What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023, and to the implementation annex thereto,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans,

– having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

– having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001, and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

– having regard to the Amnesty International technical briefing published on 27 March 2025 entitled ‘Serbia: journalists targeted with Pegasus spyware’ (EUR 70/9186/2025), documenting the targeting of investigative journalists with Pegasus spyware,

– having regard to the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2026 country report on Serbia, published on 19 March 2026,

– having regard to the 2025 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, published on 2 May 2025,

– having regard to the Western Balkans Leaders’ meeting of 1 July 2025 in Skopje, North Macedonia, on the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans,

– having regard to the declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 December 2025,

– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of 16 December 2025 on enlargement,

– having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to the Chair’s conclusions of the 2025 Summit of the Berlin Process of 22 October 2025,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2025 entitled ‘2025 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2025)0900), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2025 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Serbia’ (SWD(2025)0931),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 4 November 2025 entitled ‘2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2025)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2025 Report’ (SWD(2025)0755),

–– having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

– having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

– having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to the statements of UN Special Rapporteurs of 4 August 2025 on the Serbian government’s crackdown on the student movement,

– having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 22 October 2025 on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy,

– having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2026 on the EU enlargement strategy,

– having regard to the mission of its Committee on Foreign Affairs to Serbia from 22 to 24 January 2026,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0163/2026),

A. whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability, security and prosperity on the continent;

B. whereas each candidate country in the enlargement process is evaluated on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and respect for, and unwavering commitment to, shared European values and rights, protection of minorities and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy; whereas there are no shortcuts to EU membership;

D. whereas EU-related reforms in Serbia have slowed significantly or have shown backsliding in several key areas, particularly in the fundamentals of the accession process, such as the rule of law, fundamental rights, and media freedom; whereas the Commission has noted continued shortcomings in the functioning of democratic institutions; whereas only 2 of the 35 negotiating chapters have been provisionally closed to date;

E. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded in Serbia by the ruling coalition, putting pressure on independent media, academia, ethnic minorities, the political opposition and civil society organisations, while in parallel systematically weakening institutions and blurring the lines between political actors, state and media power;

F. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create anti-Western narratives, many of which are also generated and disseminated by domestic actors; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT Balkan (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and antidemocratic narratives and spreading them across the region; whereas these narratives are amplified by national state-associated media;

G. whereas, according to independent media monitoring in 2024, the Serbian media has shown continued democratic backsliding, with the ruling majority taking up over 90 % of prime news airtime on national TV stations and being portrayed predominantly neutrally or positively, while the opposition receives less than 10 % of airtime and is largely presented negatively;

H. whereas in line with Chapter 23, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities; whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right; whereas Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Emphasises that progress on the path towards EU accession – a genuinely merit-based process – is conditional on full respect for EU values and adherence to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, all of which are enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria; emphasises that this entails not only adopting reforms, but also implementing them thoroughly and fully, as the persistent gap between legislative alignment and effective implementation continues to undermine Serbia’s progress; stresses that each country’s path towards EU integration must be assessed on its own merits and that no country should be coupled with another or treated as part of a package; underscores that there can be no shortcuts on EU values and fundamental principles, as EU accession is a technical and a political process;

2. Notes that, according to the 2025 Commission report, there has been some level of preparation and partial implementation of the Commission’s recommendations; regrets the fact, however, that Serbia’s core commitments as outlined in its November 2024 non-paper, aimed at addressing outstanding obstacles to the opening of Cluster 3, remain largely unfulfilled; deplores, in this respect, the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeted at the countries that did not support the opening of Cluster 3;

3. Stresses that the credibility of the enlargement process must be preserved by applying strict and fair conditionality, while ensuring that reform efforts are duly recognised where appropriate;

4. Recalls Serbia’s stated commitment that EU membership is its strategic goal, but notes that stated commitments have often not been mirrored in practice, as highlighted, for example, when Serbia’s highest representatives did not attend the EU-Western Balkans Summit in December 2025; stresses that this persistent discrepancy calls for a clarification of Serbia’s European trajectory; calls on Serbia to tangibly demonstrate sustained commitment to EU values and standards and to consistently follow its commitment to EU membership;

5. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans, in the current geopolitical context, for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its size and geopolitical position, Serbia has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempt to establish a sphere of influence and its activities undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

6. Reiterates the significant need for Serbia to clearly and consistently demonstrate its geopolitical orientation towards the EU, including by fully aligning with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), in particular the restrictive measures taken by the EU in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and expresses serious concern over Serbia’s continued failure to fully align with the EU’s CFSP; regrets that its alignment is among the lowest of all candidate countries; notes that Serbia’s lack of alignment with the EU’s foreign policy, including its failure to adopt restrictive measures, is inconsistent with one of the specific objectives set out in Article 3 of the Reform and Growth Facility Regulation; reiterates its view that full alignment remains a non-negotiable requirement for accession; welcomes Serbia’s recent alignment with Council Decisions (CFSP) 2026/438 and (CFSP) 2025/490, but reiterates that selective alignment is insufficient;

7. Deplores Serbia’s continued close ties and deepening partnership with Russia, which raise concerns about its strategic orientation and undermine a credible path towards EU membership; stresses that Serbia’s European path requires a clear strategic choice; underlines that a policy of balancing between the EU and other geopolitical actors is incompatible with the political trust expected from a candidate country; calls on the Serbian authorities to desist from public messages and actions that run counter to key EU foreign and security policy positions;

8. Is deeply concerned about the investments in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on political and economic processes in the region; condemns the high-level visit to Belgrade in March 2026 by the Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, who is on the EU sanctions list; calls for the immediate closure of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Niš, which acts as a base for the Russian military intelligence agency GRU to operate from a candidate country, and urges Serbia to terminate all military cooperation with Russia, as it raises legitimate questions about Serbia’s strategic orientation and alignment with EU security interests; condemns Russian foreign interference activities in Serbia; recalls that Serbia is actively used as a regional platform to spread disinformation and misinformation campaigns across the Western Balkans region;