Changes between two versions
What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text
From · plenary report· 20 Jul 2026
on Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure
To · adopted text· 16 Sept 2026
Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure
AI:What changed, in short
Parliament adds a recital and a paragraph describing recent hybrid attacks, including incidents attributed to Russia and the assault on Ceuta, and calls for an independent investigation into the latter.17 It also welcomes the completion of the cyber coordination centre project and progress towards a permanent EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre, and calls for its swift operationalisation.34 The other changes are formal: a recital letter and decimal separator are updated and footnote markers are removed.256
4 changes of substance · 3 formal · 0 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 17 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
Changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations and punctuation-only edits are left out; they are under “Every difference”.
Changes of substance · 4
Change 1 Substance
AI summary:Adds a recital listing physical hybrid activities and attacks across the EU in the summer of 2026, including incidents attributed to Russia by national authorities and the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn.
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Added:E. whereas, in the summer of 2026, the EU witnessed an intensification of physical hybrid activities and attacks across EU territory; whereas this included an attempted explosive drone attack targeting Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany, an attempted attack by an explosive-laden maritime drone against a Romanian offshore gas project, a foiled Russian-directed sabotage and espionage plot targeting military infrastructure and Ukrainian cargo aircraft in Romania, an arson attack targeting a defence contractor in Estonia, deliberate sabotage and arson attacks targeting defence and drone manufacturing facilities in Poland, a Russian cruise missile violating Polish airspace and crashing in the Lublin region, and a foiled arson plot in Slovakia targeting a Ukrainian drone manufacturer; whereas the Leipzig/Halle Airport attack, the targeting of the Romanian offshore gas project and the sabotage plot targeting military infrastructure and Ukrainian cargo aircraft in Romania have been publicly attributed to Russia by the respective national authorities; whereas following the attack on Leipzig/Halle Airport, the German authorities closed the Russian consulate in Bonn and the Russian House in Berlin;
Change 3 Substance
AI summary:Welcomes the completion of the PESCO project on the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre and progress towards its transition into a permanent EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre.
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Changed:26. Stresses the EU’s added value in helping Member States to connect national capabilities, build common situational awareness and enable faster, more coherent responses to hybrid threats; recommends that the Commission explore proposals for a more unified framework to support Member States in the planning, operational coordination and execution of cyber operations; welcomes the completion of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project on the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC) and the proposalprogress fortowards anits transition into a permanent EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre (EU CDCC);
Change 4 Substance
AI summary:Welcomes progress towards establishing the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre and calls for its swift operationalisation and for implementation of a mandate in line with the Council conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence.
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Changed:31. Stresses that cyber resilience and defensive measures are insufficient to ensure credible deterrence against hybrid threats as highlighted in the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030; calls on the Commission and the Member States in cooperation with NATO to examine the legal, procedural and operational prerequisites for proportionate, legally compliant cyber countermeasures; reiterateswelcomes itsthe positionprogress callingmade fortowards the establishment without undue delay of the EU CDCC and calls for theits swift operationalisation and for the implementation of a mandate in line with the Council conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence, in order to achieve a more credible and capable EU cyber defence;
Change 7 Substance
AI summary:Adds a paragraph condemning the assault on the EU's southern border in Ceuta on 30 and 31 July 2026 and the subsequent invasion of Ceuta, and calls for an independent investigation.
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Added:65. Strongly condemns the assault on the EU’s southern border in the city of Ceuta, carried out on 30 and 31 July 2026, as well as the subsequent invasion of Ceuta, constituting an attack on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Member State; deplores the use of irregular migration flows as an instrument of hybrid warfare directed against the stability and security of a Member State, and therefore calls for an independent and comprehensive investigation to clarify responsibility for the planning and execution of this attack and identify the objectives pursued;
3 formal changes: legal basis, citations, references, corrections
Change 2 Formal
AI summary:Updates the letter of the recital and the decimal separator in the figure for the projected budget of state-controlled media.
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Changed:L.M. whereas there has been a drastic increase in cognitive warfare together with FIMI; whereas, according to the European External Action Service (EEAS) 4th Annual Report on FIMI Threats, Russian FIMI activity is expected to intensify in 2026, with the budget for state-controlled media projected to reach approximately EUR 1.561,56 billion, 7 % higher than in 2025, with the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions anticipated to be among the primary targets;
Change 5 Formal
AI summary:Removes footnote markers from the references to the 2024 Commission Recommendation and the 2025 Joint communication on cable security.
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Changed:38. Stresses that undersea cables are a key strategic vulnerability and target of hybrid sabotage, espionage and influence operations due to their physical exposure and systemic disruption potential as they carry the vast majority of intercontinental internet traffic; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures9Infrastructures and the 2025 Joint communication on the EU action plan on cable security (JOIN(2025)0009) as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure; calls further for maritime domain awareness capabilities, integrating satellite, surface and subsea sensor data to detect, monitor and attribute physical threats to submarine cable and offshore energy infrastructure in strategic maritime areas, including the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Black Sea, and Arctic and Mediterranean regions; recommends strong criminal liability provisions to deter such attacks and redundant systems to ensure resilience; stresses further the need for a comprehensive, multilayered approach combining technological innovation, enhanced intelligence integration, improved attribution capabilities, and strengthened cooperation between NATO, the EU Member States, and relevant private-sector actors in order to ensure coherent protection of undersea infrastructure;
Change 6 Formal
AI summary:Removes footnote markers from the references to the Critical Entities Resilience Directive and the NIS2 Directive.
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Changed:41. Welcomes the adoption of the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive10Directive and the NIS2 Directive11Directive as important steps towards strengthening resilience against hybrid attacks, but stresses that implementation delays across the Member States represent a shared urgent vulnerability and calls for their full and timely implementation; urges the Commission to make full use of its monitoring and enforcement powers; calls on the Member States to embed resilience by design as a standard requirement in all new and revised legislation;