What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

– having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(5), 21, 23, 29 and 31(2) thereof,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to Declaration 25 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, which concerns the need to protect and observe the due process rights of individuals or entities concerned by EU restrictive measures or by EU measures combating terrorism,

– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 and Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,

– having regard to Council Implementing Regulations (EU) 2021/371 of 2 March 2021, (EU) 2021/478 of 22 March 2021 and (EU) 2025/1111 of 28 May 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,

– having regard to the Council decisions amending Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999, including Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/372 of 2 March 2021, (CFSP) 2021/481 of 22 March 2021, (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021, (CFSP) 2023/1504 of 20 July 2023, (CFSP) 2023/1716 of 8 September 2023, (CFSP) 2024/1025 of 4 April 2024, (CFSP) 2024/1074 of 4 April 2024, (CFSP) 2024/1175 of 19 April 2024, 2024/1967 of 15 July 2024, (CFSP) 2024/3004 of 2 December 2024, (CFSP) 2025/346 of 18 February 2025 and (CFSP) 2025/1110 of 27 May 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) and its resolution of 2 April 2025 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 November 2020 on the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, which has been renewed until 2027,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2721 of 4 December 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, which extended the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act) for three years, until 8 December 2026,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0266/2025),

A. whereas Article 21 TEU stipulates that the actions of the Union ‘shall be guided by democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’;

B. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, adopted in December 2020, enables the EU to impose restrictive measures on individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations worldwide; whereas certain EU Member States have adopted their own national Magnitsky-style legislation and these are important tools to complement EU sanctions; whereas the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and other like-minded countries have adopted similar sanctions regimes; whereas cooperation and coordination among like-minded countries on sanctions increases their effectiveness;

D. whereas in its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, Parliament welcomed the adoption of the sanctions regime as an essential addition to the EU’s human rights and foreign policy toolbox;

E. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act applies to a broad range of human rights violations and the persons and entities listed can include perpetrators, enablers and third parties supplying material or technical assistance for repression;

F. whereas the EUGHRSR targets individual perpetrators and entities, instead of broad economic sectors, which reduces collateral damage to the general population and avoids harming access to food, medicine or public services;

G. whereas the EUGHRSR also covers widespread violations or abuses and systematic or serious concerns as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU, such as torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, arbitrary arrests or detentions, human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression, and violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief;

H. whereas the EUGHRSR listings are a form of international recognition for victims of human rights abuses;

I. whereas transnational repression has not yet been included in the list of serious human rights violations that trigger sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

J. whereas numerous Parliament resolutions have called for sanctions instruments to be used in a more flexible way and more often in cases of core international crimes or serious human rights violations;

K. whereas as at 4 November 2025, 168 listings had been made under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act (131 individuals and 37 entities); whereas the list of designations under this regime has grown, and not much is known about its impact and effectiveness;

L. whereas despite progress, substantial gaps remain in the geographical and thematic coverage of transnational listings and in the establishment of benchmarks aligned with the sanctions’ objectives; whereas, despite several calls by Parliament, corruption is still not considered a crime within the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

M. whereas listings have primarily focused on violations of physical integrity and civil-political rights, particularly those targeting political opponents and activists, predominantly males, in authoritarian regimes, rather than on core international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, and systemic violations of socio-economic rights;

N. whereas listings, in line with the EU’s strategic relationships and geopolitical interests, have largely been geographically concentrated, leaving other areas and contexts under-addressed;

O. whereas confidentiality around potential listing or de-listing is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; whereas Parliament should have a role in this process;

P. whereas parliamentary scrutiny of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act is necessary in order to strengthen its legitimacy; whereas Parliament’s resolutions containing recommendations for additional listings continue to be insufficiently considered by the Council;

Q. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act currently provides only for asset freezes and visa bans;

R. whereas the current regime of asset freezes and visa bans could be complemented by additional measures, such as restrictions on financial services, public procurement and participation in EU-funded projects, and its scope should be extended to cover the immediate family members of human rights violators;

S. whereas guidance from the Commission remains insufficient to clarify the scope of the prohibitions on delivering any kind of support, including technical and material support to sanctioned persons and entities;

T. whereas some implementation loopholes, such as derogation clauses allowing contracts that were concluded before an individual or entity was listed, create opportunities for sanction circumvention and diminish the effectiveness of sanctions;

U. whereas existing EU geographical sanctions regimes include broader restrictions that could complement the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act through cross-listing;

V. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act has largely focused on lower-level officials and functionaries, while those holding real political and military power have often remained beyond the scope of its designations;

W. whereas listings under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to date have not targeted any actors responsible for committing some of the core international crimes recognised in the Rome Statute;

X. whereas civil society actors continue to engage informally with EU institutions in proposing names for listing, in the absence of a structured mechanism for their input; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) lacks the resources to assess, investigate and respond to the information it receives;

Y. whereas improved transparency, coordination with accountability mechanisms, coordination with international actors and like-minded countries and the uptake of listings at United Nations level would strengthen the sanctions regime’s effectiveness;

Z. whereas some Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter the territory of the EU; whereas such failure to comply with the sanctions considerably harms the EU’s credibility and undermines the effectiveness of EU sanctions regimes;

AA. whereas implementation is largely carried out at national level and each Member State is responsible for enforcing the sanctions on its territory; whereas this creates a risk of weak links where individuals or companies may try to circumvent the sanctions by moving money or activities to Member States with slower or less strict implementation; whereas the EU institutions have repeatedly stressed the need for more uniform and coordinated application to make sanctions truly effective;

AB. whereas Parliament has called, in numerous resolutions, for the introduction of qualified majority voting for the adoption of sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

AC. whereas the extension of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act until December 2026 provides an opportunity to review the regime;

1. Reiterates its support for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act as an indispensable foreign policy tool for enhancing human rights worldwide and for strengthening the EU’s human rights toolbox, particularly given its capacity to contribute to changing the behaviour of targeted persons and entities and to efforts to hold accountable the direct perpetrators, enablers, instigators and indirect supporters of serious human rights violations, as well as those who directly or indirectly benefit from such violations, including their immediate family members; highlights that the instrument is designed so as to not affect the enjoyment of human rights by the population;

2. Reaffirms its unwavering commitment to combating impunity for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide through the effective use of existing EU sanctions instruments and tools, including the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the international justice system, which is facing unprecedented challenges, including baseless sanctions against judges and staff of the International Criminal Court, some of whom are EU nationals; urges the EU, in that regard, to activate its Blocking Statute to contain the impact of those sanctions;

Policy coherence and strategic effectiveness

3. Calls for a comprehensive impact assessment of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and its interactions with the EU country-specific sanctions and the other EU horizontal restrictive measures in order to evaluate its coherence, proportionality and effectiveness, including in changing the behaviour of those listed, to identify operational gaps and to ensure consistent and strategic application worldwide, and calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed in accordance with the findings of this impact assessment;

4. Calls for the listings drawn up under the EU’s EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed continuously and systematically, at least once every 12 months, so as to ensure their consistency, proportionality and conformity with the latest information and judicial decisions;

5. Considers that more information on the de-listing criteria should be made available in order to enhance legal clarity, due process, transparency and accountability;