Changes between two versions
What changed between the plenary report and the adopted text
AI:What changed, in short
Adds provisions to prioritize European bidders and EU added value in public procurement, including new recitals and paragraphs on strategic independence and reciprocity.147 Extends the scope of best price-quality ratio to intellectual and engineering services, and requires industrial partnerships for strategic projects.69 Expands the impact assessment to cover Article 15 of Directive 2014/24/EU and adds emphasis on lot division for engineering services.810 Strengthens language on preventing social dumping and preserving economic sovereignty in the call to the Commission.3 The other changes are formal or wording: recital renumbering, reference update, and rephrasing of paragraph 24.25
8 changes of substance · 1 formal · 1 of wording only
Written by AI from the two texts only · read the changes before relying on it · 4 Sept 2026 · Report a problem
+9 added · −22 removed · 8 changed paragraphs, packaging included.
Part 1 of 4: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
Removed:MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
Added:P10_TA(2025)0174
Changed:on publicPublic procurement
Removed:(2024/2103(INI))
Added:Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Added:PE767.975
Added:European Parliament resolution of 9 September 2025 on public procurement (2024/2103(INI))
21 unchanged paragraphs
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 3(3) thereof,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 114, 151 and 156 thereof,
– having regard to Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC,
– having regard to Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC,
– having regard to Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts (Remedies Directive),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries (International Procurement Instrument – IPI),
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (the European Accessibility Act) and Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of the websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies (the Web Accessibility Directive),
– having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 30 January 2020 in Case C-395/18, Tim SpA – Direzione e coordinamento Vivendi SA v Consip SpA, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze,
– having regard to the recent judgments of the CJEU on the participation of foreign bidders in EU public procurement procedures, namely the judgments of 22 October 2024 in Case C-652/22, Kolin Inşaat Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret AȘ v Državna komisija za kontrolu postupaka javne nabave and of 13 March 2025 in Case C-266/22, CRRC Qingdao Sifang Co. Ltd, Astra Vagoane Călători SA v Autoritatea pentru Reformă Feroviară, Alstom Ferroviaria SpA,
– having regard to the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement 2012,
– having regard to the Commission work programme 2025 of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 June 2024 entitled ‘2024 European Semester – Spring Package’ (COM(2024)0600),
– having regard to the Commission report entitled ‘SME needs analysis in Public Procurement’ (2021),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ (COM(2021)0778),
– having regard to International Labour Organization convention C94 of 1949 on Labour Clauses (Public Contracts),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 October 2017 entitled ‘Making Public Procurement work in and for Europe’ (COM(2017)0572),
– having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 4 December 2024 entitled ‘Shock-proofing European regions: Strengthening local and regional economic resilience in the strategic evolution of the Single Market’,
– having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ Special report 28/2023 of 4 December 2023 entitled ‘Public procurement in the EU. Less competition for contracts awarded for works, goods and services in the 10 years up to 2021’ (ECA Special Report),
Changed:– having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 May 2024 on the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No. 28/2023 entitled ‘Improve a fair and effective competition for EU public procurement contracts awarded for works, goods, and services’,
23 unchanged paragraphs
– having regard to its resolution of 16 December 2020 on a new strategy for European SMEs,
– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on the state of the SME Union,
– having regard to the Commission report of 20 May 2021 entitled ‘Implementation and best practices of national procurement policies in the Internal Market’ (COM(2021)0245),
– having regard to the Parliament study of 24 October 2023 entitled ‘The social impact of public procurement – Can the EU do more?’,
– having regard to the European Labour Authority report of May 2024 ‘Evaluating policy responses to prevent undeclared work in public procurement contracts’,
– having regard to the reports by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report) and by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’ (Letta report),
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A10-0147/2025),
A. whereas public procurement represents approximately 14 % of the EU’s gross domestic product and serves as an important instrument for economic growth, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), innovation, sustainability and social cohesion, as well as for promoting local industry and quality jobs in the EU and for supporting the transition towards resilient supply chains and business models, including in subcontracting chains;
B. whereas local and regional governments, as the largest investors and contracting authorities in the EU, are increasingly constrained by stringent EU and national rules, complex legal requirements and procedures and disproportionate administrative burdens, while simultaneously facing a persistent shortage of financial resources, qualified personnel and technical expertise – particularly at the level of municipalities and smaller regions – which frequently necessitates the outsourcing of core tasks to external entities, thereby generating additional financial strain and procedural delays;
C. whereas public procurement can drive spillover effects that increase the demand for sustainable goods and services across the whole market, as well as support the creation of a lead market;
D. whereas the 2014 reform aimed to simplify procedures, enhance transparency and the fight against corruption, promote the participation of SMEs and innovative start-ups and integrate strategic procurement objectives through a voluntary approach, yet challenges remain in transparency, efficiency, the broader use and alignment of non-price criteria, access to data and streamlining enforcement, as well as the prevention of fraud and corruption;
E. whereas the 2014 reform introduced the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criteria to incentivise the use of qualitative criteria such as environmental and social considerations in awarding public contracts; whereas the ECA Special Report noted that a large share of contracts were still being awarded on the sole basis of the lowest-price criterion in 2021; whereas 20 Member States awarded more than 50 % of their public tenders based on price alone in 2023, of which 10 Member States awarded more than 80 % of their public tenders based on price alone;
F. whereas the ECA Special Report concluded that the level of competition for public contracts had decreased since 2014, and that in the majority of Member States the incidence of this award criterion based on lowest price had even increased over the period under review;
G. whereas the EU procurement thresholds for supplies, services and construction works have remained virtually unchanged since 1994; whereas these thresholds, which are adjusted to market prices, are continuously decreasing in real terms; whereas, as a result, an increasing number of smaller contracts must now be tendered at EU level through procedures that are often lengthy and complex;
H. whereas the European Labour Authority (ELA) found that ‘when the lowest price is used as the only selection criteria, the risk of undeclared work increases due to the pressure on labour costs’; whereas the ELA also noted that ‘It is widely acknowledged that prioritising the lowest price criterion in public procurement may create an environment where labour law violations are more likely to occur due to cost-cutting pressures and inadequate oversight; the lowest price criterion may incentivise contractors to operate in the undeclared economy to reduce costs, and bypassing labour regulations’;
I. whereas the Commission’s final report entitled ‘SME needs analysis in public procurement’ points out that public procurement practices still need to be clarified, simplified and standardised, while taking into account the specificities and differing administrative systems of the Member States;
J. whereas direct cross-border procurements remain limited to just 5 % of all procurement contracts, indicating that barriers to cross-border competition and market access and complex procedures persist; whereas this figure does not take into account the participation of other Member State subsidiaries in the country where the procurement procedure takes place;
K. whereas the Commission highlights several legal uncertainties in promoting socially responsible and innovative public procurement; whereas these legal uncertainties include, among others, difficulties in connecting social considerations to the subject matter of a contract;
L. whereas the Commission President has committed to a revision of the public procurement framework with a view to enabling ‘preference to be given to European products in public procurement for certain strategic sectors’;
M. whereas the revision of public procurement directives should focus on encouraging qualitative criteria, streamlining procurement procedures and ensuring best value for taxpayers’ money; whereas, nevertheless, public procurement rules must take into account the specific nature of different sectors and industries and the specific goals of contracting authorities, recognising that a uniform approach to regulatory measures, such as payment terms, may not be suitable for all sectors, and that tailored provisions in sector-specific regulations are necessary to ensure that the overall procurement frameworks align with industry-specific operational and financial realities; whereas winning tenders should be chosen in accordance with what the individual contracting authority considers to be the economically best solution among those submitted in order to encourage greater quality orientation and flexibility in public procurement;
N. whereas public procurement remains a neutral and procedural tool, regulating how public authorities buy goods and services, and not what they buy;
Change 1
Added:O. whereas considering the challenges related to European industrial sovereignty and the need to preserve and strengthen European jobs and know-how, public procurement should be used as a major strategic lever to promote the creation of added value within the EU, thereby enhancing industrial resilience and the sustainability of European supply chains;
Added:P. whereas contracting authorities in the EU should be allowed to give preference to bids that include a significant proportion of added value produced within the EU;
4 unchanged paragraphs
Q. whereas the use of sustainability criteria can contribute to achieving the EU’s environmental goals, provided that such criteria are clearly defined, proportionate, and do not restrict contracting authorities in meeting their actual procurement needs;
R. whereas contracting authorities operate in diverse local and market contexts and must retain the freedom to define the subject, scope and strategic priorities of procurement in line with their actual needs and capacities; whereas the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity must be safeguarded in any EU-level approach to sustainable procurement;
S. whereas it is necessary to bolster trust in public procurement; whereas a lack of transparency and fairness in procurement procedures, including concerns over favouritism, unclear selection criteria, insufficient oversight mechanisms and insufficient exclusion and sanctioning, undermines trust in public contracting and creates opportunities for corruption; whereas the over-reliance on the lowest price criterion may in some cases exert downward pressure on the quality of services and safety and working conditions and may have a detrimental long-term economic impact on procuring authorities; whereas there have been cases of contracts being awarded in the absence of actual competition and with opacity and a lack of effective external control in the selection criteria, highlighting the urgent need to strengthen the principles of transparency, equality and legality at all stages of public procurement procedures;
T. whereas European businesses, particularly SMEs, encounter significant difficulties in accessing international public procurement markets due to protectionist policies in non-EU countries, while the EU maintains one of the most open procurement markets globally, leading to unfair competitive disadvantages for EU companies; whereas, in addition to protectionist policies, fair competition is often distorted by product subsidisation on the part of governments of non-EU countries, discriminatory measures and a lack of reciprocity and legal certainty;
Change 2
Changed:S.U. whereas the EU has recently added the International Procurement Instrument and Foreign Subsidies Regulation to its trade defence toolbox to promote reciprocity in access to international public procurement markets and to ensure a level playing field for EU companies and products; whereas environmental, social, labour and due diligence requirements would apply to the economic operators of non-EU countries in accordance with Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU, 2014/25/EU and (EU) 2024/1760 and other EU legislation;
V. whereas the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement 2012 has not yet been signed by all WTO members and its latest version does not include, among other things, the global labour and environmental standards adopted since its conclusion, nor an updated inflation adjustment mechanism;