What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

77. Stresses the need for the EU to foster principled dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation with China to address a number of global challenges, from multilateralism and climate change to global health and international development; underlines, in the context of the above, that the EU must adopt a multidimensional strategy that combines principled diplomacy aimed at upholding international law with economic engagement that safeguards a level playing field and hence secures EU interests, and which will require de-risking vis-à-vis China; confirms that viewing China simultaneously as a partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival remains a useful analytical framework, but stresses that it is insufficient as a long-term strategic orientation; calls for a structured debate among Member States on the future of EU relations with China in order to define the Union’s strategic objectives; underlines that only by setting out a long-term vision for EU-China relations can the Union design a policy that is consistent, credible and effective, and calls on the Commission and the Council to present proposals to this effect;

78. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interests of the EU and India; supports an EU-India summit to launch a new strategic agenda; welcomes the Strategic Dialogue on Foreign and Security Policy initiated in June 2025 and encourages the creation of an EU-India Security and Defence Partnership, including regular joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and operational cooperation between the Indian Navy and EU naval missions; underlines the objective of concluding a Security of Information Agreement with India by 2026; stresses the strategic opportunity to reduce India’s dependence on Russian arms imports by supporting defence industry cooperation and technology transfer with European partners, and calls on India to take a clear position against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and to enhance effective measures to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions; welcomes the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and underlines that this project could accelerate trade between Europe and India; encourages the EU and India to scale up investments under Global Gateway, building on the current EUR 15 billion Team Europe portfolio, with priority projects in renewable energy, sustainable transport, digital infrastructure and health security; calls for the establishment of an EU-India Business Forum to strengthen private-sector cooperation and ensure market uptake of initiatives; supports the creation of EU-India Innovation Hubs and Start-up Partnerships to promote cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and green hydrogen, including joint research under Horizon Europe; reiterates the importance of regular ministerial dialogues and parliamentary engagement to provide oversight and ensure delivery on joint commitments; calls on the Indian Government to improve the protection of women and minority rights;

79. Welcomes the 10th EU-Pakistan Political Dialogue held in Brussels on 17 July 2025, and underlines the importance of fully implementing the Strategic Engagement Plan as the framework for strengthening cooperation in political, economic, security and development matters; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to build on the progress made under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) framework and the comprehensive Migration and Mobility Dialogue; encourages continued cooperation on migration, counterterrorism and counternarcotics;

80. Expresses its support and sympathy to pro-democracy movements in South Asia, in particular in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, and underlines that these democratic ambitions of the population must be met with concrete reforms and progress by the political leadership; recalls the EU’s long-term support to democracy and civil society in South Asia and underlines that the EU should seek a closer partnership with all countries in the region to provide an alternative model of engagement to China, which is increasing its presence in the region;

82. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on developing stronger bilateral partnerships with like-minded democracies in Africa, based on equality, respect and mutual benefit, as well as on the ‘more for more’ principle, while upholding the universal values of human rights and democracy; stresses that both the EU and Africa are facing the same global challenges; underlines the need to strengthen continent-to-continent relations and welcomes the Joint Declaration of the seventh EU-African Union (AU) Summit; underlines the importance of institutionalising the parliamentary dimension of future EU-AU summits as an integral component of their framework, in order to ensure citizen representation, public oversight and a democratic contribution to the deliberations and outcomes of the partnership; reiterates the added value that the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACP) can bring and welcomes increased cooperation with OACP countries through the Samoa Agreement; calls for the creation of a dedicated EU-Africa industrialisation pact under the joint auspices of the AU, the EU and regional development banks, to mobilise public and private capital, which would ensure that Africa is not just a source of raw materials, but a hub for processing, manufacturing and innovation;

83. Remains deeply concerned by the continuing violence and humanitarian crises in several parts of Africa; is particularly alarmed by the continuing violence and insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, mainly in North Kivu and Ituri Province; calls for the EU to play an active and coordinated role in supporting the implementation of the peace process, focusing on enhancing inclusivity and women’s participation, humanitarian access and protection of civilians; urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda ceases its interference;

84. Expresses serious concern about the devastating conflict in Sudan that has resulted in mass civilian causalities, displacement and widespread human rights violations; strongly condemns all war crimes and human rights violations, and calls for unhindered humanitarian access, full accountability, enforcement of all arms embargoes, and targeted sanctions against all individuals committing these atrocities;

85. Notes with concern recent electoral challenges in parts of the African continent, including in Tanzania, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, and recognises the public engagement and demonstrations that have followed; encourages a transparent and thorough review of any reported electoral concerns and calls on the respective authorities to safeguard the expressed will of the people and uphold the rights of all political actors; underscores, in this context, the importance of ensuring that political participation and opposition activities can take place freely and without undue restrictions;

86. Regrets the democratic backsliding and the increase in military coups, notably in the Sahel, such as in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, all of which threaten regional stability; condemns the increasing attempts by external actors to undermine state sovereignty and fuel anti-European narratives through the use of mercenary groups and targeted disinformation campaigns, which is exacerbated by the role played by Russia and China in the region; recalls that this has direct repercussions on the security and prosperity of Europe and hence stresses the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s positive contributions to peace, security and development; underlines the need to use the Global Gateway initiative as a key tool to offer positive partnerships in areas such as infrastructure, health and digital transformation, thereby helping to improve the lives of local populations and countering the growing presence of authoritarian powers on the continent; calls for sustained EU investment in good governance, capacity building and partnership aimed at preventing state collapse, migration spillovers and illicit trafficking, and at fighting against terrorism;

94. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to intensify structured engagement with regional organisations – including ASEAN, the AU, CELAC and the GCC – to develop inclusive regional security architectures and coordinate multilateral policy responses such as:

(a) cross-cutting partnerships on health security;

(b) joint diversification and resilient value chains with trusted partners;

(c) enhanced cooperation on migration management, respect for human rights and dignity, and protection of the right to asylum;

(d) enhanced cooperation on addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security; highlights that climate change poses one of the significant challenges to the EU’s CFSP; calls for the EU to treat climate protection and climate diplomacy as a significant part of its foreign policy;

(e) a rapid revitalisation of global efforts towards achieving the 17 Sustainable Development Goals by 2030;

(f) defence of women’s rights worldwide as we see a global backlash against gender equality;

(g) providing collective support to the UN, notably the International Court of Justice and all other international organisations vital to upholding the international rules-based order;

Establishing non-negotiable positions we treat as inviolable

95. Reiterates that the EU is guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU, which inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement;

96. Recalls that the EU’s credibility depends on its ability to act coherently, particularly with regard to its external representation, as well as its ability to act decisively when protecting its citizens and safeguarding its interests; emphasises that the threshold for decisive action should be consistently communicated and must include unambiguous responses to grave human rights violations, systematic repression, including against parliamentarians and political opposition, and severe corruption, as well as kleptocracy; supports expanding the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (Magnitsky-style human rights sanctions regime) to cover systemic repression and corruption; underlines that corruption enables and exacerbates human rights violations, abuses and the erosion of democratic principles and the rule of law; calls for the EU to develop legislation equivalent to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;

97. Encourages deeper coordination with the G7 and other democratic partners, including within the G20, to align responses to violations of global norms;

98. Underlines the importance of ensuring that the EU’s CFSP is guided by principles that support gender equality and the WPS agenda; urges that these be maintained as core principles of the EU’s CFSP; urges the EEAS and the Commission to maintain the EU’s leading role in championing women’s rights worldwide by thoroughly and ambitiously implementing the Gender Action Plan III; expresses serious concern about the growing backlash against LGBTIQ+ rights in various parts of the world;

99. Calls for a child-sensitive approach in the EU’s foreign and security policy and highlights the need for strengthened AU-EU-UN coordination to protect children and adolescents affected by war, displacement and/or humanitarian crises;

100. Urges greater attention to be given to the persecution of all minorities, including religious minorities such as Christians; strongly condemns all violence against religious minorities and expresses its solidarity with the victims and their families; reiterates that freedom of religion or belief is inseparable from other fundamental rights and should be promoted in a mutually reinforcing manner; calls for the protection of the freedom of, thought, conscience and religion, and diversity to be integrated into the EU’s external action; calls, therefore, on the Commission to reappoint the position of Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU;

101. Stresses the necessity of supporting the defence of freedom of expression worldwide, including online, as well as media pluralism and values-based journalism, in particular investigative journalism;

102. Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to develop clear and transparent benchmarks to assess the effectiveness and overall impact of EU sanctions and to regularly update Parliament in this regard; stresses the need to strengthen the enforcement of sanctions and reiterates the importance of communicating the purpose and effects of sanctions to both EU citizens and partner countries in order to maintain public trust and international credibility; recalls that the consistent and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is necessary for the effectiveness and credibility of the EU’s external action;

103. Stresses the importance of timely and coordinated responses in crises, emphasising that effective crisis management relies on rapid decision-making, swift deployment of resources and the ability to adapt to evolving situations, rather than on planning or narratives alone;

104. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity compels Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which constitutes a key source of the EU’s political leverage on the global stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the substantial costs of unanimity should be assessed carefully;

105. Regrets that, in practice individual Member States have at times used their veto right to dilute agreements, delay decision-making or obstruct common policies; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has remained untapped;

106. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually transition to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications, specifically in the context of our sanctions regime; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States regarding a perceived reduction in their influence over foreign and security policy at EU level; recalls that the VP/HR is tasked, as set out in her mission letter, with triggering the use of Treaty provisions enabling qualified majority voting for the CFSP and, accordingly, expects the VP/HR to engage in constructive dialogue with the Member States to that end; encourages the full use of all possibilities that currently exist to enhance decisiveness in this regard and calls on the Member States to make greater and more transparent use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU in cases where they cannot endorse a decision but do not wish to block the Union’s collective action; stresses that this approach strengthens the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and coherently to international crises, while respecting national sovereignty, and demonstrates that greater effectiveness in the CFSP is already possible without a Treaty change; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

Increasing the impact of EU external action that we deliver

107. Regrets that the EU’s global visibility and political influence often falls short of its economic, financial and diplomatic footprint; regrets that this lack of visibility is at times the product of a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation so that the EU’s voice is coherent and perceived as such by its partners; calls on the Commission to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS in external action, including by ensuring full compliance with Articles 3(2) and 9 of the EEAS Decision, which may need to be updated;

108. Calls on the Council and the Commission to speak with one voice; notes that some progress on the CFSP can be made by using the provisions in the existing Treaties, such as the ‘passerelle clause’; stresses that the Treaties should provide specifically for the possibility of establishing a European Defence Union, and that the VP/HR should be supported in her efforts to become the main external representative of the EU in international forums;

109. Commends the efforts of the European Diplomatic Academy to contribute to an EU diplomatic corps and culture; calls for the Academy to include European citizens who are not only Member States’ diplomats; stresses the importance of ensuring that sufficient resources, including human resources, are allocated to the Academy;

110. Calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action and, to that end, to fully take into account Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world;

111. Calls on the VP/HR to propose a coherent and strategic communication strategy that highlights the benefits of the EU’s external action and underpins EU objectives while countering disinformation campaigns orchestrated by non-EU countries; encourages the EEAS to strengthen the EU’s political presence in our partner countries and to make our external action more accessible to audiences in those countries, including through multilingual campaigns, cultural diplomacy and engagement with local stakeholders and media; supports the inclusion of communication as a performance criterion in EEAS programming; stresses that this strategy should also strengthen the visibility of Union-funded projects with clear signposting including the words ‘European Union’ and the flag of the EU, particularly in candidate countries, in order to counter any attempts to undermine EU initiatives;

112. Advocates for a more prominent EU presence at global summits, regional forums and conflict mediation platforms, not only through Member States but also under a visible EU flag;

113. Calls for enhanced convergence between the EU’s and the Member States’ diplomatic services to improve synergies between national branding and EU messaging, in line with the ‘Team Europe’ approach;

114. Underlines that budgetary constraints pose a major obstacle to increasing the visibility and impact of EU external action; stresses that without clear geographical and thematic prioritisation, limited resources risk being spread too thinly to have a strategic impact; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to carry out a genuine exercise of prioritisation, in order to identify where EU external action can deliver the greatest political and strategic return; recalls, in this context, that the Commission must be able to ensure that funds truly benefit the intended recipient and are not misused;

115. Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU Delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls for the EEAS to be able to select and recruit its permanent EU diplomatic staff, including those graduating from the European Diplomatic Academy, and to ensure a fairer gender and geographical balance among Member States across all levels within the EEAS;

116. Highlights the strategic potential of the Global Gateway initiative to serve not only as an investment platform, but also as a tool to strengthen the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide; welcomes the fact that the Commission has given priority to the implementation of Global Gateway projects; is concerned by reports that a number of Global Gateway projects are being implemented by Chinese companies in direct violation of the initiative’s objectives of presenting an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and of creating genuine national value in partner countries; calls, therefore, for an immediate investigation of all Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway; reiterates that Global Gateway should contribute to global stability and security, while strengthening Europe’s resilience; stresses, furthermore, that to align political commitment and geopolitical ambitions, a renewed commitment to timely delivery, stronger local ownership in the identification of projects, and well-defined private sector engagement are needed; calls on the Commission to accelerate the realisation of projects and to streamline the number of flagship projects with the aim of maximising the impact of the initiative; believes, in addition, that Global Gateway projects require better public communication, in particular in the case of indirect management with implementing partners, such as blended finance operations under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus involving multiple stakeholders; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the EEAS to systematically strengthen communication around EU-funded actions, ensuring coherent messaging, clear attribution and effective visibility of the Union’s leadership and added value; points to the fact that the EUR 300 billion budget allocated to this initiative is less than one third of the scale of projects already under way under China’s comparable connectivity- and infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative; recommends strengthening Parliament’s oversight role to ensure greater accountability and transparency in the funding process for Global Gateway projects, including regular reporting by the Commission and the EEAS, enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of project selection and implementation, and systematic evaluation of results and impact;

117. Reaffirms the role of the EU special representatives (EUSRs), who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU; stresses the importance of EUSRs having a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries; insists that the appointment of new EUSRs should take place only after a hearing in Parliament;

118. Calls for a renewed approach to preventive diplomacy as a proactive external policy tool to pre-empt, mediate and peacefully resolve conflict between parties; calls on the EEAS to integrate the EU’s preventive diplomacy tools within structural prevention mechanisms and actions, such as political agreements among different actors involved in conflicts, national dialogues for reconciliation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions;

119. Recalls that Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function regarding democratic scrutiny and consultation; underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that Parliament also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies, as referred to in Article 36 TEU;

120. Underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature in the CFSP budget, as well as for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

121. Reiterates its call to promote the establishment of a system of automatic and continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; calls, in this regard, for the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Satellite Centre to be strengthened by enhancing their staff and financial resources, as well as capabilities; urges the improvement of the security protocols of the services working on intelligence and/or with sensitive information;

122. Recalls that Parliament has a distinct role to play in complementing the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action, thereby complementing the efforts of the diplomatic services of the EU and the Member States;

123. Believes that there is a need for stronger parliamentary oversight of EU external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information and structured dialogues in line with Article 36 TEU; emphasises the need for more feedback from the VP/HR and the EEAS about the actions taken and the effects achieved, in order to fulfil Parliament’s recommendations outlined in the resolutions on foreign affairs matters; stresses that democratic oversight cannot be effective without genuine access to classified information and assessments, and urges improvements to the 2002 Interinstitutional Agreement to make it fit for current security realities;

124. Underlines that each request raised above requires an appropriate written response from the VP/HR; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for those policies and must be subject to parliamentary oversight; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies, and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding;

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