What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular the provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 10 and 11 March 2022,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 17 June 2025 on the Defence Readiness Omnibus (COM(2025)0820), aimed at simplifying the relevant legal and administrative frameworks to strengthen the EU’s defence readiness,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace –Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 December 2018 and 6 December 2016,

– having regard to the Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Madrid Summit on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the Hague Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management signed by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the European Council on 24 September 2003,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0005/2026),

A. whereas the current geopolitical context, in particular the return of war to the European continent due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the consequent decision of the EU to take more responsibility for security and defence, including military support to Ukraine, requires the EU to forge stronger, sustainable and tailored partnerships to enhance cooperation with like-minded partners in a mutually beneficial way; whereas the shift in the military paradigm, combined with the rise in hybrid threats, makes no region of the EU immune to the risk of aggression or interference;

B. whereas the EU’s growing role in security and defence must remain consistent with the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action under Article 21 TEU, including respect for the UN Charter, international law, conflict prevention, sustainable development, democracy and human rights;

C. whereas the EU remains fully committed to promoting international cooperation and strengthening effective multilateralism at all levels;

D. whereas the EU-wide range of partnerships and dialogues on peace, security and defence are a key source of strength and resilience; whereas these partnerships should address the most urgent EU defence needs and challenges;

E. whereas the Strategic Compass called for extending and deepening partnerships with bilateral, regional and multilateral partners worldwide to ensure mutual benefit and enhanced collaboration, highlighting the need for interoperability, innovation and coherence between the EU and NATO frameworks, as well as for strengthened cooperation with Ukraine and the United States as key partners for European and transatlantic security;

F. whereas the surge in activity of human trafficking organisations and the instrumentalisation of migration constitute a key security risk for the EU;

G. whereas the new security and defence partnerships (SDPs) between the EU and partner countries should strive to secure and ensure the highest European security standards by acquiring and ensuring access to the most technologically advanced and effective self-defence systems;

European security environment

1. Underlines that SDPs are key for Europe to respond effectively to emerging threats and to support the EU’s ambition to strengthen its role as a global strategic actor; stresses that such partnerships – which are mutually beneficial, with a clear strategic focus and objectives – are essential for the EU to become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence, and better equipped to act and deal autonomously and in a coordinated way with immediate and future challenges and threats, with a 360° approach; states that these partnerships are a necessity, not an option for the EU; stresses that they should enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy while remaining firmly committed to multilateral cooperation as well as fully complementary with NATO, and strengthen the EU’s capacity to act together with like-minded partners in the pursuit of peace, stability and collective security;

2. Notes that the EU is currently experiencing its most critical security situation since the Second World War, facing major challenges such as strengthening its military capabilities and cybersecurity infrastructure, combating hybrid threats, countering terrorism, and protecting its critical infrastructure; stresses that Russia’s neo-imperial aspirations and revisionist attitude constitute the most significant threat to EU security and underscores the urgency of reinforcing the EU’s defence and deterrence capabilities; recalls, in this context, the growing security implications of climate change and environmental degradation for critical infrastructure, energy systems and crisis preparedness;

3. Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe to prioritise and invest more in security and defence; underlines that Russia continues its aggression on the European continent also with the support of its proxies, such as the regimes in Iran, North Korea and Belarus; notes the malicious activities of our strategic competitors and the ongoing hybrid warfare being waged by various state and non-state actors, which constitute threats to European security and the international rules-based order; emphasises the particular security concerns of EU Member States on its eastern flank, which face direct threats from Russian aggression and hybrid warfare; stresses that continued economic cooperation between the EU and China needs to be reassessed in the light of China’s support for Russia’s war economy, with a view to strengthening the EU’s economic resilience through de-risking, among other measures; underlines that the EU has to manage strategic competition from China, which is a critical enabler and supporter of Russia’s war of aggression, and spillover from conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, while addressing common global threats and challenges;

4. Underlines that through the EU Strategic Compass the EU commits to engaging more coherently, consistently and comprehensively with its partners and thus building mutually beneficial tailored partnerships based on shared values and interests; emphasises the importance of interoperability, joint training and defence industrial innovation within these partnerships, notably through initiatives such as the European Defence Industrial Programme and SAFE;

5. Underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States remain firmly committed to the rules-based international order, grounded in respect for international law, the principles of the UN Charter and the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as enshrined in the TEU; stresses that this commitment forms the foundation of the EU’s external action and its efforts to promote peace, stability, multilateralism and prosperity worldwide; emphasises that SDPs should integrate conflict prevention, climate security and sustainability as cross-cutting priorities;

6. Looks forward to the Strategic Compass being regularly updated, to ensure that the EU’s strategic vision and common objectives are always in step with recent geopolitical, social and technological developments; invites the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to integrate resilience planning into security initiatives, covering critical infrastructure, supply chains and energy independence;

Criticality of the EU-NATO strategic partnership

7. Highlights the reinforced strategic partnership with NATO, which includes structured dialogues and enhanced operational and sectoral cooperation particularly in areas such as military mobility, maritime security as well as defence industry and capability development, conducted notably through joint drills and staff-to-staff collaboration, thereby strengthening NATO’s European pillar; underlines that this cooperation must remain mutually reinforcing and be based on trust, transparency and respect for the decision-making autonomy of both organisations; stresses that democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight are essential to ensure that such cooperation strengthens European and transatlantic security; stresses that 23 of 27 EU Member States are NATO members, and believes that cooperation with non-EU European NATO members should be reaffirmed through exploring the possibilities for strengthening these partnerships;

8. Underlines that NATO is the most successful military and political alliance in modern history, having ensured collective defence, stability and security for its members for over seven decades; underlines that together, the EU and NATO represent more than one billion citizens and encompass some of the world’s largest economies, forming a community united by shared democratic values and security interests; underlines the importance of institutionalising this dialogue through regular EU-NATO ministerial consultations, joint strategic foresight exercises, and coordinated crisis response planning, ensuring that political coordination keeps pace with operational cooperation;

9. Underlines that the EU relationship with NATO is a priority and needs to continue to develop, especially through increased information and intelligence sharing; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation is key for deterrence, protection of critical infrastructure, military mobility, energy grids, digital communications, cyber, space and defence ecosystems, and societal and democratic resilience; calls for the full implementation of the EU-NATO joint declarations; calls, furthermore, on the Member States that are also members of NATO to step up their commitment to NATO;

10. Stresses that NATO remains the key collective transatlantic defence alliance, with the EU and NATO playing complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles to ensure security in Europe and enhance international security, and encourages close collaboration and a mutually beneficial partnership with the United States in this area; underlines that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to both global and transatlantic security; underscores the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, capable of acting autonomously while complementing NATO, thereby strengthening the transatlantic partnership and providing necessary security guarantees for the EU, its Member States and the international rules-based order; points out, at the same time, that European defence must stand on its own two feet and have a sufficiently strong deterrent capability; warns of the risks posed by the shifting focus of US foreign policy, which could translate into a decrease in its security commitments to Europe; emphasises, therefore, the need for the EU to develop its own planning and operational capacity;

11. Emphasises that strengthening security hinges on the ability of the Member States to equip themselves with interoperable military instruments, developed jointly through the European defence industry, in order to ensure a rapid and effective response to any threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the EU Member States; emphasises, in this context, that military capabilities must be identified in synergy with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and in line with the ‘one single set of forces’ principle; notes that the EU plays a key role in the regulatory field and in investments aimed at supporting industrial competitiveness, technological development and European defence logistics; stresses that standardisation remains a crucial pillar of EU-NATO cooperation to guarantee interoperability, complementarity of efforts, and the efficient use of resources, while avoiding unnecessary duplication; calls on the Commission and the Member States to simplify and harmonise the rules on the production, certification, transfer, military mobility and maintenance of defence materials and systems, in order to build a competitive, resilient and integrated European industrial supply chain able to ensure greater operational preparedness and full and effective interoperability between the EU and NATO;

12. Highlights NATO’s role as a global actor and reliable partner in the efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and in the fight against global terrorism;

Necessity of EU SDPs

13. Welcomes the fact that the EU is positioning itself as a reliable global security partner by strengthening its CSDP, including through mutually beneficial SDPs and deeper bilateral and multilateral dialogues; notes that SDPs are in place with eight countries so far and more are in the pipeline, including with Iceland; calls for these partnerships to include structured industrial cooperation aimed at scaling up EU-based production capacities for core defence production assets within the context of strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB);

14. Believes that the SDP framework is giving new impetus to ongoing security and defence dialogues and practical cooperation; underlines the importance of having tangible deliverables and milestones with agreed target dates; stresses the need for results monitoring, bilateral reviews and dialogue on multi-domain threat perceptions and mutual interests, which are crucial to the implementation of the partnerships; stresses the importance of securing, through strategic SDPs, a reliable supply of critical raw materials that are vital for European defence; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to provide Parliament with a regular assessment of the implementation status of SDPs;