What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text

Changed:G.K. whereas Ukraine’s EU accession process constitutes aan important contribution to and path towardtowards peace and prosperity for Ukraine and alsoUkraine, a strategic response to Russia’s aggression,aggression and a credible security guarantee for Ukraine, reinforcing the EU’s geopolitical resilience;

Added:O. whereas in mid-July 2025, the Ukrainian authorities attempted to undermine the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) by adopting Law 12414, granting the Prosecutor General extensive powers to interfere with their investigations; whereas on 31 August 2025, as a result of extensive internal and external pressure, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law 13533 in the aim of at re-establishing the status quo ante, thus taking the necessary measures towards fully restoring the independence of the NABU and SAPO;

Changed:M.R. whereas Ukraine’s democratic institutions have demonstrated adaptability by showcasing that, even amid Russia’s ongoing war of aggression and under martial law, Ukraine remains an institutionally, democratically and economically viable state; whereas, while Ukraine remains at war and is under martial law, elections are legally banned and impractical; whereas Parliament welcomes indications that preparations for elections may begin once martial law has ended; N. whereas progress has been made on public administration reform, but further capacity building, evidence-based policymaking, and improvements to human resources management are still required;

Added:S. whereas progress has been made on public administration reform, but further capacity building, evidence-based policymaking, and improvements to human resources management are still required;

Added:AC. whereas the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has raised serious concerns regarding the deterioration of labour rights in Ukraine, including violations of trade union freedoms and social dialogue; whereas freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike are protected under International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions to which Ukraine is a party, and are key elements of the EU acquis and the Copenhagen criteria;

Changed:1. Condemns in the strongest terms the Russian Federation’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the brave people of Ukraine, whowho, since 2014, have paid the highest price over the past three years in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in protecting Europe and our shared democratic values and principles; expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the fallen heroes and innocent civilian victims of the Russian aggression, including the more than 600 children who have been killed;

Added:2. Strongly condemns Russia’s organised assassinations of prominent Ukrainian public figures and servicemen and its sabotage of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure; expresses horror and outrage at the heinous assassination, on 30 August 2025 in Lviv, of Andriy Parubiy, the former Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, who had demonstrated strong commitment to Ukraine’s European aspirations;

Added:3. Expresses its outrage at the intensified drone and missile attacks carried out by Russia against civilian targets, including the attack on Kyiv on 28 August 2025, when the EU Delegation to Ukraine and the British Council were directly targeted; stresses that the recent attack, as well as all other strikes targeting civilian infrastructure, constitutes a war crime and showcases once again Russia’s blatant disregard for human life, international law, US efforts towards peace and the fundamental principles governing the protection of civilians;

Changed:3.5. Expresses deep concern over the shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included engaging directly with Russia without exerting meaningful pressure, publicly renouncing major leverage, refusing additional and discussing lifting of sanctions, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into making territorial concessions and relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence; stresses that in light of these developments, the EU and its Member States must remain Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and should reinforce their leadership role in supporting Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty, peace and justice; acknowledges that Ukraine’s security represents a crucial part of the EU’s security; notes that EU support to Ukraine has now surpassed that of the United States, underlining the EU’s vital role in sustaining Ukraine’s resilience and recovery;

Added:7. Takes note of the recent meeting between US President Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and stresses that it contrasts blatantly with Russia’s massive escalation of attacks against Ukraine, which prove yet again that Russia is not at all interested in peace, but rather in subjugating Ukraine; underlines that Vladimir Putin is disingenuously engaging with US peace efforts and is merely playing for time in order to continue Russia’s war of aggression; calls on President Trump to act on his announcement that the United States would adopt further resolute economic sanctions against Russia and those countries that are fuelling its war machine; stresses that no durable and just peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without the full participation of Ukraine’s leadership and the support of its people, as well as the participation of the European Union; notes with approval that a meeting took place between President Trump and President Zelenskyy and a number of European leaders on 18 August 2025; reaffirms its steadfast commitment to providing security guarantees and taking all the necessary steps to strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces and defence industry; rejects any Russian claims to be a guarantor of future security arrangements for Ukraine and any attempts to condition the numerical and operational sovereignty of the Ukrainian armed forces;

Removed:11. Underlines that sanctions, alongside the prevention and countering of sanction circumvention, remain crucial instruments to undermine Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression and to neutralise threats posed to European security; calls for the expansion of sanctions targeting the Russian economy, including in the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical, energy and financial sectors; welcomes the adoption of the 17th package of sanctions against the Russian Federation and calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt additional sanctions packages, particularly aimed at tackling the circumvention of existing measures; stresses that strict implementation and enforcement of sanctions are essential to deprive Russia’s war machine of resources and strengthen Ukraine’s resilience; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work to ensure continued US participation in sanctions implementation against Russia in order to maintain the pressure on Russia’s economy and state budget; is of the opinion that sanctions must be extended and continued until Russia ends its war of aggression against Ukraine and pays war reparations;

Added:14. Welcomes the European Court of Human Rights judgement of 9 July 2025 in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, which held Russia responsible for widespread and flagrant abuses of human rights in Ukraine – including the downing of MH17, torture, rape as a weapon of war, summary executions, unlawful and arbitrary detentions, and the organised removal of children to Russia and their adoption there;

Removed:12. Urges an accelerated phasing out of Russian hydrocarbon products in the EU to finally achieve a total ban; reiterates that ending the EU energy dependence on Russia’s hydrocarbons is essential for Europe’s energy security; welcomes the effective implementation of the EU’s full embargo on Russian coal, which has ended the EU’s dependence on Russian coal; recalls the EU embargo on Russian oil but regrets that Hungary and Slovakia have chosen to remain dependent on it and urges them to swiftly end this harmful reliance, where needed, with specific support measures; calls on the Council to sanction all vessels operating within the Russian shadow fleet and contact the flag states to de-list these vessels from their ships register, thereby making them ‘uninsurable’ for insurance companies; urges the increase of efforts to prevent the circumvention of existing sanctions against Russian oil; urges the EU and G7 coalition to lower the price cap on oil to further reduce Russia’s financial capacity to wage war; welcomes the Re-Power EU Plan recently announced by the Commission; urges the Commission, however, to advance the timelines thereof wherever possible and to take where needed interim measures such as lowering the oil price cap and implementing a liquefied natural gas price cap and import quota; strongly rejects calls to resume projects like Nord Stream 1 and 2; deeply regrets that more than three years after the start of the full-scale invasion, the Council has not adopted a full embargo on Russian gas; calls for a swift adoption of such a measure;

Added:15. Underlines that sanctions, alongside the prevention and countering of sanction circumvention, remain crucial instruments to undermine Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression and to neutralise threats posed to European security; calls for the expansion of sanctions targeting the Russian economy, including in the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical, energy and financial sectors; welcomes the adoption of 18 packages of sanctions against the Russian Federation and calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt additional sanctions packages, particularly aimed at tackling the circumvention of existing measures; stresses that strict implementation and enforcement of sanctions are essential to deprive Russia’s war machine of resources and strengthen Ukraine’s resilience; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work to ensure continued US participation in sanctions implementation against Russia in order to maintain the pressure on Russia’s economy and state budget; is of the opinion that sanctions must be extended and continued until Russia ends its war of aggression against Ukraine and pays war reparations;

Added:16. Urges an accelerated phasing out of Russian hydrocarbon products in the EU to finally achieve a total ban; reiterates that ending the EU energy dependence on Russia’s hydrocarbons is essential for Europe’s energy security; welcomes the effective implementation of the EU’s full embargo on Russian coal, which has ended the EU’s dependence on Russian coal; recalls the EU embargo on Russian oil but regrets that the Hungarian Government and the Slovak Government have chosen to remain dependent on it and urges them to swiftly end this harmful reliance, where needed, with specific support measures; calls on the Council to sanction all vessels operating within the Russian shadow fleet and contact the flag states to de-list these vessels from their ships register, thereby making them ‘uninsurable’ for insurance companies; urges the increase of efforts to prevent the circumvention of existing sanctions against Russian oil; urges the EU and G7 coalition to lower the price cap on oil to further reduce Russia’s financial capacity to wage war; welcomes the Re-Power EU Plan recently announced by the Commission; urges the Commission, however, to advance the timelines thereof wherever possible and to take where needed interim measures such as lowering the oil price cap and implementing a liquefied natural gas price cap and import quota; strongly rejects calls to resume projects like Nord Stream 1 and 2; deeply regrets that more than three years after the start of the full-scale invasion, the Council has not adopted a full embargo on Russian gas; calls for a swift adoption of such a measure;

Added:21. Calls on political forces in Ukraine to remain united and continue to be guided by a sense of firm political unity and cohesion, which has proven to amplify Ukraine’s resilience in the face of the ongoing existential threat to the country’s freedom and independence; calls on all political actors in Ukraine, in particular those currently in power, to use their wartime powers to foster political unity and coherent and inclusive policymaking;

Changed:27.32. Encourages Ukraine to safeguard the independence and effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions, including SAPO and NABU, by ensuring transparent appointment procedures, shielding these bodies from political interference, and reinforcing their institutional autonomy; stresses the importance of granting SAPO greater independence from the Prosecutor General’s Office and of equipping NABU with the means for timely access to forensic expertise and autonomous wiretapping capacity to conduct effective investigations; commends Ukraine for increasing the number of staff of SAPO and underlines the need to match this growth with adequate financial and technical resources to ensure operational capacity; encourages Ukraine to consider a structural reform of the State Bureau of Investigations in order to strengthen its independence and effectiveness to prevent it from being abused in the context of post-war political developments in Ukraine, in particular in connection with electoral campaigns;

Added:33. Expresses concern at the failed attempt by the Ukrainian authorities to undermine the independence of the anti-corruption institutions; welcomes the robust opposition by civil society to those unacceptable attempts, which forced the authorities to backtrack; considers this move by the authorities a dangerous attempt to undermine the achievements of a genuine fight against corruption; underscores that – had it been successful – this step would have merely benefited Ukraine’s enemies; stresses that this should serve as a stark reminder to all those in Ukraine who, out of narrow-minded interests, do not shy away from putting the country’s future at risk; reiterates that fighting corruption requires a long-term commitment and comprehensive efforts to establish good governance with well-functioning checks and balances; supports the Commission’s position that these institutions are crucial to Ukraine’s reform agenda and must operate independently to fight corruption and maintain public trust;

Changed:36.42. Recognises the challenges in maintaining pluralistic media in wartime conditions, including market collapse, security constraints and human resource shortages; believes that Ukraine’s vibrant information space and media freedom constitute one of the country’s key strengths in resisting the Russian invasion and its propaganda; calls for the restoration of full nationwide broadcasting for media providers as a matter of policy, firmly rejecting a further slide into political censorship while applying wartime restrictions, as they are necessary;

Changed:49.55. Is deeply concerned about the recent discovery of intelligence-gathering activities by Hungarian security agencies in the south-western Zakarpattia region of Ukraine; expresses regret at Hungary’sthe Hungarian Government’s systematic policies aimed at undermining Ukraine’s self-defence efforts and exploiting issues related to the Hungarian minority in Ukraine for political gain, thereby hindering Ukraine’s progress towards EU integration;

Changed:U.Z. whereas in 2024, the EU purchases of Russian fossil fuels totalled EUR 21.921,9 billion, surpassing the EUR 18.718,7 billion in financial aid provided to Ukraine that same year; whereas since the start of the full-scale invasion, the EU has spent more than EUR 200 billion on Russian fossil fuels, thus contributing to funding Russia’s war chest; whereas the Commission has announced an end to Russian gas imports by 2027; whereas if the EU continues importing Russian energy at the rate it did in 2024, it would pay an additional EUR 57.457,4 billion to Russia before the end of 2027;