What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Changed:O.Q. whereas on 10 January 2025, Nicolás Maduro claimed a new term in office and illegally maintained his grip on power despite widespread electoral fraud; whereas it recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic opposition by awarding them the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; whereas María Corina Machado was further honoured as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate for 2025; whereas recent political developments, including the removal of Nicolás Maduro from power and the beginning of the release of political prisoners, signal a critical moment in Venezuela’s democratic transition; whereas at the same time, the situation remains unstable, with key power structures of the former regime still in place and substantial challenges for democratic consolidation remaining;

Changed:Y.AA. whereas at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC, China was referred to as a decisive enabler of Russia’s aggression; whereas China has never formally condemned Russia’s illegal aggression against and invasion of Ukraine; whereas Russia characterised its strategic relations with China as being at an unprecedentedly high level; whereas the People’s Republic of China is the main supporter of Russia in its war of aggression, providing most of the dual-use goods that serve as inputs for Russia’s defence sector, as well as diplomatic, political and economic support, thereby prolonging and enabling the war; whereas Russia seeks to undermine regional stability and European aspirations through coercive and military actions, while China increasingly uses economic leverage and strategic partnerships to influence developments in the EU’s neighbourhoods alongside other actors contributing to such destabilisation; whereas through a combination of state-directed investment, strategic infrastructure acquisition, technology transfer, and influence operations, China seeks to expand its footprint within the EU;

Added:(c) respects the neutrality of certain Member States and ensures that diplomatic action is undertaken in a manner consistent with the UN Charter;

Changed:6. Honours the courage and resilience of the Ukrainian people, who are not only defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity, but who are also upholding fundamental European values; demands an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, Russian withdrawal from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war, all abducted and detained civilians, and all children illegally taken by Russia and the Lukashenka regime; calls, furthermore, for the return of the bodies of all fallen Ukrainian soldiers; urges the EU to maintain and strengthen its support for Ukraine, including through political, economic, financial and military assistance, in order to empower Ukraine; welcomes the European Council’s decision of December 2025 to provide Ukraine with a EUR 90 billion financial assistance package in the form of EU-backed loans; regrets, however, that the Council was unable to reach an agreement on a more ambitious financing structure on the basis of frozen Russian assets, which would reduce Ukraine’s growing debt burden; recalls, however, that Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025 enacts the indefinite immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets; stresses that investments in Ukraine’s territorial defence and its defence industrial base are necessary and mutually beneficial for Europe, yet do not constitute security guarantees as such; welcomes, in this context, NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative and urges the EU Member States to continue the delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, in particular air defence systems and deep strike capabilities, while simultaneously supporting a diplomatic solution to the war, in accordance with international law, with the aim of achieving a just and lasting peace;

Changed:8. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the illegitimate Lukashenka regime for allowing Belarusian territory to be used as a base for Russian military operations, thereby undermining the country’s sovereignty and posing a direct threat to the security and stability of the EU and its Member States, while continuing to repress its own population; reiterates the demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and urges the strengthening of restrictive measures; denounces Belarus’s orchestrated hybrid attacks against EU Member States, for example Lithuania, by means of unmanned aerial vehicles and balloon incursions, economic coercion, smuggling operations, military provocations, cyberattacks and state-sponsored disinformation; stresses with concern that the regimes in Russia and Belarus are instrumentalising migration as onepart of a broader strategy to undermine the hybridEU, toolsthe aimedMember atStates’ destabilisinggovernments Europe;and NATO; urges the EU and its Member States to increase political, financial and technical support for the independent media, human rights defenders and civil society initiatives operating within and outside Belarus;

Changed:9. StressesWelcomes the conclusions of the meeting of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ held in Paris on 6 January 2026, including the politically and legally binding commitments defining a common approach to supporting Ukraine, sustaining its long-term military capabilities, and restoring peace and security in the event of a future armed attack by Russia; expresses support for the proposal to establish a multinational force for Ukraine and encourages all EU Member States to give due consideration to how they can best support such a force; further welcomes the discussions on a US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; stresses that any peace deal must feature robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine, be negotiated by its elected leadership and have the backing of its people; cautions against Russia’s disingenuous proposals aimed at prolonging the war, and warns that any settlement imposed by Russia or rewarding its aggression would undermine European security; recalls that close cooperation between the EU and the US remains vital to achieving and securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and hence is crucial to the security of the European continent, alongside the EU’s efforts to take more responsibility for its own security;

Changed:12. Urges the Commission to actively support international justice mechanisms and ensure accountability for war crimes and crimes of aggression; encourages the EU and its Member States to support the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine; recalls that the ICC has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, for their involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children and their transfer to Russia; expresses support for all of the activities of the ICC and the International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory; supports innovative solutions to finance Ukraine’s defence efforts as well as its demining and reconstruction using immobilised Russian foreign assets, including those of the Russian state, Russian local authorities, Russian state-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list; calls on the Commission to propose, and on the Member States to agree on, legislationan additional legally and financially sound mechanism, in the form of a reparations loan, that enables the use of these immobilised assets;assets, hence providing longer-term visibility to Ukraine and ensuring it eventually receives war reparations, or an equivalent amount, from Russia, as provided for by international law; stresses that Russia, and not EU taxpayers, must bear the cost of Russia’s aggression; expects the Member States to strengthen their sanctions against Russia for as long as necessary to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability has been achieved; welcomes in this regard ongoing EU-G7 discussions to explore a maritime services ban for all Russian oil exports as an alternative to the oil price cap; calls, in the interim, for the EU and its Member States to reinforce the effectiveness and impact of its sanctions packages adopted so far and to agree on new ones as soon as the need arises; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to close financial loopholes that Russia uses to evade sanctions, and to impose further restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, whether through the facilitation of sanctions circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance; believes that penalties should also be imposed on European companies that continue to engage in prohibited business with the Russian Federation; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to present an EU-wide Russia strategy that links deterrence, containment, accountability and support for democratic alternatives;

Added:14. Calls on the Commission and the Council, in their external relations and policies, to consistently uphold and promote international law, and to take all necessary measures to ensure its full respect by all states, without distinction based on economic or military power;

Changed:15.16. Welcomes the recent commitment to ending the war in Gaza and takes notes of the 20-point peace plan proposed by the US administration,administration and endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which must now be fully implemented and insulated from any attempts by regional actors to undermine it; welcomes the release of all Israeli hostages kept by Hamas and the resumption of humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza; underlines that while the plan constitutes a crucial first step towards ending the conflict, several challenges remain, in particular concerning enforcement, governance, accountability and maintaining trust; underlines that the full disarmament of Hamas, its exclusion from any form of governance in GazaGaza, the reform and empowerment of the Palestinian Authority and the withdrawal of Israeli forces remain central goals for any further steps; calls for the EU to play an active role in shaping the peace and reconstruction process in close coordination with key regional actors; supports the ongoing stabilisation efforts in Gaza and welcomes the reinforcement of the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS; reiterates that the objective should continue to be a negotiated two-state solution, in line with international law, as the only viable path to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East with the Israeli and Palestinian people living side by side, in peace and security;

Removed:16. Expresses deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian situation, food insecurity and famine in Gaza, as well as the recurrent disregard for international law and UN resolutions by the Israeli Government and repeated cycles of violence and terrorist attacks across the Middle East;

Added:17. Notes with grave concern the enduring, severe humanitarian situation in Gaza, including widespread food insecurity and famine; notes with serious concern the persistent obstacles to humanitarian access and the alarm expressed by the VP/HR regarding recent licensing decisions constraining humanitarian organisations operating in Gaza; calls on all parties to allow the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid; underlines that measures which unduly restrict humanitarian actors risk dismantling essential humanitarian assistance at a time of acute need; is concerned about compliance with international law and relevant UN resolutions by all parties, and the persistence of cycles of violence and terrorist attacks across the Middle East; recalls the obligation of all parties to comply with international law and relevant UN resolutions, including those pertaining to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and journalists;

Added:19. Expresses its disagreement with the Israeli Government’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state; reaffirms the importance of respecting the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia in accordance with its constitution, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations, as key for the peace and stability of the entire Horn of Africa region;

Changed:20.22. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the existence, security and legitimate right to self-defence of the State of Israel as well as the security and dignity of Palestinians; recalls that Israel’s right to self-defence is enshrined in and constrained by international law and must be exercised with full respect for international courts; believes that Israel’s right tonotes self-defencewith cannotconcern justifythat the indiscriminate and disproportionate military actionwar in Gaza, whichGaza has had devastating humanitarian consequences and has led to unacceptable suffering for the civilian population, which has notably been exacerbated by Hamas through the deliberate abuse of civilian infrastructure and its use of the civilian population of Gaza as human shields, including the remaining Israeli hostages; stresses that the UN, the International Court of Justice and the ICC stated that Israeli military operations have not complied with international humanitarian law, including the principle of proportionality and civilian protection obligations; expresses its relief over the liberation of all living hostages and calls on Hamas to deliver the bodiesbody of allthe last deceased hostageshostage still being held by Hamas to theirhis families;family; reaffirms its position demanding a permanent ceasefire, urgent humanitarian access as well as relief corridors; deeply regrets the fragility of the ceasefire in Gaza, a circumstance which has jeopardised too many civilian lives;

Changed:22.24. Underlines that sustainable peace requires a credible political process aimed at achieving a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as a shared capital; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution andsolution; condemns the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West BankBank, recalling the EU’s long-standing position that these remain illegal under international law and Eastconstitute Jerusalema asunilateral suchmeasure anthat obstacle;undermines trust and the prospects for a negotiated solution; welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; underscores the role of the Palestinian Authority as the EU’s main interlocutor in Palestine and reaffirms that any future governance in Gaza must exclude the participation of terrorist organisations and must ensure the demilitarisation of Gaza; reiterates its opposition to any annexation plan for Gaza or any other Palestinian territory and against mass forcible transfers;

Added:25. Insists that the Commission must guarantee that EU funds are not allocated or linked to any form of terrorism and/or religious and political radicalisation; reiterates its position that all schoolbooks and school materials supported by EU funds must be in line with UNESCO standards of peace, tolerance, coexistence and non-violence; is concerned about the antisemitism, hate speech, promotion of jihad and incitement to violence taught in Palestinian school textbooks funded by the EU;

Changed:25.28. Notes that a significant weakening of Iran and its allies – including the fall of the Assad regime and the defeat of Tehran’s proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other militias – would offer hope for peace and for the continuation of regional normalisation in the spirit of the Abraham Accords; is deeply concerned about Hezbollah’s significant support for Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and its coordination with other Iran-backed militias;

Changed:26.29. Welcomes the positive changes in Lebanon since the beginning of 2025;2025, mirrored in the conclusions of the ninth EU-Lebanon association council, in particular the willingness to further support the Lebanese security sector through the full use of EU tools, including the European Peace Facility and programmes under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and explore possible future common security and defence policy engagement; remains concerned about the impact of armed militias and terrorist organisations, such asand Hezbollah,regrets, in particular, the region;lack of progress with the pledged disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups, which represents a prerequisite for regional stability; reiterates the importance of an ambitious ‘Pact for the Mediterranean’ and its effective implementation, with sufficient technical and financial support for Lebanon, focusing on capacity building, energy infrastructure and social support; urges the VP/HR and the Commission to support the Lebanese Government in its reform agenda;agenda and in its plan to reestablish a monopoly on weapons; reiterates its full support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, state authority, territorial integrity, political independence, and stability, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701;

Changed:27.30. Stands with Syria’s religiously and ethnically diverse society, which has suffered over a decade at the hands of the Iran and Russia-bolstered Assad regime and terrorist groups; supports a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned inclusive political process that incorporates territorial integrity, transitional justice and reconciliation; urges the Syrian authorities to intensify efforts to include all components of Syrian society in decision-making, progress on the implementation of the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces in the North-East and continue facilitating swift, transparent and independent investigations into acts targeting religious and ethnic communities, as well as to take all necessary actions to quell sectarian violence and fight impunity; regrets, in this context, the continuing persecution and forced displacement of, and discrimination and attacks against, religious communities, such as Christians, and reiterates the need for the EU to protect the rich multicultural identity of Syria; recognises the immense gaps in financial and human resources to reconstruct the country and supports the EU’s decision to lift sectoral sanctions, in line with the US and the UK, and provide significant development assistance, in addition to humanitarian aid, as announced in the first leg of the 2025 Brussels Conference for Syria; welcomes the visit to Syria on 8 January 2026 by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, António Costa, aimed at strengthening political ties and economic engagement; takes positive note of the agreement between Syria and Israel of 6 January 2026, setting up a dedicated communication cell to coordinate military de-escalation;

Added:31. Expresses grave concern at the ongoing fighting in areas such as Aleppo and North East Syria, which is resulting in further displacement and high number of casualties of civilian population and creating a serious security risk, notably due to the escape of Daesh fighters detained in north-eastern Syria; calls on the international coalition, including the United States, to take all necessary and immediate measures to mitigate this security risk without delay;

Added:35. Strongly condemns the targeted sanctions against legislators responsible for the Digital Services Act and other digital regulations, in particular against a former commissioner;

Removed:34. Stresses that a strong transatlantic partnership with the United States and Canada within NATO remains indispensable and forms the core of the European security architecture; recognises that the United States now follows a more transactional approach to foreign policy, marked by a reduced commitment to multilateralism and European security; highlights the importance for the EU of drawing lessons from the EU’s vulnerabilities and of taking the appropriate measures at EU level to avoid being in a position where it might be coerced in the future; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level, ensuring sustained coordination across areas such as security, technology and economic resilience, while showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic legislator’s dialogue and for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to future cooperation; calls for the deepening of the EU-US Dialogue on Security and Defence whose potential remains uncapped; recalls that, to be a strong transatlantic partner, Europe must ensure its own defence and security; reiterates, in this context, the immediate need for the EU and its Member States to fully operationalise the concept of strategic autonomy and defence readiness and, to this end, make collective and well-coordinated investments in the necessary defence capabilities; stresses the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to become more reliable and more self-sufficient in the domains of security, defence and technology, with the objective of strengthening the European pillar within NATO;

Added:39. Stresses that a strong transatlantic partnership with the United States and Canada within NATO forms the core of the European security architecture; expresses, in this context, concerns about the fact that certain elements of the new US National Security Strategy fall significantly short in adequately addressing the threat posed by Russia, notably for European and hence also US security; regrets, furthermore, the National Security Strategy’s flawed assessment of the EU as a political system, including inadequate descriptions of the domestic political situations in EU Member States; reaffirms Parliament’s long-standing support for the EU’s core values of democracy and human rights; considers the National Security Strategy to further reinforce the imperative for Europe to advance its strategic autonomy, reduce its dependencies, and diversify its partnerships;

Added:40. Regrets the decision of 7 January 2026 by the US President to withdraw from, suspend participation in, or terminate engagement with a significant number of international organisations, including numerous UN bodies; expresses its serious concern that such a move could undermine the financial sustainability of the UN system, weaken multilateral cooperation at a time when it is most needed and embolden authoritarian and revisionist actors, who have historically sought to exploit any withdrawal or disengagement by Western powers from international organisations; encourages the US administration to reflect on its decision and to reaffirm its commitment to the UN and multilateral cooperation;

Added:41. Firmly rejects any attempt to undermine the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland; recalls, in this context, that Greenland is a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark and has the authority to decide on its economic development, international partnerships and raw materials policy; reiterates that only the people of Greenland can decide on their future; cautions, at the same time, that such political processes must not be instrumentalised or influenced by external actors; highlights in particular China’s strategic interest in the Arctic and its use of economic leverage to gain political influence; takes note of the fact that US interest is driven by security concerns linked to the evolving strategic environment in the Arctic but believes that the 1951 defence agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States offers ample opportunities for an increased US presence in Greenland; recalls that Denmark, including Greenland, is a member of NATO and is therefore fully covered by the alliance’s collective security guarantees; welcomes the statement of seven European leaders of 6 January 2026 and underlines that security in the Arctic can only be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO; calls on the Commission and the European Council to define concrete support to Greenland and Denmark in line with EU principles, international law, and the NATO Charter;

Added:42. Regrets that the United States now follows a more transactional approach to foreign policy, marked by a reduced commitment to multilateralism and European security; highlights the importance for the EU of drawing lessons from the EU’s vulnerabilities and of taking the appropriate measures at EU level to avoid being in a position where it might be coerced in the future; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level, ensuring sustained coordination across areas such as security, technology and economic resilience, while showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue and for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus for future cooperation; calls for the deepening of the EU-US Dialogue on Security and Defence, whose potential remains untapped; recalls that, to be a strong transatlantic partner, Europe must ensure its own defence and security; reiterates, in this context, the immediate need for the EU and its Member States to bring the concept of strategic autonomy and defence readiness fully into operation and, to this end, make collective and well-coordinated investments in the necessary defence capabilities; stresses the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to become more reliable and more self-sufficient in the domains of security, defence and technology, with the objective of strengthening the European pillar within NATO;

Added:43. Confirms its full and unwavering solidarity with Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark; denounces the use of unilateral trade threats and economic intimidation against Denmark and other EU Member States as a form of coercion incompatible with international law and the core principles of cooperation between NATO allies; warns against attempts to instrumentalise security concerns in the Arctic to exert territorial or political pressure, fully supports the position of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland, that Greenland is not for sale; stresses that Greenland must not be used as a tool to divide the European Union; calls on the Union to respond firmly, collectively and decisively and to resist any such actions.

Changed:36.45. Commends the strong and constructive partnership with the United Kingdom; welcomes the joint statement by the UK and EU leaders of 19 May 2025 following the UK-EU Summit 2025, in particular the establishment of the comprehensive Security and Defence Partnership; calls for its swift and full implementation, including through (i) regular biannual strategic foreign and security dialogues at ministerial level between the UK Foreign and Defence Secretaries and the VP/HR to coordinate responses to crises and align strategic priorities, (ii) UK participation in the EU’s CSDP civilian and military crisis management missions, where legally possible, (iii) enhanced cooperation on cyber resilience, countering hybrid threats, safeguarding critical infrastructure, and tackling illicit finance, (iv) strengthened coordination on sanctions enforcement and (v) joint actions to counter Russia’s shadow fleet;fleet, and welcomes the joint commitment to enhance cooperation in the Western Balkans, especially in order to ensure the respect of the power sharing principle of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement; takes note of the political agreement on the core aspects of the future agreement between the EU and the UK in respect of Gibraltar, announced by the parties on 11 June 2025; awaits the publication of the full legal text for examination;

Changed:38.47. Emphasises the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and supports a credible political and security cooperation on their merit-based path to EU integration; believes that the future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova lies within the EU, in accordance with the aspirations of their people; condemns Russian interference in the democratic processes of EU candidate countries, notably Moldova; expressestakes concernnote withof regardthe toresults of the politicalparliamentary deadlockelections held in Kosovo andon urges28 allDecember political2025; partiescalls for the swift formation of a new Kosovar assembly and government, in order to workaddress togethermuch needed EU-related reforms, particularly concerning the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, and to overcomeaddress it;obligations regarding the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia; welcomes the partial lifting of EU measures on Kosovo; reiterates that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance on the basis of measurable and sustainable progress in the fundamentals cluster, including full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in particular the sanctions against Russia; welcomes the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and underlines the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement constitutes a geostrategic investment in regional security and stability, requiring commitment from both the Union and the candidate countries and calls, in this context, for the EU to make the enlargement process more predictable and politically visible to the citizens of the region; believes that, to this end, the EU must maintain the enlargement momentum and provide candidate countries with sufficient technical and financial assistance and consistent political support on their path towards full membership; stresses, however, the need to further improve the rule of law conditionality and to ensure that all EU funding for the accession countries is fully in line with the EU’s own strategic goals and interests; stresses, simultaneously, that progress on their EU accession path is merit based and conditional on full respect for international law and the EU acquis, as well as their alignment with the CFSP, including adherence to sanctions and EU visa policy; recalls that the enlargement process should proceed in parallel with institutional and decision-making reforms aimed at safeguarding the Union’s integration capacity; urges the EU candidate countries to actively support and collaborate with international justice tribunals and mechanisms to ensure that they can properly carry out their work, and prosecute and ensure accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression committed across the whole world;

Added:48. Underlines that one of the key priorities of the CFSP and CSDP in relation to the Eastern Partnership countries must be firm support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders; calls on the Russian Federation to withdraw all its troops from the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, from the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, and from the illegally occupied parts of Ukraine, with full respect for international law and the UN Charter;

Changed:42.52. Calls for the swift resumption of the Cyprus settlement talks within the UN-agreed framework, and urges against any unilateral actions that are inconsistent with a peaceful settlement; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; draws attention to the Commission’s designation of Johannes Hahn as Special Envoy for Cyprus, which underlines the EU’s commitment to a comprehensive settlement on the agreed basis and its readiness to contribute to the settlement process within the UN framework;

Changed:46.56. Condemns the authoritarian tendencies of the Georgian Dream Party and their pivot towards Russian interests, in spite of the protracted occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region / South Ossetia by Russia; rejects any recognition of the parliamentary elections and considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; urges the Georgian Parliament to repeal the laws on ‘foreign influence’ and ‘family values’; calls for an immediate end to politically motivated persecution of the political opposition, civil society and independent media and for the unconditional release of all political prisoners; urges the EU to finally respond adequately and decisively to this democratic crisis in a candidate country by leveraging all means available and reiterates its repeated call for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism;pluralism and against personalities promoting Russian-backed narratives and strongarming political processes; calls for Georgia to return to the European path in line with the clear choice of its people; recalls that, at the same time, Georgia should align with the CFSP, including compliance with sanctions against Russia;

Changed:48.58. Welcomes the positive momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively endorse Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; commends the extension of EUMA’s mandate and increase in its size; calls on the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to explore other ways to support Armenia, notably, but not exclusively, in the domain of democratic resilience;

Changed:52.62. Condemns Iran’s destabilising role in the Middle East, in particular its military support for various non-state actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as for the Houthi, which undermines regional security; reiterates its call foron the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a EU terrorist organisation and to beextend addedEU sanctions to all of its members, as well as to all those responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran; expresses its unwavering solidarity with the EUIranian terroristpeople list;in their ongoing pursuit of fundamental rights and freedoms; condemns the systematic and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against peaceful demonstrators, which has resulted in loss of life and serious injuries; condemns the Iranian regime’s attempts to censor the protests by cutting internet access and telephone networks across the country; calls on the Iranian authorities to immediately cease the use of violence against peaceful assemblies, and to fully respect the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; strongly opposes Iran’s hostage diplomacy and demands that all European nationals being detained in Iran be freed and allowed to leave the country; expresses deep concern about the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification; points to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action in the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls on the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events; supports the re-imposition of all previously lifted UN and EU nuclear-related sanctions and restrictions against Iran due to its non-compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA;JCPOA and demands immediate and decisive action in the face of the regime’s entrenched, systematic, and brutal repression of the Iranian people, including mass arbitrary detentions, torture, and the execution of political dissidents; condemns in the strongest terms the regime’s renewed and escalating campaign of violence against protesters, which has resulted in the killing of thousands of protestors, including through the deliberate use of live ammunition and state-sanctioned executions and acts that amount to crimes against humanity under international law, while the regime continues to deny fundamental freedoms to a population that persistently demands dignity, liberty and the right to live in a free and democratic country;

Changed:63.73. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; condemns China’s intimidations and threats to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters, including large-scale air and sea manoeuvres such as the ‘Justice Mission 2025’ and the ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ exercises in April 2025;2025 which jeopardise stability in the region; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that anyongoing attemptattempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; calls, furthermore, for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; recalls that the White Paper for European Defence ‒ Readiness 2030 expresses concern over China’s coercion against Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military, cyber and cognitive measures; underscores that China’s territorial claims over Taiwan have no basis in international law, that neither side is subordinate to the other and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; opposes the People’s Republic of China’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations;

Added:81. Strongly condemns the sham general elections conducted by the military junta in Myanmar on 28 December 2025, which lack any democratic legitimacy and were held in an environment of systemic intimidation, violence and coercion; highlights that the forced dissolution of opposition parties and the continued detention of political leaders in Myanmar render the electoral process void; rejects any attempt by the junta to use these fraudulent polls to seek international recognition; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to increase pressure on the military regime through targeted sanctions and to continue supporting the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar and their efforts towards a genuine, inclusive transition to civilian rule;

Added:87. Recalls the threat posed by Islamic terrorism in Africa, notably to religious communities, including Christians, and takes note of enhanced counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Nigeria, including recent actions against Islamic State-affiliated groups; cautions against the unintended consequences of external military actions, including the risk of fuelling extremist narratives, perceptions of foreign intervention and local grievances that may undermine stability and conflict resolution; underscores that the EU and the United States should intensify joint efforts to support governance and security capacities, prevent radicalisation, fight terrorism and protect religious communities;

Changed:77.89. Is deeply concerned about the tactics deployed by authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Venezuela andCubaand Nicaragua, notably the crackdowns on opposition figures, the restrictions on independent media and the shrinking civic spaces; highlights, in particular, the crackdown on the Catholic Church in Nicaragua; calls on all Latin American countries and the international community to avoid conflicts and cooperate to put diplomatic pressure on these regimes; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to use all necessary available instruments, without the exclusion of any, to ensure compliance with the democratic and human rights clauses of the cooperation agreements with these countries, which could involve their revision;revision, in particular with regard to Cuba, which is additionally a close partner of the regimes in Moscow and Minsk, providing them with political support and contributing negatively to European security, inter alia by facilitating the involvement of hundreds of Cuban mercenaries in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; underlines that such regimes cannot continue to benefit from privileged cooperation with the EU, such as under the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement; expresses deep concern over the erosion of democratic principles and the deliberate circumvention of constitutional safeguards in El Salvador, in particular with regard to the lack of independence of the judiciary and lack of transparency in governmental actions, the excessive use of force, undue militarisation, and the growing restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and the press;

Removed:78. Underlines the increased geostrategic relevance of the Arctic and reiterates the need for a coherent and up-to-date EU Arctic policy; expresses increased concern about Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic and the illegal restrictions on freedom of navigation in the Northern Sea Route; notes with growing unease the elevated Chinese interest in the Arctic and underlines that the EU must seek an appropriate response to this; stresses that the Arctic must remain a zone of peace, stability and constructive cooperation; underlines the need to strengthen regional dialogue and coordination with our Arctic partners, including Norway, the United States and Canada, in order to ensure security, sustainable economic development and resilience to geopolitical and climate-related challenges; highlights the importance of integrating Arctic climate change projections into EU foreign, security and civil protection planning; calls for the mandate and resources of the EU Special Envoy for Arctic Matters to be reinforced to better coordinate policy, monitor developments and engage with Arctic partners; calls for the EU’s and Member States’ activities in the Arctic to contribute to and not harm the well-being and rights of Indigenous communities, as per the 1996 Ottawa Declaration; welcomes any potential initiative by the Government of Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU;

Added:90. Calls attention to previous positions adopted by Parliament and the Council on the political crisis in Venezuela; recalls that the EU has consistently stated that Nicolás Maduro lacked the legitimacy of a democratically elected president and therefore was not recognised as such; expects recent developments to create openings for democratic progress for the Venezuelan people and civil society; stresses, however, that the manner in which political change occurs is of fundamental importance and notes, with grave concern, that the US unilateral military action conducted outside lawful multilateral frameworks raises significant questions under international law and risks undermining the legitimacy and sustainability of a genuine, inclusive and peaceful democratic transition; emphasises that, under all circumstances, the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter – including respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the prohibition of the use of force – must be upheld, noting that permanent members of the UN Security Council have a particular responsibility in this regard; supports a swift, peaceful and Venezuelan-led transition to democracy to stabilise the country and allow for the return of the exiled population; welcomes the beginning of the release of political prisoners as a positive signal; recalls that they have been unjustly detained in inhumane and cruel conditions; demands that all political prisoners and other arbitrarily detained people be released unconditionally; underscores that the EU shares the priority of combating transnational organised crime and drug trafficking, which pose significant security challenges, but stresses that these challenges must be addressed through sustained cooperation in full respect of international law; underlines that the oil and natural resources of Venezuela should be used in a well-administered manner by a new democratically elected Venezuelan government in a way that benefits the Venezuelan people and takes them out of poverty and fosters the country’s sustainable development;

Added:91. Underlines that the Venezuelan people must determine their own future through free and fair elections;

Added:92. Welcomes the positive telephone calls between President Trump and President Petro, and President Trump and President Sheinbaum, as a way towards constructive and diplomatic cooperation;

Added:93. Underlines the increased geostrategic relevance of the Arctic and reiterates the need for a coherent and up-to-date EU Arctic policy; expresses increased concern about Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic and the illegal restrictions on freedom of navigation in the Northern Sea Route; notes with growing unease the elevated Chinese interest in the Arctic and underlines that the EU must seek an appropriate response to this; stresses that the Arctic must remain a zone of peace, stability and constructive cooperation; underlines the need to strengthen regional dialogue and coordination with our Arctic partners, including Norway, the United States and Canada, in order to ensure security, sustainable economic development and resilience to geopolitical and climate-related challenges; highlights the importance of integrating Arctic climate change projections into EU foreign, security and civil protection planning; calls for the mandate and resources of the EU Special Envoy for Arctic Matters to be reinforced to better coordinate policy, monitor developments and engage with Arctic partners; calls for the EU’s and Member States’ activities in the Arctic to contribute to and not harm the well-being and rights of Indigenous communities, as per the 1996 Ottawa Declaration; welcomes any potential initiative by the Government of Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU; calls for the implementation of the EU-Greenland Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2023, with the aim of further strengthening an equal and mutually beneficial partnership; stresses that this cooperation should be underpinned by substantial EU investments in sustainable infrastructure projects across the raw materials value chain, as well as in other areas such as education, creating long-term value for both the EU and Greenland, while supporting Greenland’s own priorities, economic development and the well-being of its people;

Changed:MO. whereas vibrant civil societies worldwide play an essential role in advancing human rights, democracy and pluralism, as well as in promoting good governance and social progress;