What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Change 2

Changed:P.R. whereas EU defence spending is estimated to hit a record of EUR 381 billion by the end of 2025, reflecting a more than 10 % increase since 2024; whereas defence investment hit EUR 106 billion in 2024 and is projected to be close to EUR 130 billion by the end of 2025; whereas NATO’s Defence Investment Plan sets a trajectory towards 5 % of GDP in defence expenditure by 2035, with at least 3.53,5 % dedicated to core defence; whereas several EU Member States have already announced national plans to move in this direction, reflecting a step change from earlier commitments to the 2 % benchmark; whereas relevant Member States’ commitment to meet the target of 3.53,5 % of GDP would require spending a total of more than EUR 630 billion per year, as estimated by the European Defence Agency (EDA); whereas the plan comprises a commitment by NATO allies to spend up to 1.51,5 % of GDP on protecting critical infrastructure, defending information technology networks, ensuring civil preparedness and resilience, and innovating and strengthening the defence industrial base, among other measures; whereas the EU Member States have agreed on more, better and smarter defence spending that should primarily be channelled into cooperative initiatives; whereas previous agreements to do so failed to achieve set targets;

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S. whereas the CSDP has 12 civilian missions, eight military operations and one civilian-military mission, with around 4 000 personnel on three continents; whereas Operation EUFOR ALTHEA sets a route towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and still plays a pivotal role in preserving the security and stability of BiH and the region; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo, fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking and training the Libyan coastguard;

T. whereas it is becoming increasingly important to further develop existing partnerships with allies and establish more strategic partnerships around the world; whereas the EU needs tailor-made security and defence partnerships that focus on delivering results, enhancing capabilities and reducing overall dependencies on single actors and providers; whereas NATO is an important pillar of the defence of many EU Member States;

U. whereas the EU needs to be able to effectively and autonomously protect all EU Member States and citizens by taking full advantage of Article 42(2) TEU and developing a European Defence Union; whereas there is the need to further strengthen the operational value of the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) TEU and to provide more clarity on its practical arrangements in case of its activation by a Member State;

V. whereas Parliament’s active role in shaping CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations;

Change 3

Added:W. whereas Finland seized the Russian vessel Fitburg on 31 December 2025 on suspicion of intentionally severing undersea telecommunications cables,

Added:X. whereas China’s ‘Justice Mission 2025’ military exercise resulted in numerous crossings of the median line of the Taiwan Strait by Chinese aircraft, as well as crossings of the median line and repeated attempts to violate Taiwan’s contiguous zone by Chinese ships, and the blocking-off of a large number of maritime areas in an exercise of encircling and blockading Taiwan and its ports, and the conducting of long-range live firing exercises, with missiles landing in Taiwan’s contiguous zone;

A deteriorating geopolitical context

1. Emphasises that Russia represents the primary and most significant threat to the EU and its Member States; stresses the gravity and urgency of the threats to European security posed by Russia and its allies such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea; reiterates its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s continued war of aggression and barbaric attacks on civilians; strongly opposes any initiative that would deny Ukraine its sovereignty, reward Russia for its aggression, lead to territorial changes through the use of force, result in impunity and see the future of Ukraine decided on without Ukraine, and the security of Europe decided on without Europeans; underscores that Russia is also attacking Member States and other vulnerable countries in the EU neighbourhood and aims to undermine our societal resilience through its recent, repeated, intensified and increasingly frequent violations of EU airspace, affecting Estonia, Poland, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania, among other countries, and its hybrid warfare including (attempted) assassinations, arson, cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, economic coercion, weaponisation of migration and border pressure, lawfare tactics, support to extremist and separatist groups, interference in electoral processes and information manipulation; notes with concern that Russia portrays itself as a global defender of so-called ‘traditional values’, using this narrative as a tool to expand its influence abroad; calls for specific measures to be integrated into the CSDP to counter this influence; notes that Russia engages in the online recruitment of citizens and criminal gangs from EU and other European countries for its hybrid attacks;

Change 4

Changed:2. Reiterates its support for any initiative that would enable the EU and its Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace, including shooting down airborne threats; reiterates its calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an action plan on preventing and countering the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare against EU Member States in the terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains originating in Russia or any other country, including options for EU retaliatory measures that match the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU; calls on the Member States to review, in coordination with NATO and NATO allies, the rules of engagement for all types of threats to ensure they are capable of responding to the most innovative threats; stresses that the EU must show resolve and signal that any attempt by a non-EU country to violate the sovereignty of its Member States will be met with immediate retaliation; underlines that Russia’s hybrid warfare will continue unabated unless its actions elicit political or military retaliation; underlines that the EU, in close coordination with NATO, should take further action to prevent hybrid warfare on European soil, including through appropriate restrictions on Russian diplomats and the interdiction of the Russian shadow fleet using all available means; welcomes, in this regard, the ongoing EU-G7 discussions on exploring a maritime services ban on all Russian oil exports, as an alternative to the oil price cap; calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; urges the EU and its Member States to work together to ban trade and commercial activities with Russia and Belarus, particularly focusing on any potential dual-use items, as well as the transit of goods to and from the EU via their territories, and to reinforce sanctions; calls for further sanctions targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue; calls on the Council, along with its US partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet and for further action against it using the full spectrum of legal means to halt, obstruct or impede its operations, given its possible involvement in the launch of drones targeting critical infrastructure; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU through thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of military support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea and China must entail direct consequences for all other relations with those countries;

Change 5

Added:3. Regrets that, despite Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and its sustained hybrid attacks against the EU, seven EU Member States increased their imports of Russian energy in 2025 compared with the previous year; recalls that such continued dependence has been enabled by long-standing Kremlin-driven energy leverage, including the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which from their outset constituted geopolitical projects aimed at increasing Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, undermining the Union’s energy security and solidarity, and fuelling Russia’s capacity to wage war; underlines, therefore, that Nord Stream 1 and 2 must never be reactivated and calls for their permanent decommissioning as a matter of strategic security;

4. Emphasises that, while NATO and the EU Member States collectively hold a strong conventional advantage over Russia, in the light of Russia’s battlefield experience and aggressive military doctrine, further efforts are needed to draw on Ukraine’s experience and enhance capabilities in key areas such as asymmetric and hybrid warfare, drones, ballistic missiles, electronic warfare and air defence, in order to deter Russia;

5. Notes that the regime in Belarus continues to play a destabilising role in the region by aligning fully with Russia’s aggressive policies; stresses the importance of closely monitoring military movements by Russia and Belarus along the EU’s border and strengthening resilience against potential hybrid threats along the eastern frontier; highlights the urgent need for Member States bordering Russia or Belarus to be provided with appropriate and relevant resources to secure the EU’s external borders against military incursions and attacks, including through the Eastern Flank Watch;

Change 6

Changed:5.6. Underlines that Russia’s defeat by Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s success are the most effective and cost-efficient investments in European security for the short and medium-term; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole; strongly condemns the drone incursions from Hungarian territory into Ukrainian airspace and the recent statements by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán questioning Ukraine’s sovereignty; considers the United States’ policy ambivalence and its reduction in military support as counterproductive to bringing a swift and permanent end to Russia’s aggression;aggression, and that it represents an unprecedented and deeply concerning turn in US positioning towards European security; urges Europe, alongside key, like-minded partners, to enhance their military support to Ukraine, including through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) training initiatives and the financing and provision of military support such as air defence systems and deep strike capabilities, in order to create the conditions for peace; welcomes, as a significant demonstration of the EU’s continued support, the European Council’s decision of 18 December 2025 to meet a substantial part of Ukraine’s budgetary needs through 2026 and 2027 by providing Ukraine with a EUR 90 billion financial assistance package in the form of EU-backed loans; welcomes Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025 enacting the indefinite immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets; regrets that the Commission and the Council were unable to find a solution to address the concerns expressed by various Member States on the Reparations Loan using the cash balances associated with Russian sovereign assets; welcomes the Council’s calls for Parliament to continue working on the technical and legal aspects of the instruments establishing a Reparations Loan based on the cash balances associated with Russia’s immobilised assets; underscores that this would increase the pressure on Russia, reduce Ukraine’s growing debt burden, ensure that Russia, and not EU taxpayers, bears the cost of its aggression, and secure Ukraine’s future compensation for the damages this aggression is causing; reiterates its call on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately endorse the Commission proposal to use all frozen Russian assets as the basis for a substantial loan to Ukraine; welcomes the fact that, as a result of deliveries from European countries, military aid allocations to Ukraine in the first half of 2025 exceeded those of the 2022-2024 period, despite decreased US contributions; notes, however, critical gaps in tech delivery of air defence and deep strike capabilities; calls for a coalition of willing EU Member States to explore how to set up a defensive European-led Integrated Air Protection Zone (IAPZ), employing combat air patrols (CAPs) over uncontested areas of Ukraine to intercept Russian projectiles; stresses that an IAPZ would help to protect Ukrainian civilians from indiscriminate attacks, offer proactive defence against Russian incursions into EU airspace, and shift the balance of power to help force Russia to the negotiation table; calls for enhanced coordination among the EU Military Staff in response to threats along the eastern flank, including real-time monitoring and rapid information sharing; underlines that valuable insights can be gained from Ukraine’s battlefield experience to improve the EU’s overall situational awareness and hybrid threat response; calls for better coordination among European countries in the provision of both economic and military support to Ukraine;

Change 7

Changed:6.7. Underlines that in order to ensure effective deterrence against Russian aggression and sustainable peace in relation to Ukraine, credible and robust security guarantees must be offered, and coordinated collaboratively by all able and willing European and non-European partners; underscores that security guarantees should be established as Treaty obligations, guaranteeing an adequate response should Ukraine’s security be compromised, and complemented by measures to strengthen Ukraine’s own military deterrence; welcomes the conclusions of the meeting of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in Paris on 6 January 2026; strongly welcomes the proposal for a multinational ‘reassurance force’ for Ukraine, and encourages all EU Member States to thoroughly reflect on how they can best support such a force; welcomes the agreement to finalise politically and legally binding commitments to restore peace and security in the case of a future armed attack by Russia, and a clear framework for support to Ukraine, including sustaining its long-term military capabilities and deepened defence cooperation; regrets, however, that these security guarantees would only be implemented once a ceasefire is agreed upon, and that Vladimir Putin shows no willingness for such a ceasefire; notes the talks on a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; underlines the need to follow up on these ambitious proposals;

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8. Deplores the Hungarian Government’s continued obstruction of the European Peace Facility (EPF), including through legal action before the General Court of the EU, which undermines the EU’s ability to provide timely and effective military assistance to Ukraine, as well as its continuous blocking of EPF support to Armenia; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to find an alternative solution to overcome this blockage;

9. Calls for strategic measures to proactively counter hybrid threats and prevent interference in the democratic processes of accession countries, which seek to undermine EU interests and values; recognises the direct attempts to alter the results of electoral processes through FIMI campaigns and other hybrid tactics as fully fledged security threats; encourages increased funding for and investment in strategic communication, media literacy and the fight against FIMI;

10. Stresses that hybrid warfare goes beyond cyber or information attacks alone, and encompasses the economic, technological and societal dimensions of strategic confrontation; considers that Europe’s dependence on external data, critical technologies and supply chains constitutes a major vulnerability that can be exploited for coercive purposes; calls on the Commission to propose a comprehensive EU-wide strategy to ensure that the EU can attract, maintain and retain critical technologies within the EU, including by limiting foreign takeovers;

11. Highlights Russia’s growing aggression and hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova with a view to destabilising its pro-EU government through unprecedented levels of malign interference and the continued militarisation of Transnistria; condemns Russia’s continued illegal occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in Georgia, as it poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region; underlines that inadequate responses to Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008 have allowed its imperialist ambitions to go unchecked, seriously undermining the European security architecture; is concerned about Russia’s significant military build-up in the occupied regions and ‘borderisation’ along the Administrative Boundary Line; supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and is concerned about the Georgian Government’s alignment with false Russian narratives; emphasises the strategic importance of the Black Sea region for European security, energy resilience and regional stability; welcomes the adoption of the EU’s new Black Sea strategy, which highlights the critical geostrategic importance of the Black Sea for the security, stability and prosperity of Europe; underlines the EU’s enhanced engagement in the region to promote stability and strengthen its deterrence and resilience; highlights the need for the effective and credible implementation of the strategy and calls for the EU to ensure the full and equal participation of all states concerned in shaping policies and initiatives related to Black Sea security and connectivity;

12. Stresses the need to further safeguard the US-brokered agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan through the swift conclusion and signing of a comprehensive and lasting peace treaty in line with, and with full respect for, Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and including the withdrawal of foreign troops from its territory; notes the constructive role played by Armenia in securing regional peace and stability; strongly underscores the need for further efforts to overcome the deep impact of Azerbaijan’s aggressive policy towards Armenia, while acknowledging current efforts to build relations and confidence; highlights the need for engagement and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye to reduce tensions and strengthen confidence-building in the South Caucasus;

Change 8

Changed:12.13. Remains concerned about Türkiye, a member of NATO, displaying ambiguous behaviour through its lack of sanctions against Russia and its continuous challenges to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States; condemns Türkiye’s violation of Syria’s territorial integrity; is deeply concerned by attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria, as they not only result in civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the effectiveness and continuity of the fight against Daesh; welcomes the January 2026 coordinated strikes by France and the UK on an underground arms cache used by Daesh in Syria;

Change 9

Changed:13.14. Denounces Russia’s ongoing efforts to undermine stability and democratic governance in the Western Balkans, particularly through dis- and misinformation campaigns, political interference and energy leverage aimed at undermining stability and democratic governance and promoting pro-Russian sentiments fuelled by anti-Western rhetoric; notes China’s negative influence in the region; notes that EU efforts to counter these developments have been insufficient and ineffective; calls for the evaluation and streamlining of all efforts and further investment to counter pro-Russian and anti-European FIMI; expresses concern about the stability of BiH and the persistent tensions between Kosovo and Serbia; stresses that the Western Balkans is an area of strategic and geopolitical interest for the EU and that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the region directly influences that of the entire continent;14. Notes the deep instability in the Middle East and the West, North and Central Africa regions, and its linkage to the Jihadist terrorist threat;continent;

Change 10

Removed:15. Deplores the fact that escalations and the violation of international law in Gaza and the broader region diminish the chances of long-term peace for all people in the Middle East; welcomes the US-negotiated peace plan between Israel and Hamas leading to a ceasefire; calls on all parties to fully comply with the ceasefire, to deliver the bodies of all deceased hostages to their families, to allow the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid and access for other civilian assistance missions, and calls for a workable roadmap towards a two-state solution, the restoration of security and public order, including the disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the reform and empowerment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as necessary priority steps; considers it a pivotal moment for the entire region and a starting point towards further de-escalation and stability; urges the EU to swiftly broaden the mandate of its EU Border Assistance Mission to Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) and the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL-COPPS) in order to play a pivotal role in progress towards a viable political solution, including through support for the rule of law, security-sector reform and transitional justice;

Added:15. Notes the deep instability in the Middle East and the West, North and Central Africa regions, and its linkage to the Jihadist terrorist threat; stresses that this instability poses a serious threat to the security of Europeans, who are facing increased migratory pressure that facilitates the entry of terrorists into European territory;

Removed:16. Notes with concern the escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran, and in the broader region, including Lebanon, Syria and Qatar; remains concerned about internal tensions in Lebanon and Syria; supports the contribution of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern Lebanon and welcomes the extension of its mandate for one year; recalls that the majority of UNIFIL contingents come from EU Member States; condemns Iran’s persistent attempts to destabilise the region, either directly or through its proxies; highlights the need for the EU to support its partner, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, also by increasing EPF funding for the protection of the Jordan-Syria border, which is being used by traffickers as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking and has been weakened by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East;

Added:16. Deplores the fact that, in the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas, escalations and the violation of international law in Gaza and the broader region diminish the chances of long-term peace for all people in the Middle East; welcomes the US-negotiated peace plan between Israel and Hamas leading to a ceasefire, as endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803; calls on all parties to fully comply with the ceasefire, to deliver the body of the last remaining deceased hostage to his family, to allow the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid while holding international organisations to the highest neutrality standards and without imposing disproportionate or incapacitating restrictions on their operations, and to allow access for other civilian assistance missions, including through the Rafah crossing, and calls for a workable roadmap towards a two-state solution as provided by the UN General Assembly-endorsed New York Declaration, the restoration of security and public order, including the urgent disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the reform and empowerment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as necessary priority steps; underlines that the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip must be strictly and unequivocally conditional on robust international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and subject to clear and binding conditionality; stresses that all financial assistance, reconstruction material and infrastructure support must be fully controlled, audited and safeguarded to prevent any diversion to terrorist organisations or violent activities; emphasises that sustainable reconstruction, security and long-term stability in Gaza are inseparable from the complete exclusion of terrorist and extremist actors, and the PA’s capacity to prevent terrorism and armed violence; notes with serious concern the persistent obstacles to humanitarian access and the alarm expressed by the VP/HR regarding recent licensing decisions constraining humanitarian organisations operating in Gaza; considers it a pivotal moment for the entire region and a starting point towards further de-escalation and stability; urges the EU to swiftly broaden the mandate of its EU Border Assistance Mission to Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) and the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL-COPPS) in order to play a pivotal role in progress towards a viable political solution, including through support for the rule of law, security-sector reform and transitional justice; is deeply concerned about the continued escalation of violence in the West Bank and the support by the Israeli Government and armed forces for settler activities, and welcomes the December 2025 Council conclusions in this regard; regrets the Israeli Government’s formal announcement of the establishment of 11 new settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank, as well as the legalisation or retroactive recognition of eight illegal outposts and neighbourhoods of existing settlements as new official settlements; recalls the EU’s long-standing position that the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem remains illegal under international law, and constitutes a unilateral measure that undermines trust and the prospects for a sustainable peace and a negotiated solution;

Removed:17. Welcomes the commitment to increase security cooperation with Southern Mediterranean partners and calls for enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries in the field of maritime security, countering sanctions circumvention and ensuring the security of submarine cables, while also combating extremism, terrorism and illicit arms trade;

Added:17. Notes with concern the escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran, and in the broader region, including Lebanon, Syria and Qatar; remains concerned about internal tensions in Lebanon and Syria; supports the contribution of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern Lebanon and welcomes the extension of its mandate for one year; welcomes the conclusions of the ninth EU-Lebanon Association Council, in particular the willingness to further support the Lebanese security sector through the full use of EU tools, including the European Peace Facility and programmes under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, and to explore possible future CSDP engagement; underlines the need for progress on mutual confidence-building measures and the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, including the disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups, as a prerequisite for regional stability; recalls that the majority of UNIFIL contingents come from EU Member States; condemns Iran’s persistent attempts to destabilise the region, either directly or through its proxies; highlights the need for the EU to support its partner, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, also by increasing EPF funding for the protection of the Jordan-Syria border, which is being used by traffickers as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking and has been weakened by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East;

Added:18. Welcomes the commitment to increase security cooperation with Southern Mediterranean partners and calls for enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries in the field of maritime security, countering sanctions circumvention and ensuring the security of submarine cables, while also combating extremism, illegal immigration, Islamic terrorism, human trafficking and illicit arms trade;

19. Expresses deep concern over the persistent instability in Libya and the setbacks in the Sahel region, which has developed into a hotbed of jihadist violence from the Sahel to Mozambique and Somalia, with the risk of spillover into neighbouring regions and, ultimately, Europe; deplores the continued instability in Yemen and condemns Houthi attacks against Israel and on shipping vessels; stresses the long-term security risks for Europe of such developments in these regions; remains concerned over the ongoing humanitarian turmoil with security implications in Africa’s Great Lakes region; urges the EU to take measures to counter the rising influence of Russia and China, which is weakening countries in the region and undermining the EU’s positive contributions to regional stability; reiterates the paramount importance of preventing Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising, following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and calls for sustained cooperation to that end between the Syrian transitional authorities and the global coalition against Daesh; strongly believes that a reliable and sustainable solution must be found, through increased dialogue with the Kurdish communities in Syria, concerning the jihadist prisoners and their families in prisons and camps in north-eastern Syria, which represent both a serious risk and a humanitarian challenge;

Change 11

Changed:19.20. Reiterates its concern about Russia’s intensified militarisation and its aggressive posture towards the EU Member States, increased geopolitical, climate-change- and resource-driven competition in the Arctic as well as malign activities in European territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, including through the activities of the Russian shadow fleet; is also concerned about increased Chinese presence and the deepened cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic, including joint exercises; stresses that it is essential to counterbalance Russia and China’s growing influence and military presence in the region; underlines the importance of overall stability and peace in the Arctic in accordance with the principles of international law; calls for concrete and effective action by the EU and its Member States using all available means and maximum strategic creativity to stop the shadow fleet, enhance Arctic and maritime domain awareness through enhanced surveillance, intelligence sharing and satellite monitoring, and protect critical infrastructure; stresses the need for the EU to ensure the effective monitoring of its external maritime borders to prevent illegal activities; is concerned by non-EU countries’ interference in Greenland, notably inflammatory narratives and the conduct of hybrid actions on Greenland’s territory, as well as the US Government’s formulation of explicit threats against Greenland’s sovereignty;sovereignty and the recent refusal to exclude military intervention to that end; underlines that this represents a fundamental threat to the EU’s strategic security interests, and calls for the EU and its Member States to act jointly in response; welcomes, in this regard, the joint statement of 6 January 2026 on Greenland by France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Denmark and the UK, joined by other EU Member States, reiterating that ‘Greenland belongs to its people’ and recalling that ‘it is for Denmark and Greenland, and them only, to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland’;

Change 12

Removed:20. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; is concerned by China’s accelerated militarisation and its assertive posture towards its neighbours; notes with growing concern the continued pressure on freedom of navigation and critical infrastructure, with attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait; underlines that such actions undermine freedom of navigation and that China’s refusal to exclude the use of military coercion to advance its irredentist ambitions towards Taiwan poses a serious threat to regional stability; expresses deep concern about China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the use of economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics and dangerous manoeuvres against its neighbours; emphasises that any military escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have serious consequences for Europe’s security and supply chains; highlights the importance of preserving stability in the South China Sea in the light of the strategic need for security and defence cooperation with certain countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); commends the recent freedom of navigation operations carried out by the United States, the UK, France and Germany in the Taiwan Strait, which demonstrate strong international commitment to upholding international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to ensuring freedom of navigation;

Added:21. Supports all European initiatives of solidarity with Greenland and Denmark, welcomes Greenland’s important decision to select Eutelsat, a European satellite operator, to provide its satellite internet coverage, and calls for the rapid development of the European space sector, which is essential for Europe’s security, particularly through the ongoing EU Space Act initiative;

Added:22. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; is concerned by China’s accelerated militarisation and its assertive posture towards its neighbours; notes with growing concern the continued pressure on freedom of navigation and critical infrastructure, condemns the intensified and accelerated steps by China to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and recalls that the UN Charter’s explicit prohibition of the use of force applies to these regions; underlines that such actions undermine freedom of navigation and that China’s refusal to exclude the use of military coercion to advance its irredentist ambitions towards Taiwan poses a serious threat to regional stability; expresses deep concern about China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the use of economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics and dangerous manoeuvres against its neighbours; emphasises that any military escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have serious consequences for Europe’s security and supply chains; highlights the importance of preserving stability in the South China Sea in the light of the strategic need for security and defence cooperation with certain countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); commends the recent freedom of navigation operations carried out by the United States, the UK, France and Germany in the Taiwan Strait, which demonstrate strong international commitment to upholding international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to ensuring freedom of navigation;

23. Stresses the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region within the EU’s defence framework, recognising the need to address growing security concerns linked to China’s regional activities and their broader implications for global stability; considers it important to shift China’s strategic calculus regarding support for Russia through sanctions, including measures against Chinese banks involved in circumventing EU sanctions, and to strengthen the EU’s presence and partnerships in this region;

Change 13

Changed:22.24. Expresses deep concern about the intensified military-technical cooperation between Russia and China, which poses a growing threat to stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, and risks undermining global peace, the rules-based international order and European security interests; notes with concern the dependency of the EU and its Member States on imports of rare earth elements and other critical raw materials from third countries, in particular China, which constitutes a growing security risk; regrets that recent Russia-China military signalling and exercises, as well as China’s ‘Justice Mission 2025’ exercise, have further increased tensions in the region, reinforcing the importance of de-escalation, deterrence and the protection of freedom of navigation;

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25. Emphasises that deepening cooperation between the EU and India in the areas of security and defence is in the mutual interest of both sides, but also requires that India take a clear stance in view of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on India to take effective action to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions, in particular through controls on the re-export of sanctioned goods, greater transparency on energy imports and the suspension of military cooperation with Russia;

26. Notes the growing importance of dual-use space-based activities for European strategic resilience and autonomy and the rising number of operators in space; stresses that space capabilities, in particular those with a dual use, are essential for security and defence, and for ensuring autonomous decision-making, protecting critical infrastructure and enabling effective defence operations in all theatres of operation; stresses that European space autonomy requires, above all, the effective protection of orbital assets and less dependence on foreign companies and service providers; calls for the accelerated establishment of a regular Earth observation service, a reinforced European navigation and positioning system, a European secure communication solution by 2028 and an early warning system against ballistic missiles; stresses the need for an improved regulatory and governance framework for space-based activities in general and for the military use of space and anti-satellite weapons in particular; calls for closer coordination between the Member States, the Commission, the European Space Agency and the EDA, also in support of CSDP missions and operations;

27. Underlines that space-based assets are increasingly critical enablers for military purposes as well as CSDP missions and operations, including secure communications, positioning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and command support; underlines that the EU successfully operates the Copernicus, Galileo and EGNOS programmes, which provide dual-use services for the EU and its Member States; considers that this sets a precedent for the development of further European strategic enablers that fall outside the financial and technical ability of individual Member States, or where there is overriding European public interest in European solutions; calls for closer coordination between the Member States, the Commission, the European Space Agency and the EDA to prevent duplication of efforts, ensure interoperability and maximise industrial synergies across civil, commercial and defence applications; welcomes the planned IRIS2 secure satellite internet constellation and recommends that Taiwan and Ukraine be granted future access;

28. Notes the dichotomy between the very high levels of public support for a genuine European Defence Union and the varying support among the Member States for the implementation of the CSDP, despite the unprecedented threats and changing geopolitical circumstances;

Change 14

Changed:27.29. Stresses the EU’s obligation and strategic long-term global interest in maintaining the rules and values-based international order, ensuring respect for international law and upholding multilateralism; notes that traditional peacebuilding, peace negotiation expertise, transitional justice and confidence-building measures remain critically important, despite current trends; calls for the EU to assume a leading role in shaping peace negotiations and peaceful transitions in the major conflicts affecting Europe and its immediate neighbourhood; underlines that the EU should ensure its relevance in this regard by exploiting the full potential of CSDP instruments in order to ensure that peace negotiations benefit from its expertise in securing sustainable and fair peace; urges the EU and its Member States to further deepen existing partnerships and seek new partnerships with countries that share the same belief in multilateralism and a rules-based international order; insists on the importance of a strong and close partnership with the UK on security and defence with specific conditions, and welcomes the EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership; regrets that the negotiations on the UK’s participation in the SAFE programme have not succeeded so far; welcomes the agreement on SAFE between the EU and Canada; calls for the EU and the UK to agree on a balanced and mutually beneficial solution;

30. Regrets the weakening of non-proliferation and arms control regimes; calls for the redoubling of efforts to reverse this trend and demands that the EU play a much stronger role, in particular in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; points out that, while a nuclear deterrent is of crucial importance in protecting Europe as a continent, the UK and France are the only European countries that possess nuclear weapons; reaffirms its full support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime; stresses the need for an effective EU-level armaments policy to be developed and for greater transparency and convergence at national and EU level on arms exports, especially during a period of increased defence spending and EDTIB reinforcement; calls on the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and acknowledges their competences in their defence acquisition policies; calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and to strictly implement Criterion Four on regional stability and halt arms export licensing if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient might use the arms aggressively against another country in general and the Member States in particular;

Change 15

Changed:29.31. Expresses its dismay at the currentDecember ambiguity2025 US National Security Strategy, which formalises a groundless US policy of considering the EU, including its fundamental values, democratic governance principles and several of its fundamental security objectives, opposed to US interests; underscores that such positions inevitably lead European countries to reinforce their strategic autonomy, including in the EU-US defence and security relationship; acknowledges NATO’s crucial role for Europe’s collective defence, but warns of the risks posed by the growing unpredictability, short-sighted isolationism and self-centredness in US foreign policy and its shifting relations with Russia and focus on Asia, which could be accompanied by a stark decrease in military posture and the rapid withdrawal of troops from Europe and be perceived as undermining its security commitments to Europe; calls, against this backdrop, for the development of contingency plans in case of rapid US troop withdrawalwithdrawal, or as a result of any other circumstances, to ensure European deterrence and capacity for autonomous action against aggression;

Change 16

Changed:30.32. Underlines that the US remainshas so far remained the EU’s most important strategic ally and is essential to NATO’s collective defence and European security, resilience and deterrence; highlights that US engagement and close EU-US cooperation should therefore be fostered; underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to increase defence spending in a coordinated manner and for the Member States to strengthen their own defence capabilities and readiness, with the aim of ensuring strategic autonomy and developing credible deterrence independent of the United States and within the framework of a renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership; underlines that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence would reinforce European interests, contribute to a stronger transatlantic partnership with the United States and achieve shared security objectives; notes the adoption of the US National Security Strategy 2025 and welcomes the stated US commitment to support its allies in preserving the freedom and security of Europe, while regretting the negative tone towards our continent and rejecting any insinuation of interference in the democratic processes of EU Member States; welcomes the adoption of the 2025 National Defence Appropriations Act by the US Congress and its realistic restrictions on possible troop and asset withdrawals from Europe and on the withdrawal of assistance to Ukraine and Baltic security; notes, with concern, reports that US officials have allegedly informed European interlocutors of their demand that Europe take over responsibility for the majority of NATO’s conventional defence capabilities in Europe by 2027; considers that such announcements are not indicative of a dialogue between partners and allies on how best to secure European security and burden-sharing; considers that the US National Security Strategy further reinforces the imperative for Europe to urgently take responsibility for its own security;

Addressing the deterrence gap and capability issues

33. Underlines that the EU has a deterrence gap; considers that the critical issues constituting this EU deterrence gap lie in: autonomy, military doctrine, political unity, regular common threat assessment, ISR, capability gaps, unified command and control (C2), industrial capacity and innovation, and interoperability; stresses – given the rapid deterioration of the geopolitical context – the need to replenish depleted stocks, close critical capability gaps and ensure the interoperability of armed forces, scale up industrial defence production, create a true European single market for defence products and services, improve interoperability by reducing the overlapping weapons systems in use, promote standardisation in line with NATO standards, and drastically ramp up investment in innovation; considers it critical to develop, in line with the recommendations of the white paper of 19 March 2025, air and missile defence, artillery systems, ammunition and missiles, drone and counter-drone systems, military mobility, artificial intelligence, quantum, cyberwarfare and electronic warfare, strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection; calls for joint efforts by the EU and its Member States to address these gaps also through a set of EDPCIs; welcomes the establishment of the EDPCIs as a key instrument to strengthen cooperation, interoperability and industrial efficiency by fostering the joint development, production and procurement of key military capabilities, which are critical for the EU’s security and defence interests; calls, furthermore, on the industry to scale up its production and innovation as fast as possible in cooperation with, and supported by, the EU and its Member States;

Change 17

Changed:32.34. Recognises the significant efforts to advance European defence through proposals for regulations and initiatives such as EDIP, the ReArm Europe Agenda, SAFE, the defence mini-omnibus, the defence omnibus, as well as the Military Mobility package, BraveTech EU and the Defence Readiness 2030 Roadmap; urges the swift completion and implementation of the Defence Readiness Omnibus; welcomes the proposals offering Member States greater budgetary flexibility, in particular the EUR 150 billion loan facility under the SAFE instrument; considers, however, that these measures are insufficient and that massive additional budgetary investment will be necessary; welcomes the fact that the SAFE loans have been fully subscribed,subscribed and are leading to significant joint procurement actions, while reiterating its regret over the use of Article 122 TFEU, especially as Parliament has proven its ability to act swiftly when required; welcomes the announced intention for Member States to increase joint procurement by 40 % by the end of 2027 and to increase procurement with European preference by 55 % by the end of 2028 and by 60 % by the end of 2030; regrets the lack of incremental increases in joint procurement and notes that Member States have, to date, failed to implement joint procurement targets set in 2007; welcomes the adoption of EDIP Regulation (EU) XXX/2025, the first comprehensive industrial programme at EU level, which incentivises cooperation among Member States through the creation of the Structure for European Armament Programme (SEAP), the EU Military Sales Mechanism, and the EDPCIs; recalls the need for EU defence industrial funding to closely align with CSDP capability needs; calls for the creation of a dedicated EDIP-European Defence Fund (EDF) coordination mechanism to prioritise projects that enhance interoperability and operational resilience, while promoting innovation, supply-chain security and European industrial sovereignty;

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35. Acknowledges the increasingly prominent role of drones in modern warfare and underscores the urgent need to counter, in particular, the evolving military and hybrid drone threats; underlines the need to strengthen drone and counter-drone systems to protect all European flanks, from east to west and from north to south; calls for enhanced coordination, unity and solidarity among the Member States, relevant EU institutions and NATO on monitoring, intercepting and neutralising hostile drones, as well as developing and deploying an integrated air and missile defence system to ensure collective protection against drone and ballistic missile threats; encourages the Commission, the EDA and the Member States to jointly prioritise the development of advanced electronic warfare systems and directed-energy weapon systems aimed at countering potential hybrid threats and drone attacks targeting the EU; calls for a clear strategy to facilitate the most effective and cost-efficient pathways towards those capabilities; stresses the need for joint training in and integration of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities into conventional air defence forces, ensuring interoperability with NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence; urges the Member States and the Commission to urgently work on such projects, such as the Drone Coalition, in close and mutually beneficial cooperation with Ukraine; stresses the need to increase cooperation in the drone domain in terms of training facilities, certification procedures, assembly lines, battlefield coordination, real-time targeting, and resilient C2; calls for the avoidance of disproportionate dependence on non-EU countries, in particular China, for the production of drone systems; recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of intercepting drones and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective counter-UAV capabilities; highlights the fact that directed-energy weapons, which include high-energy lasers and high-power microwave systems, would allow the countering of airborne threats such as drones, rockets or loitering munitions at a fraction of the cost of the current missile-based interceptors; stresses the need to better equip and authorise police forces and civil authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones, in close cooperation with armed forces; calls for concrete measures to enhance civil preparedness and whole-of-society approaches in response to hybrid attacks using drones;

36. Highlights the need to accelerate efforts aimed at protecting the entire eastern flank, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea; stresses the urgent need for enhanced maritime surveillance in the Baltic Sea, North Sea and Black Sea regions; considers that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-UAV strategies;

37. Calls on the Member States to make full use of the SEAPs under the EDIP Regulation to improve the integration and management of defence capabilities; calls on the Commission and the (VP/HR to make better use of PESCO projects and propose new ways for the EU and its Member States to acquire joint assets to support military use, such as strategic enablers, including in space, to be deployed by Member States on the understanding that ‘military or defence implications’(Article 41 TEU) arise out of the use of assets for military purposes, not their mere ownership or maintenance; welcomes the operationalisation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity in 2025 as a significant step forward in strengthening the EU’s ability to respond autonomously to external conflicts and security crises; proposes that the Rapid Deployment Capacity become a multinational force which could, in line with long-standing Helsinki headline goals, be expanded into a larger force of over 60 000 to meet part of the NATO Force Model target;

38. Welcomes the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence Initiative as flagship projects essential for regions at highest risk of conventional warfare and hybrid attacks; notes that frontline Member States are advancing comprehensive ‘Eastern Shield’ programmes which are complementary to these flagship projects; welcomes the Commission proposal that Member States’ capability coalitions may use available tools such as EDIP, PESCO and EDPCIs, with clearly identified, tangible deliverables to trigger targeted EU support for flagship projects;

39. Calls for the EU and NATO to streamline, as appropriate, their capability development and planning processes, and C2 capacities, while ensuring their consistency and efficiency; urges the EU to align with NATO’s standards to bolster interoperability and NATO-EU complementarity to avoid the duplication of efforts; calls for enhanced joint planning and exercises;

40. Stresses that the absence of fully-fledged and robust European C2 capabilities remains one of the most critical gaps in the CSDP as well as the operationalisation of Article 42(7) TEU; underlines that credible EU action requires a permanent C2 headquarters capable of planning, commanding and conducting missions and operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels; reiterates its calls for progress towards a European command-and-control structure by enabling the EU Military Staff, if needed, to plan and coordinate autonomous European military operations with the armed forces of Member States; underscores that this strengthens the European pillar of NATO; stresses the need to avoid unnecessary duplication with the structures and processes of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; underlines that such fully-fledged C2 headquarters requires reinforced staffing, secure infrastructure and an integrated civilian-military interface; emphasises the need for interoperable, secure and sovereign C2 systems resilient to spoofing, supported by EU-developed software, data networks and communication standards; urges the Member States, the VP/HR, the Commission and the EDA to initiate, within the framework of PESCO, a project for a C2 capability as a prerequisite for credible autonomous EU action;

41. Stresses the urgent need for decisive actions to strengthen the EDTIB; calls for enhancing cooperation and coordination among Member States’ defence industries; calls for the completion of a genuine single market for defence, noting the persistent fragmentation of both the demand and the supply side; is concerned that EU Member States’ national procurement practices continue to give preference to national industries; recalls that fragmentation undermines competitiveness, resulting in duplication and diminished interoperability; calls for the removal of unnecessary political, economic and regulatory barriers and practices in Member States that undermine the efficiency and competitiveness of the single market for defence, including through the frequent use of the national security interest exemption provided in Article 346 TFEU; calls on the Commission to issue a recommendation for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in order to facilitate a harmonised and uniform approach throughout the EU, addressing the need to strictly protect the essential security interests of the Member States and emphasising that the exemptions provided in Article 346 TFEU are to be used exceptionally; considers that the Commission should be enabled to assess the overall implementation of Article 346 TFEU to remedy any potential structural misuse; calls, as a prerequisite for the creation of a real internal market for defence, for the swift implementation of Commission proposals to further harmonise and streamline the rules for cross-border contracting and intra-EU transfers of defence products to facilitate cooperation, common standards on certification and market access across the EU, including for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and innovative operators, and the circulation of defence products within the EU;

42. In order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve strategic autonomy, welcomes initiatives to strengthen the European preference in defence procurement, as defined in the EDIP Regulation, and encourages the Member States to prioritise European companies in their procurement while at the same time preserving our security cooperation with like-minded partners, without jeopardising the immediate replenishment of stocks and arsenals; underscores that EU public funds should primarily support the EDTIB; calls for coordinated efforts to ramp up production capacity, enhance interoperability and accelerate technological innovation while ensuring fair opportunities for companies from all Member States; notes that the ReArm Europe plan lacks a strong European preference clause; urges the Commission to both deepen and widen its omnibus approach towards the sector to go beyond a topical evaluation towards a structural reform of the regulatory framework; welcomes efforts to speed-up EDF decision-making processes, particularly in relation to disruptive technologies; encourages further coherence and synergies between EDF funding and PESCO projects; encourages EDF actions to further support the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EDTIB;

Change 18

Changed:41.43. Calls for appropriate measures to be taken to facilitate and incentivise the EDTIB, including through public-private cooperation models, mobilising private investment and savings, and the more active involvement of the European Investment Bank (EIB); calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently create a durable, robust and predictable funding mechanism, including by exploring the possibility of establishing a multilateral financing instrument or an EU defence, security and resilience fund, which can be used to support the expansion of the production-capacity stabilisation of supply chains and the technological independence of critical sectors, including through private investment; calls for the optimisation and better coordination of national and EU funding instruments to ensure joint capability development and the procurement of assets to ensure our collective defence; welcomes the fact that the EIB has significantly increased its investments in European security and defence, having allocated 3.53,5 % of its total financing to these projects in 2025; stresses, however, that the EUR 175 million budget of the Defence Equity Facility for the period 2024-2027 is clearly insufficient for meeting the financing requirements of the EDTIB and its value chain; calls, therefore, on the EIB to substantially increase the budget to better address the equity needs of the sector and support strategic European defence capabilities;

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44. Stresses the importance of stimulating innovation and research, including the participation of universities and technology centres in defence projects; supports the creation of a European Defence Innovation Network, under the auspices of the EDA, to connect research institutions, SMEs, innovative operators, dual-use providers and military end-users across the Member States; supports the development of regional innovation hubs and testing facilities in less industrialised or peripheral Member States to ensure that the defence ramp-up benefits the EU as a whole; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently devise mechanisms to use windfall profits and clawback funds, especially during the current periods of ramp-up, to address supply shortages and demand peaks, to drive EU-level defence and dual-use innovation and competitiveness, including through the establishment of a ‘European DARPA’ (akin to the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) with sufficient funding;

45. Underlines that the participation of SMEs across all Member States should be facilitated and promoted, and their fair and equitable access to EU-funded projects ensured; encourages sustained investment and support for SMEs; calls for simplified access to EU funding and for coordination between defence and civilian research programmes; stresses that all EU defence industry initiatives and financial instruments must ensure a level playing field for all defence industry actors across the EU, and promote cooperation between bigger and smaller companies from all 27 Member States;

46. Urges the EU, in coordination with NATO, to support the strengthening of Ukraine’s defence capabilities; underlines that this includes developing a strengthened industrial partnership enabling transfers of technology and know-how, and the integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base into the EDTIB, while supporting EDTIB activities in Ukraine, including through the SAFE fund; in that respect, urges the Member States and their defence industries to make additional investments, set up joint ventures and develop partnerships with Ukraine for the joint development of defence products in the EU, particularly in the field of drone and counter-drone technology; welcomes the Commission’s initiatives in this regard; urges Member States’ armed forces and the EDTIB to learn critical lessons from Ukraine’s capability development and battlefield innovations, especially as regards unmanned and autonomous systems, and the techniques, tactics and procedures used in combat; commends the Danish model of support for Ukraine, and calls for greater incentives for closer cooperation between and integration of the EDTIB and Ukraine’s defence industrial base; highlights the benefit of allowing Ukraine’s defence industrial base to produce outside of Ukraine;

47. Highlights the need to develop proper civil protection infrastructure and emergency planning; urges to strengthen crisis-resilient and civil defence infrastructure; underlines that defence and security policies must be based on social cohesion and democratic mechanisms; calls for the integration of social dialogue, regional development and workforce upskilling into the Union’s defence planning; stresses that dual-use investments should contribute to civilian resilience and job creation in vulnerable regions, therefore contributing to a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to crisis preparedness;