What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

R. whereas the principles of the UN are being challenged to an extent never seen before; whereas Parliament has repeatedly called on the international community to defend and strengthen the UN;

S. whereas the multilateral world order has not adequately adapted to the current geopolitical realities; whereas the UN80 Initiative launched by the UN Secretary-General is an indispensable part of the UN reform and would imply ending the veto system in the UN Security Council; whereas the dire financial situation of the UN raises serious concerns; whereas the UN is facing a USD 500 million budget cut and the loss of 20 % of its staff; whereas the UN is facing further significant cuts to its peacekeeping, humanitarian and health agencies following the withdrawal of US financial support; whereas the UN reform process necessitates sufficient financial resources and political support to sustain multilateralism as the basis for global governance;

T. whereas organised crime, particularly drug trafficking, poses a serious threat to the EU’s security; whereas since 2020, the EU has become the world’s largest market for cocaine; whereas this cocaine comes largely from Latin America and enters the EU chiefly through its Atlantic ports;

U. whereas authoritarian regimes, criminal networks and terrorist groups endanger the health and safety of Europeans through illicit drug and human trafficking, which contributes to regional instability and, in certain cases, amounts to the weaponisation of migration;

V. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has seriously undermined European and global security, causing economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices while destabilising the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood; whereas this aggression is part of a broader strategy pursuing an imperialistic and expansionist agenda, which started with the war in Georgia in 2008; whereas the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which Ukraine removed all nuclear weapons from its territory in exchange for security assurances, including from Russia, did not prevent the Russian war of aggression;

W. whereas Russia continues to plunder Ukrainian national heritage; whereas the Russian war of aggression has caused severe and long-lasting damage to the environment in Ukraine; whereas the Russian Federation is conducting intense and deliberate attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure;

X. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, for the war crime of the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children;

Y. whereas the 9 July 2025 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia marks a significant step forward in holding Russia accountable for its war of aggression and the atrocities it has committed in Ukraine;

Z. whereas the accelerated militarisation of China as well as its strategic partnerships with Russia, North Korea and Iran, could jeopardise the stability not only of Indo-Pacific countries, but also of the entire international community; whereas in recent years and in clear breach of UN Security Council resolutions, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with unprecedented frequency, while bolstering its nuclear capabilities in both quality and quantity; whereas the assertive military, political and economic pressure of these authoritarian and dictatorial powers, together with their ongoing and multifaceted assaults on the rules-based international order, constitute some of the most serious security threats to the EU Member States in its history;

AB. whereas the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan has further deteriorated over the past year; whereas all orders issued by the International Court of Justice regarding Nagorno-Karabakh should be implemented, including the order of 17 November 2023 indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who have fled the region;

AC. whereas the EU’s external action is irrevocably tied to the values and principles enshrined in Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU, including the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all Member States, in line with the UN Charter; whereas these principles apply equally to Cyprus; whereas Türkiye’s foreign policy remains at odds with that of the EU; whereas the constructive engagement of Türkiye itself is key for the Cyprus settlement talks to resume and progress within the UN framework;

AD. whereas Türkiye’s military occupation of EU territory in Cyprus continues, as does the threat of force against a Member State;

AE. whereas Türkiye’s violations of Greek airspace and infringements of air traffic regulations within the Athens Flight Information Region are on the rise; whereas violations of Greek territorial waters are also on the rise, while systematic illegal fishing activities are being conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; whereas disputes over search and rescue operations, as well as over NAVTEX-related responsibilities, still persist;

AF. whereas the only viable solution to the Kurdish issue in Türkiye is a just, comprehensive and sustainable settlement;

AG. whereas Egypt is a relevant pillar for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has been underscored by the EU’s decision to grant EUR 4 billion in macro-financial assistance to Egypt for the 2024-2027 period;

AH. whereas in 2024, the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; whereas human rights constitute an essential component of the agreement; whereas the worrying human rights situation in the country signals serious backsliding in this regard, which has increased in the context of the snap elections, as shown, inter alia, by the recent detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov and the proposal to reintroduce the death penalty in the country; whereas the Kyrgyz Government must take concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined by Parliament in its resolution of 9 September 2025; whereas in recent years, the authorities in all five Central Asian countries have clamped down to varying degrees on dissent and have tightened controls over freedom of expression, with the intimidation, harassment and prosecution of critical activists, journalists and members of the LGBTIQ+ community worsening;

AI. whereas the first-ever EU-Central Asia summit from 3 to 4 April 2025 was significant as it marked a strategic turning point in relations between the two regions and the start of a structured dialogue that fully recognises the key role of the Central Asian region as a crossroads between Europe and Asia;

AJ. whereas in its relations with India, the EU should acknowledge the country’s continued strategic engagement with Russia, including its regrettable participation in the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises with Russia and Belarus, while taking into account geopolitical challenges in a way that strengthens the EU’s shared interests with India, enhances security and upholds international law;

AK. whereas it welcomed efforts made by certain Arab states and Israel to normalise diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords; whereas it supports initiatives aimed at building broad regional and international backing for a better future in Arab-Israeli relations;

AL. whereas the EU has a historic opportunity to deepen its alliance with Latin America; whereas the political and cooperation pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement requires the approval of Parliament, the Council and the national parliaments of the Member States; whereas the trade pillar requires the approval of Parliament and the Council only; whereas this approval would mark a geopolitical milestone that reinforces the EU’s global presence and strengthens the multilateral rules-based order; whereas the agreement will set up an institutional framework to foster cooperation in areas such as human rights, sustainable development, the digital economy and combating organised crime; whereas the adoption and implementation of the agreement should improve interregional ties, ripen geopolitical dividends and advance the EU’s strategic interests; whereas the swift signing and ratification of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement underpin the EU’s deepened engagement in and strengthened political ties with Latin America;

AM. whereas the EU’s Arctic policy should encourage sustainable economic development, support Indigenous peoples in preserving their language and culture, ensure the protection of the Arctic ecosystem in the face of the climate crisis and promote resilience in the face of geopolitical challenges posed by non-EU countries; whereas this policy should take into account the justified concerns about increased cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic region; whereas this policy needs to fully integrate the recommendations of the Kiruna Declaration, support increased funding for renewable energy and sustainable waste management in Arctic communities, and build capacity for addressing environmental, economic and social challenges;

AN. whereas Russia’s repeated breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states, together with its obstruction of navigation in the Azov, Black and Baltic Seas, raise serious doubts about the prospects for sustaining peaceful coexistence in the Arctic; whereas Russia is significantly enhancing its Arctic infrastructure and icebreaker fleet, while advancing its strategic ambitions in the region; whereas the Russian Federation is pursuing a strategy to consolidate federal control over natural resources, reinforce territorial claims and attract investment through special economic zone incentives;

AO. whereas a key objective of the CFSP for the Arctic region should be to actively seek full observer or, where possible, participant status for the EU in all relevant Arctic governance bodies where it is not yet represented; whereas this also requires strengthened interoperability between the EU, its Member States and its transatlantic allies in Arctic security, maritime surveillance, search and rescue operations, and the protection of critical infrastructure;

AP. whereas the protection of religious freedom should be consistently integrated into the EU’s external action; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commission should regularly report on religious freedom and the persecution of religious minorities around the world; whereas faith communities and faith-based organisations can play key roles in promoting peace, inter-religious dialogue, conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights;

AQ. whereas the increasing faith-based persecution of religious minorities around the world, including, but not limited to, the persecution of Christians in the world as recently seen in Syria, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nicaragua, underscores the need for greater attention to be given to the persecution of religious minorities; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work with the international community to reverse the alarming trend towards increased religious persecution;

AR. whereas the Global Gateway initiative fosters close partnerships with like-minded countries based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; whereas the effective use of resources is the main priority, concentrating them on a limited number of strategic initiatives, in particular the strengthening of infrastructure, as well as countering concurrent initiatives by non-EU countries; whereas the EU’s fundamental values, including respect for human rights, good governance, democracy, transparency and environmental sustainability, should always guide Global Gateway projects; whereas these projects need to systematically involve civil society and local communities at all stages of project design, implementation and evaluation to ensure that they are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and generate meaningful development outcomes;

AS. whereas the EUR 300 billion budget allocated to this initiative is less than one third of the scale of projects already under way under China’s comparable connectivity- and infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative; whereas the current funding for the EEAS and EU delegations is insufficient to meet their needs given the scale of today’s challenges; whereas cuts to core diplomatic activities increase the risk of mission closures, which would limit the EU’s ability to act as a global player;

AT. whereas preventive diplomacy is a proactive external policy tool for avoiding conflict between parties and for mediating and supporting them in finding peaceful resolutions, including peace mediation and dialogue; whereas the efforts of malign non-EU actors have diminished the influence of the EU around the world; whereas the VP/HR, together with the EEAS, should analyse previous European diplomatic efforts and their outcomes; whereas such an analysis requires a clear understanding of local, historical, cultural and religious contexts, among others; whereas a renewed approach to preventive diplomacy might be needed to ensure that the EU is perceived as a reliable partner at all levels; whereas EU election observation missions play a central role in supporting democracy around the world; whereas parliamentary diplomacy and interparliamentary relations are key tools to achieve the EU’s foreign policy goals in non-EU countries and create ties beyond the governmental level only; whereas under the next multiannual financial framework, the budget allocation for democracy support and election observation should be increased, in particular with a view to deploying such missions to candidate countries;

AU. whereas climate change increasingly acts as a ‘threat multiplier’, leading to the further destabilisation of vulnerable countries and regions, preventable humanitarian crises and additional migratory pressures;

AV. whereas the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) calls for gender equality and the WPS agenda to be maintained as core principles of the EU CFSP; whereas the EEAS and the Commission should maintain the EU’s leading role in championing women’s rights worldwide by thoroughly and ambitiously implementing the Gender Action Plan III; whereas the ‘Leading by example’ pillar under the Gender Action Plan III requires the VP/HR to improve the gender balance in leadership positions within the EEAS;

AW. whereas in recent years, authoritarian and repressive governments, like in Russia, have doubled down on traditionalist gender norms as a means of state legitimisation and sociopolitical control; whereas transnational religious networks and far-right political movements promote anti-LGBTIQ+ polices; whereas these trends erode fundamental rights and pose a direct challenge to the values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, which encompass gender equality and form the foundation of the Union’s foreign policy;

1. Underscores that its resolutions on the implementation of the CFSP are a key component of its contribution to EU foreign policymaking; underlines that these resolutions demonstrate the practical implication of the strengthened right of scrutiny in the area of foreign policy conferred on Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that its 2025 resolution is the second of this nature in this parliamentary term and aims to serve as a guide for the EU executive when setting foreign policy priorities for this term; highlights the fact that, in an ever volatile international environment, the EU needs to simultaneously tackle numerous foreign policy challenges affecting it directly or indirectly, including the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, the rising great power competition, constant attempts to undermine the multilateral rules-based international order and a growing nexus of foreign and internal crises; strongly believes that in order to remain relevant on the international stage, the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU’s own strategic objectives and continues to define, assert and defend its interests worldwide; recalls that the EU’s external action should be guided by the values and principles enshrined in Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU, which inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity; further believes that the CFSP should ensure the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals;

2. Fully shares the concerns raised in the report by the VP/HR and is alarmed by the rapid pace of geopolitical instability driven by the assertive military, political and economic pressures of authoritarian powers and unilateral actors; underlines that from Ukraine to the Caucasus, from the Middle East to the Sahel, the Artic and beyond, an arc of instability has formed around Europe, which exemplifies the radical uncertainty in which the EU is operating; stresses that the current geopolitical context is marked by the accelerating erosion of democratic norms; notes with concern that multilateral organisations have been deeply weakened and the international rules-based order seriously undermined, leading to an environment where competition and protectionism are replacing cooperation and free trade, and where investment, information and migration flows are increasingly being instrumentalised; warns that such fragmentation threatens our strategic interests, security, prosperity and unity; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its democratic values and its interests, which, in turn, necessitates the mobilisation of our regional and global partnerships and alliances;

3. Calls, in this context, on the VP/HR to develop further a forward-looking and more coherent CFSP that:

(a) defends the rules-based international order;

(b) fosters cooperation on shared interests;

(d) establishes clear boundaries and non-negotiable positions; and

(e) increases the visibility and impact of EU action abroad;

and thereby pursues the ambitious objectives and clearly addresses the key geopolitical challenges outlined in the following paragraphs;

Shaping the rules-based international order we defend

4. Recalls that the rules-based international order safeguards state sovereignty and territorial integrity, protects the universal values of human rights, enables peaceful dispute resolution and ensures that power is subject to law rather than force; is alarmed that the rules-based international order is under unprecedented strain from a combination of internal erosion and external assault; warns that its downgrading leads to instability and conflicts worldwide, thereby weakening our own security and prosperity;

5. Underlines that Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a blatant violation of international law and of the UN Charter, as well as an unprecedented attack on the European peace order since the Second World War; recalls that Russia’s aggressions against Ukraine started in 2014; reiterates its firm belief that ultimately Russia’s aggression must fail and Ukraine must prevail, ensuring peace through strength, thereby signalling that force will never prevail over law in order to discourage others from attempting to challenge borders through military means; stresses the urgent need for a long-term and strategic approach towards Moscow and its allies;