What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Removed:The refugee crisis of 2015-16 turned into a crisis in the asylum system, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the Dublin III Regulation in responding to such a situation, its structural failings and the numerous shortcomings in its implementation.

Added:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Removed:The Commission has acknowledged that Dublin is a system ‘which by design or poor implementation [of the regulation] places a disproportionate responsibility on certain Member States and encourages uncontrolled and irregular migratory flows’. This is why in 2016 it put forward a new proposal to remedy this problem. However, despite the European Parliament approving a negotiating mandate in November 2017, the Council has still not adopted its general approach.

Added:PE648.425

Removed:To break the deadlock, the Commission announced a ‘European Pact for Migration and Asylum’, including a new proposal for a revision of Dublin III.

Added:European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation (2019/2206(INI))

Removed:An ambitious reform must be based on detailed knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the legal text in force. Although the Commission published two evaluations of the regulation, in December 2015 and March 2016 (Article 46), it has still not submitted its periodic assessment due in July 2018.

Removed:Against that backdrop, and in view of the failure of the Dublin III Regulation, the European Parliament has decided to prepare an updated analysis of the regulation, in keeping with its accountability to European citizens for the legislative acts which it adopts.

Removed:Methodology

Removed:This assessment is based on a range of complementary sources: a public hearing in the LIBE committee held on 19 February 2020, field visits, interviews with stakeholders, two questionnaires sent to all the permanent representations and national parliaments of the Member States applying the regulation, a study by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and regular coordination meetings between the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs.

Removed:1. PART I: Post-crisis feedback, learning lessons to overhaul Dublin III

Removed:1.1. The emergence of the Dublin Regulation: gradual harmonisation

Removed:At EU level, the establishment of the area of free movement went hand in hand with the launch of European cooperation on asylum. In 1990, the Schengen and Dublin Conventions came into force at roughly the same time.

Removed:From the outset, the primary purpose of the Dublin system was to determine the Member State responsible for dealing with an application for asylum in the EU, in an effort to rule out multiple applications. On the basis of the guidelines agreed at the Tampere European Summit in 1999, a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was set up with a view to bringing about closer harmonisation.

Removed:In 2003, the Dublin Convention was incorporated into EU law in the form of the Dublin II Regulation.

Removed:In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated the solidarity principle into asylum policy (Article 80 TFEU) and provided for the use of the ordinary legislative procedure. The Council is still required to act unanimously, however, partly explaining the current deadlock.

Removed:In 2008, the Commission launched the second phase of the CEAS, with a ‘Policy Plan on Asylum’, including a revision of Dublin III.

Removed:1.2. Unprecedented pressure on the CEAS

Removed:In recent years, the EU has faced the greatest migration challenge since the Second World War. In three years, the number of asylum seekers has increased more than fourfold. In 2015-16, 2.5 million people applied for asylum in the EU, compared to 562 000 in 2014 and 278 000 in 2012. The main countries of origin are still Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, countries torn by civil war, violence and conflict. According to the International Organization for Migration, 33 000 people have died trying to reach Europe since 2014.

Removed:Early in 2020, 855 000 asylum applications were still pending, significantly fewer than five years ago. As the European Court of Auditors (ECA) has pointed out, however, in the Greek hotspots people who submitted an asylum application in 2018 were given an interview appointment only in 2022, or even in 2023. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of European policy on the return of persons who are not eligible for asylum is a further significant factor in the overloading of asylum systems.

Removed:1.3. Deep imbalances in asylum matters

Removed:The exceptional influx of migrants has highlighted imbalances within the EU.

Removed:Between 2008 and 2017, one-third of the Member States hosted 90% of the asylum seekers in the EU. In 2018, Germany recorded the largest number of applications (184 180, or 28% of the total), followed by France (120 425 applications, or 19%), Greece (66 695 applications, or 11%), Italy (59 950 applications, or 10%) and Spain (52 700 applications, or 9%). Countries of first entry, such as Greece, Malta and Cyprus, also receive a large number of asylum applications in proportion to their population.

Removed:In response to this crisis, some Member States stopped applying the regulation in 2015-16. Many migrants arriving via Greece, Italy or Spain were not registered on Eurodac, owing to a shortage of resources, but also in protest at a lack of solidarity among the Member States.

Removed:There is no escaping it: the ‘Dublin system’, almost unchanged since 1990, has failed.

Removed:1.4. Emergency measures during the crisis

Removed:In response to the 2015 migration spike, the Commission took emergency measures: ‘hotspots’ were set up to manage the reception of migrants and the registration of asylum applications, a temporary relocation mechanism for applicants was introduced, and the operational and financial resources of Frontex and EASO received an unprecedented boost.

Removed:These emergency measures failed to remedy the shortcomings in the CEAS and Dublin III. The Greek hotspots are notorious for massive overcrowding and unacceptable health conditions. Early 2020 they were still housing 42 000 migrants, as against a planned capacity of 6 000.

Removed:To curb the influx of migrants and deter them from making perilous journeys from the Eastern Mediterranean, on 18 March 2016 the European Council concluded an agreement with Turkey. The Declaration, drawn up outside the international legal framework and without consulting the European Parliament, was intended as a temporary solution to the refugee crisis. However, the constant diplomatic pressure from the Turkish President, in particular regarding the situation at the Greek-Turkish border, has highlighted the fragility of this agreement and emphasised the need for a sustainable European solution.

Removed:The humanitarian situation of migrants, in particular in Greece, means that it is essential to establish a sustainable mechanism for the sharing of responsibility among Member States for the registration of asylum seekers.

Removed:1.5. Hotspots, ad hoc agreements and relocation: first signs of solidarity

Removed:According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), the Dublin III Regulation was generally well applied in the hotspots between 2016 and 2018. Invoking the family reunification criterion, Greece transferred 8 604 asylum seekers to other Member States. With the support of EASO, it issued 19 784 requests to take charge of refugees, 43% of which concerned persons in the hotspots.

Removed:The ECA is critical of the EU’s efforts to support Greece and Italy from 2015 onwards. It identifies operational weaknesses hampering the efficiency of relocation, the use of EASO expert support and poor compliance with deadlines.

Removed:In 2015, with the support of Parliament, the Council adopted two decisions on the relocation of 160 000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy. However, the Member States committed themselves to relocating only 98 256 asylum seekers, and ultimately actually relocated only 34 705. Some Member States which were opposed to the decision simply refused to apply it.

Removed:In the central Mediterranean, Italy and Malta were under heavy pressure from increased arrivals of migrants transiting through Libya. In the face of the deadlock among the EU27, a number of ad hoc agreements were concluded in 2019 to relocate people rescued at sea. The Dublin III legal framework provided for voluntary transfers to Member States which were signatories to the Malta Declaration.

Removed:1.6. Responsibility of the country of first entry and solidarity between Member States

Removed:Starting in 1990, the principle of country of first entry was intended to make Member States responsible for the management of the EU’s external borders. However, this principle places a disproportionate burden on the countries concerned and makes the provision of operational support by Frontex officers essential.

Removed:In addition, while the number of new asylum applications fell in 2017 (654 600) and 2018 (580 000) compared to the 2015-16 peak, 2019 brought a fresh increase of 18%, with 714 000 new asylum applications. That trend was confirmed in the early part of 2020: +20% compared to 2019. Migration routes and countries of origin are also becoming more diverse. Following on from Syrians and Afghans, Venezuelans and Colombians are now arriving in large numbers.

Removed:The EU therefore needs a solidarity mechanism which makes for fair sharing of burdens and responsibility among Member States, including through relocation on the basis of objective criteria.

Removed:2. PART II: Structural shortcomings, differences in interpretation, operational difficulties and political roadblocks

Removed:2.1. Obstacles to determining the State responsible for dealing with an asylum application

Removed:2.1.1. Requirement to register in Eurodac

Removed:When registering an asylum application submitted by a refugee entering the EU, the Member State in question is required to record the person’s fingerprints in the Eurodac database. By consulting the Eurodac file, the authorities can verify that the person has not been registered or has not lodged an application for asylum in another Member State.

Removed:In 2015, however, before the hotspots were established, the two countries with the highest irregular entry rates, Greece (885 000) and Italy (154 000), recorded only 11 370 and 83 245 asylum applications respectively. These shortcomings significantly undermine the Dublin system and the country-of-first-entry principle and result in numerous secondary movements.

Removed:2.1.2. Skewed application of the hierarchy of criteria for determining the State responsible

Removed:Chapter III of the Dublin Regulation establishes a hierarchy of criteria to be used to determine which country must ‘take charge’ of an asylum seeker. Priority is given to maintaining the family unit (Articles 8 to 11), after which the order is possession of residence documents and visas (Article 12), irregular entry or stay (Article 13), visa-waived entry (Article 14), applications in an international transit area of an airport (Article 15) and the first country in which the application was made (Article 3(2)).

Removed:However, requests to take charge do not reflect this hierarchy. In 2018, the family unit criterion was invoked in 5% of cases in France (out of 12 000) and in 3.7% of cases in Germany (out of 17 500). The figures are even lower in Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland or Austria, in stark contrast to Greece: 79.3%.

Removed:Applications for family reunification are less frequently accepted: in only 48% of cases, compared to an average rate of 67.6% for all procedures. All too often, Member States impose rules to regulate and restrict family reunification by requiring a binding standard of proof (e.g. DNA test, age assessment).

Removed:2.1.3. Administrative burden of the Dublin procedures and their inconsistent application

Removed:The number of Dublin procedures increased from around 90 000 in 2014 to 160 000 in 2016-17. Between 2016 and 2019, Germany and France issued by far the most requests: 68% of the total for the two countries alone. Spain, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechia issue few Dublin requests. Surprisingly, Spain issues almost no Dublin requests (7 in 2016; 11 in 2017; 7 in 2018), despite a large and growing number of asylum applications (16 544 in 2016; 31 738 in 2017; 55 570 in 2018). By way of a comparison, Greece issued 2 886 requests in 2016 (against 51 091 asylum applications), 9 784 in 2017 (against 58 661 asylum applications) and 5 211 in 2018 (against 66 969 asylum applications).

Removed:The Dublin system therefore generates a considerable administrative, human and financial burden, while only 11% of transfers are actually carried out. There are also significant differences between countries: 54.6% of transfers carried out in Greece, and 42.2% in Sweden, but only 11.2% in Germany, 6.7% in France, and 1.6% in Italy between 2016 and 2019.

Removed:Moreover, the discretionary clauses (Article 17) are rarely applied. The sovereignty clause was only invoked just under 2 000 times in 2018 against a total of more than 155 000 asylum applications. Germany (65%), the Netherlands (13%) and France (10%) used it most frequently. Some countries have used it only once (Austria, Denmark, Poland), others never (Slovenia, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia).

Removed:2.1.4. Procedures that are too complex and too lengthy

Removed:The administrative formalities to be completed by asylum seekers upon arrival in Europe are complex. The number of bodies involved (administrative, legal, medical, police, NGOs), their geographic dispersal and the fact that they are not always available to help significantly slow down the processing of applications. The lack of cooperation between these bodies and in some cases poor morale among their staff are also factors. In France, for example, asylum seekers are registered in one of the country’s 11 prefectures and must all travel to the Paris region for their interview at the National Asylum Agency (OFPRA).

Removed:The proportion of Dublin procedures in the total number of asylum applications increased from 15% in 2014 to 26-27% in 2016-17. The Dublin units in the Member States have therefore faced a significant increase in their workload, leading to backlogs and longer processing times.

Removed:Some national authorities have undergone a reorganisation in an effort to deal with the overload of cases. The lack of human resources (in particular protection officers and interpreters) is a major factor in delays. According to the information available, Greece, Spain and Cyprus have fewer asylum officers compared to the number of asylum applications. In 2019, Spain had 197 officers for 55 290 applications, compared with 1 121 officers for 5 780 applications in Austria. The growing reliance on temporary staff, for example in Greece and Cyprus, can undermine the authorities’ ability to deal with applications.

Removed:The Dublin Regulation sets deadlines at each stage of Dublin procedures. However, these deadlines are regularly missed by large margins, often several months. There are also differences in interpretation regarding the starting point of each of the procedures, necessitating clarification from the CJEU (see Mengesteab judgment).

Removed:The failure to apply certain clauses (e.g. family reunification, taking charge of unaccompanied minors) and to meet deadlines also highlights difficulties linked to the need to verify information concerning applicants. Many arrive without an identity document, complicating the task of determining their age, nationality and family ties and necessitating additional checks.

Removed:2.2. Obstacles to the transfer of asylum seekers

Removed:2.2.1. Too short a period of responsibility for Member States

Removed:Once a transfer decision has been taken, Member States have six months (18 months if the applicant absconds) to carry out the transfer. After that, the issuing State becomes responsible for the request.

Removed:In practice, this limited period of responsibility can encourage Member States who have been asked to take in asylum seekers to delay transfers. It also prompts asylum seekers to stay out of the procedure, and then to apply in another State.

Removed:Extending the period of responsibility would make it possible to combat secondary movements and irregular stays.

Removed:2.2.2. Multiple obstacles

Removed:The obstacles are many and varied. They range from refusal or unwillingness to cooperate on the part of the Member States to which requests are made, to the annulment of decisions by national appeal bodies or a failure to meet deadlines. Another important factor is that persons being transferred seek to escape the system. At operational level, the national authorities cite the difficulties in making transfers and the restrictions on transport (often by air) imposed by airlines (limit on the number of persons per flight, requirement to have a ticket bearing a name, no connecting flights, etc.).

Removed:The lack of proper reception facilities or non-compliance with Dublin procedures have been the subject of cases brought before the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The courts ruled out transfers to Member States where applicants would be unjustly denied international protection or exposed to violations of their fundamental rights.

Removed:Appeals against Dublin decisions are also very common. It is a fundamental right, but it prolongs many Dublin procedures, as the rate of appeal is high in all States, up to 80%. In some cases the appeal is used as a way to remain on the territory of a Member State by asylum seekers who do not wish to be transferred.

Removed:2.3. Migrants’ pathways, an underestimated factor in the European asylum system

Removed:2.3.1. Secondary movements, enemy of the principle of the single asylum application

Removed:A secondary movement is the movement of a person from the Member State responsible for an asylum application to another Member State. This phenomenon has a profoundly disruptive effect on the Dublin machinery. It hampers the process of designating the responsible Member State, increases the number of Dublin procedures and undermines the principle of a single application for asylum in the EU.

Removed:According to the Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, although the number of asylum applications fell after 2015-16, the number of secondary movements increased considerably. Germany and France are the two main destinations for asylum seekers who undertake secondary movements. The reasons for making them are many: family ties, presence of a diaspora, knowledge of a language, reception conditions, labour market opportunities, refusal of a transfer.

Removed:Secondary movements are also prompted by another major flaw in the system: differences in rates of protection. To give one striking example, the rate of protection enjoyed by Afghans varies between 6% and 98%, depending on the Member State concerned. For Iraqis it varies between 8% and 98%. In the absence of a European list of safe countries of origin and a shared analysis of country risks, these differences of assessment push asylum seekers to move to the Member State where they are most likely to receive international protection. Differences in reception conditions for asylum seekers are also an incentive to undertake secondary movements.

Removed:An analysis of secondary movements and the relevant trends casts doubt on the pertinence of some of the original Dublin III principles. Differences in living conditions among Member States have an impact on reception conditions. The failure to take account of asylum seekers’ aspirations and the limited period of responsibility of Member States push people to move to their desired Member State and to remain outside the system, in order to be able to apply for asylum elsewhere.

Removed:National strategies that focus only on sanctions or restrictions on access to asylum, as favoured by a majority of Member States to date, offer only a partial response to this phenomenon. A system that fails to take at least some account of asylum seekers’ pathways and their reasons for seeking asylum in a given country is bound to fail.

Removed:2.3.2. Trends in migratory flows

Removed:It is essential, therefore, to analyse migrants’ pathways in order to respond to influxes in a more structured manner and streamline asylum procedures.

Removed:There has been an increase in the number of asylum applications submitted by people who have entered a country lawfully, on a visa waiver or a residence visa. According to EASO, in 2019 one-quarter of applications were submitted by persons who entered the EU on a visa waiver. The countries they come from, although regarded as safe, offer a very low rate of protection: North Macedonia (1%), Moldova (1%), Venezuela (5%), Albania (6%), Colombia (7%), Ukraine (9%). These many applications, which have little chance of being accepted, clog up asylum systems.

Removed:The lack of data on migrants’ pathways is a barrier to a better understanding of the dysfunctions of Dublin III. Interoperability of asylum data is therefore essential. EASO should also be given access to Eurodac data under secure conditions to carry out this analysis work and expand eu-LISA’s role.

Removed:2.3.3. The human impact of the failure of the Dublin system

Removed:The ineffectiveness of the Dublin Regulation primarily affects migrants who have already been traumatised in their home countries or during their journey to Europe. The months, even years, of administrative toing and froing, of insecurity, constitute a new trauma and enable human traffickers to maintain a hold on migrants, through prostitution or forced labour networks. The failure of the Dublin system and the CEAS has given rise to numerous violations of fundamental rights. Conditions in the Greek hotspots are now deplorable, and inhumane.

Removed:Particular attention needs be paid to the protection of the best interests of children and unaccompanied minors. A number of Member States (Belgium, France, Hungary) have set up specialist units to deal with unaccompanied minors, others (Germany, Poland, Cyprus) employ specially trained personnel. But these good practices are not universal.

Removed:One of the main obstacles is the difficulty of determining migrants’ ages. Practices differ from one Member State to another and the reliability of the assessments, for example those based on medical tests, is uncertain. Multidisciplinary approaches, carried out by qualified experts, make it possible to compile sets of relevant indicators and to establish a person’s age more reliably (the United Kingdom, Malta, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands and France use such approaches). In addition, although the appointment of a legal representative to accompany or represent minors in asylum procedures is compulsory (Article 6), there are significant gaps in implementation. Lastly, some States do not provide information tailored to minors’ needs.

Removed:The right to information (Article 4) is another principle that is not properly complied with. Problems include: provision of partial information; limited access to legal aid for applicants; language barrier and lack of interpreters; delays in providing information. A lack of resources on the ground can explain these shortcomings, but they are also the result of political decisions.

Removed:2.4. Discontinuation of the CEAS and Dublin procedures during the COVID-19 crisis

Removed:During the health crisis, and as a result of the lockdown measures imposed, Dublin procedures have been significantly cut back or even suspended completely. This is the case in particular for asylum interviews. While some countries have opted for ‘remote’ sessions, many interviews have been postponed. On 16 April 2020, EASO published recommendations designed to ensure continuity of the right to asylum, but there is no crisis management plan tailored to the current circumstances, which is further undermining the application of Dublin III.

Removed:2.5. Emerging governance arrangements, the growing role of EU agencies

Removed:The many disparities in the interpretation and application of Dublin III between Member States are undermining the effectiveness of the regulation. Some are the result of national strategies to combat secondary movements or reduce processing times. Others reflect historical practices or a lack of dialogue between national asylum authorities. The Community interest suffers each time: secondary movements prevented in one country become a problem for another.

Removed:Moreover, bilateral agreements have been concluded between Member States and third countries, or between Member States, to improve the efficiency of procedures or ensure the transfer or return of asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected (e.g. the Spain-Morocco agreements; Germany-Albania). Lessons must be learnt from these agreements and replicated on the largest possible scale, to prevent future mistakes.

Removed:Convergence in visa policy between Member States is also likely to improve the functioning of the CEAS and of Dublin III, as many asylum seekers arrive lawfully on the territory of the EU, because they qualify for a visa or visa waiver.

Removed:To improve convergence between national systems, the Commission runs a network of Member States’ Dublin experts. However, it meets too infrequently (once or twice a year) to have an operational role.

Removed:It is EASO which is playing an increasingly important and proactive role in improving convergence and mutual trust between Member States and developing a common asylum culture. In 2016, EASO set up the Dublin Units Network, which is more active than its Commission counterpart. EASO also produces many guidance documents. Lastly, the agency carries out training sessions for staff in Dublin units.

Removed:Operational support to Member States is thus far the most significant input from EASO in the implementation of the Dublin system. Fostering EASO’s emergence as a genuine independent agency is a priority to improve the effectiveness of the CEAS.

Removed:Lastly, in the context of the implementation of Dublin III the Commission must also ensure greater consistency with the other CEAS provisions (reception, asylum procedures). An overhaul of the CEAS would be pointless without a significant improvement in the rate of return of persons not eligible for asylum.

Removed:on the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation