What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 49 thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23 to 24 June 2022, 29 to 30 June 2023, 26 to 27 October 2023, 14 to 15 December 2023, 27 June 2024 and 17 December 2024 and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21 to 22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on 30 years of Copenhagen criteria – giving further impetus to EU enlargement policy,

– having regard to the EU Association Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’), Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 4 November 2025 entitled ‘2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2025)0690) and previous annual communications thereon,

– having regard to its resolutions on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Türkiye,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2024 on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 entitled ‘Pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews’ (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova,

– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to the joint declarations of the Eastern Partnership Summits of 7 May 2009 in Prague, of 29 to 30 September 2011 in Warsaw, of 28 to 29 November 2013 in Vilnius, of 21 to 22 May 2015 in Riga, of 24 November 2017 in Brussels, and of 15 December 2021 in Brussels,

– having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit,

– having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2025 on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 February 2025 on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘State of Play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations’ (JOIN(2023)0050),

– having regard to the European Committee of the Regions’ opinion of 2 April 2025 on the Commission’s Enlargement Package 2024 – Western Balkans and Türkiye,

– having regard to European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

– having regard to the Commission’s 2024 and 2025 rule of law reports,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0016/2026),

A. whereas the EU enlargement process has progressed substantially in recent years in some candidate countries; whereas 9 of the 10 countries currently aspiring to join the EU hold candidate status, and some have held it for many years; whereas the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova has contributed to a renewed dynamic in the enlargement policy;

B. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s strongest foreign policy and geopolitical tools and remains a key driver of long-term security, peace, stability and prosperity in Europe, based on shared democratic values; whereas enlargement represents a historic and unique opportunity with significant socio-economic, political and security advantages for both the EU and the enlargement countries;

F. whereas Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine poses a serious threat to security on the European continent and beyond, demonstrating that non-enlargement carries significant strategic costs and undermines security and stability across our continent; whereas stagnation in the enlargement process in recent years has created a vacuum, thus opening the space for Russia and China and other harmful non-EU actors; whereas Russia deliberately interferes in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans through hybrid threat operations, including election interference and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns, seeking to stall the EU accession process in these countries and posing a threat to security both for these regions, through its illegal occupation of parts of the territory of three candidate countries, and for the entire continent;

G. whereas China’s influence is expanding dangerously, from economic dependency projects to security cooperation, particularly in the Western Balkans and Georgia, as it continues to exploit political instability and institutional weaknesses in several enlargement countries in order to undermine their path to EU integration and their democratic governance;

H. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process, of which irreversible progress on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental values remains the key cornerstone; whereas each country’s accession to the EU is conditional on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions; whereas the quality of the necessary reforms undertaken by a country determines the timeline for accession;

I. whereas the EU continues to be the biggest provider of investment and financial assistance through the pre-accession assistance instrument IPA III, the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the Western Balkan Facility, the Ukraine Facility, the Moldova Facility, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, and macro-financial assistance;

J. whereas the candidate countries’ alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains one of the key preconditions for EU accession;

K. whereas the decision-making process on enlargement is laid down in Article 49 TEU and in the negotiating frameworks drawn up for each candidate country;

Geostrategic dimension of enlargement

1. Reiterates that enlargement is a strategic response to the new geopolitical reality and an investment of the utmost importance for the EU’s security and stability in the face of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, repeated border violations, hybrid attacks and other hostile actions against its neighbours, as well as other common geopolitical challenges, requiring a long-term political democratic vision and bold actions and steps towards the completion of the European project;

2. Reiterates that enlargement is a win-win for both current and future Member States; emphasises the political urgency of demonstrating the EU’s active commitment to the enlargement process, also with a view to safeguarding the EU’s credibility towards the enlargement countries and their societies; insists that EU enlargement will strengthen Europe’s security and economy; stresses, yet again, that the future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova lies within the EU, in accordance with the aspirations of their people; underlines that the cost of non-enlargement exceeds the cost of completing the process and would risk creating geopolitical grey zones vulnerable to malign influence by non-EU countries seeking to expand their political, economic and strategic influence;

3. Underlines that accession is a key tool to promote lasting peace, democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, to foster regional reconciliation and stability, and to protect candidate countries and the EU neighbourhood from malign foreign interference, particularly from Russia; considers enlargement policy indispensable for the EU’s influence in times of heightened geopolitical instability; emphasises that the EU’s prosperity and security rests on its ability to defend democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the rules-based multilateral order; recalls the shared cultural, historical and human ties between the enlargement countries and the Member States;

Strategic priorities of EU enlargement: merit-based process and conditionality

4. Welcomes the progress made in recent years, making EU enlargement likely in the near future; commends Montenegro and Albania for their significant progress, noting their ambitions to conclude negotiations by the end of 2026 and end of 2027 respectively; urges the EU institutions, particularly the Council, to reciprocate this ambition, remove obstacles on the EU’s side and thus enhance the credibility and predictability of the process, while fully respecting the ‘strictly merit-based’ principle; welcomes the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina holds candidate status and encourages the country to take further steps to reform;

5. Commends Ukraine’s remarkable resilience and commitment to its European path, despite Russia’s war of aggression; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting Ukraine and regrets the Council’s failure to agree on the use of frozen Russian assets; praises Moldova for advancing significantly on its EU accession path and successfully completing the screening process despite continuous hybrid threats; calls for the swift opening of negotiating clusters with Ukraine and Moldova and urges the Hungarian Government to refrain from continuing to block negotiations;

6. Reiterates that, in accordance with Article 49 TEU, any European state may apply to become a member of the EU provided it respects the values set out in Article 2 TEU, including human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including minority rights; takes note of the increased support for EU membership in several countries that were previously preparing to join the EU, including Iceland, which intends to hold a referendum by 2027 on restarting accession talks, and encourages the EU’s leadership to continue building closer links with such countries; notes that on 26 March 2025, the Armenian Parliament adopted a law formally supporting EU membership and calling on the country’s government to begin the EU accession process, and considers that sustained reforms consolidating Armenia’s democracy could open a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations; welcomes potential initiatives by Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU, amid growing support for EU accession;

7. Recalls that previous enlargement rounds fostered considerable economic growth in both new and old Member States; underlines that free movement improved job prospects and wages, and reduced poverty through remittances; stresses that enlargement has had a positive impact on living standards by improving labour laws, health and safety, gender equality, digital services, education and non-discrimination;

8. Reiterates that accession must remain a merit-based and reversible process, with each applicant being assessed against the Copenhagen criteria, alignment with the EU acquis and all additional conditions of the enlargement framework; stresses that each country’s path towards EU integration must be assessed on its own merits and that no country should be coupled with another or treated as part of a package; underscores that there can be no shortcuts on EU values and fundamental principles;

9. Stresses that while the process should become more incremental and dynamic, with clear reform targets, roadmaps and intermediate timelines, there can be no fast track, as this could affect the integrity of the accession process; notes that several candidate countries have already set ambitious objectives for concluding negotiations, which should be encouraged when matched by tangible reforms;

10. Emphasises that the rule of law, democratic reform, media freedom and fundamental rights, including minority rights, must remain at the forefront of enlargement; stresses the importance of judicial independence, the fight against corruption, the inclusion of and support for civil society, and an enabling environment free of intimidation as crucial preconditions for sustainable progress towards EU membership, particularly at a time of rising authoritarian tendencies; stresses that progress on fundamentals must guide all negotiating chapters;