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Changes between two versions

What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

From · plenary report· 25 Aug 2026

A-10-2026-0199

on the findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

To · adopted text· 15 Sept 2026

TA-10-2026-0286

Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

AI:What changed, in short

The text adds a new condemnation of third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories.5 It adds that information manipulation operations have been detected against three candidates for France's 2027 presidential election and attributed to Russia.3 It changes the number of EU sanctions packages imposed since 2022 from 20 to 21.4 It shifts the call to assess legal gaps in Europol and Eurojust mandates from the Commission to co-legislators and from a planned to an ongoing revision.8 The other changes are formal: decimal separators, punctuation and a spelling correction.1267

4 changes of substance · 4 formal · 0 of wording only

Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 18 Sept 2026 · Report a problem

Changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations and punctuation-only edits are left out; they are under “Every difference”.

Changes of substance · 4

Change 3 Substance

AI summary:Adds that information manipulation operations have been detected against three candidates for France's 2027 presidential election and attributed to Russia.

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Added:BU. whereas operations to manipulate information have already been detected against three candidates for France’s 2027 presidential election and have been attributed to Russia;

Change 4 Substance

AI summary:Changes the number of EU sanctions packages imposed since 2022 from 20 to 21.

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Changed:CN.CO. whereas since 2022, the EU has imposed a total of 2021 packages of extensive and unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas those sanctions are aimed at substantially increasing pressure on the Russian war economy by targeting key sectors such as energy, finance and the defence industry, special economic zones, and enablers and profiteers of its war of aggression, and ending the EU’s dependency on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas the EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus, Iran and North Korea in response to their support for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas the efficacy of such measures should be strengthened and loopholes allowing for their circumvention should be closed;

Change 5 Substance

AI summary:Adds a paragraph condemning third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories.

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Added:6. Condemns third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories, where the impact may be further compounded by their isolation and geographical distance from the European continent;

Change 8 Substance

AI summary:Replaces the call on the Commission to assess legal gaps during the planned revision of Europol and Eurojust mandates with a call for co-legislators to perform a careful assessment during the ongoing revision.

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Changed:78.79. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication acknowledges the positive contribution of criminal justice and law enforcement cooperation to countering FIMI and disinformation activities; calls onfor the Commission,co-legislators whento preparingperform, during the plannedongoing revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust, toa carefullycareful assessassessment of the legal gaps and limitations that currently prevent those agencies from providing their full assistance to the Member States confronted with hybrid threats, and to explore ways to overcome those limitations while respecting fundamental rights and Treaty-based competences; considers that the addition of hybrid threats in Annex I to the Europol Regulation would clarify the legal framework and facilitate Europol’s work in this area; underlines, moreover, the need to ensure that Europol and Eurojust are provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively implement the upcoming strengthening of their mandates;

4 formal changes: legal basis, citations, references, corrections

Change 1 Formal

AI summary:Updates the decimal separator in the EUR 2,95 billion fine figure.

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Changed:AF. whereas the abusive practices of dominant online advertising market players, such as the practices that resulted in the Commission imposing a EUR 2.952,95 billion fine against Google for distorting competition in online advertising, underscore the need for more structural measures to ensure fair competition, greater transparency, accountability and safeguards to protect media pluralism, editorial independence and the integrity of democratic processes; whereas structural deficiencies in the digital advertising market can be exploited by malicious actors, as demonstrated by the so-called doppelganger operators using advertisements on social media to target users and by various Russian online campaigns aimed at discouraging Ukrainian men from enlisting;

Change 2 Formal

AI summary:Updates the decimal separator in the EUR 5,5 million emergency funding figure.

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Changed:AN. whereas the work of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is of strategic interest to the EU; whereas the EU has approved EUR 5.55,5 million in emergency funding for this work, in the aftermath of the reform of the US foreign aid policy; whereas a sustainable funding solution needs to be developed for RFE/RL and other independent media outlets that are essential to the strengthening of democratic resilience in neighbouring countries;

Change 6 Formal

AI summary:Corrects the punctuation in the EUR 120 million fine figure.

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Changed:26.27. Welcomes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million,, as well as the Commission’s decision to start investigations of Grok AI’s integration into X and to expand existing investigations into X’s recommender systems; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations, including into Meta, particularly in the light of preliminary findings on breaches of transparency and user-protection obligations, and reports indicating persistent issues related to scam advertising and regulatory circumvention; stresses the need for enforcement action in cases of election interference, persistent algorithmic opacity and the large-scale proliferation of fake accounts and bot networks that distort public discourse; calls on the Commission, in this context, to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, which highlighted worrying possibilities of recommender systems and bot networks being exploited, and in relation to TikTok’s obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes and to ensure deterrence during electoral periods; further takes note of the Commission’s preliminary evaluation indicating that TikTok is in breach of the DSA for its addictive design;

Change 7 Formal

AI summary:Corrects the spelling of 'remuneration'.

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Changed:32.33. Underlines that advertising and revenue-sharing practices may incentivise the spread of manipulative or harmful content, undermine electoral integrity and lead to the emergence of new disinformation actors and networks; recalls that disinformation cannot be demonetised without existing monetisation practices being sufficiently transparent; calls on the Commission, the EU digital regulators, the national competent authorities and online platforms to work together to detect and prevent illicit financing and ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes, advertising policies and other monetisation services that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctioned entities to earn income or other benefits; calls on platforms to publicly disclose renumerationremuneration flows and their beneficiaries, at least once a year; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; considers the monetisation of content from sanctioned entities to be a systemic risk, requiring swift corrective action such as suspending revenue-sharing; underlines that genuine creators and media outlets should be compensated for their losses in cases of erroneous or unfair demonetisation; is concerned by the gradual rollback of corporate commitments to internet freedom initiatives;