ofHungary’s Türkiyelong-delayed decision to swiftlyfinally ratifyapprove Sweden’s applicationaccession to join NATO and urges the Turkish national authorities to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

Changed:79.86. Deplores the fact that, more than 25 years after the start of the Barcelona Process, the creation of a shared area of prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries of the Southern Neighbourhood has not been achieved; encourages the VP/HR and the Commission to strengthen the southern dimension of the EU’s neighbourhood, including through increased dialogue and strengthened conditionality tied to the disbursement of funds, and to secure adequate resources for the timely and effective implementation of the new agenda for the Mediterranean, stresses the important role played by the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood in the management of migration in a manner based on the principles of the human rights of migrants and refugees as enshrined in international, regional and national law, solidarity, balance and the sharing of responsibility between countries; stresses the importance of practical agreementscooperation with these countries in order to mitigate the root causes of migration, consequences of irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling of illicit weapons and cultural goods; points out that many countries in the Southern Neighbourhood are rich in energy resources and can contribute more to the diversification of energy supply in European countries;

Changed:86.93. Condemns the Iranian regime for its provision of military equipment to Russia in the latter’s brutal and illegal aggression against Ukraine; stresses that the Islamic Republic is contributing to war crimes in Ukraine, as the equipment is being used to target civilians and civilian infrastructure, and calls for a robust EU response to Iran’s involvement in Russia’s war; condemns Iran’s sponsoring of designated terror groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas andHamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad;Jihad and the Houthis; condemns the illegal, unacceptable and profoundly destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea, using missiles, small boats, and attempted hijackings; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade, as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation; welcomes, in this context, the decision by the Member States to launch a maritime CSDP operation, under the name ASPIDES, to protect merchant vessels, by strengthening maritime situational awareness and accompanying vessels to deter attacks and ensure the freedom of navigation on one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for an immediate end to these illegal attacks and the release of unlawfully detained vessels and crews; expresses concern about the destabilising effect of suchIran’s activities on the Middle East and the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace; stresses the need to address and counter Iran’s wider malign and destabilising activities across the Middle East and beyond; strongly opposes Iran’s hostage diplomacy and demands that all European nationals being detained in Iran be freed and allowed to leave the country; calls on the regime in Teheran to cease its intimidation and repression campaign against Iranian diaspora groups in the EU and worldwide; calls on the Member States’ governments to be aware of the specific transnational repression tactics employed by Iran;

Changed:88.95. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against IsraelIsrael; calls for the immediate and expressesunconditional itsrelease supportof toall hostages taken by the Stateterrorist ofgroup IsraelHamas and itsfor people;the bodies of deceased hostages to be returned; recognises Israel’s right to self-defence, as enshrined in and constrained by international law, and that as such the actions of Israel must strictly comply with international humanitarian law;law, which outlines that all parties to a conflict must distinguish between combatants and civilians at all times, that attacks must only be directed at military targets and that civilians and civilian infrastructure must not be targeted in attacks; condemns the Israeli military’s disproportionate response, which has caused a civilian death toll of unprecedented scale; is very concerned about the extremely deteriorated humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and calls for humanitariana pausespermanent ceasefire so that aid can be provided to civilians in the Gaza Strip; urges the international community to continue and increase its humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in the area and reiterates that EU humanitarian aid must continue being delivered to them; urges Egyptthe andIsraeli Israelauthorities to cooperate withensure the international communitycontinuous toaccess establishof humanitarian corridorsaid to the Gaza Strip;Strip, with a focus on the uninterrupted delivery of essentials such as fuel, food, water, medical supplies and shelter, in line with international law; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon;

Removed:89. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution for Israel and Palestine on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital; encourages the EEAS and the Member States to take a European initiative to put the two-state solution back on track; recalls that settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are illegal under international law; call for an immediate end to the settlement policy, which is a major impediment to the viability of the two-state solution; emphasises that continued support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East remains a key element of the EU strategy for contributing to stability and peace in the Middle East;

Added:96. Calls on Member States to support the ICJ and to demand that Israel immediately comply with the legally binding orders issued by the court;

Added:97. Deplores the fact that Hamas and its allies are increasingly looking to take the conflict to a far broader arena in order to exert pressure on Israel as the Gaza ground offensive intensifies; is accordingly concerned that Iran and its allies are pushing for a regional war; is extremely worried about the escalatory potential of the war, as well as its impact on the wider region, especially the situation at the Israeli-Lebanese border, as fighters loyal to Hezbollah are firing rockets into Israel; stresses the importance of defusing tensions in the region;

Added:98. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution for Israel and Palestine on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital; encourages the EEAS and the Member States to take a European initiative to put the two-state solution back on track; calls, in this context, on the VP/HR and the Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to garner international support for the ‘Peace Day Effort’ for Middle East Peace, launched in New York at the UN General Assembly in September 2023; is aware of the fact that, for negotiations to resume, international stakeholders, including the US, the United Nations, the EU and Arab states, need to complement each other’s efforts for them to be constructive; recalls that settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are illegal under international law; strongly condemns the rise in extremist settler violence committed against Palestinians; calls for an immediate end to the settlement policy, as well as an end to the occupation of the Palestinian territories, which are major impediments to the viability of the two-state solution; calls for restrictive measures to be imposed on extremist settlers who violate human rights and international law; supports a just, viable and agreed-upon solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; emphasises that continued support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East remains a key element of the EU strategy for contributing to stability and peace in the Middle East; takes note with concern of the recent allegations made by Israel against 12 staff members of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); welcomes the UN’s immediate and determined response to the allegations, including the immediate dismissal of the employees in question and the launching of two separate investigations into the matter by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the independent review group led by former French Minister Catherine Colonna and three European organisations; calls on Israel, in this regard, to cooperate closely and provide all necessary evidence to the OIOS and the independent review group; welcomes the Commission’s decision not to suspend funding to UNRWA before the UN has announced the outcome of the investigations and the actions it will take; urges all donor countries which have suspended their funding to UNRWA owing to the allegations to reconsider their decision in the light of UNRWA’s immediate response to the allegations and its crucial role of delivering life-saving assistance to the two million people in the Gaza Strip who depend on it for their survival amid one of the largest and most complex humanitarian crises in the world;

Changed:91.101. Encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rightsrights, including in the context of the generalised scheme of preferences (GSP) and GSP+ where relevant, and to encourage good neighbourly relations; reiterates that all countries of the Central Asia region must commit to upholding the UN Charter, particularly the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries;

Changed:92.102. Welcomes the outcomes of the second EU-Central Asia Economic Forum in Almaty in May 2023 and the second meeting between the President of the European Council and the Heads of State of all five Central Asian countries in June 2023; calls for these high-level meetings and declarations to be followed up on with concrete actions; welcomes, in this context, the fact that the first EU-Central Asia summit is planned for this year; welcomes the endorsement of the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, which serves as a strategic blueprint to advance dialogue and cooperation in specific areas, including building cultural, social and economic resilience; urges the Commission and the Member States to sign the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with Kyrgyzstan, finalise preparatory work towards signing the EPCA with Uzbekistan and rapidly progress in the ongoing negotiations for an EPCA with Tajikistan;

Changed:97.107. Reiterates that a peaceful, free, connected, open, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific is a vital European interest; is concerned that great power competition is imposing parameters on the EU’s ability to promote multilateralism in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; acknowledges the VP/HR’s efforts to engage with the region, as evidenced by the co-organisation and co-chairing with the Swedish Presidencyorganisation of the third EU-Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum on 132 MayFebruary 20232024 and the VP/HR’s participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum on 14 July 2023; calls for the EU to actively support the Ministerial Forum on Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as an annual event;

Changed:99.109. Calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of KoreaDPRK to abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; deplores, in the strongest possible terms, the ongoing crimes against humanity and urges the country’s authorities to undertake a process of reform whereby all human rights are respected and protected; stresses the urgent need for the EU and the international community to prevent military cooperation and arms exchanges between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;DPRK;

Changed:100.110. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EUIndia and Indiathe EU in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; emphasises the full implementation of the 2018 EU strategy on India and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025, in close coordination with the Member States’ own actions to actively engage with India; welcomes the creation of the EU-India Trade and Technology Council; callsencourages the deepening of relations between India and the EU as strategic partners; calls, in this context, for anthe India-EUcommitment summitto regular multilevel dialogues and summits to be upheld to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda; encourages, in addition, a more structured interparliamentary dialogue between the European Parliament and its Indian counterpart; believes that such a dialogue would assist in the coordination of positions and initiatives in multilateral forums, particularly the UN, the World Trade Organisation and the G20; highlights the importance of a successful conclusion of the negotiations on an EU-India free trade agreement, taking into account sensitivities on both sides; expresses the hope that India will align its position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with that of the transatlantic community and calls on the Council and the VP/HR to make diplomatic efforts in this regard; recalls, in this context, that any deepening of the partnership should be based on the values of freedom, democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, equality, respect for human rights, sustainable development and a commitment to promoting an inclusive rules-based global order;

Changed:101.111. Expresses deep concern about the latest shifts in China’s domestic and military posture since the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party; considers that the growing assertiveness of China, in part through a policy of economic coercion, remains one of the primary geopolitical challenges of the 21st century; holds the view that China demonstrates that it has both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to tilt the international rules-based order; insists that this requires a multi-dimensional response through which the EU maintains its selective engagement with China on a number of key issues while de-risking its relationship by increasingly reducing economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy; notes that substantive engagement with China is increasingly difficult due to the more prominent competition and systemic rivalry dimensions; stresses that China remains important in many policy areas, including climate change; warns that the continued growth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers,transfers and cooperation in the Arctic region, may increase China’s ability to coerce the EU’s partners in Asia and around the world; reiterates its call for a more assertive EU-China strategy that shapes relations with China in the interest of the EU and takes full account of the challenges stemming from China’s rise as a global actor;

Changed:102.112. Condemns acts of hybrid warfare, such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and the surveillance or espionage of Chinese citizens within the EU; urges China to put an immediate end to these malign acts and to its information manipulation and electoral interference and calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement, as a matter of urgency, initiatives related to foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation, as suggested by Parliament; condemns the sanctions against Members of the European Parliament (and other EU entities)entities),national andparliaments, nationalEuropean parliamentsthink tanks and researchers and calls for their immediate and unconditional lifting;

Changed:103.113. Condemns the Chinese government-led system of forced labour and its violations of human rights, which the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may constitute crimes against humanity including high risk of genocide in Xinjiang and crimes against humanity in Tibet and Inner Mongolia, as well as the oppressive policies against other ethnic minorities; recalls that the EU’s ‘One China policy’ remains a cornerstone of EU-China relations; reaffirmsreiterates theits EU’scondemnation commitmentof toChina’s theviolation ‘oneof country,its twointernational systems’commitments, principleits breaches of the Sino-British and condemnsSino-Portuguese anyJoint possibleDeclarations, violationsthe ofInternational it;Covenant reiterateson itsCivil condemnationand ofPolitical theRights, Chinesethe Communist‘one Party’scountry, underminingtwo ofsystems’ democracyprinciple inand the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeBasic Region,Law includingas masswell surveillance,as the continuedcrackdown deteriorationon ofthe fundamentalspecial humanadministrative rightsregion’s autonomy and theopposition impositionfigures, ofincluding themembers Nationalof Securitycivil Lawsociety inand Hongtheir Kong;family members; calls on the Commission to assess the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macao in light of China’s breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;

Changed:105.115. Condemns the growing trend of transnational repression by China and calls on those EU Member States that have not yet done so to suspend their extradition treaties with China and Hong Kong and to close all remaining illegal Chinese ‘police stations’ on their territories; expresses concern about the agreement on ‘strengthening law enforcement cooperation and joint patrols’ signed by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the Hungarian Ministry of Interior on 16 February 2024; calls on the Hungarian Government to immediately and fully disclose all details of the agreement and its potential adverse effects on the common security and sovereignty of the European Union; calls on the EEAS to closely monitor the trials of political prisoners in Hong Kong and to call for the release of such political prisoners, including the founder of Apple Daily, Jimmy Lai;

Changed:106.116. Takes note of the latest BRICS summit that took place in Johannesburg in August 2023 and2023, of China’s geopolitical objectives with regard to BRICS;BRICS and of China’s narratives in the context of its Global Development, Global Security and Global Civilization Initiatives; highlights the need for the EU and its Member States to increase dialogue and cooperation with some members of BRICS+ to counter Russia’s malign actions and China’s rising global influence;

Changed:108.118. Strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait;Strait, which endangers regional stability; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan; welcomes the visits to Taiwan, since 2021, by consecutive official delegations from Parliament committees and encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan; calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan;

Changed:109.119. Denounces statements by the Chinese President that China will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan;Taiwan and encourages China’s leadership to exercise caution and restraint in the wake of the Taiwanese presidential and parliamentary elections; notes that neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other; expresses grave concern over China’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats, and underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage; notes the need to also focus on preventive diplomacy to avoid any escalation in the Taiwan Strait;

Changed:110.120. Notes that China has focused on strengthening its influence in the Indo-Pacific through increased aid, development, diplomacy and security cooperation over the last decade; highlights that resources need to be pooled to effectively enhance the EU’s political footprint and assert the EU as a reliable and strategic partner in the Pacific; expresses concern about China’s attempts to dominate its near-seas region, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea, which could seriously tilt the regional balance of power and negatively affect the EU’s economic and political interests; urges China, in this regard, to stop any military actions and pressure directed against the Philippine Navy and its occupied islands in the South China Sea; encourages the Member States to join forces and engage at ministerial level with Pacific island countries and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States; stresses that a serious follow-up to COP27COP28 is a key concern for the countries in the region and therefore urges the EEAS to promote global support for a sustainable green transition and to step up its climate diplomacy to consolidate cooperation on climate change adaptation and mitigation measures;

Changed:112.122. Welcomes the signature of the Post-CotonouSamoa AgreementAgreement, and its regional protocols, which will allow for an unprecedented regional focus on African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, and calls for swift ratification by both the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the EU; urges the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure that the EU-African Union summit of February 2022 is followed up on in order to deepen cooperation on initiatives of shared interest and to meet the needs of partner countries in Africa; calls for the postponed third EU-African Union ministerial meeting to take place as soon as possible; emphasises that the EU should pursue geographical priorities on a bilateral level, focusing on key African partners, but also on a regional level, focusing on the implementation of regional strategies for the Sahel and coastal countries, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa; welcomes, in this context, Operation Atalanta, which, as the first EU naval operation with the dedicated objective of protecting UN World Food Programme vessels, has become a successful counter-piracy operation; encourages the Council and the Member States to consider extending the geographical scope of Operation Atalanta;

Changed:113.123. Attaches particular importance to strengthening security collaboration with countries of the Gulf of Guinea, supporting their integration and intra-regional solidarity; welcomes, in this respect, the launch of the EU security and defence initiative in support of West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea, for an initial duration of two years, in close coordination with Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin; expresses grave concern about the deterioration of stability in the Sahel, exacerbated by the military coup in Niger and the dissolution of democratic institutions; does not and will not recognise the authorities resulting from the coup in Niger; reiterates its very clear call for the full restoration, without delay, of the constitutional order and fully associates itself with the declarations of the Economic Community of West African States and its African and international partners in this regard;

Removed:117. Notes that the EU should take a particular interest in reinvigorating its partnership with countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for foreign malign actors; urges countries across Latin America to adopt a firmer attitude of condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; is concerned about the increase in organised crime and drug trafficking in Latin America, which also has an impact on the EU; calls for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation to combat this phenomenon;

Added:127. Condemns the actions undertaken by Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, which present a direct threat to the sovereignty of Guyana; calls on the international community to engage in discussions to determine a diplomatic solution respecting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on this longstanding dispute;

Removed:118. Takes note of the summit on 17 and 18 July 2023 between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and hopes that it will improve bi-regional relations, particularly given the growing influence of China and Russia in Latin America and the Caribbean; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region, with a strong emphasis on defending the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights; welcomes the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for progress to be made towards the signing and ratification of the EU-Mexico Association Agreement; calls on the Commission and the Spanish and Belgian Council Presidencies to advance decisively and conclude the agreement with Mercosur before the end of the current parliamentary term, while keeping the highest level of ambition in relation to the enforcement of its sustainability provisions; also recalls the need to finalise the ratification of the EU-Central America Association Agreement;

Added:128. Condemns the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo who are systematically undermining Nicaragua’s democratic structures, including the separation of powers, the electoral system and respect for human rights; recalls that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties to other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, while consistently demonstrating its support for the Kremlin by, inter alia, authorising a Russian military presence in Nicaragua; calls for the liberation of all political prisoners, among whom are several Catholic bishops and priests, who have been detained in an attempt to silence dissidents, for the return to the rule of law and for a dialogue between the regime and the opposition to be facilitated by the EU; condemns the continued psychological and physical abuse that all detainees suffer at the hands of police and prison authorities, and the situation of incommunicado detention in which some of them are being held, without access to their lawyers, families or medical care; reminds the Nicaraguan regime of its responsibility to ensure that detention conditions comply with its international human rights obligations and with standards such as the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules);