Changes between two versions
What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text
From · plenary report· 30 Jun 2026
on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region
To · adopted text· 7 Jul 2026
Recommendation on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region
AI:What changed, in short
Adds a recital on the security dependence of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan on the US and the need to diversify partnerships with the EU.1 Updates the description of DPRK missile tests by removing the reference to tests over Japan and into the Sea of Japan.2 Updates the EU-Japan Digital Partnership Council details: date, ordinal, and wording on the joint research project.3 Adds that negotiations with Japan on joining Horizon Europe have been completed.4 The other changes are formal: renumbering of recitals.234
4 changes of substance · 0 formal · 0 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+5 added · −8 removed · 6 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 1 of 3: DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION
Removed:DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION
Added:P10_TA(2026)0246
Changed:to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security PolicyRecommendation on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region
Removed:(2025/2169(INI))
Added:Committee on Foreign Affairs
Added:PE776.904
Added:European Parliament recommendation of 7 July 2026 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region (2025/2169(INI))
17 unchanged paragraphs
The European Parliament,
– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),
– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence approved by the Council on 21 March 2022, which underscores the role of partnerships for the Union’s security and resilience, including in the Indo-Pacific,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),
– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and Japan of 1 November 2024,
– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Korea of 4 November 2024,
– having regard to the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part,
– having regard to the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part,
– having regard to the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement,
– having regard to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part,
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the 30th EU-Japan summit held on 23 July 2025 in Tokyo,
– having regard to the 42nd EU-Japan inter-parliamentary meeting held on 28 and 29 May 2025 in Tokyo,
Changed:– having regard to the 2nd3rd EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on 426 AprilMarch 20252026 in Brussels,Vaux-de-Cernay,
Changed:– having regard to the 8th9th EU-Japan Digital Policy Dialogue on 125 AprilMarch 20252026 in Brussels,Tokyo,
21 unchanged paragraphs
– having regard to the Letter of Intent signed on 13 March 2025 by the EU and Japan on ‘Strengthening Cooperation in Quantum Science and Technology’ to deepen joint research, exchanges and ecosystem development,
– having regard to the commitment to enhance cooperation on critical raw materials given by the EU, Japan and the United States at the Critical Minerals Ministerial meeting on 4 February 2026,
– having regard to the EU-Japan Green Alliance of 27 May 2021,
– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the 11th EU-Republic of Korea summit held on 10 June 2026 in Brussels,
– having regard to the 23rd EU-Republic of Korea inter-parliamentary meeting held on 18 November 2025 in Brussels,
– having regard to the second EU-ROK Strategic Dialogue on 22 January 2026 in Brussels,
– having regard to the EU-Republic of Korea Green Partnership of 22 May 2023,
– having regard to the 4th EUIndoPacific ministerial forum held in Brussels on 20-21 November 2025,
– having regard to the statement following the recent visit by a delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Korea and Japan from 31 March to 2 April 2026,
– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific,
– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Japan relations,
– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025,
– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2024 on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia,
– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan,
– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations,
– having regard to its positions and recommendations on Indo-Pacific cooperation, including calls to work with like-minded partners to uphold freedom of navigation and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas,
– having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0189/2026),
A. whereas the ongoing geopolitical shifts and the growing strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific are reshaping the global order; whereas East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region are pivotal to global prosperity and security, energy security and democratic resilience, hosting vital sea lanes, advanced technology ecosystems, major trade routes, over half the world’s population, and critical supply chains essential to the EU’s economic competitiveness and long-term industrial resilience in strategic sectors, as well as its geopolitical influence;
B. whereas economic security, including resilient and diversified supply chains for critical raw materials, semiconductors and clean technologies, is an integral part of trade, foreign and security policy; whereas reducing strategic dependencies and making supply chains more resilient and more diversified in critical sectors are essential for the EU’s economic security and competitiveness, in line with the its derisking strategy, while avoiding unnecessary economic decoupling;
C. whereas East Asia’s geopolitical landscape has become increasingly volatile in recent years, with regional power dynamics being increasingly shaped by systemic rivalry, maritime disputes, military build-ups, and the expanding influence of authoritarian governance models that deploy economic coercion, including discriminatory market access, hybrid threats including foreign information manipulation and interference, and commercial and political espionage that challenge peace, stability and the rules-based international order and require coordinated responses with partners that share democratic values and high regulatory standards;
Change 1
Added:D. whereas the security of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan remains largely dependent on the United States; whereas these partners are increasingly affected by US unpredictability and economic coercion, which is at times extended even to its closest allies; whereas these democratic partners therefore need to reinforce and diversify their partnerships with other actors, notably the EU, in order to strengthen resilience and shared security interests;
E. whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is built on the conviction that the security and prosperity of the EU and the Indo-Pacific are inextricably linked; whereas the strategy underscores the importance of strengthening the EU’s engagement in the region through deeper political dialogue, enhanced economic cooperation and expanded security partnerships; whereas the unravelling of the rules-based order and traditional alliances, and the emergence of aggressive actors guided by imperialistic ambitions, warrant stronger ties between the EU and like-minded partners in the region in order to increase mutual security and prosperity;
F. whereas the freedoms of navigation and overflight are fundamental principles of international law, as enshrined, in particular, in the UNCLOS, and are of key importance for the Union’s economic security;
G. whereas the increasingly complex security challenges have a profound impact on both Europe’s and the Indo-Pacific’s stability and prosperity, with the two regions’ stability more interlinked than ever; whereas both are directly affected by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the support of third countries such as China and North Korea that are enabling Russian aggression; whereas a robust EU-Japan and EU-Republic of Korea (RoK) defence-industrial cooperation is indispensable; whereas Japan and the RoK stand out for their substantial financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine; whereas Japan has provided and pledged over USD 20 billion to Ukraine in financial and military assistance since 2022; whereas instability in the Middle East has significant repercussions for Europe and East Asia with regard to energy security and supply-chain disruptions;
Change 2
Changed:G.H. whereas the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence’ states that certain actors, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), continue to endanger regional and international peace and security; whereas the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes constitute grave threats to the rules-based international order, as well as the country’s possible nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) transfer from Russia in return for arms and military personnel; whereas the DPRK has repeatedly violated United Nations Security Council resolutions through ongoing missile launches, including tests conducted over Japan and into the Sea of Japan;
5 unchanged paragraphs
I. whereas the growing importance of the digital space for the functioning of our societies and our economies has increased the number and scale of cyberattacks; whereas the joint communication on the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade states that fighting those threats and vulnerabilities requires cooperating with partners that are attached to the rule of law, fundamental freedom, democracy and human rights;
J. whereas the EU’s interests and global security are best protected by deepening practical cooperation with like-minded partners in the region – notably Japan, the RoK and Taiwan while pursuing principled and constructive engagement with regional actors, and by engaging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a central convening actor; whereas these partnerships should serve to bolster the EU’s strategic autonomy by consolidating a robust industrial and technology base for European defence, without leaving the EU too heavily reliant on external powers; whereas the EU should avoid bloc-based confrontation dynamics and instead promote cooperative multilateralism and dialogue based on international law;
K. whereas the strategic partnership between the EU and Japan serves as a model for effective bilateral cooperation that strengthens policy-shaping in multilateral forums; whereas the entry into force of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 1 January 2025, allows for deeper collaboration, including in areas such as security and defence, hybrid threats, maritime security, cybersecurity, space and non-proliferation, alongside tangible joint efforts under the Competitiveness Alliance, the Green Alliance and the Digital Partnership and Energy Dialogue;
L. whereas Japan is the EU’s closest strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas global challenges and, in particular, growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region require an ever closer partnership between the EU and Japan; whereas a free and open Indo-Pacific is a core interest pursued both by Japan and the EU, in particular by promoting a rules-based international order in which all countries adhere to international law and the principle of the peaceful settlement of conflicts; whereas Japan is an important actor in several forums in the Indo-Pacific such as the East Asia Summit; whereas the EU and Japan seek common approaches at bilateral level and in multilateral forums such as the G7, G20, the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as alignment as like-minded donors;
M. whereas the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in 2019 and was amended to include provisions on the free flow of data in 2024; whereas Japan ranks as the EU’s seventh-largest trading partner;
Change 3
Changed:M.N. whereas in May 20252026 the thirdfourth EU-Japan Digital Partnership Council expanded cooperation on artificial intelligence (AI), 5G/6G, semiconductors, cybersecurity and data governance and includedwelcomed the launchprogress ofon the ‘6G MIRAI-HARMONY’ joint research project;
O. whereas the EU-Japan Energy Dialogue in 2025 underscored joint work on clean energy supply chains, LNG security and hydrogen cooperation to support climate neutrality;
P. whereas the strategic partnership between the EU and the RoK, a key Indo-Pacific ally, spans political dialogue, trade and security cooperation; whereas the EU-RoK Free Trade Agreement has contributed to substantial growth in bilateral trade since its entry into force; whereas the EU-RoK Framework Agreement strengthens political, economic and institutional ties, including security; whereas the Framework Participation Agreement strengthens the EU-RoK political and security relationship and underscores shared values and interests; whereas at the 2023 EU-RoK Summit, leaders agreed to establish a security partnership and strategic dialogue at foreign ministerial level to enhance cooperation on global peace and security; whereas the EU-RoK Security and Defence Partnership provides a structured framework for engagement across all security domains; whereas the EU-RoK Digital Trade Agreement sets out mutually beneficial rules around data and digital technologies; whereas the RoK plays a pivotal role in regional stability;